A TREATISE OF THE PASSIONS AND FACULTIES Of the Soul of Man.

With the severall Dignities and Corruptions thereunto belonging.

By EDWARD REYNOLDS, late Preacher to the honorable Society of *Lincoln's Inne*: And now Rector of the Church of *Braunston* in *Northamptonshire*.

Juvenal. Sat. 1.

Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ira Voluptas,
Gaudia, Discursus, *nostri est farrago Libelli.*

LONDON:
Printed by *F. N.* for *Robert Bostock* dwelling in *Pauls* Church-yard, at the Signe of the *Kings Head.* 1650.

THALIS'S
PASSIONS
PACQUELIBS
Dithyrambical Mix
With the Several Digressions and
Conjurations thereunto belonging.

LONDON:
Printed by E.W. for Steven Boyfack dwelling
in Paul's Church-yard, at the Signe of
the King's Head. 1650.

TO

HER HIGHNESSE

THE PRINCESSE

ELISABETH,

PRINCESSE PALATINE OF THE RHINE, DUTCHES OF BAVARIA, &c. AND ELDEST Daughter to her Majestie the Queen of BOHEMIA.

May it please your Highnesse;

WHat the great Philosopher hath observed of Mens Bodies, is, upon so much stronger Reasons, true of their Minds, by how much our Intellectuall Maturity is more lingring, and sluggish then our Naturall, That the too Early Conceptions and Issues of them do usually prove but weak, *Aristot. polit. lib. 7. cap. 16.*

and unusefull. And we shall seldom find, but that those venturous Blossoms, whose over-hastie obedience to the early Spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do afterwards for their former boldnesse suffer from the injury of severer weather, except at least some happy shelter, or more benigne influence redeeme them from danger. The like Infelicitie I finde my selfe obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what disposition of minde, whether out of love of Learning (for * Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things easier then they are) or whether out of a Resolution to take some account from my self of those few yeers wherein I had then been planted in the happiest of all soils, the Schools of Learning; whether upon these, or any other Inducements, so it hath happened, that I long since have taken boldnesse in the Minoritie of my Studies to write this ensuing Treatise: That before I adventured on the endeavour of knowing other things,

*Amorem dixit Plato Πειρητικὸν. Cael. Rhodig. li. 16. ca. 15.

things, I might first try whether I knew my self; Lest I should justly incurre the Censure, which that * sowre Philosopher past upon Grammarians; That they were better acquainted with the evils of *Vlysses*, then with their own. This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, It happened by some accident to be like *Moses* in his Infancy, exposed to the seas. Where I made no other account, but that its own weaknesse would there have revenged my former boldnesse, and betrayed it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicitie to light on the view, and fall under the compassion of a verie Gracious Princesse. For so farre hath your Highnesse vouchsafed (having happened on the sight of this Tractate) to expresse favour thereunto, as not onely to spend hours in it, and require a Transcript of it, but further to recommend it by your Gracious judgement unto publick view. In which particular I was not to advise with mine owne Opinion, being

*Diogenes apud Laertium, l. 6.

being to expresse my humblest acknowledgement to your Highnesse.

This only Petition I shall accompany it withall unto your Highnesse feet, That since it is a Blossome which put forth so much too soon, it may therefore obtain the gracious Influence of your Highnesse favour, to protect it from that severity abroad which it otherwise justly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highnesse as great a Mirrour of his continuall Mercies, as he hath both of his Graces and of Learning.

Your Highnesse

most humble Servant,

EDWARD REYNOLDES.

A PREFACE
To the READER.

HAving been moved to give way unto the publication of this Phyloſophicall Miſcellany, the Fruit of my younger Studies, I conceive it needfull to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply ſeeme undecent in me, having adventured to publiſh ſome few, though weak Diſcourſes in Argument Divine, that I ſhould now ſuffer the Bloſſoms of my youth to look abroad, and run the hazard of publick Cenſure. Whereunto when I ſhall have given a ſhort anſwer, I ſhall reſt ſomething the more confident of a candid conſtruction.

And here I might firſt alledge the honour which God himſelf hath been pleaſed to give unto Inferiour and Naturall knowledge. In the firſt Creation, when he gave unto man the Dominion over other Creatures for his uſe, he gave him likewiſe the contemplation and knowledge of them, for his Makers Glory, and his own Delight (for God brought them unto him to give them Names). And as the holy Scriptures are all over full of the Myſteries of Gods Wiſdome in Naturall things, ſo in them are ſome ſpeciall Paſſages thereof written as to the very purpoſe in that Argument.

a Job cap. 38. 39, 40, 41. Pſal. 104. 147.

And

And we finde that Moses *and* Solomon *have therein testimonie given unto them, not onely of their Divine, but of their Humane and naturall knowledge likewise.*

And if we look into the Ancient Christian Churches, or into these of later times, we shall finde that very many Ecclesiasticall persons have not denyed unto the world, their Philosophicall and Poeticall labours, either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to Theologicall Ends, as we finde in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Cæsariensis, *Saint* Austins *Books* De Civitate Dei, *and others,* Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis, Sydonius, Apollinaris, Honorius Augustodunensis, &c. *In the* Hexamerons *of Saint* Basil, Nyssen, Ambrose, *and the Books of those who have written more directly upon some parts of the Argument of this present Treatise, as* Gregory Nyssen, Lactantius, Nemesius, Procopius, Gazæus, Damascen, *and others. And in later times, besides the Schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side, in Dialecticall, Physicall, and Metaphysicall writings: we might instance in very many of the Reformed Churches abroad, some of whose younger labours have seen the Light: as also in Oratory, Logicall, Morall, Historicall, Mathematicall, Miscellanious writings of many learned Divines of our own Church: under the Protection of which great Examples I shall use the Apologie which* Quintilian [b] *dictateth unto mee,* Vel Error honestus est magnos Duces sequentibus: *That it is no unromanly, but a pardonable Errour, which hath great*

[b] Lib. 1. cap. 6.

Exam-

Examples to excuse it. In which respect I finde my selfe chiefly subject to this Infelicity, that I am constrained to follow such Examples, as little children do their Fathers, Non æquis passibus, at a very great distance.

And truly, when I again consider the excellent use and subordination of humane learning unto learning Divine (it being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy Scripture, depending upon the propriety of words and Idiomes, or upon the customs, Rites, Proverbs, Forms, usages, Laws, Offices, Antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Romane Monarchies, as might be shewed in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able learned Pen:) when I consider that the [a] spoils of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and [a] the spoils of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the Temple: That a [b] Gentile by legall purification and Marriage, might become an Israelite: That the [c] Crown of Rabbah was put upon the head of David, and the [d] Sword of Goliah used to slay himself: That the [e] Gold and Myrrh, and Frankincense of the wisemen of the East, was offered unto Christ: when I finde the [f] Apostle convincing the Jews, out of their Law, and the Philosophers out of their Maximes. And that [g] every gift, as well as every creature of God is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of Man; I then conclude with my self, That this Morall and Philosophicall Glasse of the humane Soul may be of some service even unto the Tabernacle, as the [h] Looking glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the Altar.

[a] Exod. 12.35. [b] Deut. 21.12. [c] 2 Sam. 12.30. [d] 1 Sam. 17.51. [e] Mat. 2.11. [f] Act. 3.4. 17.23. 19. [g] Gen. 1.31. 1 Tim. 4.4. [h] Ex. 38.8

c Est quidem de communibus sensibus sapere in Deitatibus, sed in Test. animam veri, non in Adjutorium falsi. Tert. de Resurrectione, c. 3. vid. etiam Apol. ca. 47. & Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 1. p. 203. A. 207. A. E. 214. A. B. 218. 219. 223. 227. 233. 234. & l. 6. p. 465. 467. 469. 500. Justin Martyr. Apol. 1. Aug. Conf. l. 1. c. 13. Christianus Domini sui esse intelligit, ubicunque invenerit veritatem. Aug. de Doct. Chr. l. 2 c. 18. 39. 40.

Ὅσα παρ' ἑκάστοις εὖ εἰρημένα ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τῶν χριστιανῶν ἐστίν. Justin. Apol. 1. Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 52. Greg. Nazian. Orat. 1.

Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of Saint [c] Hierom, who conceiving himself in a vision beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular Authors. Though I finde [d] himself both justifying the excellent use of that kind of Learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have beene but a Dreame.

It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the too great aptnesse in the minds of men to surfeit, and be intemperate in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading [a] of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulnesse, in our studies, not for negligence; for the Apostle will tell us, That to the pure all things are pure. And even of hurtfull things when they are prepared, and their malignancy by Art corrected; doth the skilfull Physitian make an excellent use. If then we be carefull to Moderate, and Regulate our Affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel, salvation might be found, in the way of Paganisme; if we suffer not these leane Kine to devour the fat ones, nor the River Jordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I mean Piety to be swallowed up of prophane Studies, and the knowledge of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kinde of Learning with much greater Felicity, and successe) to be undervalued, and not rather, the more admired, as a rich Jewell compared with Glasses. In this case and

c De Custod. Virginit. ad Eustochium.

d Epist. ad Magn. Orat. Ep. ad Pammarch. de Obitu Paulinæ. Apolog. advers. Ruffin. l. 1.

a Vid. Not. in Coerbr. Rittershusii in Synes. Petus. ep. 56. l. 1 Tertul. de præscript. c. 7. de Idololat. c. 10. contr. Marc. l. 2. c. 16.

and with such care as this, there is no doubt, but secular Studies prepared and corrected from Pilue and Trophanesse, may be to the Church, as the Gibeonites were to the Congregation of Israel, for Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water; otherwise we may say of them as Cato Major *to his Son, of the Græcian Arts and learning,* b Quandocunque ista Gens suas literas dabit, omnia corrumpet.

b *Plin. l. 29. c. 1 Vid. notas Xilandri in Plutarch. Catonem. Sect. 13.*

Nor have I upon these Considerations onely adventured on the publication of this Treatise, but because withall, in the reviewing of it, I found very many Touches upon Theological Arguments, and some passages wholly of that Nature. Yea, all the Material parts of the Treatise do so nearly concern the knowledge of our selves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed Borderers upon that Profession.

In the perusing and fashioning of it for the Presse, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building. That it is almost as chargeable to repair, and set right an old house, as to erect a new one. For I was willing in the most material parts of it, so to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to supply the defects of Matter, as that with candid, favourable, and ingenuous Judgements, it might receive some tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I rest,

Thine in all Christian service,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.

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A TREATISE
of the Passions and Faculties of the SOULE of MAN.

CHAP. I.
Of the dependance of the Soule, in her operations upon the Body.

IT hath beene a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually wee are more curious in our inquiries after things New than excellent; and that the very nearnesse of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknown. Thus like Children, with an idle diligence, and fruitlesse Curiosity, wee turn over this great Book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary

Cic. de Div. l. 2. Plin. lib. 2. ep. 20.

Characters, wherein is expreſt the greateſt power of the Worker, and excellency of the Work; fixing our Admiration onely on thoſe Pictures and unuſuall Novelties, which though for their rareneſſe they are more ſtrange, yet for their nature are leſſe worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor ſtrikes more wonder into the beholder, than thoſe glorious Lamps of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowledged a Divineneſſe. Let a Childe bee borne but with ſix fingers, or have a part more than uſuall, wee rather wonder at One ſuperfluous, than at All naturall. *Sol ſpectatorem niſi cum deficit non habet, nemo obſervat Lunam niſi laborantem, adeò naturale eſt magis nova, quàm magna mirari*: None looketh with wonder on the Sunne, but in an Eclipſe; no eye gazeth on the Moone, but in her Travell: ſo naturall it is with men, to admire rather things New than Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for ſtudy and obſervation, though never ſo common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and uſefulneſſe of their knowledge. In which reſpect, the plaine Counſell of the Oracle was one of the wiſeſt which was ever given to man, To ſtudy and to know himſelfe; becauſe, by reaſon of his own neareneſſe to himſelfe, he is uſually of himſelfe moſt unknown and neglected. And yet if wee conſider, how in him it hath pleaſed God to ſtamp a more notable Character of his own Image, and to make him, amongſt all his Works, one of the moſt perfect Models of created

Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2.

Sen. qu. Nat. lib. 7. c. 1.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 6. c. 23.

ted excellency, wee cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the leaſt, yet of the fitteſt Volumes, in this great varietie of Nature to be acquainted withall. Intending therefore, according to my weakneſſe, to take ſome view of the inſide, aud more noble Characters of this Book, it will not bee needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover, to inſiſt on the materials or ſenſitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his Anatomy: though even in that reſpect the Pſalmiſt tells us, that he is fearefully and wonderfully made: for wee commonly ſee, that as moſt kindes of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility; ſo, many ſorts of beaſts have a greater activity and exquiſiteneſſe in their ſenſes than wee. And the reaſon hereof is, becauſe Nature ayming at a ſupeirour and more excellent end, is in thoſe lower faculties leſſe intent and elaborate. It ſhall ſuffice therefore, onely to lay a ground-work in theſe lower faculties, for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever ſome connexion and dependance on them. For whereas the principall acts of mans Soule are either of Reaſon and Diſcourſe, proceeding from his Underſtanding; or of Action and Morality, from his Will; both theſe, in the preſent condition of mans eſtate, have their dependance on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one precede, in the other follow: To the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey; to the other as Meſſengers, to perform and execute: To the one,

Sen. Ep. 76.

the whole Body is as an Eye, through which it seeth; to the other a Hand, by which it worketh.

Concerning the ministry therefore of the Body unto the Soule, wee shall thus resolve; That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinary and naturall operations, upon the happie or disordered temperature of those vitall Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these Ministeriall parts have not any over ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soule: Whence wee finde, that sundry diseases of the Body doe oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde. For, as whereseever there is a locomotive faculty, though there bee the principall cause of all motion and activitie; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinewes be dis-joynted, shrunk, or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actuall motion: Or as in the Body Politique, the Prince (whom *Seneca* calleth the Soule of the Common-wealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelitie or negligence of those instruments, whom *Xenophon* termeth the Eyes and Eares of Kings: In like manner, the Soule of man being not an absolute independant worker, but receiving all her objects

Solinus de quodam refert quod accepto vulnere in occipitio ad tantam devenit ignorantiam ut nesciret se habuisse nomen. Honorius Augustodunensis de Philosoph. Mundi, lib. 4. c. 24.

Sen. de Clem. lib. 1. cap. 4.

Xenop. Cyrop. lib. 8. & Arist. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 12.

objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which *Cicero* calleth the Messengers to the Soule, if they out of any indisposition shall be weakned, the Soule must continue like a *Rasa Tabula*, without any acquired or introduced habits. The Soule hath not immediately from it selfe that strange weaknesse, which is observed in many men, but onely as it is disabled by Earthy and sluggish Organs; which being out of order, are more burthensome than serviceable thereunto.

There are observable in the Soules of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequalitie of operation: the former of these I doe not so ascribe to that bodily weaknesse, whereby the Soule is any way oppresst, as if I conceived no internall darknesse in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man working in him a generall corruption, did amongst the rest infatuate the Minde, and as it were smother the Soule with ignorance; so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments, is only a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of mens understandings in their severall operations, notwithstanding it bee questioned in the Schooles, Whether the Soules of men have not originally, in their Nature, degrees of perfection and weaknesse, whence these severall degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheless that being granted, I suppose, that principally it pro-

ceeds from the variety, tempers, and disposi-
tions in the instrumentall faculties of the Body;
by the help whereof, the Soule in this estate
worketh: for I cannot perceive it possible, that
there should have been, if man had continued
in his Innocency, (wherein our Bodies should
have had an exact constitution, free from those
distempers to which now by sinne they are lya-
ble) such remarkable differences betweene mens
apprehensions, as wee now see there are: for there
should have been in all men a great facility to
apprehend the mysteries of Nature, and to ac-
quire knowledge (as wee see in *Adam*) which
now wee finde in a large measure granted to
some, and to others quite denyed. And yet in
that perfect estate (according to the opinion of
those who now maintaine it) there would have
beene found a substantiall and internall inequa-
lity amongst the Soules of men: and therefore
principally this variety comes from the sundry
constitutions of mens bodies; in some, yeel-
ding enablement, for quickneſse of Apprehensi-
on; in others, pressing downe and intangling
the Understanding; in some, disposing the
Minde unto one object; in some, unto ano-
ther; according as the *impetus* and force of their
naturall affections carryeth them. And there-
fore *Aristotle* in his *Politiques* ascribeth the in-
equality which hee observes betweene the *Asia-
tique* and *European* Wits, unto the severall Cli
mates and temperature of the Regions in which
they lived; according whereunto, the Complexi-
ons

Arist. Pol. lib. 7.

ons and Conſtitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd; the Soule being in it ſelfe, according to the ſame Philoſopher, impaſſible from any corporall Agent. And to the ſame purpoſe againe hee ſaith, That if an old man had a young mans eye, his ſight would bee as ſharp and as diſtinct as a young mans is; implying the diverſity of Perception to bee grounded onely on the diverſity of bodily inſtruments, by which it is exerciſed. And therefore he elſewhere obſerves (I ſhall not trouble my ſelfe to examine upon what ground) that men of ſoft and tender skins have greateſt quickneſſe of wit; and on the contrary, *Duri Carne, inepti mente:* thereby intimating, that there is no more ſignificant and lively expreſſion of a vigorous or heavie Soule, than a happie, or ill-ordered Body; wherein wee may ſundry times reade the abilities of the Minde, and the inclinations of the Will: So then it is manifeſt, that this weakneſſe of apprehenſion in the Soules of men, doth not come from any immediate and proper darkneſſe belonging unto them; but onely from the coexiſtence which they have with a Body ill-diſpoſed for aſſiſtance and information. For hee who is carryed in a Coach (as the Body is *vehiculum animæ*) though he bee of himſelfe more nimble and active, muſt yet receive ſuch motion as that affoords; and Water which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts, though its motion by it ſelfe would have beene otherwiſe, muſt yet then bee limited by the poſture and

Ariſt. de Anima lib. 3.

De Anima, lib. 2.

and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.

CHAP. II.

In what Cases the dependence of the Soule on the Body, is lessened by Faith, Custome, Education, Occasion.

BUt yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the Soule bee in some cases vindicated from the impression of the Body: And this first, in extraordinary; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the Soule, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others; wherein the Soule is carryed beyond the Sphere of Sense, and transported unto more raysed operations: For to believe and know, that there are layd up for pious and holy endeavours *those joyes which eye hath not seene, nor eare heard*, and to have some glimpse and fore-taste of them, which Saint *Paul* calleth the *Earnest, and first fruits of the Spirit*; What is this, but to leave sense behind us, and to out-run

our

our bodies? And therefore it is that *Evangelicall Mysteries* were not at the first urged by disputes of Secular learning, but were sacredly infused, not perswading by fleshly *wisdome*, but by a spirituall and *heavenly call* drawing to the beliefe of them. *Evangelicall truths* doe as much transcend the *Naturall Reason*, as *spirituall goodness* doth the *Naturall will* of Man. That one *Nature* should be in *three Persons*, and *two Natures* in *One Person*: That the *Invisible God* should be *manifest in the flesh*, and a *pure Virgin* bring forth a *sonne*. These are Mysteries above the reach of humane, yea, even of [a] Angelicall disquisition. [b] *Sarah* laughed when *Abraham* believed, and [c] *Reason* expected that the Apostles should have fallen down dead, when *Faith* shook the Viper into the fire.

There is a great difference between the manner of yeelding our Assent unto *naturall* and *supernaturall* verities. The *principles* of the one are *engraffed*, and suitable to the native Seedes, and originall notions of *Reason Naturall*. But the principles of the other are *Revealed*, and without such Revelation could never have beene sifted out by our Implanted light, or by any humane disquisition beene discovered. For the *Gospel* being a *supernaturall Science*, the principles thereof must needs transcend the reach of *Naturall faculties*, till raised and enabled by *Divine Grace*. And then indeed *Reason* is an excellent *Instrument* to *use* those principles of *faith* unto our further proficiency in sacred *Knowledge*, which, without Divine *Revelation* proposing the *Object*, and

1 Cor. 2. 4, 5. 6. —14. Heb. 3. 1. Δεῖ δὲ πρῶτος τὰς τῆς ἐκκλησίας τροφίμους μὴ λογισμοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πιστεύειν τὰ θεῖα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον μετὰ τῆς διδασκαλίας τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν λόγων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔφεσιν.

a Eph. 3. 10. *Vid. Greg. Nyssen. Homil. 8. in Cantic. & Sixt. Senens. Biblioth. lib. 6. Annot. 165. & 299.*

b Gen. 18. 12.

c Act 28. 5. 6. *Vbi ad profunditatem Sacramentorum perventum est, omnis Platonicorum caligavit subtilitas. Cyprian. de spirito vid et am. August Enchirid. c. 4.*

Divine *Grace* disposing the *Faculty*, it could never have either known or used.

And from hence I suppose did arise that usuall calumny of the Philosophers against the Christians, that they taught their followers nothing but an illiterate and naked *Belief*. Though indeed, the *Revelation* of Divine Mysteries, and the *Grace* of God being presupposed, there is no such heigth of rationall Evidence and Demonstration in all the writings of Philosophers as in the Gospel.

But to return, this freedome from bodily Restraint, have according to the Schoolmen, those *Raptures* and *Extasies*, which raise and ravish the Soule with the sweetnesse of extraordinary contemplations, wherein a man is as it were carryed *out of himselfe*, and transported [a] *Extra connaturalem Apprehensionem*, beyond the usuall bounds of sense and common Apprehension.

Now for the Exemption of the more ordinary Actions of the Soule from the Predominancy of the *Body*, It is chiefly wrought by these three meanes *Education*, *Custome*, and *Occasion*. For the Rule of [b] *Aristotle* though in Agents purely *Naturall* it hold true, yet in *Voluntary* Agents it is not constant, That things which proceed from *Nature* are unalterable by *Custome*. For we may usually observe that the Culture of the Minde as of the [c] Earth doth deliver it from the barrennesse of it's own Nature.

And therefore when [d] *Zopyrus* the Physiognomist did [e] conjecture of the disposition of

Socrates

Greg. Na. 2. Orat 3. Euseb. de præparat. Evang. lib. 1. c. 1. 3. Theodoret. Serm. 1. Therapeut. 1 Cor. 2. 7.

a Aquin. 12. qu. 2. Art. 3. & 22. qu. 175. art. 1. 4.

b Ethic lib. 2. c. 1 & l. 10. c. 9

c Τὴ μὲν κακὴ τυχοῦσα κρεῖττον θεόδεν ἀνεμάχλω φέρει. Eurip Hecub. Exercetq; fvequens tellurem atque imimperat arvis Virgil.

d Maxim. Tyrius dissert. 12.

e Euseb. de præp. Evang. l. 6. c. 9. Theodoret. Ser. 4. Cic. Tuscul. qu. l. 4 in finem & l. de fato.

Socrates contrary to that which men believed of him, and thereupon was derided as an ignorant pretender, *Socrates* himselfe did acquit the man from that Imputation, confessing that he had rightly judged of his naturall inclinations, which onely the study of Philosophy had alter'd and over-ruled.

Thus as Hard Bones being steeped in Vinegar and Ashes (as [a] *Plutarch* notes) doe lose their Nature, and grow so soft, that they may bee cut with a thred; So [b] the toughest, and most unbended Natures by early and prudent discipline may be much Rectified, though still indeed, like Simples of a strong and predominant relliſh in a compounded Medicine, they will give a tincture to all other super-induced qualities.

Socrates himselfe, notwithstanding the great mastery which he professed to have gotten over the vicious propensions of his Nature, could not yet alwayes bee so faithfull to his morall principles, as not to relapse, and betray the looseness of his disposition. And that not onely in Anger and Passions charged upon him by his best friends [c] *Aristoxenus* and *Porphyrius*. But also in unnaturall obscenities, the usuall sinne (as the [d] Apostle notes, and as [e] *Plutarch* confesseth) even of their great Philosophers. Whence that of the Poet.

Now for *Occasion* that alters the naturall *Inclination* of the *Will* and *Affections*. For so we see that the Bias of mens Desires are often turned, by reason of some sudden emergent Occurrences,

a Plut. l. an vitiositas ad felicitatem sufficiat.

b Παραπλησία ἡ φύσει διδασκαλία. Democrit. apud Theodoret. Serm. 4. Therapeut. Διαφέρειν τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματείων μαθήσεις. Diog. Laert. l. 7. Ἡ χρημάτων δοῦλος ἔστιν ἢ τύχης, ἢ πλήθους αὐλὸν φόλεως, ἢ νοσεῖν γράφει ἐργῶν χρῆσις μὴ χὶ γνώμαν τρόπωσις. Eurip. Hecub. 865 Vid Sen. de Ira. 3. c. 12.

c Cyrill. Alex. contr. Iulian. l. 6. Theodoret. Serm. 12. de virtute Activa.

d Rom. 1. 24. 25.

a Plutarch. περὶ παιδαγωγ. Inter Socraticos notissima fossa Cinados. Iuvenal. Lego partem sententiæ Atticæ Socratem corruptorem. Adolescentium pronunciatam. Tertul. Apologet. c. 4.

contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the Body. Thus we reade sometimes of men in Warre, who notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet being deprived of all possibility of flight, and hope of mercy if they should be conquered, have strangely gained by their despaires, and gotten great and prosperous Victories by a forc'd and unnaturall Fortitude. An example whereof we have in the *Philistines*, who being sorely terrified with the Ark of the Lord in the Camp of *Israel*, resolved thereupon to quit themselves like men and fight. Nor could the band of *Scythian* slaves, who, endevoured to shake off their servile condition, be removed from that insolence, till the sight of Rods and Staves and other instruments of Feare, had driven them back into their nature againe.

Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem.

1 Sam. 4. 6. 7, 8.

Justin.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Memory, and some few causes of the weakneſſe thereof.

NOw for theſe inward Senſes, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themſelves unto ſundry operations of differing qualities) I take the two later, to wit, Memory, and Fancie or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man; as being indeed the principall Store-houſes and Treaſuries of the operations of the Soule. Where by Memory, I underſtand not the faculty, as it is common to beaſts with men, and importeth nothing but the ſimple retention, and conſervation of ſome *ſpecies*, formerly treaſur'd up by the conveyance of the outward ſenſe: but as it is *Conſors & co-operatrix Rationis*, as *Hugo* ſpeaks, a joynt-worker in the operations of Reaſon; which the *Latines* call *Reminiſcentia* or *Recordatio*; including ſome acts of the Vnderſtanding: Which is a reviewing, or (as wee ſpeak) a calling to minde of former objects, by diſcourſe, or rationall ſearching for them; which is made by *Ariſtotle* to bee the remote ground of all Arts: For (ſaith hee) Memorie is the Ground of Experience, and Experience the Mother of Art: The dignity hereof in man, is ſeen, both by perfecting the Vnder-

Lib. de ſpirit. & anima.

Metaph. lib. 1.

standing, in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity; as *Seneca* the elder confesseth of himselfe, who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had beene spoken before to him; and *Cyrus*, of whom *Zenophon* testifieth, that hee could salute all the Souldiers in his Army by their Names; and *Mithridates*, who being King over twenty two Countreys, did speak so many Languages without an Interpreter; and *Politian* in his Epistles telleth of *Fabius Vrsinus*, a Child but of a eleven years of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and Memory, that hee could unto five or six severall persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many severall Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different Arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be so close, proper, and coherent within it selfe, as if it alone had been intended:) As also by affording speciall assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in Morality, or unto Principles of Wisdome and publike Prudence, gathered from Historicall observations; while the Minde, by the help of Memory, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with Examples for any service and imployment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances,

Aen. Contro. lib. 1. in Proœmium.

Plin. lib. 7. c. 24.

Quintil. lib. 11. c. 2.

Polit. Ep. l. 12. ad Pic. Mirandu.

ſtances, and paſſages of affaires together, enable it ſelfe with the more hope and reſolution, to paſſe ſucceſſefully through any enterpriſe or difficulty: for *qui credit ſperat*, hee that believeth, and is acquainted with the happy iſſue of other mens reſolutions, will with the leſſe anxiety or diſcouragement goe on in his own.

The principall Corruptions which I conceive of the Memory, are firſt, too much ſlightneſſe and ſhallowneſſe of obſervation; when out of an impatiencie of ſtaying long, or making any profound enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curioſity to feed on many, the greedineſſe of the appetite weakneth the digeſtion, (for ſo ſome have called the Memory, the Belly of the Soule) and an eagerneſſe to take in, makes uncarefull to retaine. And this is the reaſon, why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining reall improvement, or ſolidity in any: They make not any ſolemn Iourney to a particular Coaſt, and Head of Learning, but view all as it were in *Tranſitu*; having no ſooner begun to ſettle on one, but they are in haſte to viſit another. But ſuch men as theſe (except endowed with an incredible and unuſuall felicity of diſpatch) are no more able to finde the uſe, or ſearch the bottome of any Learning, than he who rides Poaſt, is to make a Deſcription and Map of his Iourneys: who, though by much imployment, he may toyle and ſweat more in travelling from place to place; yet is hee farre leſſe able to diſcover the nature of the Countreys,

treys, temperature of the Aire, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, than he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode: and though his haste be lesse eager, yet his observations are more serious. *Omnis festinatio cæca est*, saith *Seneca*; Precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the Wit as of the Body, dazeleth and disableth the eyes: And it is true in the Minde, as in the Stomack; too quick digestion doth alwayes more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning: Nor can I call that so much Study, as agitation and restlesnesse of the Minde; which is as impatient of true setled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of Minde as this, is corruptive to the Memory, is first, because Memory is alwayes joyned with some measure of Love; and wee most of all remember that, which we most respect: *Omnia quæ curant meminerunt*; There where the Treasure is, the Minde will be also: There therefore, where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithfull. So, that sudden vanishing, and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager Love for the present, of what wee pursue, and by consequence, a *fastidium* and disesteeme of that which wee soon forsake: so doe they necessarily inferre weakness on the Memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as *Seneca* speaks, *Caduca memoria futuro*

Arist. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 14.

De Benef. lib. 7. c. 3.

futuro iminentium; Men ſtrongly bent upon things future, have but weak memories of things paſt.

Secondly, the body of any one Homogeneall Learning, hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it doe by a mutuall ſervice relate to, and communicate ſtrength and luſtre each to other: ſo that he who goes through with any Science, doth from every new Branch and Concluſion which he meets with, receive a greater clearneſſe and more ſtrong impreſſion of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatiency of that Reſtraint, cannot endure to goe through an Art, to ſearch into the Root, to obſerve the knittings and dependencies of the parts amongſt themſelves, to ſee by what paſſages Truth is derived from the Principles, to this or to other Branches; muſt needs be ſo much the more forgetfull of what he knowes, by how much he is ignorant of thoſe other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other cauſes there are of weakneſſe in the Memorie; as namely, a diſtruſt, and from thence an unexerciſe of it. Whereupon *Plato* telleth us, that the uſe of Letters, in gathering *Adverſaria* and Collections, is a hinderance to the Memory; becauſe thoſe things which wee have depoſited to our Desks, wee are the more ſecure and careleſſe to retaine in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great Confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burthening it with multitude of Notions; whereby as it ſheds much over, ſo

it is withall indispoſed for the ready uſe of what it retaines; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never ſo eaſily finde out, or order and diſpoſe what we deſire to uſe, but are confounded in our own ſtore. But I forbeare to inſiſt on theſe, becauſe I haſten to the higher and more noble part of Man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancie: Its offices to the Will and Reaſon, Volubility of Thoughts, Fictions, Errors, Levity, Fixedneſſe.

NOw for the Imagination, the dignity thereof conſiſts, either in the office, or in the latitude of it: Its office, is to be aſſiſtant both to the Vnderſtanding and the Will; its aſſiſtance to the Vnderſtanding, is principally in matter of Invention, readily to ſupply it with variety of objects whereon to work, as alſo to quicken and rayſe the Minde with a kinde of heat and raptery proportionable in the inferior part of the Soule, to that which in the ſuperior, Philoſophers call Extaſie; whereby it is poſſeſſed with ſuch a ſtrong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards

wards it, to bee reſtleſſe and impatient: And of this, is that of the Poet;

Eſt Deus in nobis agitante caleſcimus ipſo:

By Divine Raptures we aſpire,
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

Μαργὸς ὁ συναισθητικὸς καὶ ἀμείνων ἢ ποιητὴς ὀργαίνει. *Ariſt. Problem.* §. 30.

The office of the *Imagination* to the *Will*, is to quicken, allure, and ſharpen its deſire towards ſome convenient object: for it often commeth to paſſe, that ſome plauſible *Fancie* doth more prevaile with tender Wills, than a ſevere and ſullen Argument, and hath more powerfull inſinuations to *perſwade*, than the peremptorineſſe of Reaſon hath to *command*. And the reaſon hereof is, becauſe *liberty* being naturall unto mans *Will*, that courſe muſt needs moſt of all gaine upon it, which doth offer leaſt force unto its *liberty*: Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, than of conſtraint; and beſt of all, when a rationall and convincing Argument is ſo ſweetned and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he ſhall be content to entertaine Truth, for the very beauty and attire of it; ſo that you ſhall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reaſon that over-rul'd, or the elegancie that enticed him. A man can be well pleaſed, to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilfull and curious hand. And therefore in that great work of mens *converſion* unto God, he is ſaid to *allure*

Hosea 2.14. 2 Cor.5.17. Cant.5.10.16 Hag.2.7. Rom.11.12. Ephesi.3 8. 1 Tim.1.15.

them, and to *speak comfortably* unto them, to *beseech*, and to *perswade* them; to set forth Christ to the Soule, as *altogether lovely*. as the *fairest of ten thousand*, as the *desire of the Nations*, as the *Riches of the world*, that men might be inflamed to love the beauty of Holinesse. That which must perswade the Will, must not onely have a *truth*, but a *worthinesse* in it: in which respect, the Principels of Knowledge are called ἀξιώματα, *worthy* or honourable speeches: and the Gospel is not onely called λόγος πίστος, a *true* saying; but λόγος ἄξιος, a *worthy* saying; and in that respect, fitted for acceptation. It is true of the *Will*, which *Seneca* hath observed of Princes; *Apud Reges etiam quæ prosunt ita tamen ut delectent suadenda sunt:* That unto them even things profitable must bee represented with the face rather of delight than of necessity; even as Physicians, when they minister a very wholesome Potion:

Lucret. lib 4. Plut. de Educat liberorum.

——— Prius oras pocula circum
Contingunt dulci mellis flavoque liquore:

That they their Patients may both please & cure,
With mixed-sweets their pallats they allure.

And hence is that observation, that the first Reformers and drawers of men into Civill society, and the practise of Vertue, wrought upon the *Will* by the ministry rather of the *Fancy*, than of rigid *Reason*; not driving them thereunto by punctuall Arguments, but alluring them by the sweet-

ſweetneſſe of Eloquence; not preſſing the neceſſity of Morality, by naked inferences, but rather ſecretly inſtilling it into the Will, that it might at laſt finde it ſelfe reformed, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be ſo. And this was done by thoſe Muſicall, Poeticall, and Mythologicall perſwaſions; whereby men in their diſcourſes, did as it were paint Vertues and Vices; giving unto ſpirituall things Bodies and Beauties, ſuch as might beſt affect the Imagination: Yea, God himſelfe hath been pleaſed to honour this way of ſetting our higher Notions, in that wee finde ſome roome in the holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes, and Poeticall Numbers and Raprures, whereby heavenly Doctrines are ſhadowed forth; and doe condiſcend unto humane frailties. And another reaſon hereof is, becauſe the deſires of men are fixed as well on pleaſant as on profitable objects; ſo that thoſe inducements muſt needs have moſt Authority, which have that happy mixture of *utile & dulce* together; not only preſſing neceſſity upon the Underſtanding, but pointing as it were and deciphering delight to the Fancy. And this reaſon *Scaliger* gives in his Inquiry, how falſe Things, ſuch as *Plato* his *Elizium*, *Homers* Fictions, *Orpheus* his Muſick, ſhould delight wiſe men: *Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limites veritatis*, ſaith he; becauſe they are not exacted to the rigor and ſtrictneſſe of Reaſon, not grounded on the ſeverity of

Iudg. 18. 14. 12. Hoſea 12. 10

Scalig. Subtil. 307. 11.

Truth, but are (as I may so speak) the Creation of the Fancy, having a kinde of delightfull liberty in them, wherewith they refresh and doe as it were open and unbind the Thoughts, which otherwise, by a continuall pressure in exacter and more massie reasonings, would easily tyre and despaire.

Concerning the Latitude of this Faculty, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one in the multiplicity of Operations; another, in the framing of Objects. To the former of these, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reason of their quickneſſe and volubility, and withall, their continuall interchanges and succeſſions, are the most numberleſſe operations of the Soule of man: where by Thoughts, I understand those sprigings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects; for when the Minde begins once to bee fixt, and standing, I call that rather Meditation than Thought. This multiplicity of Thoughts is grounded first upon the abundance of their Objects; and next, upon the quickneſſe and activity of Apprehension; that is the matter, this the forme of those Thoughts which I now speak of. The abundance of Objects is seene in this, that it includes all the varieties of *species* belonging to other faculties: as that knowledge which the Schools call *Philosophia prima*, doth within its own limits draw in, in some sort, all the severall Objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will

flying

flying and purſuing Thoughts, Wiſhings, and Loathings; and there are Thoughts belonging to the Underſtanding, aſſenting and diſſenting Thoughts, Beliefe and diſ-opinion: There are Thoughts likewiſe proceeding from Anger, firy and revengefull Thoughts; from Envie, knawing and repining Thoughts; from Joy, ſweet and refreſhing Thoughts; from Conſcience, comforting and affrightfull Thoughts; and ſo in all other faculties. And for the quickneſſe of Working, the motions of the Thoughts ſhew it, in the concurrence of theſe two things, ſuddenneſſe of journey, and vaſtneſſe of way, while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excurſion, leave almoſt no part of the Vniverſe untravelled. Now, of theſe two grounds of multiplicitie in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is *ab extrinſeco*, and diſperſed over things, (though they are not otherwiſe the Objects of Thought, than as the Minde reflecteth on the *Phantaſmata* or Images of them in this faculty) but the latter, which is the quickneſſe of Apprehenſion, though it may ſeeme to be the moſt peculiar work of Reaſon; yet the Imagination hath indeed the greateſt intereſt in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper work of the Vnderſtanding, yet the forme and quality of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in that ſtrict ſenſe, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightneſſe, volubility, and ſuddenneſſe thereof,

Vid. A. Gell. lib 9. c. 1. Aug. de Civ. Dei, lib. 9 c. 4.

of, proceeds from the immediate restlesnesse of the Imagination; as is plaine, by the continuall varietie of Dreames and other Fancies, wherein the Faculty is the principall worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects, wherein it hath a property of boldnesse beyond other faculties: For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature; and therefore they alwayes frame themselves to the truth of things, yeelding assent to nothing but what they finde: But the Imagination is a Faculty boundlesse, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which it selfe maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of perswasion and insinuation, Poetry, Mythology, and Eloquence (the Arts of rationall Fancie) have ever (as was observ'd) beene more forcible than those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason; it being (as *Scaliger* observes) the naturall infiniteneſſe of mans Soule, *Aspernari certorum finium præscriptionem*, to disdaine any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, the liberty of the Imagination in this particular, is three-fold; Creation, as I may so speak, and now making of Objects; Composition, or new mixing them; and Translation, or new placing them: unto some of which three, will be reduced all Poeticall Fictions, fabulous Transmutations, high Metaphors, and Rhetoricall Allegories; things of excellent use, and ornament in speech.

Now,

Now, for the Corruptions and Diseases of this Faculty, I conceive the principall to be these three, Error, Levitie, and dull fixednesse. The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it suffereth. That the Fancie is fruitfull in producing Error, is as manifest as it is difficult to shew the manner how it doth it. Hence, those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of melancholy men (in whom this Faculty hath the most deepe and piercing operation) have beene peremptorily possessed: Hence, those vanishing and shadowie Assurances, Hopes, Feares, Loves, Visions, which the dreames of men (the immediate issues of this Faculty) doe produce: Hence those gastly Apparations, dreadfull sounds, black Thoughts, Tremblings, and horrors, which the strong working of Imagination doth present unto, or produce in men, disquieted either with the uglinesse of their Sinnes, or heavinesse of their Natures, making them to feare where no feare is: which, whether it be done by affecting onely the Fancie, or by the impression of such formes and shapes upon the Spirits, which go unto the outward senses as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest, not onely by various relations, but by continuall experience, what strong and strange effects those distempers have produced.

Aug. Epist. 92. ad Hybrid.

Arist. Prob. Sect. 10. q. 12. *Plin. li.* 7 *c.* 12.

Peucer. de Genes. copia.

Aug. in Gen. quest. 93.

Vid. Goſinium, in Arist. Eth. lib. 7. *c.* 5. *& Wier. de Praestig. Dem. l.* 2. *c.* 24, 25, 26. *& l.* 3. *c.* 21.

Fran. Mirand. l. de Imag. c. 8. *Aug. de Civ. D., l.* 18 *c.* 18. *de divin. Daemon. c.* 5, 6.

10 Neither are we to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind wrought by the same faculties, and, as is probable, by the same meanes; I meane, the impression of likenesse of an infant in the Wombe, unto the parents, or some other, who shall worke a stronger conceit in the Fancie: Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret reall vertue intrinsecall unto the Seed of the Parents (as many do affirme) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the Fancie, must needs be hereunto ascribed: As we see commeth often to passe, in the longing of Women; and in her, who having the picture of an *Ethiopian* in her Chamber, brought forth a black Child; and in the course which *Jacob* tooke, in putting *speckled Rods* before the Cattell, when they were to conceive, that the fancie of them might make their Lambes to be ring-straked and speckled.

The Errors which are in the Fancie, are usually of the same nature with those that are wrought by it: Such was the Error of that man, which would not be perswaded, but that he had on his head a great paire of Hornes, and for that reason would not move forth nor uncover his face to any. And the causes of these Errours are by *Francis Mirandula* ascribed first to the varietie of tempers in the Body, with the predominancie of those humours which give complexion there-

unto; secondly, to the *impasture* of the Senses: thirdly, to the government of the *will*, (though that, as is granted, hath least power over this Faculty) and lastly, to the ministry of *evil Angels*, who can easily cast into the Fancie strange and false *species*, with such subtletie, as shall easily gaine them plausible credit and admittance. And of that, we finde an expresse example, (as I conceive) in that evill spirit, who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of *Ahabs* Prophets. For the *visions* of such men being for the most part *imaginarie*, the impression of that lying and deceitfull perswasion was, in all probabilitie, made upon the *Imagination*. For, notwithstanding I confesse, that prophets had events by divers meanes revealed unto them, as by *true Voices*; by reall *accesse* of *Angels*, and by immediate *illapse* of Truth into the Understanding; yet because those two wayes, by *Visions* and by *Dreames*, were (for ought can be observ'd) the most usuall meanes of Revelation; it is not unlikely, that the Devill (who in such things strives for the better advancement of his owne ends, to imitate Gods manner of working) did by this manner of Impasture on the *Imagination*, seeke to possesse the false Prophets, and to delude the Kings.

Numb. 12.6. *Joel* 2. 28.

And here, by the way, from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the misery of mans corrupted Nature, wherein those Faculties which were originally ordained for mutuall assistance, do now exercise a mutuall imposture:

and as Man did joyne with a fellow-creature to dishonor, and if it had been possible, to deceive his maker; so in the Faculties of man, we may discover a joynt compliance in the working of their owne overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy, in one to be deluded by another.

The next *Corruption* which I observed, is the *Levitie* and too much *Mobilitie* of this Power, proceeding from the over-hasty reception of the *species*. For, notwithstanding I grant the quickelle of its operations to be one principall part of the excellencie thereof, yet I thereby understand the *Power*, not the *Infirmitie*, the *Marvel*, not the *Disease* of that Faculty; the *ability* of having speedy recourse unto varietie of Objects, treasured up in the *Memorie*; or of apprehending new, with dexterity; not that *flowing* and *inconstant* humour, whereby it makes many needlesse excursions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needfull and present operation of the Soule. For, since it may fall out, that unto the same Faculty, from diversitie of occasions, contrarid operations may prove arguments of worth; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakenesse and defect, in that it straitneth and defraudeth the power of those advantages which it might receive by a timely application of the other. There may be a time, when the *Fancie* may have libertie to expatiate; but againe, some object will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore,

to have a vanishing and lightning Fancie, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but as an hanging of divers Colours, shall in one veiw present unto the Understanding an heape of *species*, and so distract its intention, argues not sufficiencie, but weakneſſe and distemper in this Facultie.

The last Corruption observed, is in the other extreame; I meane, that heavineſſe and sloggish fixednesse, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the Understanding, in those actions which require dispatch, Variety, and suddennesse of execution: from which peremptorie adhesion and too violent intention of the Fancie on some particular objects, doth many times arise not onely a dulneſſe of minde, a *Syncope*, and kinde of benummednesse of the Soule, but oftentimes madneſſe, distraction, and torment: Many examples of which kind of depravation of the Phantasie in melancholie men, we every where meet withall; some thinking themselves turned into Wolves, Horses or other Beasts; others, pleasing themselves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principalities; some, framing to themselves Feares, and others hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreames of a distempered Fancie.

Arist. Prob. Sect. 29.

Lucian. in Lucio sive Asino. Apul. in Asino. Plin. li. 7. c. 22. Olav. Magnus de Region. Septentrion. l. 18. c. 45, 46, 47. Wierus de Præstig. l. 3. c. 21. Thrasilaus omnes ad littus Pyreum appellentes naves suas credidit. apud Athen.

His ego sæpe Lupum fieri & se condere Sylvis
Mœrim, sæpe animas imis exire sepulcris,
Atque satas alio vidi traducere messes:

Virg Eclog. 8.

Here often I have seen this *Mæris* worke
Himselfe into a Wolfe and in Woods lurke;
Oft have I seen him raise up ghosts from Hell,
And growing Corne translate by Magick Spell.

And upon this over-strong working and stay of the Fancie on some one or other object, it hath oftentimes come to passe, that some men, out of depth of contemplation on some difficulties of Learning, (as is reported of *Aristotle*, in his meditation on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea) others, out of some strong and predominant passion, as Love, Feare, Despair, drawing all the intention of the Minde unto them, have attempted such strange practises on themselves, and others, as could not proceed but from a smothered and intangled Reason. And thus much briefely shall suffice, touching the honour of mans common and inferiour Faculties.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Passions, their nature, and distribution; of the Motions of Naturall Creatures guided by a knowledge without them; and of Rationall Creatures, guided by a knowledge within them: of Passions Mentall, Sensitive, and Rationall.

I Now proceed unto the Soule of Man: of which, I must speake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within it selfe: under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of Mans Minde, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as far as my weakneſse can discover) which the Soul and Body contracteth from them.

Passions are nothing elſe, but those naturall, perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own severall Spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodneſse

beareth

beareth a naturall conveniencie or Vertue of satisfaction unto them; or by an antipathie and aversation from those, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures. This being the propertie of all unconstrained self-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Passions, is principally the good; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evill of things: as one beareth with it *rationem convenientiæ*, a quieting and satisfactorie; the other, *rationem disconvenientiæ*, a disturbing and destroying nature.

This being premised touching the nature and generall essence of Passions, the divisions of them must be then grounded, because (as Philosophie teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their essentiall distinctions from their objects, and those severall respects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now since all appetite (being a blinde Power) is dependant upon the direction of some Knowledge; from the diversitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions.

Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be considered, either as dis-joyn'd, and extrinsecall to the things moved, or as intrinsecall and united thereunto; both which serve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vaine motions, but

but might ever worke towards that fixed end, which God hath appointed them to moove unto.

Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of meerely naturall Agents, which are guided to their generall or particular ends, by the Wisdome and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniforme order, observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course, never either swarving or desisting there-from, so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variablenesse nor shadow of changing. And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law onely, or at least principally in these inferiour things; wherein partly from the deficiencie and languishing of secondarie Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, wee finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations, which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautifull; or whether the originall therof be divine malediction, which for the sinne of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service,

(which Saint *Paul* calleth the *vanity of the Creature*) it proceedeth certainely from the Will and Power of that Law-giver (who is onely able) for Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisdome, to dispence sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe: So that all the Miracles which ever God hath beene pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are seene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Mans Fall, which made (if we will beleeve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation of that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to crie out, *Aut Deus Naturæ patitur, aut Mundi machina dissolvetur*; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly detaine that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observ'd, to note, that the more raysed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.

Now

Now this naturall Passion which I speake of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the *Law*, the *Equitie*, the *Weight*, the *Instinct*, the *Bond*, the *Love*, the *Covenant* and *League* of naturall things, in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Universe, service of Man, and glory of the Creator: which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.

By all which we are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a breach of a Law; or as *Aristotle* calls it ἁμαρτία an error, (which Saint *Iames* telleth us ἀνομία an iniquitie of Nature) also a certaine levitie, unusefulnesse, and emptinesse of true worth, which I call in Saint *Pauls* phrase, the *vanitie of the Creature*: thirdly, loosenesse, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts, with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow *Nature*; how much greater are those which follow *Reasons* disobedience: for all this, touching the Passions of *Nature*, I have observed onely to give light unto those of *Reason*, there being the same proportion of government in them all: saving that, what in things destitute of all *knowledge*, is guided by the Law-giver himselfe, is in the rest performed by a *knowledge conjoyn'd*, and

intrinsecall to the Worker: and this is either *Mentall*, or *Sensitive*, or *Rationall*; from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions or Passions: Mentall Passions are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreame part of the Vnderstanding, which *Aristotle* calleth Νοῦς, the *Latines*, *Mens*, or *Apex animi*; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixtion or commerce with inferior and earthy faculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an *extraordinarie Knowledge*, either of *Vision* and *Revelation*, or of an exquisite naturall *Apprehension*; both which are beyond compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attaine unto: The former of these, *I* call with the Schoole-men, *Extasie* and *Rapture*; such as Saint *Pauls* was (for so himselfe calleth it) *Novi hominem raptum*; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that *joy unspeakeable*, and *Peace past understanding* which the Apostle makes to be the *fruites of the Spirit of God*, in those hearts wherein hee lodgeth; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soule, the *Mind*, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable Light. And for the later Branch, *Aristotle* hath placed his

his greateſt felicitie in the *contemplation* of the higheſt and divineſt Truths; which he makes to be the object of that ſupreame part of the Soule. And it was the ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Heraclitus* to the ſame purpoſe, that *Anima ſicca eſt ſapientiſſima*, (which toucheth ſomething upon that of *Ariſtotle*, That Melancholy complexions are uſually the wiſeſt, for that Temper is the dryeſt of all the reſt) That a mind not ſteeped in the humours of carnall and groſſe affections, nor drench'd in the waves of a diſquiet Fancie, but more rayſed and ſoaring to its original, by divine *contemplations*, is alwayes endued with the greater wiſdome.

Another Knowledge from whence the Paſſions of this Faculcie are rayſed in Man, is that light of *Naturall Principles*, which the Schooles call *Synteresis*; unto which, the cuſtodie of all *practicall Truths* being committed, they therehence worke in the *Conſcience* motions of Ioy, Love, Peace, Feare, Horror, Deſpaire, and the like ſpirituall Paſſions, according as the Soule, out of thoſe generall Principles, ſhall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or diſquieting Concluſions.

Senſitive Paſſions, are thoſe motions of Perſecutions or flight, which are grounded on the *Fancie*, *Memory*, and Apprehenſions of the *common Senſe*: which we ſee in *brute beaſts*; as, in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fierceneſſe of Wolves, the anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like: So *Homer* deſcribeth the joy of *Vlyſſes* his Dog.

Ariſt. de hiſt Animal. l. 1. c. 1. l. 9. per totum.

Dog which after his so long absence, remembred him at his returne.

Odyss. 5. Ομῳῆ μὲ ῥ' ὁ γ' ἐσσυτο καὶ κατὰ κάββαλεν ἄμφω.

For wanton joy to see his Master neare,
He wav'd his flattering tayle, and toss'd each eare.

Seneca de Ira lib. 1. c 3. Now these motions in brute creatures, if wee will beleeve *Seneca*, are not affections, but certaine characters and impressions *ad similitudinem passionum*, like unto Passions in men; which hee calleth *Impetus*, the risings, forces, and impulsions of Nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.

I come therefore to those *middle Passions* which I call'd *Rationall*; not *formally*, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immateriall motions of the Soule; but by way of *participation* and *dependance* by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the *Will* and *Understanding*, and not barely of the *Fancie*, as in other creatures. And for calling *Passion* thus govern'd, *Reasonable*, I have the warrant of *Aristotle*: who, though the *sensitive Appetite* in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the *Rationall* powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that *obedience* which it oweth to the Dictates of the *Understanding*, whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable (though Corruption have much slackned

and

and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not intrinsecally in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.

Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good, and secondarily, the Evill of things; and either considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Faculties, in vertue of their union thereunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so doe they accasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may bee considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Faculties: and so the Passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred: which are the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest: and therefore well called *Pondera* and *Impetus animi*, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out-goings of the Soule. Secondly, the object may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union (though never without that which

the

the Schooles call *unio objectiva*, union of Apprehension in the Vnderstanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be Good, Desire; if Evill, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Faculties; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficulties and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aids which it calleth in; in which regard; Good is presented as attainable, and so it worketh Hope: and Evill is presented, either as avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake thorugh it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after: of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another. I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature: But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions: and what dignities

dignities are therein moſt notable, and the moſt notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Humane Paſsions in generall: their uſe, Naturall, Morall, Civill: their ſubordination unto, or Rebellion againſt right Reaſon.

NOw *Paſsions* may be the ſubject of a three-fold diſcourſe; *Naturall*, *Morall*, and *Civill*. In their *Naturall* conſideration, we ſhould obſerve in them, their eſſentiall *Properties*, their Ebbes and Flowes, their Springings and Decayes, the manner of their ſeverall *Impreſsions*, the Phyſicall *Effects* which are wrought by them, and the like.

In their *Morall* conſideration, we might likewiſe ſearch, how the *Indifferencie* of them is altered into Good or Evill, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reaſon, or of the violence of their owne motions; what their Miniſtry is in Vertuous, and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions; how they are rayſed, ſuppreſſed, ſlackned, and govern'd according to the particular nature of thoſe things which require their motion.

In their *Civill* reſpects, we ſhould alſo obſerve how they may be ſeverally wrought upon and

impressed; and how, and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppresse, or nourish, or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantagious; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of those, whom we are to deale withall.

And this *Civill* use of *Passion*, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of *Aristotle*, in the second booke of his *Rhetoricks*; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth: because in matter of *Action*, and of *Judicature*, *Affection* in some sort is an *Auditor* or *Judge*, as he speakes. But it seemeth strange, that a Man of so vast sufficiencie and judgment; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an Ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other mens Labours lay broken and scattered; should yet in his Bookes *De Anima* over-passe the discoverie of their Nature, Essence, Operations and properties; and in his Bookes of *Morall* Philosophie, should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie, Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords, Causes, Effects and Consequence of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and dayly use in our Life, and of necessarie and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason.

Touching Passions in order unto Civill or Judiciarie

diciarie affairs, I ſhal not make any obſervation: either of the other I ſhall in part touch upon, though not diſtinctly and aſunder, but in a briefe and confuſed collection of ſome few particulars.

The Order which I ſhall obſerve in ſetting down the honour and Corruption of them in Generall (which Method ſhall in part be kept in their Particulars) ſhal be this; firſt, according to the *Antecedents* of their *Motion*, and *Acts*; ſecondly, according to the *Acts* themſelves; and thirdly, according to the *Conſequents* of them.

Firſt, touching the *Antecedents* to the Act of *Paſsion*, they are either the *Outward* Motives thereunto, as namely, the *Objects* unto which it is carryed, and the *Cauſes* whereby it is produced: or the *Inward* Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, *Paſsion* is then ſaid commendable, when it is direct and naturall. And the Corruption is, when it is carryed to an undue *Object*, or proceedeth from an indirect *Cauſe*: but theſe are more obſervable in the particulars, and therefore thither I referre their diſtinct handling.

For the third, the Dignitie of Paſſion chiefely conſiſts in a *Conſonancie* and *Obedience* to the Preſcription of *Reaſon*: for there is in mans *Faculties* a naturall *ſubordination*, whereby the actions of the inferiour receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now *Appetite* was in *Beaſts* onely made to be governed by a *ſen-*

sitive Knowledge: But in *Man*, Sense ought not to have any *commanding* or moving Power, but only *Instrumentall*, Ministeriall and Conveying, in respect of the *Object*. The Action of *Sense* was not from the first Institution ordain'd to touch the *Affection*, but to present it selfe primarily to the *Understanding*; upon whose determination and conduct, the *Passions* were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties as it should deeme any way expedient for the benefit of mans nature: so that herein consists a great part of mans infelicitie by the *Fall*; that albeit his *Understanding* it selfe be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect *Good* to the inferiour parts; yet that small portion of Light which it yet retaineth for the goverment of our Actions, is become uneffectuall, as being able only to convince, but not to reforme.

Λόγῳ ἠνιοχεῖν ἐτάχθη, οὐ ἄγειν ἀλλ' ἵνα ἄγεσθαί τε καὶ σύρεσθαι. *Theodor. Ser. 5. de Natur. hom.*

The *Corruption* then of *Passion* in this respect, is the *independance* thereof upon its true *Principle*: when it strayeth not to looke for, but anticipates and prevents the Discourses of *Reason*; relying onely on the judgment of *Sense*, wherewith it retaines an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet; *Man being in Honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the* * *Beasts that perish*. For, as in the *body* (to use the similitude of *Aristotle*) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yeeld obedience unto the Government of the motive Facultie; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another:

Psal. 49. 20 * Θηρία μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνθρωποι, &c. *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 4.* Ἀρσαλεώτατα θηρία, *in Protrep. & Tatian. orat. ad Græc. Ethic. l. 1. c. 13.*

ther: So it is in the *Mind* of Man, when that Naturall continuitie and *Union* of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation *dependant* on another, is once dissolved; when *Affections* are dis-joynted from *Reason*, and cast off the reines whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmonie in the motion thereof which is required to the weale of Mans Nature.

Vid. Plutarch. lib. de virtute morali.

It is prodigious to see an *Instrument* (such as all *Appetite* should be) to be the *first* and *selfe-mover* in its owne actions; whence cannot in the *Minde* of Man but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a wagoner should commit himselfe to the wild and unswayed fancie of his Horses; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his owne feet, should be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no Guid to direct him. For as Fire, though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and usefull while it abides in the place ordained for it; yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most mercilesse and over-running: So *Passion*, though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of Vertue, for adding spirits and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with an happier issue than they could alone have attained unto; yet if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become subject onely to their owne Lawes, and encroach upon Reasons right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannicall. As *Bias* said of the Tongue, that it was the best and the worst

Plutarch. de Audit.

worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; *Nec meliores unquam Servos, nec Dominos sentit Natura deteriores*; They are the best Servants, but the worst masters which our Nature can have. Like the Winds, which being moderate, carry the Ship; but drowne it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in Mans little Common-wealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publike Good, than those who are best qualified for service and imployment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon publique Ruines. And indeed it is universally true, Things most usefull and excellent in their Regularitie, are most dangerous in their Abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Exercise of Passion: of Stoicall Apathie: of Permanencie, Defect, Excess, with the Cure thereof.

THe next consideration of *passion* was according to the Exercise of their *Act*: which we may consider, either according to the generall *Substance*, or according to some particular *Accidents*, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good,

Good, as being nothing elſe but naturall motion, ordained for the perfection and conſervation of the Creature. For, notwithſtanding naturall *Motion* may haply argue ſome kind of imperfection in the ſtate of the thing moving; as ſuppoſing it ſome way deprived of that wherein it ſhould *reſt* it ſelf (which makes *Ariſtotle* conclude, that the nobleſt Act of the underſtanding, *Knowledge* and cleare viſion, is rather the * *Reſt*, than the *Motion* of that Facultie) yet I ſay, it alwayes implyeth more naturall Perfection in thoſe things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfecteſt of Elements, and Heaven, the perfecteſt of Bodies; ſo the Soul of Man, the perfecteſt of formes, hath the moſt vehement motion.

And in this conſideration (ſo it be alwayes *Motion Naturall*, governed and dependant on right *Reaſon*) I find not any *Corruption*, though I finde an *Error* and abuſe; that I meane, which maketh *Paſsion* ingenerall to be *Ægritudo Animi*, a Sickneſſe and Pertubation, and would therefore reduce the mind to a ſenſeleſſe *Apathie*, condemning all life of *Paſsion*, as *Waves* which ſerve onely to toſſe and trouble *Reaſon*. An Opinion, which while it goeth about to give unto Man an abſolute government over himſelfe, leaveth ſcarce any thing in him, which he may command and governe.

For although there be in the *Will* over the *Body* an *Imperium*; yet in Rigour, this is not ſo much to be termed *Command*, as *Imployment*; the Body being rather the *Inſtrument*, than the *Servant* of the

* *Intellectio quies intellectus*, Ariſt. *Phyſic.l.7.c.4. Ethic.l.10.c.7.* ἐπιστήμη ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως, &c. *Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib.4* Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τῆ ψυχῆ ἴσησι. Κινυμένης γὰρ καὶ φερομένης, ὅτε αἰσθέσθαι ὅτε διανοηθῆναι δυνατόν. Ariſt. *Probl. Sect.30.qu.14.*

Animi commotio averſa à recta Ratione, & contra Naturam, Cic.

Ὁρμὴ πλείν ἐξοῦσα, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, Zen. *apud Laertium.*

the Soule; and the power which the Will hath over it, is not so much the command of a Master over his Workman, as of the Workman over his Tooles: The cheife subjects to the *Will* are the *Affections*, in the right governing whereof, is manifested its greatest power,

The strength of every thing is excercised by *Opposition*: We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Wind sheweth it selfe most, when it is most resisted: So the power of the Will is most seene in repairing the breaches, and setling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* disquiet the peace of mans nature; since *excesse* and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make straight a crooked thing, we doe not breake it. And therefore, as he in *Tacitus* spake well to *Otho*, when he was about to kill himselfe, *Majore animo tolerari adversa quam relinqui*; That it was more valour to beare, than put off afflictions with courage: so there is more honour, in having the *Affections* subdued, than in having none at all; the businesse of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be *above* them. And therefore our * Saviour himselfe sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, somtimes desired, sometimes mourned and greived; but these were not *Passions* that violently and immoderatly troubled him; but he, as he saw fit, did with them *trouble himselfe*. His *Reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed* them, according to the rule of perfect, cleare, and undisturbed *judgement*.

Hist. lib. 2

* Heb. 2. 17. Heb. 4. 15. & 5. 2. Mark 10. 21. Luke 10. 21. Joh. 11. 35. Luke 22. 15. Marke 3. 5. Mat. 26. 37, 38

In

In which respect, the *Passions* of *Christ* are by Divines called rather *Propassions*, that is to say, Beginnings of Passions, then *Passions* themselves; in as much as they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the *Mind* to undecencie or excesse; but had both their rising and originall from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuance limited by Reason. The *Passions* of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea, which bringeth up *mire and dirt*; but the *Passions* of *Christ* were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell, which though it be therby *troubled*, yet it is not *fouled* at all.

Hieron. in Math. 26. *Magist. Sent. lib. 3. dist. 15. Aquin. par. 3. q. 15. art. 4.*

Isa. 57. 20.

The *Stoicks* themselves confessed, that wise men might be affected with [a] *sudden perturbations* of Feare or Sorrow; but did not like weak men yeeld unto them, or sinke under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgments, like *Æneas* in *Virgill*.

Mens immota manet, lacrymæ volvuntur inanes.

He wept indeed, but in his stable mind
You could no shakings or distempers finde.

[a] *Lactant l. 6. c. 14. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 9. c. 4 l. 14. c. 9. Aul. Gell. l. 19. c. 1. Cic. Tusc. q. l. 4. Sen. Ep. 85. & de Ira, l. 2. c. 3.*

[b] And therefore indeed, this controversie between the *Peripateticks* and *Stoicks*, was rather a strife of Words, then a difference of judgements, because they did not agree in the *Subject* of the Question; the one, making *Pasions* to be *Naturall*, the other, [c] *Preternaturall*, and disorderly motions. For the *Peripateticks* confessed, That wise men ought to be fix'd & immoveable in their vertuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or feares

[b] *Aquin 12. q. 24. art. 2. 3. Cic. de fin. l. 4.*

[c] Τὰ παθη πάνυ ἀναπερισίσμαστα ἡ ψυχῆς ἡ μαλθακῆς ἢ εἰκούσης. *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2. & vid. in Pædag. lib. 2. cap. 13. Vid. Sen. ep. 57. 85. & 116. Diog. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.*

a *Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 1.*
b Εὐδαίμων τετράγωνος. *Ethic. l. 1. c. 10 & Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 6.*
c *Plutarch. contr. Stoicos.*

Plutarch. lib. de vitioso pudore.

[a] deterred or diverted from them: but as a Dye, to be [b] *foure-square*; and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure and firme bottome. which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue, in defence whereof the *Stoicks* banished *Affections* from wise men: not intending thereby to make men like [c] *Caeneus* in the Poet, such as could not be violated with any force (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion) but onely to shew, that the wisdom of Vertue should so compose and consolidate the Mind, and settle it in such stabilitie, that it should not all be bended from the Right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions. As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto *Temples*, doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are continued to the *Temple*: so in the demolishing of inordinate *Passions*, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them, as is contiguous unto *Right Reason*, whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, and improvement, and derivation of Vertue on others, of any in Mans Nature.

Now concerning the *accidents* or maner of these *Acts* which are from *Passion*, it may be considered either in regard of the *Quantitie* & *Extention*, or of the *Qualitie* & *Intention* of the *Act*. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes: for the *Quantitie* of *Passions*, we may consider that, as the *Quantitie* of *Bodies*, which is either *Continued* or *Severed*: by *Quantitie Continued*, I understand the manner

manner of a *Passions Permanency* & *durance*, by *Severed*, I meane the manner of its *multiplicitie* and *reiteration*; from both which, it hath the denomination of *good* or *bad*, as the *object* whereunto it is carried, hath a greater or lesse relation to the *Faculties*. For some *objects* are *simple*, and without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards these, may be allowed both a more *durable* and a more *multiplyed Passion*: others are *good* or *evill* only, with some *circumstances* of *Time*, *Place*, *Person*, *occasion* or the *like*; which therfore require both fewer and lesse *habituall motions*. The same may be said of the *Qualitie* of them; wherein they are sometimes too *remisse*, sometimes againe too *excessive* and *exorbitant*, according to varietie of *conditions*.

Concerning all these, I shall observe this one general Rule; the *Permanency* or *vanishing*, the *multiplicity* or *rareneſſe*, the *excesse* or *defect* of any *Passion*, is to be grounded on and regulated by the nature only of its *object*, as it beares reference to such or such a *person*; but never by the private *humour*, *prejudice*, *complexion*, *habit*, *custom*, or other like *qualifications* of the *Mind* it self. To see a man of a *soft* and *gentle nature* overpasse some *small indignities* without *notice* or *feeling*; or to see a man of an *hot* and *eager temper* transported with an *extreame* & more during *Passion*, upon the *sense* of some *greater injury*, more notably touching him in his *honestie* or *good Name*; is not in either of these, any great matter of commendation: because, though the nature of the *object* did in both warrant the *quality* of the *Passion*, yet in those *persons* they both proce-

ded out of *humour* and *complexion*, and not out of serious consideration of the *injuries* themselves, by which onely the *Passion* is to be regulated.

Of these two *extreames*, the *defect* is not so commonly seene, as that which is in the *excesse*; And therefoae we will here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this *vehemency* of our *Affections*, whereby they disturbe the *quiet*, & darken the serenitie of mans *Mind*. And this is done either by *opposing contrary Passion to contrary*, which is *Aristoties* rule, who adviseth, in the bringing of *Passions* from an *extream* to a *mediocritie*, to incline and bend them towards the other *extreme*; as Husbandmen use to doe those Trees which are crooked; or as dim and weake eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done, by *scattering* and *distracting* of them; and that not onely by the power of *Reason*, but sometimes also by a cautelous *admixture of Passions* amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current. For, as usually the *Affections* of the *Mind* are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the Barrell) as *Grief* by *Anger*, (*Circumspexit eos cum ira condolesens*, He looked on them with *Anger*, being *grieved*) and *Feare* by *Love*;

Res est solliciti plena Timoris Amor:

The things to which our heart *Love* beares,
Are objects of our carefull *Feares*.

and *Desire* by *Feare*; as in him of whome *Tacitus* speaks, *Fingebat & metum, quo magis concupisceret*, that

Ethic. l. 2. c. 9. lib. 10. c. 1.

Mar. 3. 3.

Hist. lib. 1.

that to justifie his *Desires*, he pretended his *Fears*: So likewise are some *Passions* stopt, or at least bridled & moderated by others; *Amor foras mittit timorem*, Perfect *love* casts out *fear*. It faring in this as *Plutarch* hath noted in the hunting of Beasts, that they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beasts. As we see, the light and heat of the sun shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it & to put it out. And this was that which made *Saul*, when he was possessed with those strong fits of *Melancholy*, working in him *Fury*, *Griefe*, & *Horror*, to have recourse unto such a *Remedy* as is most forcible for the producing of other *Passions* of a lighter nature; and so by consequence, for expelling these. Thus, as we see in the Body *Military* (as *Tacitus* hath observed) *Unus tumultus est alterius remedium*, That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the Body *Naturall*, some *Diseases* are expelled by others: so likewise in the *Mind*, *Passions*, as they mutually *generate*, so they mutually *weaken* each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one *losse*, is the prevention of a greater: as when a *Merchant* casteth out his *ware*, to prevent a *shipwrack*; and in a *publike Fire* men pull downe some *houses* untoucht, to prevent the spreading of the *flame*: Thus it is in the *Passion* of the *Mind*; when any of them are *excessive*, the way to *remit* them, is by admitting of some further *perturbation* from others, and so *distracting* the *forces* of the former: Whether the *Passions* we *admit*, be *contrarie*; as when a *dead palsie* is cured with a *burning feaver*, and *Souldiers* suppresse

Job 4.18.

Plut. orat. 1. de fortitud. Alexandri.

Hist. lib. 2.

presse the *feare* of *Death*, by the *shame* of *Baseneſſe*;

Iliad. γ. 121. ——— Ἀλλ' ὀτρεσὶ θῆσθε ἕκαστος
Αἰδῶ τε ῥέμβησιν.

O fearfull Grecians, *in your minds recount*
To what great ſhame this baſeneſſe will amount:

and the *hatred* of their Generall, by the *love* of their Countrey; as *Ulyſſes* perſwaded *Achilles*:

Iliad. ι. 300. Εἰ δέ τοι Ἀτρεΐδης μὲν ἀπέχθεται ἠδὲ μάλιστα,
Αὐτὸς τῇ δώρῳ· σὺ δ' ἄλλυς μὲν παραχαίνε
Τειρομένους ἐλέαιρε καὶ ἔρχατον, &c.

Though Agamemnon *and his gifts you hate,*
Yet looke with pity on the dolefull ſtate
Of all the other Grecians *in the Campe,*
Who on your Name will divine honour ſtampe,
When you this glory ſhall to them afford,
To ſave them from the rage of Hectors *Sword.*

Or whether they be *Paſſions* of a *different*, but not of a *repugnant* nature; & then the *effect* is wrought by *revoking* ſome of the *ſpirits*, which were otherwiſe all imploi'd in the ſervice of one *Paſſion*, to attend on them; and by that means alſo, by *diverting* the intention of the *Mind* from one deep *Channell* into many croſſe and broken *Streames*; as men are wont to [a] ſtop one flux of bloud, by making of another; and [b] to uſe *frictions* to the *feet*, to call away and divert the humors which pain the *head*.

a *Calores caloribus onerando deprimimus, & ſanguinis fluxum defuſa venula revocamus*, Tertull.
b *Clem. Alex. Padag. l. 2. c. 8.*

Which *diſſipation* & *ſcattering* of *Paſſion*, as it is wrought principally by this mutuall confounding of them amongſt themſelves, ſo in ſome particular caſes likewiſe, two other ways, namely, by *commission* in *divers ſubjects*, & *extention* on *divers objects*. For the firſt we ſee in matter of Griefe, the

Mind

Mind doth receive (as it were) some lightneſſe and comfort, when it findes it ſelf *generative* unto others, and produces *ſympathy* in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that eaſier, to the ſuſtaining whereof it hath the aſſiſtance of anotheres ſhoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) obſervations:

Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes ſtupent: And
Ille dolet verè, qui ſine teſte dolet.

Our tongues can lighter Cares repeat,
When ſilence ſwallowes up the great:
He grieves indeed, who on his friend
Vnteſtified teares doth ſpend.

That *Grief* commonly is the moſt *heavy*, which hath feweſt *vents* by which to *diffuſe* it ſelf; which I take it, will be one occaſion of the *heavines* of *infernall torment*; becauſe their *Griefe* ſhall not be any whit *tranſient*, to work *cõmiſeration* in any *ſpectator*, but altogether *immanent* and *reflexive* upon it ſelf.

Thus likewiſe we ſee (to inſtance in that other particular branch, of *diffuſing* the *paſſions* on *divers objects*) how the multitude of theſe, if they be *Heterogeneall* and *unſubordinate*, doth oftentimes remit a *Paſſion*: for example, in *Love*, I take it, that that man who hath a *more generall Love*, hath a *leſſe vehement Love*; & the *ſpreading* of *Affection*, is the *weakning* of it, (I mean ſtil in things not abſolute *ſubordinate*; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, then without them, becauſe they are the Seals and Pledges of that *Love*) as a River, when it is cut into many leſſer ſtreams, runs weaker & ſhalower. And this, I conceive, is the reaſon, why *Solomon*, when he com-

commendeth a *strong Love*, giveth it but a *single object*; *there is a friend neerer then a brother*; one in whō the rayes of this *affection*, like the Sun-beames in a glasse, being more united, might withall be the more fervent. I remember not, that I ever read of *wonderfull Love* amongst men, which went beyond *Couples*; which also *Aristotle* & *Plutarch* have observed. And therefore we see, in that state there is or should be greater *affection*, wherin is the least *community*: *conjugal Love*, as it is most *single*, so it is usually the *strongest*; and in the Issues and Blessings thereof, there is scarce any more powerfull Epithite to win *Love*, then *Unigenitus*, an only Son.

Φιλίαι ὑμνέμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. *Plut. de Amic. multitud. Anacharsis apud Laert. l. 1.*

Καὶ με φίλησ' ὡσεί τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φίλησι
Μοῦνον τηλύγετον. *Iliad. 1. 479. Plutarch. de multit. Amic.*

He lov'd me as one loves the onely Sonne
Of's old age, born to great Possession.

Insomuch, that even in *God* himselfe (to whom these *Passions* are but by an *Anthropopathy* attributed) that more *generall Love* of his *Providence* and *Preservation*, (which is cōmon to all his *Creatures*) is (if I may so speake) of a lower degree (though not in respect of any intention or remission in his Will, but onely the effects thereof towards the things themselves) then that more *speciall Love* of *Adoption*, which he extendeth onely to those whom he vouchsafeth to make *One* in him who was *Unigenitus* and *Dilectus* from everlasting.

I do not then (by the way) condemn all *strong* & *united Passions*, but only I observ how those, which herby grow *exorbitant*, & *work prejudice* to the *soul*, may by a *seasonable distracting* of *them*, be *reduc'd* to

a wholsome temper: for as it is noted, that amongst men, those who have bodies most obnoxious to daily maladies, are commonly more secure from any mortall danger, then those who though free from any generall distempers, doe yet finde the surprize of one more violent; so is it with mens Passions. Those who have a nature readie, upon sundry occasions to breake forth into them, doe commonly finde them lesse virulent and morose, then those who have not their Passions so voluble, and ready to spread themselves on divers objects, but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen Vertue: Of vitious Concupiscence; of their blinding, diverting, distracting, and precipitating of Reason, and of their distempering the Body.

THe last consideration of Passions, was according to the Consequents of their Act, which are the ends and effects thereof; both which I conclude in one, because the naturall end of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their owne, or a superior Vertue to produce.

Now, though in the particulars there be severall perfections conferred both on the operations of the Will, and of the Understanding, from Passions; yet I cannot think on any other generall effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that onely which *Tully* hath observed out of the *Peripatetick* of Anger, that they are the sharpners and (to keep his phrase) the Whetstones of Vertue, which make it more operative and fruitfull: for Passion stirring up the Spirits, and quickning the Fancie, hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same cleareness and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore *Aristotle* speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and Griefe, (one of which all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retain their severall portions of Goodnesse. Thus Anger, Zeal, Shame, Grief, Love, are in their severall orders the Whetstones whereon true Fortitude sharpneth its sword, for men are never more negligent-full and prodigall of their blood, then when they are thorowly pierced with a sense of injuries, or greived with a losse of their own or their Countreys Honour: So the Poet saith of *Mezentius*, when *Æneas* had slain *Lausus* his son:

Acad. quest. lib. 4. Tuscul qu. l 4

Plutarch. lib. de virt mort.

Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

Æstuat

——*Æstuat ingens*
Imo in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu,
Et furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia virtus.

Æneid. lib. 10.

A noble shame boil'd in his lowest breast,
Rage mixt with Grief, suffer'd him not to rest;
Love and a conscious Valour set him on,
And kindled furious Resolution.

So, Love and Compassion are the inciters of Bounty; Hope, the stay and anchor of Patience; keeping the Minde, amidst perils and casualties, from floating and sinking; Fear, the sharpener of Industry; and Caution an antidote in all our actions against Violence, Rashnesse, and Indiscretion: as *Latinus* said unto *Turnus*, when in rage he hastened to combat with *Æneas:*

——*Quantum ipse feroci*
Virtute exuperas, tanto me impensius æquum est
Consulere, atque omnes metuentem expendere casus.

Æneid. lib. 12.

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,
'Tis fit my serious Feares shew the more Love;
In mature Counsels, and in weighing all
The various dangers and events may fall.

Those imputations therefore which *Tully* and *Seneca*, and other Stoicall Philosophers, make against Passions, are but light and empty, when they call them diseases and perturbations of the Minde; which requireth in all its actions both

health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Pasion: For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthfull or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome,: for, what water more sweet then that of a Spring? or what more thick or loathsome, then that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting it selfe? As in the Winde or Seas, (to which two, Pasions are commonly compared) a middle temper betweene a quiet Calm and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage betweene Countreys; so the agitations of Pasion, as long as they serve onely to drive forward, but not to drown Vertue; as long as they keep their dependance on Reason, and run onely in that Chanel wherewith they are thereby bounded, are of excellent service, in all the travell of mans life, and such as without which, the growth, succesſe, and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of Pasion in generall, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of Evil as of Error, when there is but a unity of Goodnesse or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect of themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the Understanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other; as Fear is wrought by Love, and Anger by Grief; *Dolor excitat*

excitat iras; as a Lion, when wounded, is moſt raging.

Fixumque latronis
Impavidum frangit telum, & fremit ore cruento. *Æneid. l. 12.*

With bloodie mouth, and an undaunted heart,
Breaks & teares from his wound the faſtned dart.

Which effect of Paſsions, I have before touched upon; neither is it alwayes a corrupt effect, but onely then, when there is in the Paſsion generative ſome diſtemper. Secondly, in reſpect of the *Vnderſtanding* and *Will*, (both which I compriſe under one name of *Reaſon*) I conceive the Corruptions to be principally theſe four: *Impoſture*, or Seduction: *Alienation*, or withdrawing: *Diſtraction*, or Confounding: and *Precipitancie*, or an Headlong tranſporting of Reaſon. *Vide Aquin. 12 qu. 77. art. 1, 2.*

Now concerning theſe, we are firſt to remember, that there is in every Man a native and Originall ſtrugling between *Appetite* and *Reaſon*; which yet proceedeth from Corruption, and the *Fall* of man, not from *Nature entire*: For, from the law of Creation, there was no formall *Oppoſition*, but a *Subordination* between *Spirit* and *Sence*; Man having it in his own power, to excite, continue, remit, lay down his Paſſions, as Reaſon ſhould dictate unto him. And therefore (notwithſtanding the Operations of *Appetite* are common unto Men and Beaſts) yet may we not grant, that they have

I.

Plutarch. de virtute Moral. Ariſtot. Ethic. lib. 1. cap. 13. Plato apud Tneodor. Serm. 5. de Nat. Hom. Imperat Animus corpori & paretur: Imperat Animus ſibi, & reſiſtitur. Aug. Confeſ. l. 8. c. 9, 10 Aug. Civ. Dei, l. 14. c. 64, 23, 24, 26.

have the same manner of being educed and governed in both these.

Affectus in homine erant in potestate ejus tripl citer quantum ad exc tationem, durationem, intentionem, & remissionem, Per. in Gen. li. 4.

For, as the Operations of the *vegetative Soul*, though common to Beasts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of these severally so restrained, as that they are truely said to be proper and peculiar works of that superficiall form unto which they are annexed: so likewise the *Sensitive Appetite*, though generally it be common to Men and Beasts, yet in Man it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of *Reason*; and therefore may properly be called an *Humane Appetite*, as being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto Mans Nature: so that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his Faculties, and such an happie subordination of them each to other, as that every Motion of the Inferiour power was directed and governed; and therefore might truely and properly be attributed to the Superiour: But, when once Man had tasted of that murthering Fruit, and poysoned him and all his Posteritie; then began those swellings, and inward Rebellions, which made him as lame in his Naturall, as dead in his Spirituall Condition. Whence *Passions* are become, now in the state of *Corruption*, Beastly and Sensuall, which were before, by *Creation*, Reasonable and Humane: For, *Man being in Honour, was without Understanding, and is become as the Beasts, that perish.*

But

But to return: We are (as I ſaid) to remember, that there is in man, by reaſon of his generall *Corruption*, ſuch a diſtemper wrought, as that there is not onely *crookedneſſe* in, but *diſſention* alſo, and fighting between his parts: And, though the Light of our *Reaſon* be by Man's Fall much dimmed and decayed; yet the remainders thereof are ſo adverſe to our unruly *Appetite*, as that it laboureth againſt us, as the Philiſtines againſt *Samſon*, (or rather indeed, as *Dalilah*; for *Samſons* eyes were truely put out, before ever the Philiſtines were upon him); it laboureth, I ſay, to deprive us of thoſe Reliques of Sight which we yet retain.

And this is that firſt corrupt *Effect*, which I call * *Impoſture*, or Occæcation; whereby *Paſſion* reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of reſiſtance or controul, laboureth to muffle *Reaſon*, and to obliterate thoſe Principles and originall Truths, whereby their unrulineſſe might be reſtrained. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place to the violence of *Appetite*, laboureth next to encline and prepare his *Minde* for *Aſſent*, and to get *Reaſon* on the ſame ſide with *Paſſion*. * *Diſobedience* is ever cavilling, and *contentious*; and he who will not work the Righteouſneſſe of God, will be ſure to diſpute againſt it, and to ſtumble at it. And therefore the Apoſtle telleth us, that *Repentance*, and putting away of Luſts, is the onely pre-

* *Tanta eſt vis voluptatum, ut & ignorantiam protelet in occaſionem, & conſcientiam corrumpat in diſſimulationem. Tert. de ſpectat. cap. 1. Ariſt. Rhet. li. 1. c. 3. Quint. l. c. 2. Τὸ γὰρ ἥκιστον σοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν κρατεῖ* Pſ. 10. 8. Eccleſ. 5. 2. 2 Tim. 2 25. Iam. 1. 19, 20, 21. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Ioh. 3. 20.

preparation to *Acknowledge the truth*: For, so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sinne, he will ever reject the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe *Reason* to say some thing for it.

And the Reasons hereof are these Two; a *Love* of our *Passions*, and a *Love* of our *Ease*. For the former, it is the speech of *Aristotle*, Κακία ἐστὶ φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς, That evill and inordinate Motions have a power in them to *Corrupt Principles* of *Reason*, and to make a man commit that, which in Rhetorick is with *Aristotle*, absurd; but in Divinity, with Saint *Peter*, damnable; ἢ καμπὰς στρεβλοῦν ποιεῖν, to *pervert and make crooked* that, which should be the *Rule* and Judge in our actions. For *Passion*, in opposition to *Reason*, is a like an *Humour*, which falling from the Head to the *Eyes*, darkneth the sight thereof: or, as some Concave Glasses, which represent the *Species* of things to the Eye, not as they are in themselves; but, with those Inversions, Depressions, and other the like Deformities, which the indisposition of the Glasse frameth them unto: or, as it is said of the *Polypus*, that he changed himselfe alwayes into the colour of the Rock in which he hides; and, as they feign of *Proteus*:

—Πρώτιστα λέων, γένετ' ἰδὲ γλήνων,
Αὖτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων, καὶ πάρδαλις, ἠδὲ μέγας σῦς.

He

He made himself a Lyon, and anon
Became a Boare, a Panther, a Dragon.

So likewise, the *Vnderstanding* being once invaded by *Passion*, is brought to change into diverse shapes, and to judge of things, not according to their naked and naturall truth, but according as it finds them beare in the *Fancie* those impressions of *Pleasure*, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.

Ægrotantes Medici alios Medicos ad se vocant, & Magistri palæstræ alios Magistros ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι καίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς, διὰ τὸ χρίειν περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. Arist. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 16.

And another Reason why we seeke to warrant and to maintaine a *Passion*, when we have given way unto it, is the love of our *Ease*: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a Corrupt *Passion*; yet that part of it, which hath the sting in it, is unpleasant: and therefore there is required the hand of *Reason*, by Apologies, Pleadings, and blandishments, either to mollifie the *Passion*, that it shall not pierce, or to harden and arme the *subject*, that it may not be sensible of it.

And, that this Deceit and *Excæcation* is a proper work of *Passion*, (besides our owne dayly experience) this one Argument might sufficiently proove; namely, the Practice of *Heretiques*: who proposing to themselves either Gaine, or any other Carnall and corrupt End; did thereupon presently (as the Apostle notes) vent the perverse Disputes of their owne corrupt Minds, and make all Truth an

Tertul. contr. Valent. cap. 4.

1 Tim. 6. 5.

Tertul. de Fuga. Isid. Pelut. l. 1. ep. 102.

Hand-maid and Lacquey to their own Lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custome hath been, *Prius persuadere quam docere*; to creepe upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines: And as it is said of GOD, that he first accepted *Abel*, and then his Sacrifice; so doe they labour first, to worke an approbation of their persons in the hearts of Men; whence, in the second place, their perverse Conceits doe finde the easier accesse to their Vnderstandings.

Herod. Thalia. Aneas. lib. 2.

For, when silly and unstable Mindes shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiration when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a *Man* that had wholly renounced the World; like *Zopyrus* or *Synon*, cloathed and deformed with seeming Povertie and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, than sighes; pretending to bring nothing but the plentifull promises of Salvation, Teares in his Eyes, Oyle and Honey in his *Mouth*, and the most exquisite Picture of true Holinesse, which it is possible for the art or Hypocrisie of mans Invention to draw out: How can the Vnderstanding of weake and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto beliefe, by those two Credulous Qualities, of *Ignorance* and *Feare*) but be made inclinable to receive, not onely

onely willingly, but with greedineſſe alſo, whatſoever poyſonous Doctrine, under pretence of wholeſome and ſaving phyſick, ſuch a ſubtill Impoſtor ſhall adminiſter unto them? Such a great force there is in Voluntary Humilitie, neglecting of the body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to inſinuate and take poſſeſſion of weake and credulous Natures: with whom haply, more Reall, Serious, and Spirituall Argumenrs, comming with leſſe pompe and oſtentation, would not prevaile.

——*Captique dolis, lacrimiſque coactis*
Quos neque Tydides nec Lariſſæus Achilles.
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinæ.

They are ſurpriz'd by *frauds* and forced teares,
In whom their greateſt foes could work no fears;
Whom ten years war not won, nor thouſand ſhips
Are ſnar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

The ſecond manner of *Corruption*, which *Paſſion* uſeth on the Underſtanding and Will, was *Alienating* or withdrawing of Reaſon from the ſerious examination of thoſe *Pleaſures*, wherewith it deſireth to poſſeſſe the *Minde*, without controule: that when it cannot ſo farre prevaile, as to blind and ſeduce Reaſon: getting the allowance and *Affirmative Conſent* 2.

thereof, it may yet at least so farre inveagle it, as to with-hold it from any *Negative Determination*, and to keepe off the *Minde* from a serious and impartiall consideration of what *Appetite* desireth: for feare least it should be convinced of Sinne, and so finde the lesse sweetnesse in it.

2 Pet. 3. 5. And this is the Reason of that affected and *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which Saint *Peter* speaks of; whereby *Minds* prepossessed with a love of Inordinate courses, doe with-hold and divert Reason, and forbeare to examine that Truth, which indeed they know; as fearing, least thereby they should be deterred from those Vices, which they resolve to follow. Which is the same with that excellent *Mataphore* in Saint

Rom. 1. 18. *Paul*; who saith, That *the wrath of God was revealed from Heaven, on all ungodlinesse and Vnrighteousnes of Men, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, which hold or detaine the Truth in Vnrighteousnesse*: that is, which imprison and keepe in that τὸ γνωστὸν Θεοῦ, as the Apostle interpreteth himselfe in the next verse; all those Notions of Divine Truth, touching the Omnipotencie and Justice of God, which were by the finger of Nature written within them, to deterre them from, or (if not) to make them inexcusable, in those unnaturall pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus *Medea* in the Poets

Καὶ μὰ Δία νῶ μεν οὐδὲν ἀρᾶν μέλλο κακά,
Θυμὸς δ' ἐ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμὴν βελευμάτων.

Euripi. Medea
Vid. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 284. Edit. Heins.

I know 'tis wicked that I go about,
But Paſsion hath put all my Reaſon out.

And therefore, that Maxime of the Stoicall Philoſopher, out of *Plato*, is falſe; Πασα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στερῆται τῆς ἀληθείας, That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth; ſince, as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, directly agreeable to the phraſe of Saint *Peter*, there is Ἄγνοια ὀκ προαιρέσεως, an elected or *Voluntarie Ignorance*, which for their Securities ſake, men nouriſh themſelves in.

Arria. Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 28. Ariſtot. Ethic. lib. 3 cap. 1. Malunt neſcire quia jam oderunt. Tertul. Apol. c. 1. Βούλη τὴ Ἄγνοια. Juſtin. lib. qu. & Rep. q. 140. Ψα δοιεκούσιον. Clem. Alex.

And that there ſhould be ſuch an *Alienation* of the *Minde* from Truth, when the Fancie and Heart are hot with *Paſsion*, cannot be any great wonder: For, the *Soule* is of a limited and *determined Activitie* in the Body; inſomuch, that it cannot with perſpicuitie and diligence give attendance unto diverſe Objects. And therefore, when a *Paſsion* in its fullneſſe, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more cleare and naked brightneſſe of Truth is ſuſpended and changed: So that as the Sunne and *Moone* at their riſing and ſetting, ſeem farre greater then at other times, by reaſon of thick Vapours which are then interpoſed: ſo, the *Minde* looking upon things through the *Miſts* and Troubles of *Paſsion*, cannot poſſibly judge

of them, in their owne proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and diſtemper.

But then, thirdly, if *Reaſon* will neither be *deluded* nor wonn over to the patronage of *Evill*, nor *diverted* from the knowledge and notice of *Good*; then doth *Paſsion* ſtrive to confound and diſtract the Apprehenſions thereof, that they may not with any firmeneſſe or efficacie of Diſcourſe, interrupt the Current of ſuch irregular and head-ſtrong Motions. And this is a moſt inward and proper effect of *Paſsion*: For, as things preſented to the *Minde*, in the nakedneſſe and ſimplicity of their owne Truth, doe gaine a more firme Aſſent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; ſo, on the contrarie, thoſe things which come mixt and troubled, dividing the intention of the *Minde* betweene *Truth* and *Paſſion*, cannot obtaine any ſetled or ſatisfactorie Reſolution from the Diſcourſes of *Reaſon*.

And this is the Cauſe of that *Reluctancie* betweene the *Knowledge* and *Deſires* of *Incontinent* Men, and others of the like Nature: For, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves of them, they are but ἡμιπόνηροι, *Halfe-Evill*, as not ſinning with that full and plenarie Conſent of *will*, but *Præter Electionem*, as he ſpeakes; ſo I may more truly ſay of them, that they have but an *Halfe Knowledge*, not any diſtinct and applicative

Ethic. l. 7. c. 10. In confinio concupiſcentiæ & pœnitentiæ aſpera & tumultuoſa gaudia. Plutarch lib. Philoſophand. cum princip.

plicative Apprehenſion of Truth, but a confuſed and broken Conceit of things in their Generalitie: Not much unlike unto Night-talkers, who cannot bee ſayd to be throughly aſleepe, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kinde of inordinate temper betweene both; or (as *Ariſtotle* himſelf gives the ſimilitude) it is like a *Stage-Player*, whoſe Knowledge is expreſſe and cleare enough, but the things which it is converſant about, are not perſonall and particular to thoſe men, but belonging unto others whom they perſonate: So, the *Principles* of ſuch men are in the generall, Good and True; but they are never brought downe ſo lowe, as if they did concerne a mans owne particular Weale or Woe, not thorowly weighed with an aſſuming, applying, concluding Conſcience; but, like the Notion of a Drunken or ſleeping man, are choaked and ſmothered with the Miſts of *Paſſion*. *Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 3.*

And this third Corruption is that, which *Ariſtotle*, in the particular of *Incontinencie*, calleth Ἀσθένεια, the *Weakneſſe* and diſabilitie of *Reaſon*, to keepe cloſe to her own Principles and Reſolutions: Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet; *How weake is thy heart, ſeeing thou doeſt all theſe things, the workes of an imperious Whoriſh Woman?* And elſewhere, Whoredome and Wine are ſayd to *take away the heart*. So *Hector* deſcribes laſcivious *Paris*: *Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 7.* *Ezek. 16 30.* *Hoſ. 4 11.*

—— κἄλον,

——— καλὸν,
Εἶδος ἐτ' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδὲ τις ἀλκὴ.

Iliad. γ. 45.

Thy face hath beautie in't, but in thy breſt
There doth no ſtrength nor reſolution reſt.

The laſt Effect (which I ſhall but name) is that which *Ariſtotle* calleth Προπέτεια, *Raſhneſie* or *Precipitancie*; which is the moſt Tyrannicall Violence which *Paſsion* uſeth; when, in ſpight of all the Dictates of *Reaſon*, it furiouſly over-ruleth the *will*, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaſeth to put in practiſe: and like a Torrent, carryeth all before it: or, as the Prophet ſpeaks, *ruſheth like an Horſe into the Battell*: So *Luſt* and *Anger* are ſometimes in the Scripture called *Madneſſe*: becauſe it tranſporteth the Soule beyond all bounds of Wiſedome or Counſell, and by the Dictates of *Reaſon* takes occaſion to become more outragious, *Ipſaque præſidea occupat*, feeds like Wild-fire upon thoſe Remedies, which ſhould remove it: As ſhe ſaid in the Poet:

Jer. 50. 38.
Pſal. 102 8.
Eccleſ. 9.3.
Luke 6.11.

Sene. Medea.

Levis eſt dolor, qui capere conſilium poteſt,
Libet ire contra.

That's but light griefe, which counſell can abate:
Mine ſwels, and all advice reſolves to hate.

The

The Corrupt effects which Paſsion worketh in the laſt place on the Body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the paſsions; ſometimes too ſudden and violent, ſometimes too heavie oppreſsion of the heart; or other, ſudden perturbation of the ſpirits. Thus old *Ely* dyed, with ſudden grief; *Diodorus*, with ſhame; *Sophocles*, *Chilo* the *Lacedemonian*, and others, with joy; Nature being not able to beare that great and ſudden immutation, which theſe Paſsions made in the Body. The cauſes and manner of which concitation, I referre (as being inquiries not ſo directly pertinent to the preſent purpoſe) unto Naturall Philoſophers and Phyſicians. And from the Generalitie of Paſsions, I proceed unto the conſideration of ſome particulars, according to the order of their former diviſion: In all which, I ſhall forbeare this long Method of the antecedents, Concomitants, and Conſequents of their Acts, (many particulars whereof, being in the ſame nature in all Paſsions, will require to be obſerved only in one or two, and ſo proportionally conceived in the reſt) and ſhall inſiſt principally in thoſe particulars which I handle on the cauſes and effects of them; as being Conſiderations, wherein commonly they are moſt ſerviceable or prejudiciall to our Nature.

CHAP. IX.

Of the affection of Love, of Love naturall, of generall communion, of Love rationall, the object and generall cause thereof.

NOw the two first and fundamentall Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the Pasion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every morall object is a cause, though not every cause an object) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kinde of expansion or egresse of the heart and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawne and attracted, whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and generall cause of Love. Now, as in Nature, so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is that naturall or impressed sympathie of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline to an union with the other, by reason of some secret vertues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutuall friendship, as betweene Iron and the Loadstone: The other, is that common and more discernable attraction which every thing receives from those natures or places, whereon they are ordained and directed by the Wisdome and Provi-

Providence of the first Cause, to depend both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, so is He in his Pallace, (if I may so call it) the World, a God of Order, disposing every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, so sweetly, as that is all harmonious, (from which harmonie, the Philosophers have concluded a Divine Providence) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.

Arrian. Epict. li. 1 ca. 6.

And this Order and Wisdom is seen chiefely in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and happie inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto Him who is the Fountaine, whence issue all the streames of their limited being, and the fulnesse of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though something too Poetically, seemeth to have expressed:

Principio Cælum ac Terras camposque liquentes
Lucentemque globum Lunæ Titaniaque Astra
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per Artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

Æneid. lib. 6. Pet. Crinit. li. 6. c. 12.

(Lights,
Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all those glorious
Which beautifie the Day, and rule the nights,
A Divine inward Vigour, like a Soule,
Diffus'd through every joint of this great Whole,
Doth vegetate, and with a constant force,
Guideth each Nature through its fixed course.

* *Græci enim τὸ πᾶν vocant.*

And such is the naturall motion of each thing to its owne Sphere and Center; where is both the most proper place of its consisting, and withall the greatest freedome from forreine injury or violence.

But we must here withall, take notice of the generall care of the Creator; whereby he hath fastned on all creatures, not only this private desire to satisfie the demands of their own nature, but hath also stamp't upon them a generall charitie and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Universe or common Body; wherein cannot possible be admitted (by reason of that necessary mutuall connexion betweene the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclind the nature of these necessary agents, so to worke out of their discords the perfect harmonie of the whole, that if by any casualty it fall out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformitie, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniforme and naturall motions of the particulars; they then must prevent such damage and reproch, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their own natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whereunto considered in their own determinate qualities, they have an essentiall reluctancie. Which propertie and sence of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set downe, 1 *Cor.* 12. where he renders this reason of all, that there might be *no*

Schisme

Schisme in the Body: which likewise he divinely applyeth in the mysticall sence, that all the severall *gifts of the Spirit* to the Church, should drive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common Fountaine; and should never be used, without that knitting qualitie of *Love*, to which he elsewhere properly ascribeth the building, concinnation, and perfecting of the *Saints*.

1 *Cor.* 8. 1. *Ephes.* 4. 12.

Now, as it hath pleased the infinite Wisdome of God to guide and moderate, by his owne immediate direction, the motions of necessarie agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the generall end, (which motion may therefore, as I before observed, be called the naturall Passion of things) so hath it given unto Man a reasonable Soule, to be as it were his Vice-gerent in all the motions of Mans little World.

To apply then these proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we shall finde first a Secret, which I will call Naturall; and next, a Manifest, which I call a Morall and more discursive attraction. The first of these, is that naturall sympathie wrought betweene the affection and the object, in the first meeting of them, without any Passion of the person, till farther inquirie after the disposition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, naturall, and sensitive Vertues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beautie, motion, speech behaviour; all which comming under the spheare

of Sense, I include under the name of Judiciarie Physiognomie: Which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities; but a farther presumption of the Judgement; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that soule, which animateth and quickneth these outward Graces.

Ethic. lib. 8. And indeed, if it be true which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* tels us, That similitude is the ground of Love; and if there be no naturall Love stronger than that which is betweene the Body and the Soule, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the Soule with those lovely impressions of Nature which we finde in the Body, and may by the same reason collect a mutuall discoverie, by which we acknowledge a mutuall sympathie betweene them. And therefore it was no ill counsell (though not alwayes to be heeded) *Cave tibi ab iis quos natura signavit*, to take heed of such who like *Cain* have any marke of notorious deformitie set upon them by Nature. And therefore *Homer* speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of *Thersites*, fits him with a Body answerable to such a Mind.

Iliad. β. 217.

——αἰσχιστος δε ανηρ ὑπὸ Ιλιὸν ἦλθε
φόλκος ἦεν χωλὸς δ' ἑτερον πόδα, τὼ δέ οἱ ὦμω
κύρτω ἔτη σὴ θ' συνοχωκότε ἄντορ υπήρθε
φόξος ἦην κεφαλὴν ψεδνὴ δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.

The most ill-shapen man that to Troy *came,*
With eye distorted, and in each foot lame,

His

His ſhoulders crooked, to his breſt ſhrunk down,
A ſharp wrye head, here and there patcht with down.

But yet herein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much auſteritie of Mind, to reject the judgement of ſenſe, and to quarrell with this naturall inſtinct; yet it is fit, that in this caſe, conſidering the deceitfulneſſe of things, and what a divers habit, Education or Hypocriſie hath wrought in many, betweene the out and inſide of their Natures, that we ſhould, I ſay, bring a fearfull judgement, like love of *Bias* the Philoſopher, which may eaſily, upon good warrant and aſſurance, alter it ſelf: otherwiſe, when a thing is throughly knowne to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repoſe themſelves in it.

But here likewiſe we muſt obſerve that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot ſtand in private towards one particular, without damage and inconvenience to the publique Body, Politique or Eccleſiaſticall, whereof we are members, the generall muſt ever be eſteemed more deare and precious. A ſcandall to the body, and a Schiſme from the whole, is more dangerous and unnaturall, than any private Diviſions: for, if there be a wound or ſwelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoyning will be content to ſubmit themſelves unto paine, for the recoverie of that; and rather than it ſhall periſh, ſuffer any trouble which may conduce to the relieſe thereof.

And

And this is the Love of fellow members, among themselves. But then, if any part be so farre corrupted, as that it doth more easier derive its contagion upon others, than admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered; or, if the whole Body be readie to perish by Famine; then doth the Sence of Communitie so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruell amongst themselves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the safety of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the Faction betweene the Belly and the Members, was wisely applyed by *Menenius Agrippa*, in a Rebellion amongst the people of *Rome*; to shew how unnaturall a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their own private Discontents, when the Weale publique is together therewithall endangered.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Rule of true Love: the Love of God and our ſelves: ſimilitude to theſe, the cauſe of Love in other things: of Love of Concupiſcence: how Love begetteth Love; and how preſence with, and abſence from the object, doth upon different reſpects exerciſe and increaſe Love.

FRom this *generall* and fundamentall cauſe of *Love*, proceed ſome others, *ſpeciall* and particular, whereof, the firſt and principall is a *ſimilitude* and reſemblance betweene the thing *loved*, and that which is the Naturall *Rule* of *Love*.

Now, the Rule of all Love, is by divine Truth preſcribed to be *God*, and a *Mans ſelfe*; ſo that, what beareth ſimilitude to theſe, is the proper and right Object of our Affection. To ſpeake therefore a word or two of theſe. *Ariſt. Probl. ſect. 10 ſect. 51.*

The Maſter-Wheele, or firſt Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Paſſion, is the *Love of God*, grounded on the right *knowledge* of Him; whereby the Soule being raviſhed with the apprehenſion of his infinite *Goodneſſe*, is earneſtly drawne and * *called out*, as it were, to deſire an *Vnion*, *Viſion*, and participation of his Glory and Preſence; yeelding up it ſelfe unto Him, (for *Καλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλεῖν.

by * *Love* a man giveth himselfe to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its Affections and Actions to his Will.

And this *Love* is then *Regular*, when it takes up all the *kinds* of *Love*, and all the *degrees* of *Love*. For we *love God*, *Amore amicitiæ*, for the *Goodnesse* and Excellency which is in himselfe, as being most *lovely*; and *Amore desiderii*, with a desire of being united unto him, as the Fountaine of all our *blessednesse*; and *Amore complacentiæ*, with a *love* of joy and *delight* in him; when the Soule goes to God, like *Noahs* Dove to the Arke, and with infinite sweetnesse and securitie reposeth it selfe in him; and lastly, *Amore Benevolentiæ*, with an endeavour (so farre as a poore Creature can to an infinite Creator; *for our God extendeth not unto him*) to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.

And thus we are to *love him above all things*; first, *Appretiativè*, setting an higher price upon his Glory and Command, than upon any other thing besides; all Dung, in comparison. Secondly, *Intensive*, with the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our Love of him: Thirdly, *Adæquate*, as the compleat, perfect, and *adæquate object* of all our *Love*, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the Wise-man speaking of the Love and Feare of God, tells us, that it is *Totum Hominis*, the *whole of Man*. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto severall Faculties; Beautie to the Eye, Musick to the Eare, Meat to the Palate, Learn-

* *Amor non nisi donum amantis in Amatum. Guiliel. Paris. de Legibus, c. 19.*

Learning to the Mind; none of these can satisfie the Facultie, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring *Vanitie* and *Vexation* with them: *Vanitie*, because they are *empty*, and doe *deceive*; and because they are *mortall*, and will *decay*: *Vexation*, in the Getting, for that is with Labour; in the keeping, for that is with Feare; in the Multiplying, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfet, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is *Totum Hominis*, fitted to all the wants of an immortall Soule: *Fullnesse*, to make us *perfectly* happy: *Immortality*, to make us *perpetually* happy: after whom we hunger with desire, and are not griped: on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be *loved*, not with a divided, but a *Whole Heart*. To *love* any Creature either *without God*, or *above God*, is *Cupiditas*, *Lust*, (which is the *formale* of every sinne, whereby we turne from God to other things) but to *love* the *Creatures under God*, in their right *order*: and *for God*, to their right *end*, (for hee made all things for himselfe) this is *Charitas*, true and regular *Love*.

Matth. 22. 37. *e*

Vid. August. d[1] *Doct. Christ. l.* c. 22. *& li.* 3. c. 10 *& de Trinitat l.* 8. *ca.* 3. *& l.* 9. *c.* 8.

Now, the Image and likenesse of God (not to speake of that Eternall and Essentiall *Character of his fathers brightnesse*) is in his *Word*, and in his *Workes*: the one, being the manifestation of his *Will*: and the other, of his *Power* and *Wisedome*. Our *love* to his *Word*, is our *search* of it: as being the onely *Glasse*, wherein we see the Won-

ders and deepe things of God: our *Beleefe* of it, *All*, and *Onely*: acknowledging in it, the fullnesse of its *Truth*, and of its *sufficiency*: and our *Obedience* to it, submitting our selves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the *workes of God*, there are two chiefe things whereunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures *attracted*, and wherewith it desires an *Vnion*, namely, the *Truth* and *Goodnesse* of them: for by these onely, may all the diverse Faculties of Mans Soule be exercised and delighted: The Love of both which, is then only *Regular*, when it is *limited*, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act: *Humble*, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity: and lastly, *subordinate* unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in the Creature, then as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.

I come now unto that other *Rule of Love*, wherein *Aristotle* hath placed the Nature thereof, *A mans selfe*, or that unity and proportion which the thing *loved* beareth unto the party *loving*, which in one place, he calleth ἰσότης, *Equality*; in another, ταυτότης, *Identitie*; in another, ὁμοιότης, *Similitude*; in another, κοινωνία, *Communion*; all Relative-tearmes, which referre unto the *party loving*.

Ἕτεροι αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος. *Arist. lib. 9. cap. 9. Ethic. lib. 8. cap. 9. 12. Lib. 9. cap. 39.*

The Root of every mans *love* unto *himselfe*, is that *unity* and *identity* which he hath with *himselfe*; it being naturall to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of its owne being: because

the more *simple* and *One* it is, the more it is like the *Fountaine* of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this *love* of Man unto *himselfe*, if *subordinate* unto the *love of God*, and *governed* thereby, is *Debitum naturæ*, a necessary Debt; and such, as the neglect whereof, is a trespasse against Nature. *Aristot. Ethic. lib. 9. cap. 4. 8.*

Now then, as we *love* our *selves*, for the *unity* which we have in our selves; so, whersoever we find any *similitude* to our *selves*, or character of our *selves*, either in *Nature* or *Habits*, upon that also do the beames of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may represent our selves first, in *Substance*: as the Husband and Wife are said to be *one flesh*, and Children are branches and portions of their Parents: Secondly, in *Qualities* or Accidents: as one *man* resembleth another in *Naturall*: and one *friend* another in *Habituall* Qualities: *as Face answereth to Face in Water, so the heart of Man to Man.* *Arist Magnor. Mor l. 1. c. 34.*

With respect unto this double *Similitude*, there is a double *Love*: the one, *Naturall*: the other acquired, or *Habituall*: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in *Ælian*, *Plutarch*, and others, we read of the Naturall affection of Elephants: which seeing their young fallen into a deep Pit, will leape downe after them, though it be present death: and of the marvellous *cunning* and *valour* which many other Birds and Beasts use to provide for the safetie of their Brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered: *Ælian. lib. de Anim. 2. c. 40. Lib. 2. c. 25. Lib. 6. c. 9. Lib. 9. c. 8. Lib 11. c. 38. Plutarch. de Solert. Anim. & de Amore. Aristot. Hist. Anim. lib. 9. c. 4. 8.*

Yea, the *Pelican* (if we believe the ſtory) doth feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with Serpents, with her own blood to recover them againe: which Embleme *Iohn* the ſecond, King of *Portugall* is ſaid to have choſen, whereby to expreſſe his *Love* to his ſubjects: And *Homer* elegantly expreſſeth the care of a Bird feeding her young ones.

Sophocles in Electra, & ibi Scholiaſt. p. 127 Tholeſſ. de Repub. lib. 8. c. 1. Sect. 19.

Iliad. 1. 324.

——ὅππῃσι νεοσσοῖσι φορφάσσῃσι
Μάσσα κ' ἐσσὶ κιλαίῃσι, κακὼς δ' ἄ ἐξοὶ πέλει αὐτῇ.

She brings her young ones what meat ſhe can find,
When ſhe her ſelfe with hunger's almoſt pin'd.

And the like affection, another Poet hath expreſſed in the moſt cruell of all the Beaſts, the Tyger:

Statius. Theb. lib. 10.

——*Sic Aſpra Tygris*
Fœtibus abreptis Scythico deſerta ſub Antro
Accubat, & lepedi lambit veſtigia lecti.

——The Tyger (which moſt thirſts for blood)
Seeing her ſelf rob'd of her tender brood,
Lies down lamenting in her *Scythian* Den, (lyen.
And licks the prints where her loſt whelps had

Ælian. l. de animal. 2. cap. 40.

And this kind of *Pietie* we finde *Recipocrall*, returning from the young ones upward: ſo the young Lyons are ſaid to feed and provide for their old ones; which is alſo obſerv'd of Eagles, Storkes and other creatures. And hence wee read

read of νόμοι πελαργικοὶ, *Laws*, which receive their denomination from the *Stork*, providing that children ſhould nouriſh and take care of their Parents in their diſtreſſe. And for men, ſo great is the power of naturall affection, that Parents deſire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vitious men (as *Seneca* ſomewhere ſpeaketh) deſire that their ſonnes may bee vertuous, and vertuous men that they may bee more worthy and happy than themſelves, as *Hector* prayed for his ſonne.

& *lib.*3. *c.*23. & *lib.* 9. *c.* 1. & *l.*10 *c.*16. *Plutarch. de ſolert. animal. Ariſtoph. in lib* 10. *c.*23. & *lib.*8. *c.*57.

Καὶ ποτέ τις εἰπὶ πατρὸς ὃδε πόλλον ἀμείνων. *Iliad.*1.480.

Let it beſaid, here's a brave Son indeed,
Who doth his noble Father farre exceed.

And *Æneas* to *Aſcanius.*

Diſce puer virtutem ex me, veroſque labores,
Fortunam ex aliis, ——— *Ænead. lib.*12.

Virtue and Patience learne my ſonne of me,
But may thy fortunes better Patterns ſee.

And therefore *unnaturalneſſe* of affection is reckoned up by the Apoſtle amongſt the fouleſt of ſinnes, when like *Iſmael* the nature of men groweth wilde and brutiſh, as the Philoſopher calleth ſuch men θηριώδεις, men of ſavage and fierce dipoſitions. And therefore in the Scripture an unnaturall man is called *Onagar homo*, a wilde- 2 *Tim.* 3.3.

wilde-aſſe man, *Gen.* 16. 12. *Ioh.* 11. 12. but a meeke and tender-ſpirited man is called *Ovis homo*, a Sheepe-man, or a man of a ſociable and calme diſpoſition, *Ezek.* 36. 37. 38. And amongſt the *Thebans* there was a Law made, which appointed a Capitall penalty upon thoſe unnaturall men, who ſhould caſt out and expoſe their children unto ruine.

Æ'ian. var. hiſt. l.2. c.7.

And as this kind of Love ariſeth from *Propinquity of Nature*, ſo another there is growing out of *Similitude of Manners*. All fleſh, as *Hyracides* ſpeakes, will *reſort to their like, and every man will keepe company with ſuch, as he is himſelfe*; as we ſee learned men hold correſpondency with thoſe that are learned, and good with thoſe that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, ſhall ever want Friends; becauſe every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the ſame reaſon that a man by the ſtudy or practice of any good things laboureth to commend himſelfe to his owne judgement, and to the love of others; he is ingaged (unleſſe he will be falſe to his owne grounds) to love any other whom hee obſerveth to ſtudy, and practice the ſame thing: For how can I expect, that that in me ſhould reape *Love* from others, which in others reapeth nothing but *Envie* from me? And upon this reaſon it is, that a man can hardly permit another to *love* that, which he himſelfe hateth; becauſe we are too apt to make our *Iudgements* or *Paſſions* the rule of another mans, and to diſlike that

Eccleſ. 13.17. Α'εὶ ἡ χρησὸς χρησὸν ὀυ μισεῖ ποτε. *Menand. Thirſitis vitia, non aliter indicas Homerus quàm quod eſſet viris præſtantiſſimis Achilli & Vlyſſi inviſus. Iliad. 2. Vid. Ariſtot. Pro* §.10 *q.*51 Τετὶξ μὲν πίτνα φίλος μυρμαχι δὲ μύρμαξ, *&c. Theod. Idil. 9.* Φιλία ἐς μόνους σπυδαίους διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα. *Stoici apud Diog. Laert. in Z'non. l.7. Maxim. Tyrius diſſert.* 4.

in

in him, which we do not allow in our ſelves: Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently deſcribed in *Achilles*; when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and *Agamemnon*:

——Οὐδέ πῃ σε χρὴ
Τὸν φιλέοντ', ἴνα μοί μοι ἀπηχθόμενος φιλέῃσθα,
Καλὸν τοὶ σεῦ ἐμοὶ ἦ κήδεσιν ὅς κε μὶ κήδῃ. *Iliad ι. 610.*

It is not courteous, that where I hate, you
Should love, except you'ld haue me hate you too:
But take this rule, If you'll be thought my freind,
The man that offends me, do you offend.

So much naturally are men in love with their owne *likeneſſe*, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated: and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey. *Plutarch. de Adulat. & Amicis.*

It is true, that in ſome caſes, *similitude* is the cauſe of *Envie*; but this is onely then, when *firſt* the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality: in which caſe, the meeting of ſuch men in one diſpoſition, is but like the meeting of two rough Streams which makes them run with the more noiſe: Therefore, a wiſe and a meek-tempered man ſhall ſooner win and hold the *love* of an angry man, then he who is like unto him in that diſtemper; becauſe ſuch a man (though indeed he be Conqueror, in regard of his Wiſdom) yet by his

his Patience he seemeth to yeeld: and there is nothing which a mans Passion loves so much as Victory. Whereas between Anger and Anger there must needs be fighting of affections, which is the remotest temper from *Love*.

Secondly, when by accident the quality wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulnesse, or profit. For as the Stars, though they agree in light, yet *Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur*, those that are small, suffer losse by the brightnesse of others: So amongst men agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,

Plin. Panyg.

Hesiod.

Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ χθονεῖ, καὶ τέκτων τέκτονι.

The potter's often angry with his mates,
One neighbour-Architect the other hates.

And therefore as the Sun and Moon agree best in their light when they are fartheſt asunder, so in these Arts which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance because thereby the one doth the lesse damage or darken the other.

Now this *Natural* and *Habitual Love* is then regular, when *subordinate* to that greater, our Love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly-informed *Reason*; which amongst many others, are these three:

Δεῖ μὲ συμπεφῆκεν, ἀλλα μίχεσθαμᾶν. *Vid. A. Gell. lib.* 1. *cap.* 3.

First

First, That our *Love* carry its right respect, and no sinister or by-end with it: That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit: For, as the [a] Philosopher speaks, true *Love* is a *benevolent* Affection, willing good unto another for his own sake. *Hominum Charitas*, saith *Cicero*, *gratuita est*. True *Love* is *free*, and without self-respects: whereas to shroud our own private aimes under the name of Friendship, *Non est amicitia sed mercatura*, is onely to make a Trade and Merchandize of one another.

[a] Rhet. l. 46. 4.

De Nat. deor. l. 1

Senec. Epist. 9.

Secondly, That our *Love* be *serene*, not mudded with Errour and Prejudice: * in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses, that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of *Polydamus* to *Hector*:

* Ἀλλ' ἐ χρὴ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τετάσθαι βουλὴν ἀγαθὴν παρὰ δαίμονος, &c. *Eurip. Rhes.* 106.

Οὕνεκα τοι πολέμῳ θεὸς ὤπασε ἔργα,
Τοὔνεκα καὶ βουλὴν ἐπιτάλλεις πείθεσθαι ἄλλοις;
Ἀλλ' ἐ πῶς ἅμα πάντα δυνήσεται, &c.

Because thou canst in War all men out-do,
Wilt thou presume thou canst in Counsel too?
One breast's too narrow to contain all Arts;
God distributes his gifts in several parts.

Iliad. 9. 700. *de Vid. Plutarch. de Anim. Tranquil. Cicer. ad Articum, l.* 14. *ep.* 13.

In this case therefore our care must be, To discern between the abilities and infirmities of

men, that our Honour and Love of the *Person* render not his *weaknesses* beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappie diligence in the imitation of them. *Vix enim dici potest, quanto libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus*; Love is very apt to transport us so far, as to make us imitate the errours of whom we love. Like unskilful Painters, who not being able to reach the *beauty* of the face, expresse onely the *wrinkles* and blemishes of it.

Quintil. l. c. 2. & l. 10. c. 2.

Plutarch. de Adulat.

Thirdly, that our Love keep in all the *kindes* thereof its due proportion, both for the *nature* of them, being towards some a *love of Reverence*, towards others of *friendship*, towards others of *Compassion*, towards other of *Counsel* and *Bounty*; as also for their several *degrees* of *intention*, which are to be more or lesse according to the *Natural*, *Moral*, or *Divine* obligations which we finde in the persons loved. For though we must *love All men as Our selves*, yet that infers not an *Equality*, but a *Fidelity* and *Sincerity* of *love*; Since even within Our selves, there is no man but loves his *Head*, and his *Heart*, and other vital parts, with a closer Affection then those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repairable. And therefore the Apostle limiteth the μαλιστα, the greatest *degree* of our *Love* upon two objects; those of our *own house*, and those of the *household of faith*; not excluding others, but preferring these.

1 Tim. 5. 8. Gal. 6. 10.

I shall end this particular with naming one *Species* of *Love* more (for all this hitherto hath been *Amor Amicitiæ*, a Love of a Person for him-

himself) and it is that which the Schools call *Amor Concupiſcentiæ*, a love of *Concupiſcence* or a *Circular love*, that which begins and ends in a *Mans ſelf*, when his Affections having gone forth to ſome object, doth again return home, and loves it not *directly* for any *abſolute* goodneſſe which it hath in it ſelf, but as it is *conducible* and bears a relation of *Commivence* to him that loves it. For though all affection of *Love* (as *Ariſtotle* obſerved) be *Circular*, in as much as the *Object* firſt moves the *Appetite*, and then the *Appetite* moves to the *Object*, and ſo the motion ceaſeth where it began (which is a Circle;) which alſo by the way ſhews us in an Embleme the firmneſſe and ſtrength which *Love* works amongſt men; becauſe, of all Forms and Fabricks, thoſe which are *Circular* are the ſtrongeſt; as we ſee in Arches, wherein every part doth mutually touch and claſp in that which is next it:) Yet in this *Love* which I here ſpeak of, there is a greater *Circle*; in that, after all this, there is another Regreſſe from the Object to the Appetite, applying the goodneſſe thereof unto the ſame, and loving it onely for the commodity and benefit, which the minde is likely to receive from it.

Another ſubordinate and leſſe principal *cauſe* of *Love*, may be *Love* it ſelf; I mean in another man: for as it is natural, according to *Ariſtotle*, to praiſe, ſo ſure it is to love, φιλάνθρωποι, men of loving and good natures: and ſo he maketh juſt, beneficient and pleaſant; Καὶ ὅλως τὸν σπεδραῖον φιλοφίλους, men that are true lovers of their own friends to be

Ethic. l. 8. ca. 1. & li. 9 ca. 1.

be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that *Love is strong as death*. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his enemies (it being unnatural to *hate* the dead, whom we cannot *hurt*: for the utmost harm that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of *Thebes*, *Æteocles* and *Polynices*;

Statius Thebaid. *Nec furiis post fata modus, flammæque rebelles*
Seditione rogi.——

Their furies were not bounded by their fate;
Ones funeral-flame the others flame did hate.)

Even so likewise a mans *Love* hath a power to bury his enemies, and to draw unto it self the most backward and differing affections: for being of a transient nature, and carrying forth it self into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other natural Agents) worketh semblable and alike affections unto it self. For besides that hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity, he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witnesse, his Conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, *Saul*, the patern of raging and unreasonable envie, was sometimes brought to relent, and accuse himself. And this is the occa-

Pessimam causam meam hodierna pietas fecit; prorsus nocens, quicunque visus tam bono fratri est nocens. Senec. in Thyeste.

sion

sion (as I take) of that speech of *Solomon*: *If thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coles of fire upon his head.* Which, though perhaps with earthy and base mindes, it hath a property of hardning and confirming them in their hatred; yet, with mindes ingenuous and noble, it hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the Apostle telleth us, that *we love God, because he loved us first*; and *Mary Magdalene* having had *much forgiven her*, did therefore *love Christ much*. And therefore the Poets counsel is good:

Prov. 25. 21.

Nimis durus est animus, quidlectionem, si nolebat impendere, nolit reperdere. Aug. de Catech. Rudib. c. 4.

1 *Joh.* 4. 19. *Luk.* 7. 47.

Στέργετε τὺς φιλέοντας ἰν' ἄν φιλεῦσι φιλῆτε.

Theocrit.

If for thy Love thy self wouldst loved be,
Shew love to those that do shew love to thee.

Vin' ut ameris? ama. Martial.

The next two Causes which I conceive of Love, I will joyn in one: namely, the *absence* from, and contrarily, the *presence* with the thing *loved*: both which in a different respect, do exercise *Love*. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of *Aristotle*, that though distance of place do not dissolve the *root* and *habit*, yet it doth the exercise and *acts* of *Love*; except he meant it (as I suppose he doth) of the *transient acts* thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of *Love* and *Beneficence* to another. For, as in natural bodies there is not onely a *Complacencie* or *Delight in* their proper place, when they *enjoy* it; but an innate-

Ethic. lib. 8. *c.* 5

nate propension and *motion* thereunto, when they are *absent* from it; so in the minde of man (whose [a] *Love* is his *weight*) there is not onely a *Love* of *Delight* in the *fruition*, but a *Love* likewise of *Desire*, in the *privation* of a *Good*, which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth it selfe upon it: [b] as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresseth the love of *Dido* to *Æneas*:

Illum absens absentem auditque videtque.

When night had sever'd them apart,
She heard and saw him in her heart.

And it is the wonder of *Love* (as Saint *Chrysostome* speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things far seperated from each other: Wherein stands the Mystery of the *Communion* of the *Church* on Earth, both with it selfe, in all the dispersed members of it, and with *Christ* the Head, and that other part of it which *triumpheth* in Heaven. So that herein, *Divine love* hath the same kinde of vertue with *Divine Faith*; that as this is the *being* and *subsisting* of things *to come*, and distant in *Time*; so that is the *Union* and knitting of things *absent*, and distant in *Place*.

But then, much more doth *Presence* to the goodnesse of an object *loved*, encrease and exercise our Love; because it gives us a more compleat sight of it, and union unto it. And therefore Saint *John* speaks of a *Perfection*, and Saint *Paul*

a *Animus amare refertur, sicut corpus pondere. Aug. de Civit. Dei. l.* 11. *c.* 28. *Pondus meum amor meus, eo fertor quocunque feror. Confess. lib.* 13 *cap* 9. *&* *Epist.* 89.

b *Plutarch. sympos l.* 5. *q.* 7. *Æneid. l.* 4.

Τὰς ἐκ πολλῶν διαστημάτων ὄντας σώματα γεῖν καὶ συνδεῖν. *in* 1 *Cor.* 10. 30.

1. *Joh.* 4. 18.

Paul of a *Perpetuitie* of our *Love* unto *God*, grounded on the fulneſſe of the *Beatificall Viſion*, when we ſhal be *for ever with the Lord*; whereas now, *ſeeing onely in a glaſſe darkely*, as we *know*, ſo likewiſe we *love but in part only*. And *Ariſtotle* makes Mutuall *Converſation* and Societie one of the greateſt bonds of *Love*; becauſe thereby is a more immediate exerciſe; and from thence, a greater increaſe of Affection.

1 Cor. 13. 8

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5

As living * Creatures, ſo Affections are *nouriſhed* after the ſame manner as they are *produced*. Now it is neceſſary, for the firſt working of *Love*, that the Object have ſome manner of *Preſence* with the Affection, either by a *Knowledge* of *Viſion*, or of *Faith*. And therefore Saint *Paul* ſaith, *If they had knowne, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory*; their Ignorance and hatred of Him went both together: *Simul ut deſinunt ignorare, ceſſant & odiſſe*; as ſoone, ſaith *Tertullian*, as they ceaſed to be ignorant of Chriſt, they ceaſed to hate Him: And uſually, in the Phraſe of the Scripture, *Knowledge* and *Love* are identicall. So then, all *Love* proceeding from *Knowledge*, and all *Knowledge* preſuppoſing ſome *preſence* of the thing knowne, it appeareth, that the *Preſence* of the Object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nouriſheth this Affection.

* *Plut. de Invidia & Odio. Ariſt. Polit. li. 1. cap. 7.*

1 Cor. 2. 8

Apolog. li. c. 1

2 Tim. 2. 19
Mat. 7. 23
John 9. 21
Pſal. 1. 6. & 37. 18
Rom. 8. 29

The laſt Cauſe or inducement to this *Paſſion*, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of divers *Beautifull* and *Amiable* Qualities in the Object; as namely, *Sympathie*, *Juſtice*, *Induſtrie*, *Temperance*, *Ingenuitie*, *Facilitie*, *Pleaſantneſſe* and

Innocency of Wit, *Meekneſſe*, *Yeeldingneſſe*, *Patience*, *Sweetneſſe* of behaviour and diſpoſition, without Cloſeneſſe, Suſpicion, Intermedling, Inquiſitiveneſſe, Moroſitie, Contempt, Diſſention; in all which, men are either *Injuſti*, or *pugnaces*, doe either wrong us, or croſſe us: Which two the Philoſopher makes the generall Oppoſites of *Love*: On which I ſhall forbear to inſiſt, as alſo upon the circumſtances of the act of this *Paſſion* it ſelf, in the quantity and quality thereof, and ſhall proceed in brief to the *Conſequents* or *Effects* of this *Paſſion*.

Rhetor. l. 1. c. 4

CHAP. XI.

Of the Effects of Love, Union to the Object, Stay and Immoration of the Minde upon it, Reſt in it, Zeal, Strength, and Tenderneſſe towards it, Condeſcention unto it, Liquefaction and Languiſhing for it.

THe firſt which I ſhall obſerve, is *Union*, occaſioned both by the *love* which we have to a thing for its *own ſake*, & likewiſe, for the *love* of *our ſelves*, that there may be a greater mutuall intereſt each in other. Where-ever *Love* is, it ſtirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it *loveth*: *Where the Treaſure is, there the heart will be.*

be. Hence none are ſaid to *love* God, but thoſe that are ſome way united unto him. And therefore, as *Gods* firſt *love* to man, was in making man like himſelfe; ſo his ſecond great *love*, was in making himſelfe like man. Hence we read ſo often of that *myſticall* inhabitation of *Chriſt* in his *Church*, of that more peculiar *Union* and preſence with the people, of a Spirituall *Implantation* into him by *Faith*, of thoſe neere relations of *Filiation* and *Fraternitie*, of mutuall intereſt each in other, *I am my beloveds, and my beloved is mine*; importing an inſeparable *Union* of the *Church* to *Chriſt*. And this may be the reaſon of that order in Saint *Pauls* ſolemne Benediction, The *Grace* of *Chriſt*, the *Love* of *God*, and the *Communion* of the *Spirit*: for, as the *Grace* of *Chriſt* onely taketh away that enmitie which was between ſinners and God, and is the onely meanes of our reconciliation unto him; ſo the *Love* of *God* is the onely *Bond* of that *Communion*, which we have with him and his holy *Spirit*.

Union is of diverſe ſorts. One, ſuch whereby diverſe things are made *ſimply one*, either by the *converſion* of one into the other, or by the *compoſition*, or *conſtitution* of a third out of the things united, as of mixt bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole ſubſtance out of the eſſentiall parts: Another, ſuch whereby things united are made one *after a ſort*, either by an *accidentall aggregation*, as divers ſtones make *one heap*, or by an *orderly* and artificiall *diſtribution*, as divers materialls make *one houſe*. Or by either a *naturall* or *moral*

Arist. Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 4 Diogen. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7

inclination and sympathy which one thing beareth unto another. And of this sort is that *union* which ariseth out of *love*, tending first unto a mutuall *similitude* and conformity in the same desires; and next, unto a mutuall *possession*, fruition, and proprietie, whereby the minde loving, longeth to be seised of the thing which it loveth, and cannot endure to be deprived of it. So *Moses* prayed, *I beseech thee shew me thy glory:* for the *vision* of God is the *possession* of him; and so *David*, *My soule thirsteth for God, when shall I come and appeare before him?* And this is the foundation of all *sorrow*, when the soule is dispossessed of that which it *loved*, and wherein it rested. And this *desire of possession* is so great, that *Love* contenteth it selfe not with the *Presence*, but even then putteth out its indeavour unto a neerer, and more *reall union*, as if it would become *really One* with the thing which it *loveth*; which is seene in *embracings*, kisses, in the exiliency and egresse of the spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplicity and naturalnesse of all mutuall carriages, as if a present friend were not yet present enough. Which kinde of expressions of *love* are thus elegantly described by *Homer* when *Eumæus* saw *Telemachus* safely returned home from Sea.

Amor Hedera Plutarch. de Aud. Scal. de subtilitate. Arist. Polit. lib. 2. c. 4 Vel præsentem desideramus. Plin. Paneg.

Odyss. Π. 54

——Ταφὼν δ' ἀνόρουσε συβώτης,
Ἐκ δ' ἀρὰ οἱ χειρῶν πέσεν ἀσγέα, τοῖς ἐπονεῖτο
Κερνὰς αἴθοπα οἶνον, ὁ δ' ἀντίος ἤλυθ' ἀνακτος.
Κύσσε δέ μιν κεφαλήν τε καὶ ἀμφὼ φάεα καλὰ
Χεῖράς τ' ἀμφοτέρας, θαλερὸν δ' ὀλοφύρατο κῆρ.

Eumæus

Eumeus all amaz'd ſprung to the door,
The pots of wine which his hands mixt before
Did both fall from them: he ranne on to meet,
And with full welcoms his young maſter greet.
He kiſt his head, hands, eyes, and his tears kept
Time with his kiſſes, as he kiſt he wept.

The like elegant deſcription wee have of the love of *Penelope*, when *Vlyſſes* after his returne was perfectly known unto her.

Δρακύσασα δ' ἔπειτα ἰθὺς δεμνῶ, ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρα χεῖρας — Odyſſ. λ. 208
Δειρῇ βάλλ' Ὀδυσῆι, κάρη δ' ἔκυσ'.

She wept and ran ſtraight on, her hands ſhe ſpread
And claps'd about his neck, and kiſt his head.

Love hath in *morall* and divine things the ſame effect which *fire* hath in *naturall*, to congregate homogeneall, or things of the ſame kinde, and to ſeparate heterogeneall, or things differing: as we ſee in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the ſpirituall part of man collected together, and raiſed from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love ſhal be perfect, all things ſhall be harmonius and homogeneall, not in regard of naturall properties, but in a pure and unmixed ſpiritualneſſe of affection in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the *union* of love proceeds another ſecret effect, namely, a *reſting* of the mind in the thing loved

loveth. In which respect the Philosopher calleth knowledge the *rest* of the understanding. And this can onely be totall and perfect in the Union of the soule with God, the chiefest good thereof. Whence some have made the threefold *Appetite* in man, Concupiscible, Rationall and Irascible, to have their finall perfection and quiet by a distinct union to the Three Persons in the Trinitie: for the *Concupiscible* power is carried *ad bonum*, to *good*, which they say is the Attribute of the *holy Spirit*; the rationall *ad verum*, to that which is *true*, which is the Attribute of the *Sonne*; and the Irascible *ad arduum*, to *power*, which is the attribute of the *Father*. But to let that passe for a spiders web (curious, but thin) certain it is, that *God* onely is that *end*, who can fully accomplish the perfection and terminate the desires of those creatures, whom he made after a peculiar manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there ariseth from the *Union* unto any other *Object* of *Love*, a *satiating* and *quiating* of the Facultie; which in a word, is then only (in *Objects* of inferiour order and goodnesse) regular, when the *Object* is *naturall*, and the *Action limited*. Disproportion and Enormitie are the two Corruptions in this particular.

Gerson de Myster. Theol.

A third Effect, which I shall observe of *Love*, is *Stay*, and Immoration of the Mind upon the *Object loved*, and a *diverting* of it from all others: as we observe in *Eumeus*, when he saw *Telemachus*, he threw away the businesse which he was about before: And the Woman of *Samaria*, being

ing transported with the *love* of Christ, left her Pitcher, which she had brought to the Well, that she might goe and call others unto his Doctrine: And *Mary* left the thought of entertaining Christ at the Table, out of an extraordinarie desire to entertaine him in her heart. And this effect the Poet hath excellently expressed in *Dido*; who having shewed before a marvellous Princely wisdome and sedulitie in fortifying her new Kingdome, and viewing the works her selfe, (as he had before described) as soone as she was once transported by the *love* of *Æneas*, then all stood still on a sudden.

Non cæptæ assurgunt turres, non arma juventus
Exercet; portusve, aut propugnacula bello
Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta——. *Ænead. l. 4.*

The Towers long since begun rose up no more,
And Arms did rust, which ere-while brave youth wore.
No Ports, or Sconces, no defence went on,
But all their works hung broken, and halfe done.

Thus as *Plutarch* hath observed, the Images of things in the fancies of other men are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish; but the Impressions which *love* makes, are as it were written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the Memory.

Love and *Knowledge* have mutuall sharpening and causalitie each on other: for as Knowledge doth generate *Love*, so *Love* doth nourish and exercise

ercise Knowledge. The reason whereof is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the *Truth* and *Good* of them: for it being the property of *Truth* to unite and apply *Goodnesse* (nothing being apprehended as Good, unlesse that Goodnesse be apprehended as *true*) the more Appetite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it seeke with that: the Heart and the Treasure can seldome be severed; the Eagles will alwayes resort to the body; *Davids* Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion betweene the strength of *Love* and *Death*; for as in Death nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arme the heart in its greatest conflict; uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testifie the naturall love with each living creature beareth to its owne conservation: so doth *Love* draw and unite those Spirits which administer either to the Fancie or Appetite, to serve onely for the nourishing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that treasure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and influence, do therefore with the same force, whereby they carry the mind to the consideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneall; no determined power of the Soule being able to impart a sufficient activity unto diverse

verſe independing operations, when the force of it is exhauſted by one ſo ſtrong; and there being a ſympathy, and as it were a league between the faculties of the ſoul, all covenanting not to obſcure or hinder the Predominant Impreſſions of one another. And therefore as in *Rome* when a Dictator was created, all other Authority was for that time ſuſpended; ſo when any ſtrong *Love* hath taken poſſeſſion of the ſoul, it gives a Superſedeas and ſtop unto all other imployments. It is therefore preſcribed as a Remedy againſt inordinate *Love*,

Plutarch. in Amatorio.

Pabula Amoris
Abſterere ſibi, atque aliò convertere mentem.

Lucret. apud Petr. Crinit. lib. 16. cap. 4.

To draw away the fuell from this fire,
And turne the minde upon ſome new deſire.

For Love is *Otioſorum Negotium*, as *Diogenes* ſpake, the buſineſſe oftentimes of men that want imployments.

Σχολάζουσων ἀχολία. *Diogenes apud Laert. l. 6.*

Another effect of Love is Jealouſie or Zeale. Whereby is not meant that ſuſpicion, inquiſitive, quick-ſighted quality of finding out the blemiſhes, and diſcovering the Imperfections of one another (for it is the property of true Love to thinke none evill) but onely a provident and ſolicitous feare, leſt ſome or other evill ſhould either diſturbe the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of *Job* towards his ſons; and of the *Apoſtle* towards his Corinthians, *I*

Laert. lib. 6.

Job 1. 5.

2 Cor. 11.2. *am jealous over you with a godly jealousie*: So *Penelope* in the Poet was jealous of the safety of *Vlysses*.

Ovid. Epist. *In te fingebam violentos Troas ituros,*
Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram.

How oft, my deare Ulysses, *did I see*
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rush on thee?
And when great Hectors *name but touch'd mine eares,*
My cheeks drew paleness from my paler fears.

Zeale is a compounded affection, or a mixture of *Love* and *Anger*; so that it ever putteth forth it selfe to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in *Christ*, whose zeale or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it is said that the *Zeale of Gods house did consume him.* As water when it boyleth, (from which metaphor the word *Zeale* is borrowed) doth in the boyling consume, or as the Candle wasteth it selfe with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, *that much water cannot quench Love.* It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it growes. And therefore the sinne of *Laodicea*, which was contrary to *Zeale*, is compared unto *luke-warme* water, which doth not boyle, and so cannot worke out the scum or corruption which is in it.

Joh. 2. 17.

Ἀπὸ τῦ ζέειν λέγω.

Cant. 1.8.

Rev. 3.15.

And from hence it is that *Love* makes *Weake things strong*, and turneth Cowardice into Valour, and Meeknesse into Anger, and Shame into Bold-

Plutarch de Amore prolis.

Boldneſſe, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearefull Hen, which hath nothing but flight to defend her ſelfe from the Dog, or the Serpent, will venture with courage againſt the ſtrongeſt creatures to defend her little Chickens. Thus Zeal and love of God made *Moſes* forget his Meekneſſe; and his Anger was ſo ſtrong, that it brake the Tables of the Law, and made the people drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wittily expreſſed by *Seneca*, that *Magnus dolor iratus amor eſt*, a great griefe is nothing elſe but Love diſpleaſed, and made angrie. It tranſporteth Nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth ſuch a force and vigour into it, as that it will venture on any *difficulties*; as *Mary Magdalen* would in the ſtrength of her *love* undertake to carry away the dead body of Chriſt (as ſhe conceived of him) not conſidering the weight of that, or her owne weakneſſe. It hath a conſtraining vertue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power, as the *Corinthians*, when they were *poore* in *eſtate*, were yet *rich* in *Liberality*. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the eſtate of an abſent friend, whom we therefore ſuſpect not ſufficiently guarded from danger, becauſe deſtitute of the helpe which our preſence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and ſtains of the thing loved to redound to the griefe and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, ſecurity, and honour of what he pretendeth affection to, loves nothing

Num. 12.11. *Exod.* 32.19.

Senec. in Herc. Oetæ.

Vid. Plutarch. Amatorium.

Non patiar me quicquam neſcire de eo quem amem. Plin. Epiſt.

but himselfe in those pretenses.

Another Effect of *Love* is *Condescension* to things below us, that wee may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his owne judgment, and to doe that which a looker on might happily esteeme weaknesse or Indecency; out of a fervent desire to expresse affection to the thing beloved. Thus *Davids* great *Love* to the *Arke* of Gods presence did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy (for which *Michal* out of pride despised him in her heart) and was contented by that, which she esteemed baseneſſe, to honour God: herein expressing the *love* of him to mankinde, who was both his *Lord* and his *Sonne*; who emptied, and humbled, and denyed himselfe for our sakes, not considering his owne worthinesse, but our want; nor what was honourable for him to doe, but what was necessary for us to be done. *Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit*, what ever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of love to their children doe lispe, and play, and fit their speeche and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore *Themistocles* being found playing and riding on a Reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till hee himselfe was a father of Children.

The last Effect which I shall observe of this Passion is that which I call *Liquefaction* or *Languor*, a melting, as it were, of the heart, to receive the

Πόθος τὶς τὰ τῶν φίλων φιλοῖσιν αἰδίδαυ nand. Eurip. Helen.

Plutarch. Apothegm. Lacon.

Vid. Plutarch. Sympoſiac. l. 5. q. 7.

the more easie impressions from the thing which it loveth, and a decay of the Spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painfull and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most viscerall affection. And therefore called by the Apostle, *Bowels of Love*. And we read of the *yearning* of *Joseph Bowells* over *Benjamin* his mothers sonne, and of the true mother over her childe. *Incaluerunt viscera*, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowels, which the more vehement it is, doth worke the more suddaine and sensible decay and languishing of Spirits. So *Amnon* out of wanton and incestious *Love*, is said to *grow leane from day to day*, and to have been *sick* with vexation for his sister *Thamer*.

And in spirituall love we find the like expression of the Spouse; *Stay me with flaggons, comfort me with apples, for I am sick with love*: Wine to exhilerate, apples to refresh those Spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreame out-let of Love. And for this reason the Object of our Love is said to *overcome us*, and to *Burne the heart*, as with *Coles of Juniper*; and the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth;

Est mollis flamma medullas
Interea, & tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,
And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding brest.

Now

Ὡς τῶτον ἐγὼ καιὸν ἴσω σὺν Δαίμονι τάχα ὡς τάχιστ' ἐπ' ἔρωτα, &c. *Theocrit. Idyll. 2.*

Gen. 43.

1 Reg. 3. 26.

2 Sam. 13.

Cant. 2. 5

Cant. 6. 5. & 8. 6

Ænead.

Now the cause of this *Languor*, which love worketh, is in *Sensitive* Objects, an earnest desire to *enjoy* them; in *Spirituall* Objects, an earnest desire to *increase* them. In the former, Want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety: In the other Fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when wee wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a *distance* promiseth much pleasure, but taste and experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the *Appetite*, and the greater the experience, the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance *Moses* had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Passion of Hatred, the Fundamentall Cause or Object thereof Evill, how farre forth Evils are willed by God, may be declined by men: Of Gods secret and revealed Will.

THe next in order is *Hatred*: of which the Schoole-men make two kinds; an *Hatred of Abomination* or loathing; which consists in a *pure aversion* or flight of the Appetite from somthing apprehended as *Evill*, arising from a dissonacy and repugnancy between their Natures: and an *Hatred of enmity*, which is not a flying, but rather a *pursuing Hatred*, and hath ever some *Love* joyned with it, namely a Love of any Evill which we desire may befall the person or thing whnch wee hate.

I shall not distinctly handle these asunder, but shall observe the Dignities and Corruptions of the Passion in generall, as it implyes a common *disconvenience*, and natural *Unconformitie* between the Object and the Appetite.

The *Object* then of all *Hatred* is *Evill*; and all evill implying an opposition to Good, admits of so many severall respects as there are kinds of opposition.

And

And there is first an *Evill* of *Contrariety*, such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a Wolfe unto a Sheep, occasioned by that *Destructive* Efficiency which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an *Evill* of *Privation*, which we hate formally and for it selfe, as implying nothing but a *Defect* and Absence of *Good*

Thirdly, an *Evill* of *Contradiction* in the *not being* of any creature, oppos'd to its being. For *being* and *Immortality* is that which *Aristotle* makes one of the principal objects of *Love*; Annihilation then, or *not* being is the chiefest Evill of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an *Evill* of *Relation*; for as things in their owne simple natures *evill*, may have in them a *relative Goodnesse*, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security of men: so things in their absolute being *good* may have in them a *relative*, or *comparative evill*, and in that sense bee by consequence hated; as our Saviour intimates, *He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me*: When they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Christ, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the Law, if a mans deerest brother, or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from God unto Idolatry, hee was not to conceale, pity, or spare him, but his owne hand was to be first upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of

of *Æneas* toward *Dido*, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition unto which by divine guidance he supposed himselfe to be directed.

——— Quanquam lenive dolorem
Solando cupit & dictis avertere curas,
(Multa gemens magnoq; animum labefactus amore)
Iussa tamen Divûm exequitur ———

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,
And on her pensive soule to breath some ease,
(Himself with mutuall love made faint) yet still
His purposes were fixt t'obey Gods will

So then we see what qualification is required in the *Object* of a just *Hatred*, that it be evill, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature: and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.

But here, in as much as it is evident that the being of some evill comes under the Will of God; (*Is there any Evill in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?*) & our Wil is to be conformable unto his; it may seem that it ought to fall under our Wil too, and by consequence to be rather loved than hated by us since wee pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those *Evills* which he thus *willeth*, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next wee will observe how

farre the Will of God is to bee the rule of our will; whence will arise the cleare apprehension of that truth which is now set downe, that the unalterable *Object* of mans *Hatred* is all manner of *Evill*, not onely that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and miserie.

First then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himselfe hath sworne, that hee will not the death or destruction of a sinner: and by consequence neither any other evill of his Creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy he is not delighted in the ruine, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groanes of any thing which himselfe created: But he is said to will those Evills as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious *Power* over all the Creatures, and of his glorious *Iustice* on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left onely to the wisedome of God himselfe to know and ordaine the best meanes for glorifying of himselfe in and by his creatures, wee are not here hence to assume any warrant for willing evill unto our selves or others, but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evill unto himselfe, if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Countrey-men the Iewes might be the more advanced.

Secondly, it is no good Argument, *God willeth* the inflicting of such an *evill*, therefore it is unlawfull for my will to decline it: for first the Will of God, whereby he determineth to work

this

this or that evill on particular Subjects, is a part of his *secret Counsell*. Now the *Revealed*, and not the *Hidden will* of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions: whence it commeth to passe, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or aversations to goe a crosse way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure in my sick bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to second the Will of God by an execution thereof upon my selfe, or by a neglect of those Ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his mercy, that I might fulfill his Will. Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake me, yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turn my back rather then my conscience in persecution: alwayes reserved, that though I will that which God willeth, yet my will be ever *subordinated* unto his. We owe *submission* to the *will* of *Gods purpose* and Counsell, and we owe *conformity* to the *will* of his *Precept* and Command; we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to worke himselfe, and wee must conforme to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore

Secondly, though the Will of God were in this case knowne, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it bee to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the Wisedom and Purpose of God hath made inevitable; for as the promises and de-

crees of Good things from God doe not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our profaneness in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableness of a future evill (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny it self, or to love its owne distresses.

Of which that wee may be the more sure, wee may observe it in him, who as hee was wholy like us in nature, and therefore had the same naturall inclinations and aversations with us; so was hee of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by *the hand and Counsell of God before determined*) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Devine Decree. He knew it was not his Fathers Will; and yet, *Father, if thou be willing, let this cup passe from me*: he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an *Oportet*, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time againe, *Father, if it be possible, let this cup passe from me.* Consider it as the *Destruction* of his Temple, and *Anguish* of Nature, which hee could (not being in all things like unto us) but love; and then *Transeat*, let it passe: but consider it as the *necessarie meanes* of procuring pretious blessings for mankinde, and of fulfilling the eternall Decree of his Fathers Love, and then, *Not as I, but as thou wilt.*

The same may be applyed in any manner of humane

mane evills, notwithstanding wee are with an armed *patience* to sustaine them, or with an obedient *submission* unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that *pressure* of nature, which they bring with them (on which the God of nature hath imprinted a naturall desire of its owne quiet and integrity) so farre forth all *Evill*, not onely may, but must be hated by every Regular will, upon pain of violating the Law of its Creation.

And indeed in all this there is not any deviation from the *will* of God, intending that which we abhorre: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himselfe, or any good thing of his owne making; so neither doth it stand with the goodnesse of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousnesse, whereunto he in the dispensation of his Wisdome and Justice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmure at the Wisedome of God in thus ordering evills unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertaine those naturall desires of a straightned minde after deliverance from those evills, were to be in *Solomons* phrase *too Righteous*, and out of a purpose to answer the ends of Gods Wisedome, to crosse the Law of his Creation.

So then it is evident that the *Object* and *fundamentall cause* of *Hatred*, is *all* & *onely Evill*: which (however in respect of the *Existence* of it, it bee

in some cases *good*; for as it is in the *power* of *God* to bring out of confusion order, light out of darknesse, his owne honour out of mans shame; so is it his *providence* likewise to turne unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves doe only hurt them.) Yet I say this notwithstanding, as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created Law and in-bred love, which each thing beareth to its owne perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.

As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of God, blessings, as health, peace, prosperity, good successe, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdome and sobriety, whereby they should bee moderated, occasions of much evill and dangers; so that their Table is become their snare (as the experience of those later Roman Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men had made them in luxurie and vilenesse so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt warre with God.) Notwithstanding I say all this; yet for as much as these things are such as doe quiet, satisfie, and beare convenience unto mans nature, they are therefore justly with thankfulnesse by our selves received, and out of love desired unto our frinds.

I now proceed from the Object or generall fundamentall cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which doe arise from it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injurie, Base Feares, Disparity of Desires, a Fixed Iealous fancy.

THe first which I shall note is a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smels, and Horseflies with oyntments; the Locust will dye at the sight of the Polypus, and the Serpent will rather flye into the fire, then come neare the boughes of a wilde Ash: some plants will not grow, nor the bloud of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mixe with the feathers of other fowles. So *Homer* noteth of the Lyon, that he feareth fire, and the Elephant nauseates his meat, if a Mouse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kinde: from which naturall Antipathy it cometh, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, doe yet at the very first sight flye from it, as from an enemy to their nature; nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

Arist. Hist. Anim l.9.c.44 See Plin. Nat. Hist. l.8.c.4.9. 10. l.9.c.62. l.10 c.37.74. lib.16.c.13. l.20. in proœm. lib.22.c.20. lib.24.c.1. Ælian. de Animal. l.3.c.7. l.4 c.5. l.5.c.48.50. l.6.c.22.45,46 Plutarch Sympos. l.2 4.7.

Plutarch de Odio & Invid.

——Ουκ ἔστι λέοντα καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια πιστὰ
Οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν
Ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς ἀλλήλοισιν.

Iliad. λ. 2.

Lyons with men will ne're make faithfull truce,
Nor can you any way the wolfe induce
To love the Lamb: they ſtudy with fixt hate,
The one the other how to violate.

And the like kind of ſtrange *Hatred* wee may ſometimes finde amongſt men; one mans diſpoſition ſo much diſagreeing from anothers, that though there never paſſed any injuries or occaſions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have mindes averſe from one another; which the Epigrammatiſt hath wittily expreſſed.

Martiall.

Non amo te Sabidi, nec poſſum dicere quare,
Hoc tantum poſſum dicere, Non amo te.

I love thee not yet cannot ſay for what;
This onely I can ſay, I love thee not.

Another cauſe working *Hatred* of a thing in the mindes of men, is the *difficulty* and conceited impoſſibility of obtaining it, if it bee a good thing which wee either doe or ought to deſire. which the Caſuiſts call *Acedia*, being a griefe of the appetite looking on a *Difficult Good*, as if it were evill becauſe dificult; from whence ariſeth a Torpor

a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the meanes which might help us to it. Thus wicked and resolved sinners conceiving happines as unacquirable by them, do grow to the hating of it, to entertaine rancorous affections against those which perswade them to seek it, to envy and maligne all such they find carefull to obtain it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, and to divert their minds towards such more obvious and easie delight, as will be gotten with lesse labour; thus *Difficulty* rendereth *good* things *hatefull*; as *Israel* in the wildernesse despised the pleasant Land, because there were sons of *Anak* in it.

Vid. Arist. Ethic lib. 9. c. 4.

An this is one great cause of the different affections of men towards severall courses of life; one man being of dull and sluggish apprehensions, hateth Learning; another by nature quick, and of noble intellectualls, wholly applyeth himself unto it: the *difficulty* perswading the one to *de pise* the *goodnesse*, and the *goodnesse* inducing the other to *conquer* the *difficulties* of it: so one man looking unto the *pain* of a vertuous life, contemnes the *reward*; and another looking unto the *R ward* endures the *pain*. And we shall usually find it true, that either *Lazinesse*, fearing disappointment, or *Love* being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kind of Hatred and dislike of that which did either *deterre* them from seeking it, or *deceive* them when they sought it. As she, who while there was any Hope, did sollicite *Æ-*

Ænead. 4.

neas with her teares and importunities; when he was quite gone, did follow him with her imprecations.

Arist. politic. lib. 7. c. 7. Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri, Lucan. l. 1.

There is no *Malice* growes ranker then that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darkneſſe is more formidable then that of an Eclipſe, which aſſaults the very veſſels of Light; nor any taſte more unſavory then of ſweet things when they are corrupted. The more naturall the *Union*, the more *impoſſible* the *Re-union*. Things joyned with them, being broken aſunder may be glewed again; but if a mans Arm be broken off, it can never be joyned on again: So thoſe hatreds are moſt incurable, which ariſe out of the greateſt and moſt naturall Love.

Plutarch. de amore frat.

Δεινή τις ὀργὴ, δυσίατος πλάξ,
Ὅταν φίλοι φίλοισι συμβάλωσ' ἔρίν.

Eurip. Medea.

When Love of friends is turn'd to wrath, be ſure
That wrath is deep, and ſcarce admits a Cure.

Another very uſuall, but moſt evill cauſe of *Hatred* is *Injuria*, when a man becauſe he hath done another wrong, doth from thence reſolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both ſacred and prophane: *Ioſephs* Miſtreſſe firſt *wronged* him in aſſaulting his chaſtity, and then *Hated* him, and cauſed him to be caſt into priſon. *Amnon* firſt abuſed his ſiſter *Tamar*, and then *hated* her worſe then before he loved her. *Phædra* having ſolicited *Hippolitus* her,

her husbands son unto incest; being denied, did after accuse him to his father, and procure his ruine. And *Aristotle* proposeth it as a problem, Why they who corrupt and violate the chastity of any, do after hate them? and gives this reason of it, because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadnesse, which in the sinne they contracted. This cause of Hatred *Seneca* and *Tacitus* have both observed as a thing usuall with proud and insolent men, first to *hurt* then to *hate*.

Probl. Sect. 4. Sect. 11.

Proprium humani ingenii odisse quos læserit. Tacit. vit. *Agri. & Senec. de Ira. l. 2. c. 33*

And the reason is first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; & the proper affection which respecteth an enemy is Hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equall or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared: and *oderunt quos metuunt*, it is usuall to hate those whom we feare: if inferiour, yet the memory and sight of him doth upbraid with guilt, and affect with an unwilling and unwelcome review of the sinne, whereby he was wronged; and Pride scorns reproof, and loves not to be under him in Guilt, whom it over-tops in Power: for Innocence doth alwayes give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged; besides Hatred is a kind of Apology for wrong: For if a man can perswade him to hate him whom he hath injured, he will begin to believe that he deserved the injury which was offered unto him, every man being naturally willing to find the first inducement unto his sinne, rather in another than himself.

The next cause (which I shall observe) is *Feare*, I mean slavish Fear; for as Love excludeth Fear, so Feare begetteth Hatred; and it is ever seene, *Qui terribiles sunt, timent*. they that terrifie others doe feare them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated: for as *Aristotle* speaketh, *Nemo quem metuit, amat*; no man loves him whom he feares: which is the same with that of Saint *Iohn*, *Love casteth out Feare*: not a *Reverend*, submissive, awfull *feare*; not a *cautelous*, vigilant and obedient *feare*; not a *feare* of *Admiration*, nor a *feare* of *Subjection*; but a *feare* of *slavery* and of Rebellion, all flashes of horror, all the tossings & shipwracks of a torn mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit; briefely, all evill and hurtfull feare. And this I believe is one principall reason of that malice & contempt of godlinesse, which shewes it selfe in the lives of Atheisticall and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature, so is it marvellously enraged by the fearefull expectation of that fiery vengeance which their pale and guilty consciences do already preoccupate; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God; so their stubbornnesse and malice concludes that they will hate him again; *Let us eate & drink for to morrow we shall dye*

There may be a double root of this *Feare*, outward and inward. The *outward* is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the Potent, and therupon the lesse avoidable malice of the person hated: (as it was the speech of *Caligula*, *O derint*

rint dum metuant.) And herein our Averſarion (if it obſerve that generall rule of goodneſſe in paſſions ſubordination to Reaſon and Piety) is not only allowable, but naturall, while it extends it ſelſe no further then the Evil which we wrongfully ſuffer. For I cannot but think that the ſpittle and ſcourges, the thornes and buffets; the reed and knees of thoſe mocking and blaſphemous Iewes were ſo many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no ſinne, was ſo deeply deſirous to have paſſe from him.

But the next, the *inward* root of Feare is the *guilt* and burthen of an uncleane and uncovered Conſcience, for Pollution and weakneſſe when it is naked, muſt needs bee fearfull. And therefore that inference of *Adam* had truth in it, *I was afraid, becauſe I was naked*: for having diſrobed himſelfe of Originall righteouſneſſe, he was thereupon afraid of the curſe and ſummons of an offended juſtice. Now from this *feare* may ariſe a double hatred; an hatred of a mans own Conſcience: for an evill man ὁ μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἔχει, as the Philoſpher ſpeaks, is not a frend unto himſelfe, but flyes and labours to run away from himſelfe, and is never in ſo bad company, as when he is alone, becauſe then hee keeps company with his owne Conſcience.

Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4. δικαιοῦσι τοὺς κακοὺς μὴ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν μισεῖσθαι. *Scholaſt. in Soph. Cl. œdip. Tyr.*

Which is the reaſon why ſome mens hatred of themſelves hath proceeded ſo farre, as to make themſelves the Inſtruments of that ſmall meaſure of Annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherein notwithſtanding they diſcover, how

farre their fury should extend against themselves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it: for he that hates a thing would if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a naturall hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venemous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them most, if his Conscience be naked and let loose to flye upon him, if that worm that never dies (unlesse killed with our Saviours bloud) begin thorowly to sting and gnaw him, would thinke himself a wise Merchant, if he could exchange beings with the worst of these. The Worme and Viper of Conscience is of all the creatures the most ugly and hatefull. A wicked man when he doth distinctly know himself, doth love every thing, save God, better than himself.

Iuvenal.

——— Diri conscia facti.
Mens habet attonnitos & surdo verbere cedit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.

The mind being conscious of some dire offence,
Fills them with feares, a Torturer from thence
Shaketh, and with redoubled blowes doth urge
The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.

Nor can I esteem this a corrupt, though it be a miserabe passion; for as a bad man is to himself the worst, so is he by consequence the hatefullest of all Creatures.

The second *Hatred*, which may arise from that

Fear

Feare which is cauſed by a ſecret *guilt* of minde, is of all other moſt corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Authours or Executioners of Juſtice; of the equity and juſtneſſe of whoſe proceeding, we are from within convinced; ſuch as is the malice and blaſphemy of Malefactours againſt the Iudge, and of Devils and damned men againſt God and his righteous judgements, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they moſt worthily do endure: for it is the nature of proud and ſtubborn creatures (as was before obſerved) *Odiſſe quos leſerint*, firſt to wrong God and then to hate him.

Another particular cauſe of this paſſion may be a *Diſparity* of affections and Deſires: for notwithſtanding there be many times *Hatred* where there is *Similitude* (as thoſe beaſts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the ſame common meat, as the Philoſopher obſerveth) and ſundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of ſinne enough to themſelves, except they begot a Monopoly, and might ingroſſe it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehenſion of ſome enſuing inconveniences which are likely to follow there-from, as hath been formerly noted: So that in that very ſimilitude of *Natures*, there is a diſagreement of *ends*, each one reſpecting his owne private benefit. *Hiſt. Animal.*

Now the *Corruptions* herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that *diſparity* whereon the paſſion is grounded; which ſometimes is

Morall

Morall, wherein it is laudable to hate the vitious courses, in which any man differs from us, or we our selves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruine, except it be in such a case when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted is in danger to be betrayed, unlesse prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes this *Disparity* may be in actions *Civill*, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things; *Opposition* of a mans *Hopes*, and of his *Parts* and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other: so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, *Ambition* and *self love*; the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may reduced, that *Hatred* which ariseth out of *parity of Desir*, as amongst *Competitors* for the same Dignity, or Corrivalls for the same Love, or Professors of the same Art, either by reason of Covetousnesse, or Envy, or Ambition, a greedy desire of their owne, or a discontented sight of anothers good.

Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem.
Pompeiusve, parem ——

Thus two great Rulers do each other hate,
Cæsar no Better brooks, *Pompey* no mate.

Malem hic primus esse, quám Romæ secundus. Cæsar de oppidulo quodam dum Alpes transiret *Plutarch.*

And

And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devoure the love which they owe unto their Country. More noble was the behaviour of *Themistocles* and *Aristides*, who when they were ever imployed in the publique service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not resume them til they returned, and became private men againe. Plutarch. de gerund. Rep.

The last cause which I shall observe of *Hatred* may bee a *setled* and permanent *Intuition* of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kinde of habituall detestation; it being the nature of Evill commonly to shew worse at the second or third view. And that first, because the former Act doth worke a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked, but with a fore-staled resolution of finding Evill therein: and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the Object the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledg being a master and light unto the later. But light and wandring fancies (though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of Evill, and by consequence liable to an ofter Anger, yet by reason of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and unexercise of memory, they are for this cause the lesse subject to deepe and rooted hatred.

Vnto this Head may bee referred that *Hatred* which ariseth from excessive *Melancholy*, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and Haters of the light, delighting only like the [a] Shrieke Owle, or the Bitterne in desolate places, and [b] monuments of the dead. This is that which is called [c] λυκανθρωπία, when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have bin the distemper of [d] *Nebuchadnezar*, when he was thrust out from men, and did eate grasse with the beasts. [e] *Timon* the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of μισάνθρωπος, the *Man-Hater*, because he kept company with no man, but onely with *Alcibiades*, where of he gave this only account, because hee thought that man was borne to doe a great deale of mischiefe. And we read even in the [f] Histories of the Church, of men so marvelously averse from all converse or correspondence with men; that they have for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety yeares, immured themselves in Cels and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they travelled fare to visit them. So farre can the opinion of the minde, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of humane disposition, which the [g] Philospher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society, and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention, the signe and the fruit of hatred.

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Zeph. 2. 14. Is. 34. 11. 14, 15
[b] Math. 8. 28.
[c] Herodot. de Neuris in Melpom. Plin. lib. 8 c. 22. Virgil. Eclog 8. Pompon. Mela de situ orbis l. 2 Wierus de præstig. dæmon. l. 3. c. 21. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 17. Olaus mag. de Reg. Septentr. lib. 18. c 45. 46. 47. Luci. in Asine.
[d] Dan. 5. 21.
[e] Cicer. de Amicit. & lib. 4. Tuscul. quæst. Suidas in Timon. Plutarchus in Alcibiade & Antonio. Laert. in Timone. Turneb. Adversar. l. 24. cap. 33.
[f] Socr. l. 4. c. 18. Theodoret. l. 4 cap. 26. Sozom. lib. 5. c. 29.
[g] Aristot. polit lib. 1. cap. 2.

CHAP. XIIII.

Of the Quality and Quantity of Hatred, and how in either respects it is to bee regulated.

I Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the *Quantity* and *Quality* of its Acts: which must be observed according to the *Evill* of the object: for if that be *unchangeable*, there is required a continual *Permanency* of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the mind: or if it be *importunate* and Assaulting, there is required a more frequent *repetition* of the Act. The same likewise is to be said of the *Quality* of it: for if the Evill be of an Intense and more Invincible nature, our Hatred must arme us the more: if more Low and remisse, the Passion may bee the more negligent.

Here then is a fourefould direction of the Quantities and Qualities of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First the unalterableness of the Evill, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it warrants the Reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred

We may instance for the three former in sinne, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of goods.

First then *Sinne* is in its owne formall and abstracted nature, *Unchangeable*, though not in respect of the subject, in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God bee repaired and restored againe; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of Evill, by a removing of it, not by a new molding it into another frame. Sinne then remaineth in its owne Nature unchangeable and alwaies evill, and the reason is because it is a Transgression of a *perpetuall Law*, and a Remotion from an *unalterable Will*: Sinne then is to bee hated with a continuall and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditionall and more flexible dislike, they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore wee see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them, and so makes the passions thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by seasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in *Morality* likewise much dammage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the publique by nourishing such private enmities and being peremptory in continuing those former

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mer differences, which, though haply then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmefull, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a growne and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly, Again as no evill is altogether so unchangeable as *Sinne*, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a *Multiplicity* and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its *importunity* and insinuation, that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it: Some Evils there may be, which requier only a present and not a customary exercise of this passion. Present I say when the Object is offensive and not customary; because as the Object, so the Passion likewise may be unusuall. Sinne onely is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures (though best armed against such assaults; and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keepe us ever on our guard, that wee be not unprepared for a surprize.

Thirdly, Then for the *Quantity* of an Evill, because that is not in any thing so *intense* as in *Sinne* whether wee consider it in its owne Nature, as a Rebellion against the highest good, or in its effects; either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution, or of the vastnesse of it, both in Guilt and Punishment: In

these respects our *Hatred* of it cannot be to deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their extension, nor so Destructive in their Consequents; and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first when a man shall apply his *Hatred of Prosequution*, or ill willing against that Evill, which is the proper obiect onely of *Aversation*: for some things there are onely of conditionall evills, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive onely in their application requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

Secondly, a Corruption in regard of Intension is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the obiect admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against onely relative Evills. There is not any man betwixt whose naturall faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion (it being the Providence of divine dispensations so variously to frame and order mens fancies, as that no man shall have an Independance or selfe sufficiency, nor say unto the other members, I have no need of you; but there should bee such a mutuall ministry and assistance amongst men, as where

whereby might be ever upheld those essentiall vertues of humane society, *Vnity* and *Charity*, no man being able to live without the aide of others; nor to upbraid others with his owne service. Now in this case, if any man, who either out of the narrownesse and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his owne mind, is indisposed for some courses of life or study, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them, or to an undervalewing of Persons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a desire of the not being of them, as things utterly unusefull, because hee sees not what use himselfe can have of them; he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike as a blinde man should doe in wishing the Sunne put out, not considering that hee himselfe receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withall.

For as too excessively to doat on the fancy of any particular thing may prove harmfull, as appeareth in the Poetical fable of *Midas*, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what hee out of too excessive love made his Idoll, became his ruine; (as many men need none other enemy to undoe them than their owne desires.) So on the other side, the extreame *Hatred* of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we see intimated in that other fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extreme malice a-

gainst

gainst the poore Cock, at whose early crow their covetous master every day rouſed them unto their labour, killed him; and ſo (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their lazineſſe, were every day by the vigilancy of their maſter (whoſe Covetouſneſſe now began to crow earlier than his Cock) called from their ſleepe ſooner than they were before; till at length they began to wiſh for that which the raſhneſſe and indiſcretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when wee goe about any thing out of the dictates of Paſſion, it is a great point of Wiſedom firſt to conſider whether we our ſelves may not afterwards be the firſt men, who ſhall wiſh it undone again.

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CHAP. XV.

Of the good and evil Effects of Hatred. Cautelousnesse and Wisdom to profit by that we Hate, with Confidence, Victory, Reformation. Hatred is General against the whole kinde. Cunning, Dissimulation, Cruelty, runing over to Persons Innocent, violating Religion. Envie, Rejoycing at Evil. Crooked Suspition. Contempt. Contumely.

NOw proceed to the Consequents or Effects of this Passion: And first, for the useful and profitable Effects thereof, which may be these:

First, A *Cautelousnesse* and fruitful *wisdom* for our own welfare, to prevent danger, and to reap benefit from that which is at enmity with us. For we shall observe in many evils, that no man is brought within the danger, who is not first drawn into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions then most desperately wound the Soul, when they beguile and entangle it. But the greatest use of this *Caution*, is to learn how to benefit by the *Hatred* of others; and as learned Physitians do, to make an Antidote of Poyson. For as many venomous creatures are

Quod de cantharide observavit, Plutarch. lib. de sera numinis vindicta.

Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit. Sen. de Benef. l.2. c.18.

by Art used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries which themselves had made (Naturall Attraction, as it were, calling home that poison which injury and violence had misplaced): so the malice and venome of an enemy may by wisdom be converted into a Medicine, and by managing, become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent Similitude of *Plutarch*: As healthy and strong Beasts doe eat and concoct Serpents, whereas weak stomacks do nauseate at Delicates: so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends; and an *injury* doth one man more good then a *courtesie* doth another. As Winde and Thunder when they trouble the Ayr do withal purge it; whereas a long Calme doth dispose it to putrefaction: or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it; so a wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy, to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when *Cato* advised that *Carthage* should be utterly destroyed, *Scipio Nascica* perswaded the contrary upon these reasons, That it was needful for *Rome* to have always some enemies, which by a kinde of *antiperistasis* might strengthen and keep alive its vertue, which otherwise by security might be in danger of languishing, and degenerate into luxury. For as the Israelites, when there was no Smith amongst them, did sharpen their instruments with the Philistians; so indeed an enemy doth

Plutarch, de capiend. ex hostibus utilit. Cæl. Rhodigin. antiq. lect. l. 5. cap. 17.

Florus, lib. 2.

1 Sam. 13. 20.

doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those vertues, which by lying unexercised might contract rust and dulnesse; and many times, when the reasons of the thing it self will not perswade, the fear of giving advantage to an enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of Insultation.

Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atridæ.

This makes our foes rejoyce: they wolud have bought
With a great price these crimes we do for nought.

Thus as a Sink by an house, makes all the house the cleaner, because the *Sordes* are cast into that: Or as they observe that Roses and Violets are sweetest, which grow near unto Garlick and other strong sented Herbs, because these draw away unto them any fetid or noxious nourishment: so the eye and neerenesse of an enemy serveth, by exciting *Caution* and diligence, to make a mans life more fruitful and orderly then otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus *Hector* sharply reproving the Cowardice of his brother *Paris* (who had been the onely cause of the War and Calamity) when he fled from *Menelaus*, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him that he was

Πατρὶ μέγα πῆμα πολήτε παντὶ τε δήμῳ
Δυσμενέσιν δὲ χάρμα, &c. *Iliad. γ. 51.*

To father, City, People, losse and blame;
Joy to his foes, and to himself a shame.

Secondly, Hatred worketh *Confidence* and some Presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former: for *cautelousnesse* or Furniture against the onset of evil, cannot but make the minde more resolute in its own defence, then if it were left naked without Assistance. Again, of all others, this is one of the most *confident Passions*, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backt with Reason, as the Philosopher observes; and ever the more *Counsel*, the more *Confidence*. Besides, being a deep and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another, as *Hatred*: *Anger* would onely bring *Trouble*; but *Hatred*, *Mischief*: *Anger* would onely *Punish* and retaliate, but *Hatred* would *destroy*: for as the Philosopher notes, it seeketh the *not being* of what it *hates*. A man may be *angry* with his Friend, but he *hates* none but an Enemy; and no man can *will* so much hurt to his Friend, as to his Enemy. Now the more hurt a Passion doth *intend*, the more strength it must call out to *execute* that intention; and ever the more *strength*, the more *confidence*.

Rhetor. l. 2. c. 4.

Thirdly, it worketh some manner of *Victory* over the evil hated: For, *Odium semper sequitur ex animi*

animi elatione, as *Scaliger* out of *Aristotle* hath observed, It ever ariseth out of pride and heigth of minde, ὑπερέχειν δοκοῦσι ὑβρίζοντες Injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kinde of Victory. For so far forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in moral and practick courses; wherein I think it is a general Rule, He in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the will, which never chuseth an object till it love it. There onely we can have perfect conquest of sin, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incompleat restauration of Gods Image: the body of nature and the body of sin are born, and must die together.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in Reasonable creatures, namely, the *reformation* of the person in whom the evil was. For as countenance & encouragement is the fosterer, so hatred & contempt serveth sometimes as Physick to purge out an evil. And the reason is, because a great part of that goodnesse, which is apprehended to be in sin, by those that pursue it, is other mens approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrent Coins, which passe rather because they are received, then because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of Credit, see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himself, as still to feed on those vanities which he seeth do provoke others unto lothing; though I confesse,

fesse, it is not a perswasion of mens, but of Gods hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorow Reformation.

I now proceed to observe those Effects, which are corrupt and hurtful: and here wee may observe,

First, the Rule of *Aristole*, whose Maxime it is, that *Hatred* is always πρὸς τὸ γένη against the *whol kinde* of its object: so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not *general*, but admit of *private* Reservations and Indulgences. For since the nature and extent of the Passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, *Sin*. In which, though there is no man which findes not himself more obnoxious and open to one kinde then another (it being the long exprienced policy of the devil to observe the divers conditions of mens Natures, Constitutions, Callings, and Employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will) in somuch that a man may herein haply deceive himself with an opinion of loathiog some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices perswade to a casual dislike thereof; yet I say it is certain, that if a mans hatred of *Sin* be

not

not πρὸς τὰ γένη an *Universal* and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privie exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his perswasions to himself what they will; this is rather a personated, then a true hatred, a meteor of the brain, then an affection of the Soul. For as in the good, so in the ill of things notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes, (as *Seneca* saith) *Scelera dissident*, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very Contrariety such an Agreement against God, (as in *Herod* & *Pilate* against *Christ*) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united Passion. And hence is that of Saint *Iames*, *He that offendeth in one, is guilty of all*; because in that one, he contemneth that Original Authority which forbad all. There are no terms of consistence between Love and Hatred divided upon the same uniform Object. It is not the material and blinde performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue either our true love to the precept, or our hatred to the Sinne, then a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgion can prove, either that we delight in our own payn, or abhor our own flesh. It is not Gods Witnesse within us, but his Word without us; not the tyranny of conscience, but the goodnesse of the Law, that doth kindly and genuinely

genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps Fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sin. A *Lacedemonian* endeavouring to make a dead carcass stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward means would avail little, except there were something *within* to support it. It is certainly so in Actions as it is in Bodies: *Fear*, as an outward prop, may help a while to keep them up; but *Love* is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.

Plutarch. Apotheg. Lacon.

Secondly, Another evil effect of Hatred, is a *close* & cunning *Dissimulation* in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of fairnesse and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth it self. For by this means is the passion *strengthened*, & the Person whom it respects, *weakned*: this by incautelousnesse and *Credulity*; (for common Charity, when it sees no signes of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by Restraint and Suppression; for any thing, the more united, the more weighty it is: and as Winde, so Passions, the closer it is pent, the more strength it gathereth. *Plutarch* compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the Historian hath often observed in *Tiberius* (whose principal vertue was Dissimulation) who being offended in the Senate with some words

vide Senec. Epist. 103.

words ſpoken by *Haterius* and *Scaurus*; the Hiſtorians obſervation upon it is this: *In Haterium ſtatim invectus, Scaurum, cui implacabilius irascebatur, ſilentio tramiſit.* The one he rebuked; but the other, whom he more implacably hated, he paſſed by with ſilence. And elſewhere upon a like occaſion, *Quæ in præſens civiliter habuit, ſed in animo revolvente iras, etiamſi impetus affectusque languerat, memoria valebat.* Though he ſeemed to take what was ſpoken, courteouſly; yet he layed it up in his minde: and though the heat of Paſſion, by being ſuppreſſed, did languiſh, the memory and grudge remained ſtrong ſtill. In which words, the Hiſtorian hath expreſſed that excellent deſcription of the ſame quality in *Homer*.

Tac. Annal. l. 1.

Annal. l. 4. Statuit reponere odium donec impetus famæ & favor exercitus languerit. De Domitian. in vita Agric.

Ἐπεὶ ἦ ῥα θεὰ ἐς θυμὸν ἐνώσατο μητιόεσσαν,
Ἐς ῥ' ἴμεν Ἀργείων παρὰ νῆας ὠκυπόρους,
Ἀτρεΐδῃ τε πρόφρασσι καὶ ἀμφοτέροισι μένοντε.

Iliad. χ. 81. Diog. Laert. l. 7. Μίσος ἐστὶν ὀργὴ χρονία. Odium est ira diuturna.

Low men with a Kings wrath are quite oppreſt:
For though he ſeem the ſame day to digeſt
The heat of's paſſion; yet he ſtill reſerves
Cloſe Anger in his breſt, till fit time ſerves.

Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragedian,

Ira quæ tegitur, nocet.
Profeſſa perdunt ora timidæ locum.

Senec. Traged. Medea.

Anger that's hid, gives surer blowes;
But profest hate doth revenge lose.

And therefore *Hannibal* was wont to say, that he was more afraid of *Fabius* when he did nothing, then of *Marcellus* when he did fight; of the one mans closeneſſe, then of the others boldnes.

And the reaſon why of all the Paſsions this of *Hatred* can thus ſmother and ſuppreſſe it ſelfe, is, becauſe it doth not affect the heart with trouble or ſadneſſe (which Affection the ſoule loves not long to hold faſt) but with a perverſe joy and delight in pondring the contrivances of Revenge (which the Philoſopher and the Poet have placed among the Objects of Delight.)

Ariſtot. & Juvenal. Vindicta malũ quo non jucundius ullum.

Now of all the wayes whereby this Paſsion is ſuppreſt, the moſt hateſull to God and man is, when men do palliate and ſhrowd their malice under pretences of Love, and praiſe men unto ruine. Like the Panthar, which with his ſweet breath allureth other Creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. *Peſsimum inimicorum genus laudantes*, of all kinde of Enemies thoſe are the worſt, which as the Prophet ſpeaks, do *break mens heads with oil*, and make a poiſon of their own merits to kill them with praiſes, as *Achilles* ſpake in the Poet.

Ælian. de Animalib. 5. c. 40.

Tacit. vit. Agr. Ἐχθρῶν ἔπαινος οὐδεὶς ἀξιόχρεως κατὰ ἀλήθειαν.

Sopb. in Ajac.

Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι πεύσῃ ὁμῶς ἀίδαο πύλῃσιν.
Οὐχ ἕτερον μᾶλλον μισήσω δειλὸν ἐόντα.

Iliad I. 313. Saluſt. in Catil.

That man's as odious to me as hell gates,
who with his mouth ſpeaks fair, with his heart hates.

And it was wicked counſell which *Theognis* gave to his *Cyrnus*, amongſt ſo many ſage and moral precepts, like a dead flye in a pot of ointment.

Εὖ κἀπίλλε δ' ἐχθρὸν ὅταν σ' ἐπιχείρεῃ ἑλκεῖν,
πρὸς σὲ νιν, μεθύσαν μωμεύμενον ἔμμενος.

Fawn on thy Foe, till he be in thy will,
Then, without Reaſons, give revenge her fill.

It is a quallity of all others moſt diſtant from nobleneſſe and ingenuity of minde; for generous ſpirits will acknowledge with honour and love the vertues of their enemies; as *Fabritius Lucinus*, when many were competitours for the Conſulſhip, gave his ſuffrage to *Cornelius Ruffinus*, the worthieſt of the Company, though he were his bitter enemy: and *Cæſar* cauſed the demoliſhed ſtatues of *Pompey* to be erected again, not ſuffering the honor of ſo brave a Commander (though his enemy) to bleed and languiſh under his eye. Whereupon *Cicero* told him, that in reſtoring the ſtatues of *Pompey*, he had faſtned and made ſure his own. And *Publius Scipio* made none other uſe of his emnity with *Tiberius Gracchus*, than to diſpoſe his daughter unto him in Marriage, becauſe at that time when he was ſure to judge with leaſt favour and partiality, he found him to be a vertuous

E' χθρὸς ὢν μὲν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς, καὶ φίλος ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν, βέβαιος, *Soph. ib.*

A. Gellius, lib. 4. ca. 8.

Plutarc. de capiend. ex hoſtibus util.

Homer. Il. a. 48. Οὐδέ τινα πρὸς ἐχθρῶν μεμνημένον ἔμμεν ἄνωγα. *Theogn.*

Aul. Gell. lib. 12. cap. 8. Liv. lib. 38.

vertuous and deserving man. And the Emperour *Adrian*, to shew that he esteemed *Hatred*, retained a base and un-Princely disposition, as soone as he came to the Empire, he laid aside all his former enmities, insomuch as then meeting one who had been his capitall enemy, he said unto him, *Evasisti*, thou art now escaped from my displeasure.

Elius Spartian. in Hadrian.

Thirdly, another evil effect of Hatred is *Cruelty*; for it * seeketh (as I noted out of the Philosopher) the *Not-being* of that which it hates: and therefore among the Ægyptians, a * fish was the Hieroglyphick of Hatred, because of all creatures, they do most devour one another. And thus *Achilles* in the Poet expresseth his hatred of *Hector*, when he besought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable buriall.

* μῖσος ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀφανισμὸν τοῦ πλησίον βούλεσθαι ἢ ἀφανισμοῦ τινος αἴτιον εἶναι. *Diog. Laert. l. 7.*

* *Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 8. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5. & lib. 1.*

Iliad. X. 346.

Αἲ γάρ πως ἀμὸν μὲν μένος ἠδὲ θυμὸς ἀνήη
ὠμὰ μασσαμένους κρέα ἐδμεναι.

I would my minde would give me leave to gnaw
Thy flesh in morsels, and to eat it raw.

And the like expresions we finde of the cruelty of *Tiberius*, a man full of rancour.

Fastidit vinum, quia jam fuit ille Cruentem;
Tam bibit hunc avidè, quam bibit ante merum.

He loaths all Wine for Blood, & now with more
Greedy delight drinks this, then that before.

Sueton. Tiber.

Hatred contenteth not it selfe with the death of an Enemy, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, insulting with pride and indignities over the dead body which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loathsomnesse, revenge ir selfe. *Caligula*, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, *Ita feri ut se mori sentiat*, that he should perish with such lingring blowes, as that he might feel himself to die. And he often commanded aged men to stand by and look upon the slaughter of their children, and after would force them unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their others which were left alive: for, to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing which more frequently occurreth. The Philistines cut off the head of *Saul*, and sent it in Triumph up and down their Countrey. And the Historian notes of *Otho*, that he never looked with more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, then the head of *Piso* his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of *Hector*, every man (as the Poet describes it) did bestow a stab and a contempt upon it. But above all, most hatefull was the cruelty of *Marc. Antonius* and his wife *Fulvia*, shewed on the dead body of *Cicero* the glory of the Romane eloquence: they cut off his head and his hands, setting them, in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent Orations; from whence they took it to their Table, and *Ful-*

Sueton. de Calig & in Tiber. cap. 61.

Ib. in Calig.

Senec. de Ira. lib. 2. cap. 33.

Οὐ δ' ἔκτανον, ἐς δεῖνος, Cassiby & ἔδλαβ' ἐδ' ἐκ μιᾶς πυρᾶς. *Soph. Ajax.*

Tacit. hist. li. 1.

Capit abscissum in contio praefigi solita. Apud Just. lib. 24. Virg. Æneid.

Ἔχει δ' ἑκάστοις δύσκλειαν ἀνηρ ἀχθρὸς, &c. *Eurip. Hercul. furens.*

Fulvia cursing it, and spitting upon it, pulled out the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and pricked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin; to shew that malice would ever do mischiefe to a man in his noblest and highest treasure: as we see in that desperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, first made him (in hope to escape) to renounce his Religion and Salvation, and then presently slew him; that, as far as was in his power, he might kill his soul, as well as his body.

Pet. Crinit. l. 1. c. 8. Plutarch. in Cicerone.

But yet further: *Hatred* doth not content it self to be *Cruel* to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others that have any relation to him, though never so innocent. As we see in *Haman*, who thought onely displeased with the neglect of *Mordecai*, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruine of all the Jews. And it is noted by Historians, that when *Sejanus* fell, the storme lighted on his Family and Freinds, as well as on himself: as is also observed in the punishment of the Conspiracy against *Nero*, detected by *Millichus*. And *Themistocles* (though innocent) was like to have suffered in a crimation of Treason, onely for being a freind unto *Pausanias*. Yea, so overflowing is this Quality, that it will sometimes strike a freind rather then not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profession of *Darius*, *Pereat cum inimico amicus*, Let my freind rather perish with mine enemy, then mine enemy escape by my freind. And hence it is observed of *Aristides*, that he was wont to propose

Sext. Titius quod habuit imaginem L. Saturnini domi suæ condemnatus. Cic. pro Rabirio.

Tacit. Annal. lib. 5, 6. Suet. Tib. c. 61. Annal. l. 15. Plutarch. de cap. ex host. util. Q. Curt. l. 7.

Plutarc. de Adulat. & Amic. Plutarch. in Aristid.

poſe ſuch adviſes as he knew did conduce unto publick weal by ſome other men, and not from himſelfe, leſt *Themiſtocles*, out of hatred of his perſon, ſhould have withſtood and impedimented a generall good. But *Ajax* in the Poet went yet higher.

Ε᾽χθεῖν ὀλέσαιμι——
τέλος δαίνοιμι κ᾽ αὐτος. *Sopboc. in Ajac.*

So I may ſlay mine Enemy,
Let the ſame ruine ſwallow me.

And the principall reaſons of this overflowing of *Hatred*, are *Fear* and *Cowardice*: for he who hateth the Father, and ſheweth cruelty unto him, doth uſually fear the Son, leſt he riſe up in his Father's quarrell: And hence is that Maxime of cruell policy: *Forſan futurus ultor extincti patris. Senec. Troas.*

Νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνων, παῖδας καταλείπει. *Staſianus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 6. Hom. Odyſſ. γ. 307.*

That man's unwiſe, who doth the Father ſlay,
And leaves the Sons, his quarrell to repay.

For we know *Oreſtes* revenged his Father's quarrell and blood upon *Ægiſthus*.

And beſides, *Cruelty* doth uſually proceed from *Cowardice*, as *Amianus Marcellinus* hath obſerved; and fearfull men, when they have any advantage to be cruell, do ſeldome hold any meaſure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave *Odium etiam timor ſpirat. Tert. Apol. c. 26. Vicus animi ex mollitie naſci conſuetum. Am. Marc. l. 27. & Ariſt. Rhet. lib. 2.*

any

any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any Emperours which were more cruell, then those who were most fearfull and effeminate; as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, &c. As they say, that wounded beasts, when they dye, bite hardest; their feare and despair making them furious: So there is no Wrath or *Cruelty* to that which proceeds from *weakness*, when it hath either jealousie, or advantage, or despair, to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto *profanesse*, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As we see in the cruelty of *Tiberius* towards the family of *Sejanus*, who because it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender Virgin to be strangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, should first be deflowred, that so she might be the fitter to be slain. And *Boniface* the eighth Pope of that name, being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Ashwednesday to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such Bishops as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to minde them of their mortalities; when *Prochetus* Bishop of *Geneva*, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himselfe at his feet to receive this Ceremony, he threw the Ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, A *Gibelline* thou art, and as a *Gibelline* thou shalt die: so powerfull was his malice, to profane the rites of his Religion! Yea, so farre will hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a villany,

Senec. de Ira, lib. 1. c. 13.

Maxime mortiferi esse solent morsus morientium bestiarum. Florus, l. 2. c. 13.

Suet. Tiber. c. 61

Tacit. Annal. l. 5.

Pet. Crinit. li. 7. c. 13.

lany, it hath ſometimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a cup of poyſon: as it is reported of Pope *Victor* the third, that he was poyſoned in the Chalice at the Communion. Neither have there been wanting Examples of deſperate men, who have made the moſt holy parts of Religion, Vowes, and Sacraments, the Seales and Pledges of their conſpiracies in Malice: as once *Cataline* and his aſſociates did animate themſelves in their bloudy purpoſes, with drinking the bloud of a ſlaine Childe.

Martin. apud Plotin. in vit. Pont. 3.

Saluſt in Cat. Florus lib. 4. Don. lib. 37. Plut. in licen. & in Publicola.

Now of all *Hatreds*, there are none more furious and unnaturall then thoſe which ariſe out of contrarieties in *Religion*; becauſe as a Stone, the higher the place is from whence it fals, doth give the more dangerous blow: no wounds ſo mortall, as that of a Thunderbolt: ſo of all other thoſe Hatreds which make pretences unto Heaven, and which ariſe from motives of the higheſt Nature, are ever moſt deſperate and mortall. And therefore our Saviour tels us, that in this caſe men would forget all the bonds of naturall Obligation; in ſo much that the *Father would deliver his owne Childe, and the Children their Parents unto death.* As we finde that the bloudy Hatred of *Cain* againſt *Abel* aroſe from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow exceſsive, which hath *Zeale* to kindle it, and pretence of *Religion* to warrant it: For when that which ſhould reſtraine and ſet limits to a Paſsion, is made a party to ingage it, and fewell to foment it, no wonder if a Paſsion

which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose none upon it selfe. And this occasion of mutuall *Hatred*, we finde observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one Towne would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeale to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.

Modum tenere in eo difficile est quod bonum esse crediderunt Senec. Ep. 23. *Plut. de Isid. & Osirod. Iuvenal.*

——*Summus utrinq;*
Inde furor vulgo quod Numina vicinorum
Odit uterq; locus.

This caus'd their rage, this made their great debate:
One Towne did worship what the next did hate.

Another dangerous effect of *Hatred* is *Envy* and *Malignitie* at the sight of anothers happinesse: and therefore *Envy* is called an *Evill Eye*, because all the diseases of the *Eye* make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth: as Vermine doe ever devoure the purest Corne, and Moaths eat into the finest Cloth, and the Cantharides blast the sweetest Flowres: So doth *Envy* ever gnaw that which is most beautifull in another whom it hateth; and as the Vulture, draweth sickness from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feeles as great paine in the good of a Chirurgions, as in the ill offices of an Enemies hand: it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates: yea and commonly greater too from the good then from the ill: For, *Odiorum acriores causæ*

Arist. Rhetbr. lib. 2. cap. 10. Plut. de Odio & Invidia.

Ælian. de Animal. lib. 3 c. 7. Rhet. l. 4. c. 18.

cauſæ quando iniquæ: When *Hatred* is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiſeth it ſelfe the higher. And the reaſon is, becauſe in Paſſions of this Nature, the leſſe we have from the Object, the more we have from our ſelves; and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is ſupplyed by the riſing of our own ſtomacke: as we ſee in the body, that thin and empty nouriſhment will more often ſwell it, then that which is ſubſtantiall.

And therefore I thinke there are not any Examples of more implacable *Hatred*, then thoſe that are by *Envy* grounded on *Merit*. As *Tacitus* obſerves betweene the paſſages of *Domitian* and *Agricola*, that nothing did ſo much ſtrengthen the Emperours hatred againſt that worthy Man, as the generall report of his honorable behaviour and actions in thoſe military ſervices, wherein he had been imployed: and the ſame likewiſe he intimates in the affections of *Tiberius* and *Piſo* towards *Germanicus*. *Tacitus.*

It is wiſely therefore obſerved by the Hiſtorian, That men of vaſt and various imployments, have uſually the unhappineſſe of *Envy* attending them, which therefore they have ſometimes declined by retyring and withdrawing themſelves from continuall addreſſes, as a wiſe mariner, who (as he ſpake) doth *aliquantulum remittere Clavum ob magnum fluctus vim*. And thus we finde the honour *Davids* merits procured him, was the foundation of that implacable *Hatred* of *Saul* towards him. For as in naturall moti- *Plutar. lib. de Rep. gerenda.*

tion, that which comes from the fartheſt extreme, is moſt ſwift and violent: ſo in the motions of the Minde, the further off we fetch the reaſon of our *Hatred*, the more venemous and implacable it is.

And here we may obſerve the mutuall and interchangeable ſervices, which corrupt affections exerciſe amongſt themſelves: For as Philoſophy obſerves in the generation of thoſe cold Meteors which are drawne to the middle region of the Aire, they are firſt by the coldneſſe of the place congealed, and afterward doe by the like impreſſions fortifie and intend the ſame quality in the Region: ſo here *Hatred* firſt generates *Envy*; and this againe doth recipocally encreaſe *Hatred*, and both joyne in miſchiefe. So much the more hurtful to the Soule, wherein they are, then to the Enemy whom they reſpect, by how much they are more near and inward thereunto: for certainly a malignant humour doth moſt hurt where it harboureth.

From this followeth another evill Effect, which I will but name, being of the ſame Nature with *Envy*; and it is that which Philoſophers call Ἐπιχαιρεκακία, a rejoycing at the calamity of him whom we hate, a quality like that of thoſe who are reported to have* been nouriſhed with poyſon. For as in Love there is a mutuall partaking of the ſame Ioyes and Sorrows (for where the will and affections are one, the ſenſes are in ſome ſort likewiſe) ſo *Hatred* ever worketh contrarietie of affections: That which worketh Griefe

Ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἡδονὴ ἐπ' ἀλλοτριοις κακοῖς. *Laer. in Zen. lib 7.*

Plutarch. de Curioſit.

Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 7.

Mag. Mor. cap. 28.

Prov. 17, 5. 24. 17.

* *Caelius Rhod. Antiq. lect. lib. 6. cap. 35*

Griefe unto the one, doth worke Joy unto the other. And therefore *Thales* being asked how a Man might be cheerfull and beare up in afflictions, answered: If he can see his enemies in worse case then himselfe. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kinde of Men:

Pectora felle virent, Lingua est suffusa veneno:
Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere Dolores.

Their breasts with gall, their tongues with venome flow:
They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw only the vitious humors of the body unto them; and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those Wormes which receive their Life from the Corruption of the Dead; and surely the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from * Flies, because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.

Another corrupt Effect of *Hatred* is a sinister and crooked suspition, whereby with an envious and criticall Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpnesse of our owne wits, or the course of our owne behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our owne braines: Evill men being

* *Beelzebub. Matth.* 12 14. βεελζεβουλ *vertunt* 70. 2. *Reg* 1. 3. Ἀπόμυιος *apud Pausan. lib.* 5 *&* *Clem. Alex. in Protrept. Myindem vocat Plin. l.* 29. *cap.* 6.

being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a foule Sent. It is numbred amongſt one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it *Thinketh none Evill*; and certainely, there is not a ſo uler quality againſt Brotherly Love, then that which (for the ſatisfying of it ſelfe with but the Imaginary Evill of him whom it diſliketh) will venture to finde out in every action ſome cloſe impiety, and pierce into the reſerved and hidden paſſages of the heart: like him in the Philoſopher, who thought where ever he went, that he ſaw his owne Picture walk before him. And therefore we ſee how *Agrippina* when ſhe would not diſcover any ſhew of *Feare* or *Hatred* towards her Sonne *Nero*, who had at the firſt plotted her death on the Sea: and that fayling, ſent the ſecond time *Anicætas* the Centurion to make ſure worke, did in both theſe practiſes decline all ſhew of ſuſpition, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the Murther to be directed by him. *Solum Inſidiarum remedium aſpicens, ſi non intelligirenter.* Suppoſing the onely remedies of theſe plots to be, if ſhe ſeemed not to underſtand them. For ill meanings do not love to be found out; As the ſame Hiſtorian telleth us of *Tiberius*, *Acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret:* He hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked *Suſpition* which is not rooted in *Hatred*. For as to thinke the worſt of our owne Actions, is a ſigne of *Hatred* to our ſinnes (for I thinke no man loves his ſinnes who dares ſearch them:) ſo con-

Tacit. Annal. lib. 14.

contrariwiſe to have an humour of caſting the worſt gloſſes upon the Actions of another Man, where there is no palpable diſſimulation, argues as great a want of Love. We ſearch for Evill in our ſelves to *expell* it; but we ſearch for evill in another to *finde* it. There is ſcarce a more hateful quality in the eyes of God or Man, then that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuſe him.

Another effect which proceedeth from corrupt *Hatred*, is proud and inſolent carriage, whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilifie the Merit of a perſon. For though the Apoſtle hath in this reſpect of Pride and Swelling, oppoſed Knowledge unto Love: *Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth*; yet the oppoſition holdeth not there onely: For there is *Timor Cordis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*; as well a ſtubborne as a learned Pride: a Pride againſt the Perſon, as againſt the weakneſſe of our Brother: a Pride whereby wee will not ſtoope to a yeelding and reconciliation with him, as whereby wee will not ſtoope to the Capacitie and Edification of him that is the ſwelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that *Hatred* (as *Ariſtotle* hath excellently obſerved) when it is ſimple and alone (though that ſeldome fall out) is without the admixion of any Griefe. And the reaſon I take it is, becauſe Griefe is either for the Evill of another, and ſo it is ever the Effect of Love: or for the Evill which lyeth upon our ſelves, and ſo is the cauſe of Humi-

Rhet. l. 2. c. 4.

Humilitie; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in it selfe some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a Contempt and Insolence towards another Man. And therefore as it was Pride in Men and Angels, which wrought the first Hatred between God and them; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is Pride.

Prov. 10. 12

The last Corruption of this Passion is *Impatience*, *Contention* and *Fury*, as the wise Man telleth us, *Hatred stirreth up strife*. And therefore that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called Μακροθυμία, and *Longanimitas*, Long suffering, to signifie some length, distance, and remotion between a Mans Minde and his Passion. But Hatred, being of a fierce Nature, is so farre from admitting any Peace, or yeelding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been observed out of *Aristotle*) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Affection of Desire. What it is. The severall kinds of it, Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall. Intemperate, Vnnaturall, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most Generall Internall cause Vacuity, Indigenee. Other Causes, Admiration, Greatnesse of minde, Curiosity.

THE next Passions in order of Nature to these two are *Desire* and *Abomination*, which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and Hatred, then the Act from the Habit, or then a man sitting from himselfe walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more briefly passe it over. *Desire* is the wing of the Soule whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the *Eagle to the Carkasse* in the Scripture proverb, to feed it self upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the Appetite of the Eagle is attended with sharpnesse of sight to discover its prey, with swiftnesse of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon it:

Job 39.30. *Matth.* 24. 28. *Habac.* 1.8.

it: So according to the proportion of the Soul's love unto its object, doth it command and call together both the Wisdome and Powers of the whole man to direct unto, and to promote the procuring of it. And the very best characters and truest lineaments which can be drawne of the mindes of men, are to be taken from their *Desires*, rather then from their *Practices*. As Physitians often judge of the Diseases of sicke men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not do so much evill as they desire, for feare of shame or punishment: Good men cannot do so much good as they desire, for want of Power and Provisions of vertue. Besides, *Practises* may be over-ruled by ends, but *Desires* are alwayes genuine and naturall; for no man can be constrained to will that which hee doth not love: And therefore in the Scripture good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections, and the inward longings of their soules after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of Love, and such as have least Proximity and danger of infection from forreigne and secular ends. Saint *Paul* himselfe was much better at *willing*, then at *performing*; and Saint *Peter*, who failed in his promise of *Doing*, dares appeale to Christs owne Omniscience for the truth of his *Loving*. What ever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soule, that it *desires to feare Gods Name*, and according to the prevalency of that Affection, hath its conversation in heaven too. In which regard *Christ* is called

Plutar. Nat. Quæst. cap. 26.

Rom. 7. 18, 19. Jesh. 21. 17.

Neh. 1. 11. Isa. 26. 8. Phil. 3. 20.

led the *Desire of all Nations*, both because where he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfie all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Romane Emperours, *Neminem unquam dimisit tristem*, he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

Hag. 2 9. Joh. 12. 32. Psal. 107. 6.

The desires of the Soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, *Naturall*, *Rationall*, *Spirituall*.

Naturall Desires respect [illegible], things of simple *Necessity* to the Being, Preservation, and integrity of Nature, as the *desires* which things have to their proper *nourishment* and *place*, *ad conservationem individui*, for preserving themselves; and to *propagation*, and increase *ad conservationem speciei*, for preserving of their kinde.

Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 10.

Rational Desires are such as respect [illegible], such things as are *Eligible* in themselves, and the proper objects of *right Reason*; such as *Felicity*, the common *End* of all rationall Appetitions; *Virtue*, the way; and *External good things*, as Health, Strength, Credit, Dignity, Prosperity, the *Ornaments* of humane life.

Spirituall Desires respect [illegible], heavenly & spiritual things, the *things of God*, *Things which are above*, The knowledge whereof we have not by Philosophicall; but by Apostolicall discovery, by the *Spirit of God, who onely searcheth the deep things of God.*

Heb. 9. 23. 1 Cor. 3. 13. Col. 3. 1.

The *Corrupt Desires* contrary unto these are either *Vitious* or *Morbid*. *Vitious* are againe of two sorts: First, *Intemperate* and incontinent Desires, which erre not in the substance or nature of the thing desired; but only ἐν τῷ πῶς, as the Philosopher speaks, in the *measure* and *manner* of desiring them. It is lawfull to drinke Wine, and a Man may erre (*as Timothy* did) in an over * rigorous severity to Nature, when health or needfull refreshment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued to *reason*, not to *infirmities*, that it may be a *servant* to the Soule, but not a *burden*. But if we let Wine bee ἐπίδιος, as the Heathen called it, to take a freedome against us, like *Cham* to mock us, and discover our nakednesse, and make us servants unto it; If we do not only *eat* Hony, but *surfet* on it; If we must have meat like Israel in the Wildernesse, not onely for our *Need*, but for our *Lust*; If we eat and drinke so long that we are good for nothing, but either to lye down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to day, and dye to morrow; If we make our belly the grave of our Soule, and the dungeon of our Reason, and let our *Intestina* as well morally as naturally farre exceed the length of the whole Man besides; This is in the Apostles phrase, to be *lovers of pleasure rather then lovers of God*; and it is an intemperate excesse against naturall desires which will everend in pain. It was a witty speech of *Anacharsis* the Philosopher, that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes; The first of *Delight*: The second of *Excesse*: The third of *Sorrow*. If we let our *Delight* steale us into

Prov. 31.6.
1 *Tim* 5.23.
Psal. 104.15.
* *Vid. Socr. li. 4. cap.* 18. *Euseb. l.* 4. *c.* 38. *li.* 5. *c.* 17. *Iren. l.* 1 *ca.* 34. *Tertul. advers. Psychic. c.* 15. *Epiph. Tom.* 2. *l.* 2. *Vid. Gul. Sive. Antiq. Comm. li.* 31 *cap.* 7,8. *Clem. Al. ped. li.* 2. *ca.* 1,2. *Hiero. l.* 2. *adv. Jovinian.*

Megarenses obsonant, quasi crastina die morituri. Tert. Apol. ca. 39.

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

into *Excesse*, and become a mocker, our *Excesse* will quickly betray us unto *Sorrow*, (as *Dalilah* did *Samson* to the *Philistines*) and let us know that after Wine hath mocked, it can rage too. Like the head of the *Polypus*, which is sweet to the Palate, but after causeth troublesome sleeps, and frightfull dreames. Prov. 20.1. *Plut. de Auditione.*

Secondly, there are brutish and *unnaturall Desires*, which the Philosopher calleth θηριώδεις, ferine and inhumane, instancing in those barbarous Countreys, where they use to eat mens flesh and raw meat; and in the Woman who ripped up Women with childe, that she might eate their young ones: Unto which head I refer those which the Apostles cals πάθη ἀτιμίας, & πάθη ἐπιθυμίας, *vile and dishonorable Affections and passions of Lust*, wherein forsaking the guidance of Nature, they dishonored their bodies amongst themselves, and gave themselves over, as S. *Jude* speaketh, unto *strange flesh*; also incestuous and promiscuous Lusts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as the ancient Brittaines offering of men and children in sacrifices, eating of the bodies of Friends that dyed, burning of the living with the dead, and other like savage and barbarous practices, wherein we finde how farre naturall corruption improved with ignorance and want of Education or Religion, can imbrute the manners of Men. *Ethic. l.7 c.6.* Rom.1.26. 1 Thes.4.5. Iud. ver.7. *Vid. Euseb. de præp. Evang. lib.1.c.4. Hieron. lib.2. cont. Jovin.* *Tveod. Serm. 9. de Legib. Cœl. Rodigin. Amiq. lib. 10. cap.21,28. Plin. l.5. c.17. 30. & l.7. c.2.*

Lastly, there are *morbid Desires*, growing out of some distemper of Minde or Body, called by the Philosopher νοσήματα, as those of children, which

eat coales or dirt, and the strange and depraved longings of women with child, called κύησις, or *Pica*, from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant and various appetences of Nature, so misguided by vitious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers in that Bird.

Ethic. l. 7. c. 6.

Cæl. Rodig. lib. 3. cap. 15. Vid. Stephan. & Gorræum in voce κύησις.

Having considered the severall kindes both of regular and corrupt *Desires*: I shall content my self with a very brief inquiry into the causes and effects of this Passion.

The causes moving it are *External, ex parte objecti*, in the object; *or Internall, ex parte subjecti*, in the minde. The *Object* is any thing apprehended *sub ratione Boni & jucundi*, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stirre the desire of *Eve* towards the forbidden fruit: *She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.*

De bono & jucunde, vid. Philosoph. Rhet. l. 1.

Gen. 3. 6.

Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formall reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are objects of our love, is first that they be *possible*: For *Desire* being the motion and endeavour of the Soule towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be *motus in vacuo*, like that of *Noah*'s Dove, that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whet-stone, and wheele of industry; if that faile, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty *Velleities*, and imaginary wishes, he can never put

forth nor addresse his endeavours towards an impossible good. Though an old man may wish himself young again, yet no man was ever so besotted as to endeavour it. And this distinction between vanishing *Wishes* and serious *Desires* is of great consequence to be attended in all the motions of the Soule, morall or sacred, in as much as those Desires onely which are active and industrious, purposely addressing themselves to the prosecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, do commend the Soule from whence they issue, for vertuous and pious.

Concupiscunt etiam & quæ non possunt. Sen. de Ira, l. 1. c. 3.

μεγαλοψυχία δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων. Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 4.

Vid. de volitione & velleitate, Aquin. 1.2 qu. 13. art. 5. & Valent. Tom. 2. disp. 2. qu. 8. p. 2

Secondly, the object of the *Desires*, *qua tale*, is apprehended as *Absent* and *distant*, in as much as presence worketh delight rather then desire. The things we have we enjoy, we do not covet; we rest in them, we do not move towards them. Yet not alwayes *Absent quoad totum*, but *quoad gradus*, not into the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the presence of a good thing doth in some sort quicken the desires towards the same thing, so far forth as it is capable of *improvement* and augmentation.

Crescit amor nummi quantùm ipsa pecunia crescit. Et minus hanc optat qui non habet, Juvenal. Sat. 14. Arist. lib. 1. Politic. c. 6. Plutarch. lib. de Cupidit. divit. a. Senec. ep. 73. Marc. 9. 24.

As we see in externall riches of the body, none desire them more eagerly then those that possesse them; and the more vertuous the Soul of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the Appetition of a greater measure; as the putting in of some water into a Pump, doth draw forth more. No man is so importunate in praying, *Lord help mine unbelefe*, as he that can say, *Lord, I beleeve*. Thus even *present* things may be desired in order

to improvement, and further degrees of them: as many times a man hath a better stomack to his meat after he hath begun to eat, then when he first sate downe unto it. Again, things present may be the Object of our *Desires* unto *Continuance*, as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore *Life*, even while it is possessed it is desired, because the possession of it doth not cause the Appetite to nauseate or surfet upon it. Few men there are who Desire not old Age, not as it is old Age, and importeth decay, decrepidnesse, and defects of Nature: For a young man doth not desire to be old now; but as it implyeth the longer and fuller possession of Life: For a man being conscious to himselfe; first of his own insufficiency to make himself happy from and within himselfe; and next of the immortality of his Nature: as upon the former reason he is busied in sending abroad his *Desires* (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the Soule) to bring in such things as may promote, *perfection*: so those very *Desires* having succeeded do farther endeavour the satisfaction of Nature, by moving towards the *perpetuity* of what they have procured. It was a sordid and brutish wish of *Philoxenus* in the Philosopher, who wished that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture, that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer (it being the wisedome of Nature, intending the chiefe perfections of Man to his Soule, to make his bodily Pleasures the shorter.) But surely the Soule of Man having a reach

Arist. Ethic. li. 3. ca. 13.
Idem l. 3. c. 3. Problem. § 28. quæst. 7.
Suidas in Philoxenum.
Ælian, var. hist. l. 10. ca. 9.
Τοιαῦτα δεῖ ποτὶ θεὸν εὔχεσθαι ἃ καὶ ἄνευ γένεσθε ἀγαθὰ ἔσται.
Diog. Laert. in Antisthen. l. 6.

as

as farre as Immortality may iuſtly deſire, as well the *perpetuity* as the preſence of thoſe good things wherein ſtandeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counſell of *Antiſthenes* the Philoſopher, That a man ſhould lay up ſuch proviſions, as in a Shipwracke might ſwimme out with him, ſuch treaſure as will paſſe and bee currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, is *to lay up a good foundation againſt the time to come.*

The *Internall Cauſes* moving *Deſire*, in regard of the ſubject or minde of man, may be different according to the different kindes of Deſires ſpoken of before. The moſt generall which reſpecteth them all is a *vacuity*, *Indigence*, and ſelfe-inſufficiency of the Soule: For having not within it ſelfe enough either to preſerve it, or to content it, it is forced to go out of it ſelf for ſupplies, for whereſoever God hath implanted ſenſitive and rationall affections, he hath been pleaſed to carry them from themſelves, and to direct them abroad for their ſatisfaction: by that means preſerving the Soule in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himſelf. Every creature though it have its life in its own poſſeſſion; yet the preſervation of it, it fetcheth from ſome things without. The excelleneſt Creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nouriſhment, and for their knowledge. And therfore of all graces, God hath choſen *faith* & *repentance*, and the chief means of carrying us to him, becauſe theſe two do moſt

ἀναπλήρωσις τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυικὴ ἐπιθυμία. Ariſt. Ethic. li. 3. ca. 11. ἐκ τῆς ἐνδείας ἐπιθυμία. Clem. Alex. Str. l. 17.

carry us out of our selves, and most acquaint us with insufficiencies, *Repentance* teaching a man to abhor himself, and *Faith* to deny himself.

Si quid deerit id à nobis petierimus. Sen. Epi 119. Vid Plut. Cœlius Rhod. li 14. cap 7.

Now because *Emptinesse* is the cause of *Appetence*, we shall hereupon finde, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vaste desires. The more the minde of any man is in *weight*, the more it is in *rest* too. As they say that in Rivers, ships go slower in the Winter, but withall they carrie the greater burdens: So many times men of lesse urgent and importunate Apperitions and motions of minde, are more furnished and better ballanced within. In *Jothams* Parable the Bramble was more ambitious than the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other *Arbor Desideriì*, the tree of Desire, is weakest, and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore we shall finde that mens Desires are strongest when their constiturions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as wee see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and miscellany of desires. Thus wee see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internell furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavie things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the signes either of a childish or a sick Temper of minde; as the Naturallists observe, that the least creatures are the greatest breeders: a Mouse bringeth

Iudg. 9. 9. 15.

Iob 7. 1, 2, 3.

τὰ μεγαλα ὀλιγοβρατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολυτοκα. Arist. de Generatio Animæ, li. 4. ca. 4.

bringeth more young ones than an Elephant.

Onely here wee must distinguish both of contentment and of Desires. There may bee a double *Contentment*, the one arising out of *sluggishnesse* and narrownesse of minde; when men out of an unwillingnesse to put themselves to the paines of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have, and had rather have a poore quiet than a Treasure with labour. As they say of the Fig-tree, though it be least beautifull of other Trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withall it is free from Thunder. And as the Historian said of some men, that they are *solâ socordia innocentes*, doe men no hurt, onely because it would cost them paines to doe it: so may wee of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they professe to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but onely lay them asleepe, as even an hungry man when he sleepeth, hath his hunger sleepe with him.

Vivunt, non quomodo volunt; sed quomodo Cæperunt. Sen. de Tran. ca 2. Plut. Sympos. l. 5. quæst. 9.

Tacit.

Another contentment there is arising out of *wisdome* and practicall learning (as the Apostle tels us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented) when the heart being established and made steady with grace and solid materials within, as a Ship with ballast, is lesse tossed with lower affections: as *Saul* cared not for his Asses when he heard of a Kingdome.

Phil. 4. 11, 12. Heb. 13. 9.

Namq; labant curvæ justo sine pondere naves; Perq; mare instabiles nimiâ levitate feruntur. Ov. Met. li. 2. Iuven. Sat. 14. Plin. l. 7. c. 56. Stuck. l. 2. c. 8. fol. 165.

——*Gratæ post munus artifex*
Contingunt homines veteris fastidia quercus.

When men had once discover'd better corn,
They loath'd their masse, & oaken bread did scorn.

And this kind of contentment doth not stupifie loose Desires, but change them, as the Cats *Vnum magnum* was more worth to her than all the varietie of shifts which the Fox did boast of; and one Sun doth more comfort us in the day, than many thousand Stars in the night.

Plut de Solert. Animal.

Again, Desires are either of things *excellent*, as the vertuous and spirituall desires of the Soule whereby men move towards God; and these do neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well acquainted with God as *Moses*, who yet was the more importunate to know him better, *I beseech thee shew me thy glory:* nor any man more acquainted with Christ than Saint *Paul*, who yet desired *to be dissolved, and to be with Christ* neerer.

Sapiens est divitiarum naturalium Quæsitor accerrimus. Sen Epist 119.

Exod. 33. 18.

Phil. 1. 23.

Other Desires are of *middle things*, τὰ μεταξύ, as the Philosopher cals them; such as Wealth, Profit, Victorie, Honour, which are not good in themselves, but as they are managed. And these *Desires* though not extinguished, yet are verie much asswaged, and moderated by the weight and wisedome of solid contentment. He was the wisest man then alive, and who knew all the quintessence, and what ever was desireable in the Creature, who said, *Da mihi panem Statuti mei, Give me the Bread of my Allowance,* δὸς μοι τὰ τῆς χρείας ἐπαρκοῦντα ἐμοὶ ἄρτον so much as the quality of my place

Arist. Ethic. li 7. ca 6.

Prov. 30. 8.

Theophylact.

and

and ſtate requireth, which is that which our Saviour limiteth our deſires unto; ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος & συμμέτρος our portion and *dimenſum*, ἐφήμερος τροφή, in Saint *James*, *daily food*; and was pleaſed to anſwer that wiſe King in that his requeſt, and to give us a record and catalogue of his daily bread.

Another cauſe of *Deſire* may bee *Admiration*; A ſtrange thing though monſtrous and deformed, calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marvellous *Lenocinium*, and inticer of Deſire, *æſtivæ nives, hybernæ roſæ*, as the Panegyriſt ſpake, Snow in the Summer, and Roſes in Winter; the Birds of this Countrey, and the Roots of another; dainties hardly procured without the ſhipwracks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly; theſe are the delights of the curioſities of men. The ſame fruits when they are worſe but rarer, have a farre greater value ſet upon them, then when expos'd by their commonneſſe unto every mans purchaſe; And it was a wiſe complaint of old *Cato*; That it went ill with the City, when a Fiſh was ſold for more then an Oxe. We ſee Deſires do not put forth themſelves more freely in any then in Children; I thinke the chiefe Reaſon of it is the ſame which the Philoſopher giveth of their memories; becauſe every thing to them is new and ſtrange, for ſtrange things as they make ſtronger impreſſions upon the *Retentive*, ſo they do upon the *Appetitive* faculties. And therefore we finde *Herod* who cared nothing at all for the Doctrine of Chriſt, becauſe it was holy and divine, had yet a great

Τροφὴ ἰσόμοιρος *Suidas.*
Luke 22. 42.
Iam. 2. 15.
Iob 23. 12.
1 Reg. 4. 22.
Vide Weſer. de menſuris, l. 2. c. 3. & Angel Canninium de pane quotid. ad calcem Inſtit. Syria. Stuck. Convival. li. 1. ca. 22.

Plut. Apoth.

Rhet. lib. 2.

Luke 23. 8.

Desire to have seene his miracles, because they were wonderfull. And Men have travelled farre to see those persons and things, the fame whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange Flowres and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strange Sinnes too (which is the curiositie and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation among Men. *Nero* gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even *Solomons* ships, besides substantiall Treasure) did bring home Apes and Peacocks. Athens which was the eye, the floure, and Epitome of Greece (to shew that this curiositie is the disease as well of Wits, as of Childhood) spent all their time and studie *in inquiring after new things*. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made Lawes to interdict the transporting of their countrey Fruits into other places, least the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to bee Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and Figges of *Canaan* were used as Incentives unto the expedition of *Israel*. And hence *Plutarch* telleth us that the Word Sycophant is derived, to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figges into other Countries. As on the other side we reade, that the Athenians set up a pillar, wherein they published him to bee an Enemie of the Citie, who should bring Gold out of Media, as an Instrument to corrupt them. And the Romane Governour commanded his souldiers

Aristippus Athenas navigavit Socratem invisurus. Plutarch. de Curiosi. l. Reg 10. Plato Ægyptum, Italiam, Siciliam petiit Philosophiæ causâ. Vid. Theo. Orat. 1. de fide. Ze. 1. 8. Græc. ἔφοδια. Arist. Tom. 2 Orat. de pace poster: Græciæ, Græcia. Thycidides vid. Cœl. Rhod. l. 10. c. 25. Acts 17. 21.

Plut. in Solon. & de Curiosit. & lib. 1. Cod *quæ res exportari non debeant.*

Arist. Tom. 3. Orat. 2. Ælius Spart. in piscen. Nig.

souldiers that they should not carrie any Gold or Silver into the Field with them, least thereby they should be looked on by the Adversary, as the Persians by *Alexander*, rather as a prey, than a foe.

A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires, *is height and greatnesse of minde*, which cannot well set bounds of measure unto it self, as *Seneca* said in another sence, *Magnitudo non habet certum modum.* Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various Desires. A great Ship will not be carried with the Saile of a Lyter. Nor can an Eagle flie with the wings of a Sparrow. *Alexander* was not so great in his Victories as in his Desires, whom one world could not satisfie: nor *Pompey* in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greatest.

Epist. 43.

Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi. Vt Gyare inclusus cogatur, &c. Juv. Satyr. 10. Sen de Benef. l. 7. c. 2. p. 94. & 119. Eccles. 6. 9. Prov. 17. 24.

Another cause of Desires may be Curiositie, which is nothing else but a desire of prying into, and listing after the businesses of other Men, which is called by *Solomon*, *Ambulatio Animæ*: The walking up and downe of the Soule, as he elsewhere telleth us, that the *Eyes of a Foole are in the ends of the Earth*: Such a Man being like the Witches which *Plutarch* speaks of, that weare Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home: Or like the Falckoners Hawkes that are hooded in the house, and never suffered to use their Eyes but to the hurt of other Birds: like

Plut de Cur.

Hoc se quisq; modo semper fugit. Lucret. apud Sen. de tranquil. c. 2.

Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte ponere, &c. Horat.

like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing where he is; but can see a great deale of light abroad at a little passage. So these kinde of Men have vast desires of Forreigne knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that he looks every way but *upward*: so we may of Pragmatists, that their Eyes looke all wayes but *inward*. Whereas the mindes of prudent Men are like the Windows of *Solomons* Temple, broader inward than outward. As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the darke towards *Pharaoh*: Or as the Sunne in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkned. A wise mans Eyes are in his head, whereas a Foole hath τὸν ἐπιπήγνιον as it is in the *Proverbs*, his minde in his heels onely to wander and gad abroad.

1 Reg. 6.4.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of other causes of Desire, Infirmity, Temerity, Mutability of Minde, Knowledg, Repentance, Hope. Of the effects of it in Generall, Labour, Languor. In Speciall, of Rationall Desires, Bounty, Griefe, Wearinesse, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of vitious desires, deception, Ingratitude, Envy, Greedinesse, Baseneſſe of resolution.

OTher causes of Desires are *Infirmity*, *Rashnesse*, and *Mutability* of Mind, Which three I put in one, as having a neer Relation and dependance within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons, are both Temerarious in precipitating the Minde, and anticipating the Dictates of Reason which should regulate or restraine them: as also mutable and wandring like the Bee from one Floure unto another; *Infirmity* not suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees, and *Temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any; and lastly, *Mutabilitie* making him weary of those things which weakneſſe and rashneſſe had unadvisedly

Ἔτι δὲ ἀκρασίας τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δὲ ἀοδήγητα ὅτι μὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι οὐκ ἐμμένουσι διὰ εὐβουλίαν τὸ δι' τὸ πάθος ὅτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν. Arist. Eth. lib. 7. c. 8.

visely transportid him unto *Omnium Imperitorum animus in lubrico est*: Weake minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like fickle and nauseating stomacks, which long for many things and can eat none. Like sick bodies, *quæ mutationibus ut remediis utuntur*, as *Seneca* speakes, which tosse from side to side, and thinke by changing of their place they can leave their pain behind them. Like *Achilles* in the Poet:

Μαximum indicium est malementis fluctuatio, Sen. Ep. 120. vid. ep. 10. & de Tranq. cap. 2. ὥσπερ παῖδας ῥᾳδίως ὀπιδυμοῦντας πρὸς χείρεως δὲ καταλείποντας· Aristid. Tom. 2. Orat. 1. Vid. etiam Plutarch. de Tranq. Iliad. ω.

Ἄλλοτ' ὀπὶ πλευρὰς κατακείμενος ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
Ὕπτιος ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνὴς τύπτ' ἔδαφος ἀέρσας.

Now he leans on his side, now supine lyes,
Then grov'leth on his face, and strait doth rise.

This Sickneſſe and Inconſtancy of Deſires is thus elegantly diſcribed by the old Poet *Lucretius*:

——*Vt nunc plerumq; videmus,*
Quid ſibi quiſq; velit neſcire & quærere ſemper.
Commutare locum, quaſi onus deponere poſſit.
Exit ſæpe foras magnis ex ædibus ille,
Eſſe domi quam pertæſum eſt ſubitoq; revertit.
Currit agens mannos advillam præcipitanter
Auxilium tecti is quaſi ferre ardentibus inſtet.
Oſcitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villæ,
Aut abit in ſomnum gravis, atq; oblivia quærit:
Aut etiam properans Vrbem petit, atq; reviſit.
Hoc ſe quiſq; modo fugit. At, quod ſcilicet ut fit,
Effugere haud potis eſt, ingratus hæret & anget.

Lucret. lib. 3. *Jactor, Cruciagitor, ſtimulor, uror ſor in amoris rota, miſer exanimor, ſeneſco, diſſolvor, diſtrahor, deripior, ita nullam mentem animi habeo. Ibi ſum, ibi non ſum, ubi non ſum ibi eſſe avemus. Ita mihi ingenia ſunt, quod lubet non lubet jam id continuo, &c.* Plaut. Ciſtell.

Wee

We see how troubled Mortals still enquire,
Yet ne're can find what 'tis which they desire.
One changeth place, as if he could unload
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,
Weary of a great Palace; strait turnes back,
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.
Wearied both here & there, he mounts his steed,
And runs to th'neighbor town with swifter speed
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set
He gapes and sleeps and studies to forget
Why he came thither, haply turne his raine,
And to the City poasteth backe againe.
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shunne,
And scape himselfe, but ne're can get it done.
He bears the thing he flyes. What he would leave
Vnwelcome selfe unto it selfe doth cleave,
Aud cleaving doth torment. ——

Nihil tam occupatum tam multiforme toti ac tam variis morbis concisum ac laceratum quàm mala mens, Quintil. lib. 12. cap. 1. *Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte: Ponere atque ipsum vitas fugitivus & ero,* Horat. vid. Plutarch. de Tranquillit.

The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is (as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more it delighteth in one and the same uniform operation. *Mutability* is not pleasant in it selfe; but the delight of it ariseth out of the *pravitie* and *defect* of *Nature.*

Εἰ ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ ἐστι, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτῆ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν χὴ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν. Arist. Ethic. lib. 7. c. ult.

I might here insist on other more obvious causes of desire: As,

1 *Knowledge* and experience of the goodnesse of that which wee desire: as the Apostle also telleth us, *That Experience worketh Hope*: And we use to say, *Ignoti nulla Cupido.* A man cannot desire that of which he hath no Apprehension. Knowledge is Appetites Taster.

2 *Sorrow* and *Repentance* for the Evils wee feele, the contrary whereunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire Health so eagerly as when Sickness teacheth us to va'ue it: For as in Colours, so in Actions or Affections, contraries doe set forth and sharpen one another. And as *Labor Naturall*, doth make Man earnestly desire the Shadow, as *Iob* speaks: so *Sorrow* which is *Labor Mentall*, doth make a Man earnestly thirst after that which can remove the thing which begets that sorrow. The Apostle telleth us, *That Desire and Zeale are the fruits of godly Sorrow.* *David* never panted so earnestly after Gods favour and presence, as when he felt what a Greif it was to be without it: For in this case there is an Apprehension of a double goodnesse in the thing we desire, both is perfective unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinall unto Nature wronged.

Lastly, *Hope of speeding in our Desires*: For the stronger any mans perswasions are, the more cheerfull and vigorous will bee his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content my selfe with the intimation of these things. And in the next, very briefly to runne over some *Effects* and Consequents of this Affection: Which are,

1 In regard of *Desires* at large, *Labour* and *Paines*: For they are onely Velleities and not Volitions; halfe and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious; but waste away in sluggish and empty speculations. [a] The Fisherman that will take the Fish, must be contented

Tum denique omnes nostra intelligimus bona. Quum quæ in potestate habuit meus ea amisimus, Plaut. captiv. c. 7. l. 2.

2 Cor. 7. 11.

[a] Οἱ ἁλιεῖς ἀναπαύεσθαι φαίνεσθε τῇ θαλάττῃ, Aristip. apud Laert. l. 2.

tented to be dashed with the Water. [b] And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them:

Ἀργὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ θεὸν ἔχων αὐτὰ στόμα·
Βίον δωΐαιν' αἰ ζυλλεγὲν αὔχυ πίνε.

Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no paine,
By devout sloath shall never gather gaine.

[b] Eurip. Electra. Plutarch. Instit. Lacon. ἐπεὶ μὴν τ' χεῖρ' ἐυτοχεῖ δόξυ χὴ ζῆλε ποὸς ἡμῶν, &c. Eurip. Rhes.

It was the just reproofe of him in the Poet who was upbraided with comming to the feasts, but withdrew himselfe from the labour of other Men. Nature hath often made the roots of those Plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that Delight is the fruit of Labour. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *Desire* is usually accompanied with *Sorrow*.

Homer. Iliad. Σ 341, 348. Eurip. Rhe 325

Aristot. apud Laert. lib. 5.

Againe, *Desires* doe commonly worke a *Languor* and fainting towards the thing desired, if they be either strong or hasty: For Hope deferred maketh the heart sicke. As *Ahabs* eager desire of *Naboths* Vineyard, cast him upon his bed. And *David* expresseth his longings towards Gods Law, by the breaking and fainting of his Soule. *Cum expectatio longior est consenescit animus, & debilitatur mens.* Delaied expectation weakneth and withereth the mindes of Men. And therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of Desire by groaning, which is the Language of Sicknesse.

Arist. Eudemi lib. 2. cap 10. Prov. 13. 12. 1 Reg. 21. 4. Ps. 119. 20. 81. *Usque ad aegritudinem desideravit*, El. Lampid. in Com. Rom. 8. 22. 2 Cor. 5. 2.

2 In regard of *Reasonable* and Spirituall Desires. The effects of this affection are:

1 *Large heartednes* and *Liberality*. That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him, as the ἀναθήματα and trophies of his mercifull triumph over them. One man adornes the Gospell with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisedome.

Phil. 3. 8, 9, 10. Matth 13. 45. Hag. 2. 6, 7. Matth. 2. 11. Isa. 60. 5. 17 Psalm 68. 29

Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before the armour of sinne, are then become the spoyles of Christ. *Antonius* out of the strength of his desires towards *Cleopatra*, bestowed many countries upon her.

Plutarch in Anton.

2 *Griefe* for any losse or hazard of the thing desired. As the Sea-mans needle which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving till it finde the North point againe. *Flagrantia sunt animorum desideria cum solatia perdiderunt*, as the Orator spake. Desires burne hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.

Nazar. Orat. Panegyr.

3 *Wearinesse* and *Indignation* against any thing which standeth between Desire and the fruition of that which is desired. *Vehementiùs per metus & pericula exibit*: That which resisteth increaseth it. As a River goes with more strength where it is hindred and withstood. The Church did venture blowes when she sought her Love and like the Palme tree rose up above her pressures: *plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis*, as

Senec. Epist. 75. Ab abice sevior. ibit. Plutarch. Sympos. l. 4. A. Gell. l. 3. c. 6.

Tertullian

Tertul. Apolog. cap. ult.

Tertullian ſpeakes to the Heathen. The more you mow us downe, the thicker wee grow? the more we ſuffer for him, the more we love and deſire him. Saint *Paul* careth not for a diſſolution that he may goe to Chriſt, as a ſtone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to it, place.

Thirdly, For *Corrupt* and *vitious Deſires*; their *Effects* are firſt, *Deception*, and haling of Reaſon as it were captive from determining, adviſing, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knowes in *theſi*, and at large, in *hypotheſi*, and as to his owne particular intereſt or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can ſay them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knowes the things which he ſpeaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the Philoſopher giveth the reaſon of it, the very ſame with S. *Iames*. That Reaſon which overcomes Luſt muſt bee λογικὸν ἐμφυτὸν Reaſon ingrafted; or to uſe the phraſe of another Apoſtle, συγκεκραμένον immixed and contempered with the ſoul, and not onely extrinſically irradiating it. And theſe kinde of men are elegantly called by *Iulius Pollux* ἑκουλόδουλοι men willingly ſlaviſh, and ὑπηνεμίοι ſubdued and brought under by their owne affections. As *Plutarch* ſaith of *Ageſelaus* that hewas ruled by *Lyſander* his ſervant, he having only the name, but the other the execution of his power. This ſlavery of mens minds under the tyranny of luſtfull deſires is thus deſcribed by the Satyriſt.

James 1.14. Ἐκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος.

Ethic. l. 7. c. 2. ἐκλελυμένου.

Ib. cap 7. ult. Hoſ. 4. 11. ὡσεὶ ἐλαία ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.

c. 3. *vid.* c. 9. *Vid. Plaut. Aſinar. act.* 1. *Scen.* 3. *Cicer. de Senectut.* James 1. 21. Heb. 4. 2.

Onomaſt. lib. 3. *cap.* 7.

Plutarch. in Lyſandro.

Mane

Persius Sat. 5. Vid. Arrian. Epict. l. 3 c. 24.

Mane piger stertis? surge, inquit Avaritia, eja
Surge: negas. Instat, surge inquit, non queo surge.
Ecquid agam rogitas? En saperdam advehe ponto,
Castoreum, stupas, hebenum, thus, lubrica Coa.

What sluggard snore so long? saies lust, up rise,
Awake, get out. Dar'st thou say nay? it cries
The same againe, up, rise? I cannot. No?
Rise though you cannot, when Ile have it so.
What must I doe? what doe? up, wipe your eies;
See, here's a goodly Ship of merchandise;
Shell fish, Castoreum, Flax, black Indian woods,
Frankincence, Wines of Coos and other goods.

Thus sordidly doe vaine men sell themselves and as it were, render up their Reason into the hands of vitious and greedy Affections, giving leave to their soules to suffer a shipwrack in that vessell which bringeth goods into their Cellars, and traffiquing their own judgment in exchange for a ship of wares.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 3. cap. 3. & l. 2. c. 27.

Secondly, These kinde of *Desires* make men *ungratefull* and *forgetfull* of any kindnesse which hath already been done them. *Memoriæ minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum.* As in buckets at a well, the longer the line of the one is which moves downeward, the shorter is the line of the other which riseth upward; so the larger our Desires are towards the future, the narower our memories are of things past. And usually mens valuations of things are more in the performance, hen

then when they are performed. And the reaſon, is becauſe as nature hath ſet our eies forward, and not behinde us: ſo the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principall factors, looke naturally before them, not to what they *Have*, but to what they *Hope*. The eye whereby we looke backeward into our lives is the eye of *Repentance*, we there either ſee our ſelves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himſelfe in both theſe Relations. But the eye whereby we looke forward, is an eye of *Hope*, and *Deſire*, and by that we are repreſented to our ſelves better and greater then we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadſtone be very neere it; But it mooveth downward, though the Center be never ſo remote. So much ſtronger are the motions of *Deſire*, then thoſe of acknowledgement and retribution.

Nam ferè maxuma pars movem hunc homines habent, quod ſibi volunt, Dum id impetrant Boni ſunt, ſed id ubi jam penes ſeſe habeant, ex bonis peſſumis & fraudulentiſſimi Plaut. Captiv. nihil æquè eſt gratum adeptis & concupiſcentibus. Plin. l. 2. E. 15.

Beſides the apprehenſions of *Goodneſſe* in a thing are much other in the *Deſire* then in the *Review*: as uſually the Sunne and the Moone looke bigger at their riſing, then when they are come over our heads. *Deſire* lookes on nothing in them but that which pleaſeth. *Review* findes that in them which diſpleaſeth. When we deſire Wine we thinke onely on the ſweetneſſe, when we review it, we remember the headach. Beſides what we deſire is apprehended as the matter of our life, what is paſt, men apprehend as in the hand of death. *Quicquid retro eſt mors tenet.* As in our life, ſo in our delights, ſo much of them is dead as is over and gone. We love our food

Senec. de Brevit. vitæ & Ep. 120.

when it is meate, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth through us we despise it. And the secret worke of concoction, (which is as it were the Review of our meat) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite tooke in a lumpe, and together.

And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever finde that they are like the Apples of Sodome, *Quæ contacta cinerescunt*, which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meates we eate, which go much more into excrement, then into nourishment and substance. Like the Cyprus tree which they say is very faire, but beares no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautifull in *frontispicio*, but ridiculous in *penetrali*. And if we looke well on them, we shall finde, that as they are mortall themselves, so they come to us through mortality, it was a bold, but true ὑξύμωρον of *Seneca*. *Mortibus vivimus*. We live by the deaths of other things. Our fullest Tables furnished with death, nothing but *fereta*, the *biers* of birds and beasts. Our richest garments the bowels and skinnes of other creatures, which worke out their owne lives to preserve ours. Silke is a grave to the worme that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our Offices and Honours seldome come to us but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them. And our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other mens Desires.

Tertul. Apol. cap. 40.

Phocion apud Plutarch. Apoph. Clem. Alex. Ped. lib. 3. cap. 3.

3. Theſe *Deſires* as they are *forgetfull*, ſo they are *envious*, and looke with an evill eye upon others competition, accounting their ſucceſſe our owne damage. If a man ſhould draw the genealogie of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we ſhould finde the Roote of that great Tree to be nothing but luſt. It was Deſire and inordinate appetite by which the devill perſwaded our firſt parents to pick a quarrell with their Maker. *Whence come warres and fightings*, ſaith Saint *Iames*, *but from luſts which warre in your members?* When a man hath warre within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himſelfe, will diſagree with all the world beſides. The ſea toſſeth every thing which comes into it, not becauſe it is wronged, but becauſe it is unquiet. And a luſtfull man will contend with every innocent man that proſpers, not becauſe this man doth him injury, but becauſe he grudgeth this mans proſperity. As the ſea repreſenteth every ſtrait thing that is put into it crooked, ſo luſt every harmeleſſe thing perverſe, and as *Seneca* ſpeakes, hath *Odium ſine inimico*, hatred without an enemie. Greedy Deſires are like a ſwollen and envious ſpleene, which ſucks away ſubſtance from all the reſt of the body.

Vid. Senec. de Ira. lib. 3. c. 31. Alienis gemitibus libenter Emolumenta conquirit. Ammian: Marcell. lib. 31. Egregium Exemplum invidiæ etiam Eccleſiaſtica ex cupiditatibus ortæ apud eundem Marcellinum inter Damaſum, & Vreiſinum. lib. 27.

Epiſt. 105.

4. Theſe *Deſires* are *Hidropticall*, and like a * Βουλιμία in the ſtomacke which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it. *Vnnaturall deſires* being herein very like unto *naturall motions*, the further they proceed, the ſtronger and

** Celius Rhodig. lib. c. 39. lib. 14. cap. 1.*

swifter they are. Like winde in a bladder, they never fill the heart, but inlarge it. The Grecians began their drinkings in little Cups, but proceeded unto flagons: and many times those Appetitions which begin in modesty go on unto impudence, and the more our lives hastens to leave the world, the more our lust hastens to possesse it. As it is noted of the *Parthians*, that the more they drinke, the more they thirst. And, which is a marvellous illogicall stupidity, the more continuall experience men have of the vanity of the world, the more greedy experiments they make to finde out solidity in it. Like your melancholly searchers after the Philosophers Stone, that never dote so much upon their project as then when it hath deluded them, and never flatter themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched by their Art, then when it hath brought them unto beggary.

Laert. in Anacharsi. lib. 1. Senec. de Ben. lib. 2. c. 27. Nihil Satis marituris, Imo morientibus ep. cap. 120 Plin. li 15. c. 22.

Lastly, from hence it comes to passe that these kindes of Desires are *Base*, and diject the minde unto sordid and ignoble Resolutions. For *cui nihil satis, nihil turpe.* He that hath ever enough will count nothing base whereby he may get more. As the *Historian* saith of *Otho*, that he did *Adorare vulgus, jacere oscula, & omnia serviliter pro Imperio.* Adore the people, dispence and scatter abroad his curtesies, crouch unto any servile expressions, to advance his Ambitious designes. Like *Antæus* in the Poets, fall to the earth, so hee may grow the stronger by it. As *Zopyrus* and *Pisistratus*, who wounded, mangled, deformed

Tacit. Hist. l. 1.

Herodot. Thalia. Plutarch. in Solone.

formed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate, and gaine their ends. As the Scripture noteth of *Absolom*, and the Historian of *Julian*, that out of affectation of popularity, they stouped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather sordidnesse of Ambition, *Menelaus* in the Tragedian, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto *Agamemnon*.

Ammian. Marcel. lib. 25.

Οἶσθ' ἐτ' ἐπώδαζες ἄρχειν Δαναΐδαις πρὸς Ἴλιον,
Τῷ δοκεῖν μὲν ἧσσ' ἄχι χρήζων τῷ δ' βέλεσθαι θέλων.
Ὡς ταπεινὸς ἦς, ἁπάσης δεξιᾶς προσδιηγάνων,
Καὶ δούλας ἔχων ἀκλείστους τῷ θέλοντι δημοτῶν,
Καὶ διδοὺς προσώρησιν ἐξῆς πᾶσι, κ' εἰ μή τις θέλοι,
Τοῖς τρόποις ζητῶν προσᾴδεσθαι τὸ φιλόπρωτον ἐν μέσῳ, &c.

Eurip. Iphig.

You know how you the Rule o're Grecians *got,*
In shew declining what in truth you sought:
How low, how plausible you apprehended
The hands of meanest men: How then you bended
To all you met: How your gates open flew,
And spake large welcome to the pop'lar Crew:
What sweetned words you gave even unto those
Who did decline, and hate to see you gloze.
How thus with Serpentine and guilefull Arts
You screw'd and wound your selfe into the hearts
O'th vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now
Makes you forget how then you us'd to bow.

CHAP. XXII.

Rules touching our desires. Desires of lower Objects must not be either hastie, or unbounded: such are unnaturall, turbid, unfruitfull, unthankfull: Desires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, industrious: Connexion of vertues, sluggish Desires.

UNto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here adde two or three Rule pertaining to the morall use, and managing of it. And they are, First, concerning Objects of an *Inferiour* and Transitory nature, that our *Desires* be neither *Hastie* and precipitate, nor *Vaste*, and unlimited. And in matters more *High* and Noble, that they be not either *wavering* and interrupted *Desires*, or *Lazie* and negligent *Desires*.

Prov. 28. 26. 20. 21.

1. For the first of these, we have a rule in *Solomon*, concerning Riches, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate desire: *He that maketh haste to be rich, shall not be without sinne*, I may add, *Not without cares neither*: for we know the nature of all Earthly things, they have something of the Serpent in them, to *Deceive*. The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the

way

way of Honour and Ambition, a ſlippery and giddy way; the way of carnall Pleaſures, a deep and a fowle way, the way of learning it ſelf (the nobleſt of all ſublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certainely he had need have better eyes then a blinde Paſſion, who in ſo ill ground will make good haſte and good ſpeed together. *In labyrintho properantes ipſa velocitas implicat.* He is not the likelieſt man to get firſt out of a Maze, who runnes faſteſt. An over nimble *Deſire* is like the ſtomacke of a ſick man newly recovered, more greedy, then ſtrong, and fuller of Appetite then digeſtion. Whence ariſe immature and unconcocted counſels, blinde and ungoverned Reſolutions: like thoſe monſtrous people, which *Plinie* ſpeakes of, whoſe feet go backward, and behinde their eyes. For when the minde of man is once poſſeſſed with conceit of *Contentment* to be found in worldly glories, when the inſinuations and ſweet inchantments of Honour, Profit, Pleaſure, Power, and Satans *Hæc omnia,* hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reaſon aſleep; it is then ſufficient that we know the end, which we deſire; we have not the patience to inquire after the right way unto it: becauſe it is the ſuſpition of our greedy *Deſires*, that the true means are commonly the moſt tedious, and that honeſty for the moſt part goes the fartheſt way about. And hence withall it uſually commeth to paſſe, that theſe haſty and preproperous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which ſlowneſſe with maturity might have made uſe of.

ἐν ὁδῷ μὴ σπεύδειν. *Chilo apud Laert. lib. 1.*

As

As the Romane Souldiers by their greedineſſe on their prey, miſſed of taking *Mithridates*, who otherwiſe could not have eſcaped them. And therefore it was wiſe counſell of *Neſtor* in the Poet.

Plutarch. in Lucullo.

Iliad. ζ. 70.

Μὴτις νμῦ ἐναίρων ὑπερβαλλόμενος, μετόπισθεν
Μιμνέτω, ὥς κεν πλεῖα φέρων ὑπὶ νῆας ἵκηται.
Ἀλλ' ἀνδρὰς κτείνωμεν ἔπειτα ἢ κ τὰ ἔκηλοι
Νεκρὲς ἀμπεδίον συλήσετε τεθνειῶτας.

Let none go lingring after ſpoyle, and ſtay
To load himſelfe with a too haſty prey.
But firſt let's kill: W'are ſure after ſuch fight,
Carcaſſes being rifled cannot bite.

Senec. de Tranq. l. 2. Arian. Epict. lib. 1. c. 26.

2. The next Rule to keepe this Paſſion in order with reference unto inferiour Objects is, that it be not an *infinite* and unlimited *Deſire*. Appetite ſhould anſwer our power to procure, and our ſtrength to beare and to digeſt. Wee ſhould not go about to ſwallow a Camell, when a Gnat doth make us ſtraine, Immoderate *Deſires* can neither be ſatisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundedneſſe of Deſires we are to take heed of; for theſe reaſons.

Ariſt. Polit. lib. 1. cap. 6. Senec. Ep. 16. 39. de bene fic. lib. 2. c. 27.

1. Firſt, for the *unnataralneſſe* of it: for all *unnaturall* and unneceſſary *Deſires* are *infinite*, as the Philoſopher hath obſerved; As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited *Deſire* is onely there requiſite, where the Object

Object thereof is Infinite, and ordained to perfect Mans Nature; but not where it is onely a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enjoy his Contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his Minde which is immortall; and therefore not able to bee replenished with any perishing happinesse) nor to outreach the vastnesse of his opinion, which being Erronious is likewise Infinite, (For *Omnis Error immensus*, as *Seneca* speaks;) but then only when it affords such conveniences, as wherewithall the seasonable and vertuous imploiments of Nature may with content be exercised. It is then a corrupt *Desire* which proceeds not from our Want, but from our Vice. As that is not a naturall thirst, but a disease and distemper of the Body, which can never be satisfied.

Extrania non augent bonum, sed condiunt, Sen. Epist. 66.

Nunquam sitim invenit libido, Cicer. Tusc. *Malum infinitum.* Arist. Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 6. Polit. l. 3. c. 5. *Exiguum natura opinio immensarium,* Epic. apud Sen.

Now the miseries of *unnaturall Desires* are first, that they corrupt and expell those which are Naturall: as multitudes of strangers in a City, doe eat out the Natives; thusin luxurious Men, strange Love doth extinguish that which is Conjugall.

1. *Plutarch. in Gryllo, & de Sanit. tuendâ.*

Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the minde with them. As immoderate laughter, so immoderate Lusts are never without paine and convulsions of Nature. Morbid *desires* of the Mind are like an Itch or Vlcer in the Body, which is with the same nayles both angered and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.

2. *Plut. de Sanit. tuendâ.* *Sen. de Tranq. cap. 2.*

Thirdly, they are ever attended with Repen-

3.

tance, both because in promises they disappoint, and in performances they deceive; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains; as those delicates which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomacke; and after they have pleased the Palat doe torment the bowels. The Minde surfeits on nothing sooner than on unnaturall Desires.

Alterna inter Cupiditatem nostram & pœnitentiam vices sunt. Sen. de Orig. sap. cap. 27.

Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments; as weake and wanton stomacks which are presently cloy'd with an uniform dyet, and must have not onely a painefull but a witty Cooke, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the niceneſſe of their appetite. As *Nero* had an officer who was called *Elegantiæ Arbiter*, the inventor of new Lusts for him.

4. *Sen. de Benef. l. 3. c. 3.*

Quod ministerium fuerat, ars habeti. Cæpta. Liv. l. 39 Ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι ἡδονὴ καὶ ὄρεξις. *Eth. l. 3. c. 12.*

Lastly, unlimited Desires are for the most part envious and malignant: For he who desires every thing, cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himself wanteth. And therefore *Dionysius* the Tyrant did punish *Philoxenus* the Musitian, because he could sing, and *Plato* the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himselfe. In which respect hee did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions.

5. *Tacit. Annal. lib. 16.*

Plut. de Tranq.

Favorinus apud Ælium Spart. in Adr.

Secondly, *unbounded Desires* doe worke *Anxiety* and *Perturbation* of Minde; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good; whereas those

Desires

Deſires which are in their executions Turbid, or in their continuance Permanent, are no more likely to leade unto ſome farther end, than either a miſty and darke, or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at laſt unto his journeyes end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vaine. And together with thisthey doe diſtract our noble Cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy deſires. *Martha* her *Many things*, and *Maries One thing* will very hardly conſiſt together.

Laſtly, there is one Corruption more in theſe *unlimited Deſires*, they make a man *unthankfull* for former benefits: as firſt, becauſe *Caduca memoria futuro imminentium.* It is a ſtrong priſumption that he ſeldome looks backe upon what is paſt, who is earneſt in purſuing ſome thing to come. It is S. *Pauls* Profeſſion and Argument in a matter of greater conſequence, *I forget thoſe things which are behind, and reach forth unto thoſe things which are before.* And ſecondly, though a man ſhould looke backe; yet the thoughts of ſuch a benefit would be but ſleight and vaniſhing, becauſe the Mind finding preſent content in the liberty of a roving deſire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature, which likewiſe (where they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulfulnes: every ſuch man being willing rather to conceive the benefit ſmall, then to acknowledge the vice and vaſtneſſe of his owne Deſires.

Sen. de Benef. lib. 3.

The next rule which I obſerved for the go-

vernment of these Passions, doe respect those *Higher* and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity: And herein,

1 Our *Desires* are not to be *Wavering* and Inconstant, but Resolute and ful of Quickness and Perseverance: First, because though we be poore and shallow vessels; yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages, by which wee should give admittance unto the matter of our true happines; yea so full are we already of contrary qualities, as that our greatest vehemency wil not be enough, either to empty our selves of the one, or to fil our selves with the other. And therefore the true *Desires* of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most patheticall and strong similitudes of *Hunger* and *Thrist*; and those not common neither; but by the panting of a tired Hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable shower. Secondly, every desirable Object the higher it goes, is ever the more united within it selfe, and drives the faster unto an unity: It is the property of Errours to be at variance: whereas *Truth* is *One*, and all the parts thereof doe mutually strengthen and give light unto each other: So likewise in things *Good*, the more noble, the more knit they are, *Scelera dissident*: It is for sinnes to be at variance amongst themselves. And those lower Goods of Riches, Pleasure, Nobility, Beauty, though they are not Incomparable; yet they have no naturall Connexion to each other; & have therfore the less power to draw a constant and continued Desire. But for nobler and immateriall

Εὐμετάβολός ὁ πολίτης, Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.

teriall goods wee see how the Philosopher hath observed a connexion betweene all his morall vertues, wherby a man that hath one, is naturally drawne to a desire of all the rest: for the minde being once acquainted with the sweetnes of one, doth not onely apprehend the same sweetnes in the others, but besides findeth it selfe not sufficiently possest of that which it hath, unlesse it bee thereby drawne to procure the rest: all whose properties it is by an excellent mutuall service to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and in some sort greater Vnity unto each other. Ethic. l. 6. c. 12.

And lastly for the highest and divinest good; the truth of Religion, that is in it selfe most of all other One. as being a Beame of that Light and Revelation of that Will, which is Vnity it selfe. And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles, yet Saint *Paul* calleth them all but Μία πίστις, one Faith, as having but one Lord for the Object and End of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifestly required, united desire to carry the soul thereunto. Ephes. 4. 5.

II. The last Rule which I observed, was that our Desires ought not to bee faint and sluggish, but industrious and painefull, both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withall in the pursuit of our happinesse; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the severall furtherances requisite thereunto. And indeed that is no True, which is not an Operative

Desire: a Velleity it may be, but a Will it is not. For what ever a man will have, he will seek in the use of such meanes, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for Mountaines of gold, and *Balaam* may wish for an happy death, and an Atheist may wish for a soule as earthly in substance as in Affection; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancie, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any paines, which stand like the Carman in the Fable, crying to *Hercules* when his Waine stuck in the mud to helpe it out, without stretching out his owne hands to touch it, are first unnaturall desires, it being the formall property of this Passion to put the Soule upon some notion or other. And therefore we see wheresoever Nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And secondly they are by consequence undutifull and disobedient Desires, in that they submit not themselves unto that Law, which requireth that we manifest the life and strength of our Love by the quickneſse and operation of it in our Desires. And lastly, such Desires are unusefull and fruitlesse: for how can an object which standeth in a fixed distance from the Nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections? The desires of the sluggard (saith *Salomon*) slay him, because his hands refuse to labour. These affections must

Prov. 21. 15. 13. 4.

have

have life in them, which bring life after them: Dead desires are deadly desires.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affection of Ioy or Delight. The severall Objects thereof, Corporall, Morall, Intellectuall, Divine.

THe next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscible Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the *Presence* of, and Vnion to an Object; and that is, when either wee by our desire have reached the Object, which worketh *Ioy* and Delight: or when in our flight the Object hath overtaken us, which worketh *Griefe* and Sorrow. And these two do beare the most inward relation unto and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon *Aristotle* in his Ethicks hath made them the foundation of our vertues, and rules of our working. And the reason is naturall, because the end of our motion is to attaine rest, and avoid perturbation. Now *Delight* is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquility of mind, which we receive from the Presence and Fruition of that good, wherunto our Desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher in

Καινοτίζουσιν οἱ τὰς παθήσεις ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην. Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

Cicer. Tusc. l. 4. Εὔλογος ἔκφασις *Zeno. apud Laert. l. 7. Clem. Alex. strom. lib. 2.* κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, *Rhet. l. 1. c. 11.*

in one place call it a motion of the Soule with a sensible and felt instauration of Nature, yet elswhere he as truly telleth us that it standeth rather in * rest than motion; as on the other side Griefe is the streightning and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sense and burden of some present Evill oppressing our Nature. Now these Passions are divers, according to the diversity of the Objects: which are either *Sensitive* and Bodily; and then Delight is called *Voluptas* Pleasure, being a medicine supply against bodily indigence and defects: or *Intellectuall* and Divine, and then it is called *Gaudium* Ioy, being a sweet and delightfull tranquillity of minde, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other Passion of *Sadnesse* considered; which in respect of the Body is called a Sense of *Paine*; in respect of the Soule, a Sense of *Griefe*.

First then for the *Object* of our *Delight*; it is onely that which can yeeld some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an *Empty* and perfectible nature. Whatsoever then is either *Medicinall* for the Repairing, or *Naturall* for the Conserving, or any way *helpefull* for the advancing of a Creature, is the onely true and allowable object of its Delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little & little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth, or as * Ivie which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap therof, may haply yield some

* ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἔστιν ἢ ἐν κινήσει, Eth. l. 7. c. ult.

Gaudere in Sinu. Cic. ἐν δύμῳ χαίρειν Iliad. ω. *Qui sapit in tacito gaudeat ille Sinu. Tibul. Vid. Damascen. de Orthodox. fide, lib. 2. cap. 13. & Nemes. de Anima. c. 18.*

* *Arbores necat omnem Succum auferendo, &c.* Plin. l. 16. c. 34

ſome meaſure of vaniſhing content to mindes, which taſte every thing with a corrupted palate; but certainly ſuch ſophiſticall premiſes can never infer in the concluſion any other than a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore *Seneca* is bold to finde an impropriety in *Virgils* Epithite, *Mala Gaudia*, joyes which iſſue from a polluted fountain; as not having in them that inſeparable attribute of abſolute Delight; which is to be unvariable. For how can a minde (unleſſe blinded with its own impoſtures, and intangled in the errours of a mis-led affection) receve any nouriſhing and ſolid content in that, which is in it ſelfe vaniſhing, and unto its Subject deſtructive? Whatſoever then may bee delighted in, muſt have ſome one of the fore-named conditions, tending either to the *Reſtitution* of *decayed* nature, to the *preſervation* of *entire* nature, or to the *Perfection* of *Empty* nature. And to the former and imperfecter ſort of theſe, *Ariſtotle* referres all corporall and ſenſitive Pleaſures (unto which he therefore granteth a ſecondary and accidentall goodneſſe) which hee calleth ἰατρικὰ the Medicines of an indigent nature; whereby the defects thereof are made up, and it ſelfe disburdened of thoſe cares, which for the moſt part uſe to follow the want of them.

Epiſt. 59. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 14. c. 8.

Ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἰατρεία τῆς σωματικῆς ἐνδείας. *Nemeſ. c. 18. Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.* ἀγαθὰ μέχρι τινός.

Herein then I obſerve a double corruption; an unnaturall and unlimited Delight. *Unaturall*, I meane thoſe accurſed pleaſures which were exerciſed by men given over to vile affections and greedy in the purſuing of luſts, whoſe very names

abhorre the light. *Vnlimited* Delights are those, which exceed the bounds of Nature, and the prime Institution of lawfull and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repaire not, and strengthen nature, * they weaken and disenable it; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the minde Curiosity breeds Errours.

* Vnde factum ut quæ ad funera pertinerent in Templo Veneris venderentur. *vid. Plutarch. que Rom. q* 23.

Other Objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concern the Body; and they are *both the Morall and Contemplative* Actions of the Minde; To both which *Aristotle* hath attributed principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts lesse laborious, as residing in that part of the Soule, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest, simplest, and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, cleare, independant; spirituall, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choisest perfections, whereby the Soule may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftimes the contemplations of the minde have annexed unto them both Griefe and Anxiety; but this is never naturall to the act of Knowledg, which is alwayes in its own vertue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weakenesse and doubtings of the Vnderstanding, which hath not a cleare light thereof; or out of the admixtion and steeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men minister

Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.

niſter unto themſelves deſperate thoughts or weak feares, or guilty griefes, or unlimited Deſires according as is the property of the Object joyned with their own private diſtempers: Thus we ſee the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that ſweet effect which is naturall unto it, to produce, but Doubtings, Terrours and Diſquietings of Conſcience; it being the property of the workers of Darkneſſe to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all theſe former objects of mans Delight (becauſe they are amongſt *Salomons* Catalogue of things under the Sunne) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let paſſe the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madneſs and not joy. For *Seneca* telleth us that true *joy* is a *ſerious* and ſevere thing: and not to meddle with riches and other ſecular Delights, which have *wings* to flie from us and *thorns* to prick us, even that higheſt naturall Delight of the Mind, Knowledge and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongnes of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sun, and therefore not obnoxious to *Salomons* vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noiſe, yeelding rather a windy Pleaſure than a true Delight. The properties whereof is not to puffe up, but to repleniſh. And therefore it is the prayer of Saint *Paul*, *The God of Peace fill you with all joy*. True heavenly *joy* is a *filling*, a ſatiating joy: a *joy unſpeakable*, with Saint *Peter*; a *Peace paſt underſtanding*, with S. *Paul*. Nor doth this property of overflowing and ſwallowing the

Ioh.3.20. Iob 1.14. Iſa.30.11. 2 Pet.3.5.

Eccleſ.2 2.2.

Sophoc. Ajax. *Senec. Epiſt.23.*

Rom.15.13.

Minde and any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weakneſſe of the ſoul, as it is of the body to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in, nor doth the minde deſire to ſubdue or conquer, but only to be united with its obje&t.

And here the only corruption of our Delight is, the deficiency and imperfe&tions of it. For though this bleſſed Light leaves not any man in the ſhadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the ſhadow of ſin, but the darkneſſe whereof hee is without much of that luſtre and glory, which hee ſhall then have, when the righteous ſhall ſhine like the Sun in the Firmament. Yet at the leaſt our endeavours muſt be, that though our *joy* cannot be here a *repleniſhing joy*, yet it may be an *Operative joy*, and ſo work out the meaſure of its own fulneſſe. I have done with the ſeverall Obje&ts of mans delight, Corporall, Morall, Intelle&uall and Divine.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Cauſer of Joy. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Charges by accident a cauſe of Delight.

NOw proceed to ſpeak of the more particular cauſes and effects of this Paſſion Touching the former, not to meddle with thoſe which are unnaturall, belluine, and morbid (which the Philoſopher hath given ſome inſtances of) The generall cauſe is the naturall *goodneſſe* of the Object, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to *unite* and make preſent the Object with the Faculty. And that is done (to ſpeak onely of intellectuall Powers) three manner of wayes; by *Contemplation*, by *Confidence*, and by *Fruition*, by thinking of it in the Minde, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.

Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6.

Ariſt. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1.

Contemplation addes unto the Soule a double Delight: Firſt, from its own property, it being the proper and naturall agitation of mans minde; inſomuch that thoſe things which we abhorre to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature deſires to know ſpeculatively. And

therefore the Devils first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evill as good, for he knew that the minde of Man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in it's own nature had no perfection in it.

But then secondly, in the Object of true Delight, Contemplation ministreth a farther joy, in that it doth in some sort pre-unite our Souls and our Blessednesse together: and this is partly the reason why *Aristotle* so much advanceth his Contemplative before his practique Felicity: For though this in regard of it's immediate reference unto Communion, bee of a more spreading and diffusive Nature; yet certainly in that sweetnesse of content, that serenity of Soule, that exaltation of thoughs which we receive from those noble motions of the higher Minde, the other doth far in pleasure and satisfaction surpasse all active happines. And hence we see in the parts of Mans Body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practique. The parts of Vision are before the parts of Action, the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himselfe (notwithstanding in him there can bee neither accession nor intermission of Delight) yet by way of expression to us ward, he did not in the creation of the World so much joy in his *fiat*, as in his *vidit*; not so much when he gave his creatures their *Nature*, as when he saw their *Goodness*: Nature being the Object of *Power*; but Goodness the Object of *Delight*; and therefore the day of his

his reſt was more holy than the dayes of his working, that being appointed for the Contemplation, as theſe were for the production of his creatures.

And as Contemplation by way of *Preſcience*, when it looketh forward on good things hoped: So alſo by way of *Memory*, when it looketh backward and revieweth evill things eſcaped, doth miniſter matter of renewed joy. No Man looketh on the Sea with more comfort, than he who hath eſcaped a ſhipwrack. And therefore when *Iſraell* ſaw the *Egyptians* dead on the Sea-ſhore, the fear of whom had ſo much affrighted them before, they then ſang a Song of Triumph. Paſt troubles doe ſeaſon, and as it were ballace preſent Comforts, as the Snow in Winter encreaſeth the beauty of the Spring. *Ariſt. Rhet. l. 1. c. 10.*

But in this particular of *Contemplation*, notwithſtanding the excellency of it, there may be Corruption in the Exceſſe (For in thoſe matters of Delight, except they bee ſuch as are diſproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I meane divine things, wee ſeldome erre in the other extreme.) And that is, when wee doe not divide our ſelves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, ſo to attend upon mear mentall notions, as to neglect the practicall part of our Life, and withdrew our ſelves from the fellowſhip and regard of humane ſociety, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monſtrous to ſee a fire burne without light, or ſhine without heat (aberrations from the ſupreme Law being

in

in divine things impious as they are in naturall prodigious.)

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation, and a fore enjoying of the Light of God, is towards him as unpleasing, as it is in it selfe uncomfortable, for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own Comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of Delight is the sure *Confidence* of the Minde. Whereby upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires.: so that what ever doth encourage our *Hope*, doth therewithall strengthen and enlarge our *Delight*. *Spe gaudent* saith S. *Paul*, and *Sperantes gaudent* saith the Philosopher, Hope and Joy goe both together: For where Hope is strong, it doth first divert and take off the Minde from poring upon our present wants, and withall ministreth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.

Rom. 12. 12. *Arist. Rhet.* l. 1. c. 11, 12.

But here we must take heed of a deep Corruption: For though I encline not to that opinion which denyeth *Hope*, all asswaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating Mind; yet to have an ungrounded Confidence, and either out of Presumption or Security to resolve upon uncertain and casuall events, there

there-hence to deduce Arguments of Comfort, works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like his in the Poet:

——*Petit ille dapes ſub imagini ſomni,*
Oraque vana movet, dentemque indente fatigat.

Ovid Met.

Who dreaming that he was a Gueſt
At his Imaginary Feaſt,
Did vainely glut upon a Thought,
Tyring each Jaw and Tooth for naught:
And when he fanci'd dainty meat,
Had nothing but a Dreame to eat:

Iſa. 29. 8. μὴ σὺ θάνης λιμῷ κάρτοι χρυσοῖσιν ὀνείροις. Theoc. Idyl. 21.

Or like the Muſitian in *Plutarch*, who having pleaſed *Dionyſius* with a little vaniſhing Muſick, was rewarded with a ſhort and deceived Hope of a great Reward. A preſumptuous Delight though it ſeeme for the time to miniſter as good content as that which is raiſed on a ſounder bottome; yet in the end will work ſuch inconveniences as ſhall altogether countervaile and over-weigh the deceipt of its former Joyes: For the Minde being mollified and puffed up with windy and unnouriſhing comfort, is quite diſabled to bear the aſſault of ſome ſudden evill, as having its forces ſcattered by Security, which caution and feare would have collected. For wee know in Bodies, *Vnion* ſtrengthneth naturall motion, and weakneth violent; and in the Minde the collecting and uniting of it doth both enable it for proſecution of its owne ends, and for reſiſting all oppoſite force.

Plut. de Audi.

It is therefore no comforting but a weakning Confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectuall cause of *Delight* is the *Fruition* of Good, and the *reall Vnion* thereof unto the Minde: for all other things work delight no farther, than either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of Pleasure and joy, the more the *Vnion* is, the more is the *Delight*. (And Vnion is the highest degree of Fruition that can be) thus wee see the presence of a Friend, yeelds more content than the absence, and the imbraces, more than the presence: so in other ontward Delights, those of *Incorporation*, are greater than those of *Adhesion*. As it is more naturall to delight in our meats than in our garments; the one being for an union inward to encrease our strength; the other outward only to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most clear, are most pleasant, and perspicuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have *Speculum* and *Ænigma* put together by S. *Paul*, *We see as in a glasse darkly*, where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the *glasse* of *Nature* and of *Faith* (both which are in their kinde *evidences of things not seen*) we shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union, *in his presence* only is the *fulnes of joy*.

Now

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing: Firſt, *Propriety* unto it, for a ſick man doth not feele the joy of a ſound mans health, nor a poor man of a rich mans money. *Propriety* is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongſt men, one man being agreeved to ſee another to have that which hee either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, *Poſſeſſion:* For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own, if it be any way detained and with-held from him, which was the cauſe of that great contention between *Agamemnon* & *Achilles*, and between the Greeks and Trojans becauſe the one took away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly, *Accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was appointed: For a man may have any thing in his cuſtody, and yet receive no comfort nor reall delight from it, except he apply it unto thoſe purpoſes for which it was inſtituted. It is not then the having of a good but the uſing of it which makes it beneficiall.

Τὰ αὐτῶν πᾶσιν ἡδέα διὸ καὶ φιλοτεκνοι *Ariſt. Rhet. l. 2. Pol. lib. 2. c. 3. Ethic. lib. 8. c. 12.*

Arrian. Epict. l. 1. c. 22.

Now beſides thoſe naturall cauſes of *Delight*, there is by accident one more; to wit, the *Change* and *Variety* of good things, which the diverſity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptineſſe of ſuch things as wee ſeek Delight from, doth occaſion, where Nature is ſimple and uncompounded, there one and the ſame operation is alwayes pleaſant; but where there is a mixed and various Nature, and diverſity of Faculties, unto which doe belong diverſity of inclinations, there changes doe miniſter Delight: as amongſt lear-

Ethic. lib 7. c. ult. l. 10. c. 4.

ned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments, which bring not a * *Satiety* along with them, as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body, when hee enquireth the reason why in a journey the inequality of the wayes do lesse weary a man than when they are all plaine and alike. Wee may give for the walking and wandring of the Desire (as *Solomon* cals it) to wit, that change and variety doe refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto it. [a] And therefore as I have before observed of *Nero*, the same hath *Tully* observed of *Xerxes*, that hee propounded rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.

Hereunto may bee added as a further cause of *Pleasure*. Whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen Griefe, as *Words*, [b] *Teares*, *Anger*, *Revenge*, because all these are a kind of Victory, then which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore *Homer* saith of Revenge, that it is sweeter then the dropping honey.

Gustata magis quam Potata delectant. *Cic. Tusc. lib. 2. Prob. Sect. 5. quæst. 7. Vid. Senec. de Tranq. c. 2, 3.*

a Quod etiam de Tiberio notavit Sueton. cap. 43. Qui hoc officio fungebantur dicti (ut videtur) ab *Ælio Lampridio Voluptarii in Alex. Sever.*

b Κοιτὸν τι χαρᾶς λύειν ἥδιον. *Xenoph. Hellenic. lib. 7.* Est quædam etiam volendi voluptas. *Plin. & Cic. de fine l. 1. Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 11.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of other Causes of Delight. Vnexpectednesse of Good. Strength of Desire. Immagination. Imitation. Fitnesse and Accommodation. Of the effects of this Passion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, Satiety in Baser. Whetting of industry. A timorus unbeliefe.

VNto these more principal Causes of this Affection I shall briefly adde these few which follow.

1 The *suddennesse* and *unexpectednesse* of a good thing causeth the greater Delight in it. For *Expectation* of a thing makes the Minde feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that meanes make them the lesse when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choyce and delicate stomacks. That the sight and smell of their meat doth halfe cloy and satiate them before they have at all tasted any of it: so the long gazing upon that which we Desire by *Expectation* doth as it were defloure the Delight of it before fruition. Whereas on the other side, as the Poet expresseth it.

Vix sum apud me ita animus comm tus est metu spe gaudio mirando hoc tanto tantoque repentino bono *Terent. Andr. Act.* 5.4.

Tacitus quarelam, animo meo tam repentinum tamque magnum non concipiente gaudium. Apul. Asin. Aur. l. 11.

Sophocl. Antig.

——ἡ ἐκτὸς κ᾽ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδας χάρα,
Ἔοικεν ἄγαν μήκος ὧδεν ἡδονῆ.

No joy in greatnesse can compare with that,
Which doth our Hopes and thoughts anticipate.

So strong and violent hath been the immuration which *sudden joy* hath wrought in the Body, [a] that many (as I have formerly noted) have beene quite overwhelmed by it, and beene made partakers of *Augustus* his wish to enjoy an [b] εὐθανασία and to die pleasantly. And for this Reason it is that [c] new things, and such as wee [d] admire, and were [e] not before acquainted withall doe usually Delight us, because they surprize us, representing a kinde of strangenesse unto the minde, whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For strange and New things have ever the greatest price set upon them. As I noted before of the Romane Luxury, That it gloryed in no Delicates but those which were brought out of [b] strange Countreys, and did first pose Nature, before either feed or adorne it.

2. *Strength of Desire*, doth on the other side enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature ever delighteth most in those things which cost us deerest, and strong desires are ever painfull. When [c] *Darius* in his flight drank muddy water, and *Ptolomy* did eat dry bread, they both professed that they never felt greater pleasure: strength of Appetite marvellously encreasing the Delight in that which satisfied it. For want and Difficulty

a Multis mortem attulit gaudium ingens, inspera-tum interclusâ animâ. & vim magni noviſq; motus non sustinente. *A. Gell. l. 3. c. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. & cap. 15.*

b *Sueton in Aug. cap. 99.*

c *Arist. Ethech. 1004.*

d Delectat quicquid est Admirabile *Cic. partit. Orat.*

e Proximorum incuriosi longinqua sectamur. *Plin. lib. 8. Epist. 20.*

b *Vide Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. 2. c. 1. Plin. l. 9. c. 34. & lib. 22. c. 2. Plutarch de tuenda sanitate.*

c *Vid. Ciceron. Tusc. qu. l. 5.*

Difficulty are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition, [a] as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bittereſt Herbes. And as wee ſay, *Nulla ſunt firmiora quàm quæ ex dubiis facta ſunt certa.* Thoſe evidences are ſureſt which were made cleare out of doubtfull. So thoſe pleaſures are ſweeteſt, *Quæ ſuaves fiunt ex triſtibus*, which have had wants and feares and Difficulties to provide a welcome for them. And therefore [b] Wreſtlers and Fencers, and ſuch like Maſters of Game, were wont to uſe their hands unto heavie weights, that when in their Games they were to uſe them empty and naked, they might doe it with the more expediteneſſe and pleaſure.

3 *Imagination* and Fancy, either in our ſelves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. *Diogines* his ſullen and Melancholly fancy took as much pleaſure in his Tubbe and Staffe, and water, as other men in their Pallaces, and amplyeſt proviſions, And he in the Poet.

Qui ſe credebat miros audire Tragœdos
In vacuo lætus ſeſſor Plauſorquè Theatro.—
Cum redit ad ſeſe, pol me occidiſtis Amici
Non ſervaſtis ait, cui ſic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratiſſimus error.

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,
And in an empty Theäter did ſit
And give Applauſes: but being heal'd, complains
Friends I'm not ſav'd by this your love, but ſlaine:
Rob'd

a *Plutarch de Tranquill.*
d *Quintil. lib. 5 cap. 12.*
c *Quintil. lib. lib 11. cap. 2.* Si mihi tranquilla & placata omnia fuiſſent, inercdibili qua nunc fruor lætitiæ voluptate caruiſſem. *Cic. Orat. poſt Reditum.*
Max. Tyrius. Diſſert. 33.
Plutarch. de profect. virtutem.

Horat. Epiſt. lib. 2. Ep.

Robb'd of that sweet Delight I then did finde,
In the so gratefull errour of my Minde.

Fictas Fabulas cum voluptate legimus *Cic. de fin. l. 5.*

Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted with Mythologies and Poeticall Fables, with Elegancies, Jests, Urbanity, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants, Pomps, Triumphes, and publick Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.

Vid. Plutarch de Aud. Poet. & Quintil. lib. 2. cap. 23.

4 Upon the same Reason we are marvellously Delighted with lively *Imitation*, as with those Arts which doe curiously expresse the works and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things doe wonderfully content us whose naturall Deformities wee abhorre. We are well pleas'd with *Homers* Description of *Thirsites*, and with *Sophocles* his expression of the Vlcer of *Philoctetes*, with *Parmeno* his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and *Theodorus* his of the ratling of Wheels, with *Plautus* his description of a chargeable Wife, and *Horace* his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

Hinc encomium stultitiæ, pediculi febrium, &c. *Plaut. in Aul. Horat. l. 1. Sat. 9.*

Ethic. l. 10 c. 7. Plutarch. de Aud. Poetis.

5 Those things Delight every man which are οἰκεῖα τῇ φύσει, as the Philosopher speaks, *Suitable fitted*, and *accommodated* to his Genius and frame of Nature, as in the same Plant, the Bee feedeth on the Floure, the Bird on the Seed, the Sheep on the Blade, the Swine on the Root. So in the same Author one man observeth the Rationall, another the Historicall, a third the Elegant and more Rhetoricall passages, with speciall De-

light

light, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each minde. And I finde it observed out of *Hipocrates*, that even in the Body many times that kinde of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a more particular Delight, though in it selfe it may be worse; yet proveth better nourishment unto that Body then such, as though better in it selfe, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardnesse of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay; nor the same imployments of minde for men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I beleeve any thing which would more conduce to the generall advancement of Arts and Learning, then if every Mans Abilities were fixed and limited to that proper course, which his naturall sufficiencies did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement (for every thing growes most when it is best pleased:) The one from *Nature*, the other from *Custome* and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more naturall unto us. And therefore the Philosopher reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place. Those things that are *Naturall*, and those that we are *accustomed* unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.

Cœl. Rhod. lib 5. cap. 34. ἡδονὴ ἐστιν ἐνίσχυσις τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως. *Nemes. ex Arist. c. 18.*

Ethic. l. 10. c 9. τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τὸ ἐθισμένον τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἔνῃ. *Rhet. l. 1. c. 11.*

Touching the *Effects* of this Passion, I shall

name but these few: First, the effects of *Corporall* Delights are only (as I observed out of *Aristotle*) *medicinall*; for repairing the breaches and ruines of our decayed Natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preserving our selves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greedines of mortality would in short time devoure. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgresse these bounds, they begin to *oppresse Nature, weaken and distemper the body, clog the minde, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carryed away with them, are presently over-cloyed with one kinde, and must have variety to keep out loathing: which *Tacitus* observes in that monster of women, *Messalina, facilitate adulterorum in fastidium versa ad incognitas libidines prosluebat*, that loathing more easie and common sins, she betook her self to unnaturall lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 1. 26.

* τας γὰρ ἡδονας ὅταν παρὰ δὲον Ἀνδρὶς ὑπὸ σημ' ἐγὼ λῶ φύτον ἀλλ' ἐμὲ ψυχὴ νῆμ' ἐκεῖν. *Sophoc.*

Plut. in Gryllo Annal. l. 11.

A second effect of Joy is *Opening* and *Dilatation* of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the minde, whence it hath the name of *Lætitia*, as it were a broad and spreading passion. Now the reason of this motion occasioned by Joy, is the naturall desire, which man hath to bee united to the thing wherein he delights to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we finde in this Passion an exultation and

Lætitia amentes latitudine.

egresse

egreſſe of the ſpirits, diſcovering a kinde of looſeneſſe of Nature in her ſecurity, doing many things not out of reſolution, but inſtinct and power tranſporting both minde and body to ſudden and unpremeditated expreſsions of its owne content: For of all Paſsions Joy can be the leaſt diſſembled or ſuppreſſed, *Nam gaudio Cogendi vis ineſt*, ſaith *Pliny*, it exerciſeth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man, as we ſee in *Davids* dancing before tht Ark; and the lame mans walking, and leaping, and praiſing God, after he had been cured of his lameneſſe. And this diffuſion of the ſpirits ſheweth both the haſte and forwardneſſe of Nature, in ſtriving as it were to *meet* her Object, & make large *room* for its entertainment, as alſo to diſpell and ſcatter all adverſe humours that would hinder the ingreſſe of it, and laſtly to ſend forth newes as it were through the whole Providence of nature, that all the parts might beare a ſhare in the common Comfort.

Panigir. ad Trajan.

Thirdly, thoſe noble delights which ariſe from heavenly cauſes, doe withall cauſe a ſweet thirſt and longing in the Soule after more, as ſome colours doe both delight the ſight and ſtrengthen it: For while *God* is the object, there cannot be either the ſatiety to cloy the Soule, nor ſuch a full comprehenſion as will leave no roome for more.

Plut. in Peric

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by Grace, doe deſire a more plentifull fruition of him in glory; and they that delight in the ſight of Gods Glory, doe ſtill deſire to be for ever ſo delighted. So that their *Deſire* is without *Anxiety*;

because they are *satiated* with the thing which they do desire, and their *satiety* is without *loathing*; because still they desire the thing wherwith they are *satiated*; they desire without Griefe, because they are repleniſhed; and they are repleniſhed without wearineſſe, because they desire ſtill: they ſee God, and ſtill they desire to ſee him: they enjoy God, and ſtill they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and praiſe God, and make it their immortall buſineſſe ſtill to love and praiſe him:

Et quem ſemper habent, ſemper habere volunt.

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher
To have for ever, they do ſtill desire.

* *Ariſtid. Tom. 1 Orat. in Puteu. Æſcul.*

* Divine Joy is like the water of *Eſculapius* his Well, which they ſay is not capable of putrifaction.

Ariſt. Ethic. l. 10. c. 5. Polit l 8 c. 5.

Fourthly, Delight whetteth and intendeth the actions of the Soule towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactneſſe in the doing of them, because it exonerateth the minde of all thoſe dulling Indiſpoſitions which unfitted it for Action. And for this reaſon happily it is, that the Lacedemonians uſed * Muſick in their Warres to refreſh and delight Nature: For Joy is in ſtead of recreation to the Soule, it wonderfully diſpoſeth for buſines. And thoſe Actions which nature hath made neceſſary, it hath put pleaſure in them, that thereby Men might be quickned and excited unto them;

* *Plut. de Hom. Aud. Gell. l. 1. c. 11.*

ard

* and therefore Wise men have told us that pleasure is, *Sal & condimentum vitæ*. The Sawce which seasoneth the Actions of men.

Lastly, because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrowes, then with pleasures, therefore whether out of *Conscience* of guilt, which deserves no joy, or out of *experience*, which useth to finde but little joy in the world, or out of *feare* of our own aptnesse to mistake, or out of a *provident care*, not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our possession of it, and because usually the minde after shaking is more setled, whether for these or any other reasons, we see it usually come to passe, that vehement joy doth breed a kinde of jealousie and unbelieſe, that sure the thing we have is too good to be true? and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they doe but dazle and deceive us, as *Quod nimis volumus haud facile credimus:*

The things which we desire should be,
We scarce believe when we do see.

So *Jacob* when he heard that his sonne *Joseph* was alive, fainted, being astonished at so good newes, and could not believe it. And when God restored the Jewes out of Captivity, they could thinke no otherwise of it then as a dreame. And *Peter* when he was by the Angel delivered out of Prison, took it for a vision onely, and an apparition, and not for a truth.

* *Cicer. offic. lib. 1. Clem. Alex. strom. l 2. Plaut Casin. Act. 2 Sc. 4. Quintil. lib. 5. cap. 14.*

Gen. 45. 26. Psal. 126 1.

Acts 12. 9. Luke 24. 42.

And lastly, of the Disciples after Christs resurrection, when he manifested himselfe to them, it is said, *That for very joy they beleeved not*, their feares keeping back, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joyes, *Omnia tuta timens*, not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see.

As in the Sea when a storme is over, there remaines still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth,

Vt si quando ruit, debellataque reliquit
Eurus aquas, pax ipsa tumet, ponsumque jacentem,
Exanimis jam volvit hyems——

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,
To tosse the roaring Billowes, even that peace
Doth swell and murmure, and the dying Wind
On the calm'd Sea leaves his own Prints behinde.

Even so in the Minde of man, when it's feares are blowne over, and there is a calme upon it, there is still *a motus trepidationis*, and a kinde of sollicitous jealousie of what it enjoyes.

Aread. 4. Majus gaudium quam quod universam hominis caperent vix satis credere se quisque audisse velut somnivanam speciem. Liv. lib. 33. Odiss χ 213.

And this *unbeliefe* of joy is admirably set forth in the Carriages of *Penelope*, when her Nurse and her Sonne endeavoured to assure her of the truth of *Vlysses* his returne after so many yeares absence by the Poet, in which doubting he still persisted, till by certaine signes *Vlysses himself* made it appeare unto her, whereupon she excused it after this manner.

Αὐτὰρ μὴ νῦ μοι τοῦτο μνηστὲ νεμίσσα, &c.

My deare Ulysses *let it not offend,*
That when I saw you first, I did suspend
My love with my beliefe, since my faint breast
When first with those glad tidings it was blest,
Trembled with doubts, lest by such forged lies
Some crafty false-pretender might devise
To have ensnar'd me, and with these false sounds,
Defil'd my love, and multiply'd my wounds.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it evill, sensitive, intellectuall, as present in it self, or to the minde, by memorie, or suspition, particular causes, effects of it. Feare, Care, Experience, Erudition, Irresolution, Despaire, Execration, Distempers of Body.

THE opposite Passion to this of Delight, is *Griefe* and *Sorrow*, which is nothing but a perturbation and unquietnesse, wrought by the pressure of some *present evill*, which the minde in vaine strugleth with, as finding it self alone too impotent for the conflict. Evill I say either

either formerly, as in ſinne, or paine, preſent, or feared: or privatively, ſuch as is any good thing which we have loſt, or whereof we do deſpaire, or have been diſappointed. And this is in reſpect of its object as the former Paſſion, either *Senſitive* or *Intellectuall*. Senſitive is that anguiſh and diſtreſſe of nature which lyeth upon the body. A paſſion in this ſenſe little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being alwayes joyned with ſome meaſure of its decay, but onely as it ſerves ſometimes for the better fortifying it againſt the ſame or greater evils, it being the condition as of corporall delights, by cuſtome to grow burdenſome and diſtaſtefull, ſo of paines to become eaſie and familiar.

The other and greater *Grief* is *Intellectuall*, which in *Solomons* phraſe is, *A wounded ſpirit*; ſo much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a ſpirit is more vitall then a body, beſides the anguiſh of the ſoule, findes alwayes, or works the ſame ſympathy in the body, but outward ſorrowes reach not ever ſo farre, as the ſpirituall and higher part of the ſoule. And therefore we ſee many men out of a miſtake, that the diſtreſſe of their ſouls hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily ſpoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.

The cauſes of this Paſsion, are as in the former, whatſoever hath in it power to diſturbe the minde by its *union* thereunto. There are then two *Conditions* in reſpect of the *Object*, that it be *Evill* and *Preſent*. *Evill* firſt, & that not onely *formally* in it ſelfe;

selfe; but *apprehensively* to the understanding. And therefore wee see that many things which are in their Nature *Evill*; yet out of the particular distemper of the Minde, and deceitfulnesse in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chiefe Corruption of this Passion, I meane the misplacing, or the undue suspending of it: For although strictly it is owne property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor adds any perfection, but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it beares either to a superior Law, as testifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our grief for the breach thereof: or to our consequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater Wisedome and Providence, it may bee said to adde much perfection to the mind of man, because it serves as an inducement to more cautelous living.

The next Condition in respect of the Object, is, that it be *Present*, which may fall out either by *Memory*, and then our *Griefe* is called *Repentance*: or Fancy and *Suspition*, and so it may bee called *Anxiety* of Mind: or by *Sense* and present union, which is the principal kind, & so I call it *Anguish*.

For the first, nothing can properly and truly work *Griefe* by ministry of *Memory*, when the Object or Evil is long since past, but those things which doe withall staine our Nature, and worke impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after in their operations offensive & burdensome; so on the other side many things

Heb. 12 11. which for the time of their continuance are irkesome and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater Ioy; Whether they be meanes used for the procuring of further good;

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c

Ænead. l 1. Iliad. 4. Through various great mishaps & dangers store,
We hasten to our home and wished shore:
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,
Only reserve you selves for better lives.

Or whether they be Evils wich by our Wisedome we have broken through and avoided;

——*sed & hæc olim meminisse juvabit.*

When we are arrived at ease,
Remembrance of a storme both please.

The Objects then of *Repentance* are not our passive, but our active Evils: not the Evils of suffering, but the Evils of doing; for the memory of *afflictions* past, represents unto us Nature loosed and delivered, and should so much the more increase our joy, by how much redemption is for the most part a more felt blessing than Immunity; but the memory of *sins* past represents Nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned; And so leaves a double ground for *Griefe*, the staine or pollution, and the guilt or malediction, a deformity to the Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here

here to wander into a diſgreſſion touching *Repentance*, only in a word it is then a *Godly Sorrow*, when it proceeds from the memory of Evill, not ſo much in the reſpect of the *puniſhment* as of the *ſtaine*. When we grieve more becauſe our ſin hath made us *unholy*, then becauſe it hath made us *unhappy*; and not only becauſe we are runne into the danger of the Law, but becauſe we are run out of the way of the Law. When it teacheth us to cry, not only with *Pharaoh*, take away this *Plague*; but with Iſrael in the Prophet, take away *Iniquity*.

Concerning *Griefe* of *Preoccupation*, ariſing out of a ſuſpitious *Feare* and expectation of Evill, I know not what worth it can have in it, unleſſe haply thus, that by fore-accuſtoming the Mind to Evill, it is the better ſtrengthened to ſtand under it: for Evils by premeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Mind gathering ſtrength and wiſedome together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent adviſe of *Plutarch*, that we ſhould have a prepared Mind, which when any Evill falleth out, might not be ſurpriſed by it. To ſay as *Anaxagoras* did when he heard of the death of his Son, *Scio me genuiſſe mortalem*, I know that I begat a mortall Sonne. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparedneſſe compoſeth the Minde to patience. *Vlyſſes* wept when he ſaw his Dog, which he did not when he ſaw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was ſurpriſed by the other.

Præcogitati mali mollis ictus. Sen. *Epiſt.* 77. *Vid.* Cic. *Tuſc. qu.* l. 3.

Plut. de Tranq.

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
Et perferre soror potero.

Had I forseen this Grief, or could but fear it,
I then should have compos'd my self to bear it.

Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of Mans Life, to be onely a meditation upon Death; becaus that being so great an Evill in it self, and so sure to us, it ought to be expected, as that it may not come sudden, and find us unprepared to meet the King of Terrour. For it is in the property of custome and acquaintance, not only to alleviate and asswage evils (to which purpose *Seneca* speakes, *perdidisti tot mala si nondum misera esse didicisti*, thou hast lost thy afflictons if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable) but further as *Aristotle* notes to worke some manner of delight in things, at first troublesome and tedious; and therefore he reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things, and teares are by Nature made the witnesses as well of Ioy as of Griefe.

Consolatio ad Helviam.

Rhet. l. 1.

Odiss. σ 422.

Καὶ κύνει ἀσπάσιος γαῖαν, πολλὰ δ' ἀπ' ὀσσε
Δάκρυα θερμὰ χεεν ἰὼν ἐπὶ πατρίδα γαῖαν.

He kist the shore, fast teares ran from his eyes,
When he his native Country first espyes.

And *Seneca* (whether Philosophically or Rehetorically) obserues, that obstinacy and resolvednesse

in

in griefe, doth so alter the nature of it; *ut fiat tandem infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor.* That at length it turnes into a kind of pleasant paine, sure I am the Apostle biddeth us count it *Ioy, when we fall into temptations.*

Et quædam etiam dolendi volupt. Plin. l. 8. ep. c. 6.

The last presence of Grief was *Reall*, when some ponderous evill either of affliction or of Sinne, the losse of some good wherein we delighted, the disappointment of some hope wheron we relyed, meeting with impotency in our selves to remove what we suffer, to recover what we lose, to supply what we want, doth bruise and lie with a heavy weight upon the tendereſt part of Man, his Soul and Spirit. And in this I cannot find considered meerly in it selfe any worth at all (it being nothing else but the violation and wounding of Nature) but in order to the effects which it produceth it may have sundry denominations, either of a serviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I shall but briefly name them, and passe over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally these: First, as it is an instrument of publik administration and discipline. It is as it were both a Schoolmaster and a Phisitian, to teach and to cure: so the Philosoper telleth us that by pleasure and paine, Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences, the Rod being unto the Mind, as a Rudder unto a Ship: so the Prophet *David* putteth chastisement and instruction together: *Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, and teachest out of thy law*, and again, *It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learne thy Commandements.* Therefore God

Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 1. c. 8. Ethic. l. 10. c. 1. Calamitates remedia. Sen. de. Tranq. l. 1. c. 9. Psa. 94. 12. Psal. 119. 71. Ier. 22. 21.

Grande doloris Ingenium misériſq; venit ſolertia rebus.

the Law in the *Wilderneſſe*, where the people were in want and under diſcipline: to note that *Grief* is a good inſtrument unto learning; for after in their proſperity they would not hear.

Ethic l.2.c.3.

And as it is a means to *teach*, ſo it is a means to *cure* too; for therefore paine is uſually made the matter of puniſhment, that as men offend by ſinfull pleaſure, ſo they may be amended by wholſome ſorrow. Αἱ γὰρ ἰάσεις διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων: Cures are uſually wrought by contraries.

Sen. de otio, Sapi. c.4.

Epiſt. 67.

Again, it doth by *Experience* ſtrengthen and harden, making both wiſe and able, for enduring further calamities, *quos Deus amat, indurat & exercet*. God exerciſeth and traineth thoſe whom he loves, bringing them up *non in deliciis ſed in caſtris*, not in Paradiſe but in a Wilderneſſe. Now as the Philoſopher ſpeaketh, ἀνδρεία ἐμπειρία τις ἐν ἔργοις ἀνδρείοις εἶναι. Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour, whereby a man contemneth, τὰ κενὰ τῶν κινδύνων many things which are indeed, but *terriculamenta*, skar-crowes to ignorant and weak minds. Whereas many pains have wrought patience, and patience experience of an iſſue and eſcape, that experience armes the Soule unto more patience, in new aſſaults. For if God were a rationall creature, having paſt through the fire and kept its own Nature unviolate, it would never after be the leſſe afraid of the fire. And as *Plutarch* excellently ſpeaketh, A wiſe man ſhould be like gold to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers diſlike many things in a place, which thoſe that are home-born, and uſed unto, do eaſily digeſt: thus the Apoſtle argueth,

Ethic. l.3.c.8.

Οὐδ' ἰσθλὸς ἰσθλὸς καὶ συμφορᾶς ὑπὸ φύσιν πεφευγὼς, &c. Eurip. Hec. Vid. Plut. l. de Adulat. & Amic. Conſol. ad Apollonium Plut. de Aud.

argueth, God hath delivered, and doth deliver; therefore he will deliver. So *Vlysses* in *Homer*. 2 Cor. 1, 9, 10.

* Τλήσομαι· ἐν γὰρ ἐμοὶ κραδίη τετληότι θυμὸς, Odyss. ε. 222.
Ἤδη γὰρ μάλα πολλ' ἰτλάσθην.

I'le beare with a firm mind, what ere comes more,
Having endur'd so many Griefes before,

And elſe where on the ſame manner he incouraged his companions on the Sea.

Ὦ φίλοι οὐ γάρ πω κακῶν ἀδαήμονες ἦμεν &c. Odyss. μ. 208.

Sirs, w'are not now to learne what ſorrowes are,
Having felt ſo many; and this now by farre
Comes ſhort of that which we endured then,
When the proud Cyclops *ſhut us in his den:*
Yet that we ſcap't, he of his prey did miſſe,
Hereafter we ſhall joy to think of this.

* Thus as Iron which hath paſſeth through the fire, being quenched, is harder than it was before: ſo the Minde having paſſed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them againe. And therefore it is wiſe adviſe which learned Men give, to let Griefes have a time to breath, and not to endeavour the ſtopping of them, while they are in *Impetu*, and in their firſt riſing. As Phiſitians ſuffer humours to ripen, and gather to ſome head before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concocted Griefe, and experience hardened and inſtructed Nature to ſtand

* *Plut. de. Ad. & Amic. & de Sanit. tuendâ. Vt Crudum adhuc vulnus medentium manus reformidat, deinde patitur, atque ultr orequirit; Sic Recens animi Dolor conſolationes rejicit atque refugit, mox deſiderat & elementer admotis acquieſcit. Plin. Ep. l. 5. c. 16. Vid. Plut. Conſ. ad Apoll.*

stand under it. It doth then willingly admit of those remedies, which being unreasonably applyed it rejecteth and resisteth.

Ovid. de Remed. Amor. l. 1.

Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est.
Cum dederit lachrymas animumq; expleverit aegrũ,
Ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit.

Who would forbid a Mother then to morne,
When her Sons ashes are warme in his urne?
But when she's cloyd with teares, & sorrow's rage
Is over, Counsell then may griefe asswage.

Ἐγὼ μὲν λιπαρὴς εἰμὶ φόβος λέγει Ὅτ' ἐμοῦ παραινοῦς ἄμεινον ἢ πάλιν ποιεῖν

Sophoc. Oedip. Tyr.

Whereas before it doth rather exasperate than allay it. For of all Passions, this of Griefe doth least admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto* new Wine, *defervescere*, slack, and comes to its just temper again.

* Τὸν χρόνον τοῦ νέον οἶνον πολλὴν δίνην ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν αἰῶνα δεῖν ἔχειν τοιοῦτον ἀνώμαλον καὶ ἀνωμάλευτον, &c. *Alexis.*

The last profitable effect is *feare* and suspition, care or sollicitousnesse to avoid those evils which oppresse our Nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evills which Experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt child the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on worke, are of good use in the minds of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on and guided by religion, are onely that *Nepenthes* and medicine against Griefe, which who so mixeth

Of this medicine we read in *Homer*.

and

and applyeth aright, ſhall not ſpend nor load himſelf with unuſefull ſorrow. Thus as Bees do poiſe themſelves with little gravell ſtones, that they may not bee carried away with the winde, which the Poet hath elegantly expreſſed:

Odyſſ. λ. 221. Plin. l. 21. c. 21. Plutarch. Sympoſ. l. 1. c. 1. Macrob. l. 7. c. 1. Clem. Alex. in Protrept. Nazian. Carmin. in nob. patris ad filium.

——*ſæpe Lapillos,*
Vt Cymbæ inſtabiles fluctu jactante ſaburram
Tollunt, his ſeſe per inania nubila librant.

Georg. l. 4. Plutarch. lib. de ſolert. Animal.

As ſhips with ballace, ſo the little Bee
Whith gravel's pois'd, that he may ſteady flee.

So patience and wiſdome in the bearing of one ſorrow, doth keep the minde in a ſtable condition againſt any other. A man doth never over-grieve, that keeps his ears open to counſell, and his reaſon to judgement above his paſſion.

Iliad. τ. 65.

The evill effects of grief commonly follow the exceſſe of it, and they reſpect the *Reaſon*, the *Will*, and the *Body*; in the *Reaſon*, it works diſtractions, irreſolution, and weakneſſe, by drawing the main ſtrain of it, rather to a fearfull contemplation of its own miſery, than to a fruitfull diſcourſe how to avoid it; for as the motions of a wounded Body, ſo the diſcourſes of a wounded Minde are faint, uncertain, and tottering.

Οὐκ οἶδ' εἰς ὅτι βλέψω κακῶν πολλῶν παρόντων· ἢ γὰρ ἀφύλακτος πόνος τοῖσι μὲν ἔνεστι, τοῖσι δ' ἐξαρκεῖ τὸ μὴ ἐνεῖδον αὖ λύπαις ἄλλαις, &c. *Eurip. Hecub.*

Secondly, in the *Will*, it worketh firſt *Deſpair*, for it being the property of *Grief* to condenſate and as it were on all ſides beſiege the Mind, the more violent the Paſſion is, the leſſe apparent are the Paſſages out of it. So that in an extre-

mity of anguish where the passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out, the Mind is constrained having no Object but its owne paine to reflect upon, to fall into a dark and fearfull contemplation of its owne sad estate, and marvellous high and patheticall aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feeles its owne sorrow, but knows not the weight of other mens. Whereas if all the calamities of mortall men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equall portion, *Socrates* was wont to say that each man would rather chuse to goe away with his owne pain.

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinfull wishes and execrations both against it self and any thing that concurred to its being in misery; as we see in Israel in the wilderneſse, and that mirror of Patience *Iob* himself; and thus *Homer* bringeth in *Vlysses* in despaire, under a sore tempest bewailing himself.

Numb. 14. 2. *Job* 3. 1. *and* *Ier.* 20. 14. *Isai.* 8. 21.

Odiss. 9. 306.

Τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις οἳ τοτ' ὄλοντο, &c.

Thrice four times happy Grecians who did fall
To gratifie their friends under *Troy* Wall:
Oh that I there had rendred my last breath,
When Trojan Darts made me a mark for death;
Then glorious Rites my Funerall had attended,
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evill effect is to *indispose* and disable for

for *Duty*, both becauſe *Grief* doth refrigerate (as the Philoſopher telleth us) and that is the worſt temper for Action; and alſo diverts the Minde from any thing but that which feeds it, and therefore *David* in his ſorrow forgot to eat his bread, becauſe eating and refreſhing of Nature is a mitigating of Grief, as *Pliny* telleth us. And laſtly, becauſe it weakneth, diſtracteth and diſcourageth the Mind, making it ſoft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto it ſelf.

Ariſt. Prob. Serl. 11. Quæſt. 13.

Iliad. ω. 130. Μιμνήσκου σ' ἀν τοίτυτε' ἐπῶν.

Dolor cibo lenitur. Plin. l. 22. c. 14.

Crudelis ubique luctus; ubique pavor.

Griefe and fear goe uſually together.

And therefore when *Æneas* was to encourage his friends unto Patience and Action, he was forced to diſſemble his own ſorrow.

Curiſque ingentibus ager
Spem vultu ſimulat, premit altum corde dolorem.

Ænead. 2.

Although with heavy cares and doubts diſtreſt,
His looks feign'd hopes, and his heart griefs ſuppreſt.

And it is an excellent deſcription in *Homer* of the fidelity of *Antilochus* when he was commanded to relate unto *Achilles* the ſad newes of *Patroclus* death.

Ænead. 1. Conſilium vultu tegit & ſpem fronte ſerenat. Ænead. 4.

Ἀντίλοχος δ' ἀκάχησε μῦθον ἀπ' οὔας, &c.

When Menelaus *gave him this command,*
Antilochus *aſtoniſhed did ſtand.*

Smitten with drunkenesse through his grief and fears,
His voice was stopt, and his eyes swam in teares.
Yet none of all this griefe did duty stay,
He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay,
And went, and wept, and ran, with dolefull word,
That great Patroclus *fell by* Hectors *sword.*

* In a tempest saith *Seneca*, that *Pilot* is to bee commended, whom the shipwrack swalloweth up at the Sterne, with the Rudder in his hand.

And it was the greatest honour of *Mary Magdalen*, that when above all other, she wept for the losse of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent to seek him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, drynesse of bones, exhausting of Nature. Grief in the heart, is like a Moath in a garment, which biteth asunder, as it were the strings and the strength thereof, stoppeth the voice, looseth the joynts, withereth the flesh, shrivelleth the skin, dimmeth the eyes, cloudeth the countenance, desloureth the beauty, troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth the whole frame.

Now this Passion of grief is distributed into many inferiour kinds, as *Griefe* of *Sympathy* for the evills and calamities of other men,* as if they were our owne, considering that they may likewise befal us or ours, which is called *mercy*; grief of (a)*repining* at the good of another man, as if his happinesse

* *In Naufragio Rector laudandus quem obruit mare Clavum tenentem. Seneca ad Petil. c. 6. Arist. To. 2. Orat: Rhodiaca. Vide Odyss. λ. 703. 716. Iliad. χ. 460. Damascen. de Orthodox. fid. l. 2 c. 14.*

* Ἐποικτίσειεν δ' ἂν οὐδένα ἴμπας καὶ πᾶν ὅτῳ ξυμβολὴ ξυμβολῇ ἐλθεῖν τὸ τῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆμὸν σκοπῶν. *Sophoc. Ajax.*

a *Sed videt ingratos intabescitq; videndo Successus hominum; carpitq; & carpitur una, Supplicium q; suum est. Ovid. Met. 2. Insitum est mortalibus natura recentem aliorum felicitatem ægris oculis introspicere. Tac. Hist. l. 2. Aut tibi malum quid aut alteri Bonum Evenit: Bion. ad malevolum quendam quem tristem aspexit, Apud Laert.*

happineſſe were our miſery: As that Pillar which was light unto Iſrael, to guide them, was darkneſſe unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them; which is called *Envy*. Griefe of (*b*) *Fretfulneſſe* at the proſperity of evill and unworthy men, which is called *Indignation*; griefe of *Indigence* when we finde our ſelves want thoſe good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but deſire to enjoy them our ſelves too, which is called *Emulation*; griefe of *Guilt* for evill committed, which is called *Repentance*; and griefe of *Fear* for evill expected, which is called *Deſpaire*; of which to diſcourſe would be over tedious, and many of them are moſt learnedly handled by *Ariſtotle* in his Rhetoricks. And therefore I ſhall here put an end to this Paſſion.

b Prov. 30. 21, 22. Pſa. 73. 12, 13. Iob 21. 7. Eccleſ. 10. 5, 6, 7. *Marmoreo Licinus Tumulo jacet, & Cato parvo, Pompeius nullo. Patricios omnes opibus cum provocet unus Quo tondente gravis juveni mihi barba ſonabat, &c. Difficile eſt Satyram non ſcribere. Iuvenal. Satyr. 1. Vid. Ariſtot. Ethic. l. 2. & Mag. Moral. l. 1. Vid. Suidam in Voc.* Ζῆλος.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the affections of Hope, the Object of it, Good Future, Poſſible, Difficult; of Regular and inordinate Depair.

THe next Rank and Series, is of *Iraſcible Paſſions*, namely thoſe which reſpect their Object, as annexed unto ſome degree of *Difficulty*, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it, the firſt of which is *Hope*, whereby I underſtand an earneſt and ſtrong in-

clination and expectation of ſome great good apprehended as *poßible* to be obtained, though not by our own ſtrength, nor without ſome intervenient *Difficulties*. I ſhall not collect thoſe prayſes which are commonly beſtowed upon it, nor examine the contrary extreames of thoſe who declame againſt it, making it a means either of augmenting an unexpected evill, before not ſufficiently prevented, or of deflowring a future good too haſtily pre-occupated, but ſhall only touch that dignity and corruption which I ſhall obſerve to ariſe from it, with reference to its Objects, Cauſes, and Effects.

Iliad. ξ. 704. προσδοκία ἀγαθῶν. Suid. προσδοκία κλήσεως ἀγαθῆς. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 2. Spes quaſi pes animi. Iſid. Hiſpal. Orig. lib. 7. cap. 2.

Concerning the *Object* or fundamentall cauſe of *Hope*, It hath theſe three conditions in it, That it bee a *Future*, a *Poßible*, a *Difficult Good*.

Contemplatio eſt ſpei in hoc ſpatio per fidem, non Repræſentatio, nec poſſeſſio, ſed expectatio. Tertull. de Reſur. cap. 23. Rom. 8. 24.

Hebr. 11.

Firſt, *Future*; for good preſent is the Object of our ſenſe, but *Hope is of things not ſeen*; for herein is one principall difference between divine *Faith*, and divine *Hope*, that Faith being ὑπόστασις πραγμάτων ἐλπιζομένων, The *ſubſtance of things hoped for*, hath ever reſpect to its Object, as in ſome manner *preſent* and *ſubſiſting* in the promiſes and firſt fruits which we have of it, ſo that the firſt effect of *Faith* is a preſent Intereſt and Title; but the operation of *Hope* is waiting and expectation; but yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the *preſence* of an Object, the leſſe hee hath of *Hope* towards it, for though Hope be ſwallowed up in the compleat preſence of its Object, yet it is not at all diminiſhed but encreaſed

encreaſed rather by a partiall preſence; and as in *maßie Bodies* though violent motions be in the *end* weakeſt, as being furtheſt from the ſtrength that impelled them, yet naturall are ever ſwifteſt towards the Center, as neareſt approaching unto the place that drawes them: ſo in the *Hopes* of men, though ſuch as are violent and groundleſſe prove weaker and weaker, and ſo break out at laſt into emptineſſe and vapour: in which reſpect Philoſophers have called *Hope* the dreams of waking men; like that of the Muſician whom *Dionyſius* deceived with an empty promiſe, of which I ſpake before: yet thoſe that are ſtayed and naturall, are evermore ſtrong, when they have procured a larger meaſure of preſence and union to their Object, *Quo propius accedimus ad ſpem fruendi eò impatientius caremus*. The nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.

Ariſt. apud Laertium. l. 5.
Plato apud Cæl. Rhod. l. 12. c. 2.
Ariſt. Ethic. lib 9. & Plutarch. de Audit.
Plin. Epiſt. lib. 6. Epiſt. 1.
προσδοκῶσι καὶ σπεύδουσι.
2 Pet. 3. 12.

And the reaſon is, becauſe *Goodneſſe* is better knowne, when it is in a nearer view of the underſtanding, and more united thereunto. And the more we have of the knowledge of goodneſſe, the more we have of the deſire of it, if any part bee abſent. Beſides all greedineſſe is attractive, and therefore the more we know of it, the faſter wee haſten to it. And it is the nature of good to encreaſe the ſenſe of the remainders of evill. So that though the number of our defects be leſſened by the degrees of that good wee have attained unto, yet the burthen and moleſtation of them is increaſed, and therefore the more poſſeſſion

sion we have of good, the greater is our wearines of evill, and the more Nature feeleth her defects, the more doth shee desire her restauration.

The next condition in the Object of our *Hope* is *possibility*; for though the will sometimes being inordinate may bee tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicite Condition if they were not so, yet no hope whether regular or corrupt, can respect its object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, Hatred and Despaire, the one being a proud opposition, the other a dreadfull flight from that good in which the minde perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true *meanes* unto an end hoped, and the *strength* of those *powers* which are to work or bestow them; or if they bee such ends as are wrought without any such meanes, by the bare and immediate hand of the Worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the *will* and *power* of him that bestoweth it.

Here then because I finde not any Arguments of large Discourse in the opposite Passion, (unlesse wee would passe from naturall or morall unto Theologicall handling thereof) wee may observe what manner of *Despaire* is onely regular and allowable, I meane that which in matters of importance drives us out

out of our ſelves, or any preſumption & opinion of our own ſufficiency. But that deſpaire which riſeth out of a groundleſſe unbeliefe of the *Power*, or diſtruſt of the *goodneſſe* of a ſuperiour Agent (eſpecially in thoſe things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruines Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives baſely of God himſelfe, in making our guilt more omnipotent than his Power, and ſin more hurtfull than he is good: *ruines*, in that the minde is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper meanes of recovery.

Of this kinde of *Deſpaire*, there are three ſorts: The one *Senſuall*, ariſing out of an exceſſive love of Good, Carnall, and Preſent; and out of a ſecure contempt of Good, Spirituall, and Future; like that of the Epicures, *Let us eat and drink* while we may, *To morrow we ſhall dye*: The other *Sluggiſh*, which diſheartneth and indiſpoſeth for Action, cauſing men to refuſe to make experiments about that wherein they conclude before hand that they ſhall not ſucceed: The third *Sorrowfull*, ariſing from deep and ſtrong apprehenſions of Feare, which betrayeth and hideth the ſuccours upon which Hope ſhould be ſuſtained: as in the great Tempeſt wherein Saint *Paul* ſuffered ſhipwrack; when the Sun and Stars were hid, and nothing but Terrour to be ſeen; *All Hope that they ſhould be ſaved was taken away.*

1 Cor. 15.

Deſperatione debilitati, experiri noluut quod ſe aſſequi poſſe diffidunt. Cic. in Orat. ad Brutum.

Act 27. 20.

The laſt condition in the object of *Hope*, was *Difficulty*, I mean in reſpect of our own abilities,

for the procuring of the Good we hope for; and therefore Hope hath not only an eye to *Bonum*, the good desired; but to *Auxilium* too, the help which conferres it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his owne power to bestow upon himselfe; *Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco*, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the *Wil* and *Power* of some superiour causes, by dependence whereupon it hath some good warrant to attaine its desires.

Spe perficiendi, si vires, pecunia, consilium, scientia, apparatio. Cic. de Invent. ad Herenn.

And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both *per modum Boni*, as the *Good* desired, *& per modum Auxilii*, as the *Ayde* whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt & foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the *Power* to help in some assistants; or concerning *Will* in others (as indeed generally a blind and mis-led judgement doth nourish Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base and degenerous minds in their dependence upon second and subordinate meanes, without having recourse to the first supreme Cause; which is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a lyar, either by Impotency, whereby he may faile us, or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Iob 31. 24. *Ier.* 17. 5. *Psal.* 62. 9. *Rom.* 3. 4. *Iob* 6, 15, 16.

Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground & warrant of such a confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly reposing it selfe upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to our themselves.

And

And this is the difference between Despaire and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in it selfe; but withall as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now Despaire leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh onely on the hardnesse: on the other side, Presumption never regardeth the hardnesse, but buildeth only upon the possibility. And this is *spes mortua*, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by St. *Peter*: For a lively Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is *Pax Luminosa*, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest, grounded only on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senselesnes than peace, and this is *Tenebrosa Pax*, a peace springing out of Darknesse; for a true Peace is *quies ex fide*, a believing rest; but counterfeit is only *quies ex somno*, a sleeping or dreaming rest. The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serenity: otherwise it is but like the rest of *mare mortuum*, whose unmoveablenesse is not Nature but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, Want, and Weaknesse together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sence Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more then Precept: Provision of Ayds: the uncertainty of outward meanes, to establish Hope, Goodnesse of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.

THe next things to be considered, are the *causes* of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of *Hope* is our *Want*, & our *Weaknesse* put together, the one driving us *ad Bonum*, to the *Object*; the other *ad Auxilium*, to the Aid (and whereſoever there is *Indigence*, there is *Impotence* likewise.) Now in what man ſoever we finde theſe two unſupplyed, there is the root and fundamental ground of Hope; notwithſtanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite oppoſite paſſion, out of an apprehenſion of an inevitable ſubjection unto evill, and utter baniſhment from the fountaine of good. So then of thoſe three eſtates of man; the eſtate of *Fruition*, which is their *Sabbath* and reſt; the eſtate of *Travel*, which is the day of

of worke; and the eſtate of *damnation*, which is the *night* of diſpaire: in the firſt we have the accompliſhment; in the third the finall overthrow; in the ſecond the excerciſe of our Hopes: becauſe in that alone our *Indigence* may by Gods fulneſſe be filled, & our *Impotence* by his Will and Power ſupplyed. In which reſpect, all men have roome for hope to enjoy *God* their laſt *Good*; though not a hope of *Confidence*, aſſurance, and *Expectation*, which is peculiar only to the godly (who alone have a preſent intereſt in his promiſes;) yet ſuch a generall Hope as may well ſuffice to ſtop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are ſolicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingneſſe of God to helpe us.

The next cauſe of Hope is. *Experience* and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the meanes conducing to the attainment thereof. For notwithſtanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not tryall of our ſtrength, or others oppoſition, or of the difficulties of the Object, may with hot and eager mindes, worke preſumptions of ſucceſſe, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reaſon why young men and drunken men are both obſerved by *Ariſtotle* to be εὐέλπιδες, men of ſtrong Hopes) being naturally or by diſtemper bold and opinionative: even as on the other ſide, ſtrength and acuteneſſe of underſtanding, becauſe it ſees ſo farre into the Object, works often diffidence, ſlowneſſe and irreſolution in our Hopes: as *Pliny* out of *Thucidides* obſerves; and the Philoſopher like

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12. Ethic. l. 3. c. 8.

Lib. 4. Ep. 7. Rhet. l. 2. c. 13.

likewise of old men, that they are ἀνοήμονες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, men slow in their Hopes; because of great experience;) yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the later doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, *Aristotle* saith, they are therefore confident, *quia sentiunt superiores*, because they believe much in their own strength. And of a young man he saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, πάντα ἰδίαν ἔχουσι διὰ ἀπειρίαν, they are peremptorie in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas on the other side, as a lame man placed upon some high Tower, can over-view with his eyes more ground, than he hath hope to overrun with his feet in a whole day; so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, & are withall not insensible of their own weaknes, out of the vastnes of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame unto themselves as narrow Hopes, as they do large desires; but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly; but only it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then properly *knowledge* and *experience* is the cause of *Hope*; experience I say, either of the conquerablenesse of the Object by our own meanes: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readinesse of the Will of him from whom we expect further assistance: For as there is lesse casualty, and by consequence more presumption to be had of

an

an event of Art then of Fortune (the one proceedning from a govern'd, the other from a blinde, & contingent cauſe) ſo conſequently there is greater hope & confidence to be given to the ſucceſſe of an enterpriſe, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and raſhly adventured on. *Experience*, being as the Philoſopher obſerveth, the Root of Art, as unexperience is of Fortune.

Γίνεται δὲ μνήμη τῶν πολλάκις ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ ἐμφανισθέντων ἀφ' ὧν ἡ ἐμπειρία. *Philo apud Laert. l. 1.*

Met. l. 1. c. 1.

Now this *Experience* may be ſuch, either as our ſelves have had, or ſuch as we have obſerved other men to have; that which we have from our ſelves is the moſt forcible to induce this affection, becauſe every man is the beſt meaſure of his own abilities; and it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions. Nothing could more aſſure the hopes of *David* in his encounter with *Goliah*, than an experience formerly had againſt creatures every way as formidable, a Lion and a Beare, wherein notwithſtanding they were the ſheep of *Ieſſe*, and not of *God* that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions paſt, and forward with courage and reſolution on ſecond enterpriſes: For though in ſome caſes it be requiſite with Saint *Paul* to forget that which is paſt, when the remembrance of it may be an occaſion of ſloth, wearineſſe, and diſtruſt; yet there may a happy uſe be made of a ſeaſonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former ſucceſſefull reſolutions and patience may upbraid our preſent fears, and ſharpen our languiſhing and ſluggiſh Hopes. *O paſſi graviora*, was the beſt

best Argument which hee could have used to put his fellowes in confidence of that which hee added:

——*Dabit Deus his quoq; finem.*

Since that in greater griefes you have found ease, Doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battle between *Scipio* and *Hanniball, ad amnem Ticinũ*, though the victory by reason of the excellency of the Generall, fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman Generall could not have used a more effectuall perswasion unto *Hope*, then when he told his Souldiers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome; *Cum ijs est vobis pugnandum quos priore bello terrâ mariq; vicistis*: You are to joyne battle with those whom in the former War you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the *feare* of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the *hope* of a second victory perswade the other to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battell between the Greeks and the Trojans, when *Hector* had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by *Homer*.

Τοῖσι δ' μεγαμήνισεν ὃ δ' ἐν νἱοὶ ἦτορ Ἀχαιοῖς
Οὐκ ἐφασαν φίνξεσθαι ὑπὸ ἐκ χερὸς, ἀλλ' ὀλέσθαι
Τρῶσιν δ' ἐλπὶς θυμὸς, &c.

Iliad. 704.

These were the mutuall motions did engage
The minds of Grecks and Trojans on this rage.
The Grecians all despair'd t'escape the blow,
Deeming themselves near to an overthrow:
But former Victory in those of Troy,
Kindled a hope another to enjoy:
They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,
The Grecians Ships to burn, and Them to slay.
Thus Hope of Victory enflam'd the one;
Th'other were more enflam'd, 'cause they had none.

Quondam etiam victis redit in Præcordia virtus, Victoresque cadant. Æneid. 2.

Forsan miseros meliora sequentur. Æneid. 12. *Etiam si spero non subesset, necessitas tamen stimulare deberet.* Qu. Cur. l. 4.

That *Experience* from others, which may enliven and perfect our *Hope*, in the applying their examples and successes to our owne encouragements. For since the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one anothers steps (Precedents having the same precedence to Reason in vulgar judgements, which a living and accompanying guide hath to a Mercuries finger in a Travellers conceit; the one only pointing to, but the other leading in the way.) And as I finde it observed, that running Metall will sooner melt other of its owne kind, than fire alone: so the examples of Vertue will sooner allure and prevaile with the minds of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, than a naked and empty Speculation of Precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man, not only a Morall, but a sociable creature, that so

so when his *Hopes* towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the *reason* of *Precepts*, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious sense of *example*

Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus ——

Horace. *Magnos viros, non Schola Epicuri, sed contubernii fecit.* Sen. Ep. 6.

Those things more sluggishly our mindes excite,
Which enter at the eares, than at the sight.

Sight, which is the Sense of Example, is oftner employed in the government of our Passions, then *Hearing*, which is the Sense of *Precept*. And therefore when the Poet would fit an advice for the person of *Ascanius*, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.

——*Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum,*
Et Pater Æneas & Avunculus excitet Hector.

Recount the brave examples of thy blood,
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,
Let be thy Patern, that the World may see
Father and Uncle both alive in thee.

For though an Argument from Example, to prop a fainting Hope, be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect

respect of moral and perswasive insiuuation, as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions which *Agamemon* gave unto *Menelaus*, when he commanded him to goe into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the Battel.

Θέῤῥει δ' ἴκελ' ἴθι κὴ ἐγκέλευσον ἅπαχδε
Πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνσπα ἕκαστον,
Γαῖραι κυδίστω, &c.

Run thorow the army, cry, encourage all,
Minde them of their Progenitors, and call
Each by his Name; praise them, and let us too
What we command to others, our selves doe

Non convenit qui illum ad laborem impulerim, nunc me ipsum fugere. Terent. Heaut. Quo major fuero, tanto plus laborabo. Maximinus apud Jal. Capitolinum. Il. 67. Si quid injungere inferiori velis, id prius in te ac tuos si ipse statueris, facilius omnes obedientes habeas. Liv. l. 26.

It is true indeed that some men are blessed with a greater excellency of gifts then others; yet we are not to thinke that any man was ever made, as *Seneca* speaks of *Cato*, *In convitium humani generis*, for a reproach of mens weakness, rather then for an example and encouragement of their actions; or for astonishment rather then emulation unto others: This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great vertues, not onely that we might wonder and beleeve, and knowe that the same things which for the greatnesse of them are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their possibility be the objects of our Hope, and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of *Hope*, may be large furniture with, or strong dependence upon the *assistant means*

of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterpriſe, are in ſtead of head and hands, to advance a mans deſigne, which likewiſe is elegantly expreſt by *Diomedes* and *Saperdon* in *Homer*.

Iliad. κ 222. &c.

——— Αλλ' εἴ τις μοι ἀνὴρ ἅμ' ἑπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος
Μᾶλλον θαλπωρὴ καὶ θαρσαλεώτερον ἕρδειν
Σωτῆ σὺν ἱρχομένω, &c.

μ 410.

If any Second would accompany,
My hopes and courage would the greater be:
For when two joyn, the one may haply note
What th'other over-paſs'd: or if he know't,
His counſell would be weake, and his minde ſlow,
When he ſhould execute what he does know.

And according as theſe meanes which we relie upon, have more or leſſe power or certainty in them, they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt *Hope*; ſuch are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like: All which can be cauſes only of a *hope* of *probability*, but not of *certainty*: becauſe they are all means which are ſubject to miſcarriage, and are alſo ſubject to the Providence of God, who only can eſtabliſh and give finall ſecurity to our Hopes, as being ſuch an Aſſiſtant in whom there is neither weakneſſe nor mutability, which ſhould move him to diſappoint us.

All other ayds have two ill qualities in them: they have *wings*, and therefore can eaſily forſake us; and they have *thorns*, and therefore if we leane too hard on them, they may chance, in ſtead of helping, to hurt us. The beſt promiſes which earthly

2 Chron. 28. 20, 21. Exek. 29. 6, 7.

earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

Εἰ δύναμαι τε καὶ ἐν τελείεται νῷ. Iliad. ζ 391.

If the thing lye within thy power to do,
And Divine Providence permits it too.

Here then we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the minde ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those meanes which it hath, so build unto it self peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in it selfe light and opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermixtion of feare and caution, might have been retained.

And as there is an errour in the trust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those meanes: For though divine *Hope* hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet those *lower Hopes*, of which I speake, doe alwayes depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdome of combining their ayds, and of fitting them unto casuall occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightnesse

Horat.

lightnesse and uncertainties, *Leves spes & certamina*, as the Poet calleth them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timeing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our meanes to the variety of occasions; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony; the having of our minds either too light and voluble, or too fixed and constant; or too spread and wandring; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspicious; or too peremptory, resolute, or hastie; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious; or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often, notwithstanding the good store of other aides, endanger and shipwrack the successe of our endeavours: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something a like industry to be used, as in the trial of Mathematical Conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so couched and dependent upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and to have all to do again.

Ἐλπὶς ἐν πίστει συνίστησιν. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2.

A fourth cause of *Hope*, may be *Goodnesse and facility of Nature*, whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readinesse to further any mans purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others; for it is the observation of *Aristotle* touching young men, *Suâ ipsorum innocentiâ cæteros metiuntur*. Their owne goodnesse makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every mans

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12.

prejudice

prejudice loves to finde his own will and opinion: ſo doth his charity to finde his owne goodneſſe in another man. They therefore who are ſoft and facile to yeeld, are likewiſe to beleeve; and dare truſt them whom they are willing to pleaſure. And this indeed is the rule of Nature, which makes a mans ſelfe the *Patern* of what it makes his Neighbour the *Object*.

Now from this facility of Nature proceeds a further cauſe of *Hope*, to wit, *Faith* and *Credulity*, in relying on the promiſes which are made for the furtherance thereof: For promiſes are obligations, and men uſe to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their eſtate: ſo that the promiſes of an able friend, I eſteem as part of my ſubſtance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of Hope, which according as the Authority whereon it relies, is more or leſſe ſufficient & conſtant, is likewiſe more or leſſe evident and certain.

And in theſe two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Iudgement come between them and our Hopes

For as he ſaid of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oſtentimes *ſibi omnia fingunt*, they build more upon Imagination then Reality. And then if what *Tacitus* ſpeakes in another ſenſe, *fingunt, creduntque*, if our faculty feigne aſſiſtances, and our cedulity rely upon them, there will iſſue no other then Ixions Hope, a Cloud for *Iuno*. And therefore *Ariſtotle* out of an eaſineſſe to Hope, collects in young men, an eaſineſſe to be deceived: credulity very often meets with Impoſtures. And hee elſe- *Rhet. lib. 2.*

elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men amongst those who are obnoxious to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others: and as once *Apelles*, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtain for a Picture.

Rhet. l. 1.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of *Hope*, is *wise Confidence*, or a happy mixture of *Boldnesse*, *Constancy* and *Prudence* together; the one, to put on upon an enterprise; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected doe occurre; and the third, to guide and manage our selves amidst those difficulties: For, as he said in Studies, so we may in Actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) *Altius ibunt qui ad summa nituntur*: The further we set our aimes, the more ground we shall get; and then,

Quintil. l. 1. in Proœm. Magnæ indolis signum est sperare semper. Flor. l. 4.

——*Possunt quia posse videntur.*

When a man thinks, This he can do,
By thinking, he gets power too.

And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the successe of *Alexander*'s great Victories, *Nihil aliud quã benè ausus vana contemnere*, his confidence judging them fecible, did by that meanes get thorow them. And though it was venturous, yet as the case might be, it was wise counsell which we finde in the same Historian; * *Audeamus quod credi non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur,*

Liv. l. 19.

* *Liv. l. 25.* Τολμᾶι ἀτέκμη τὸκος χω κὰν μὴ τύχω. *Eurip. Hec.*

videtur, facillimum erit. Let us ſhew our courage in adventuring on ſome difficult enterprize, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more eaſie: For our enemies will conclude that our ſtrength is more than they diſcover when they ſee our attempts greater than they could ſuſpect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy ſhooes, that they may begin to conquer the difficulty in the learning of the Art. And therfore the Philoſopher telleth us, that θρασεῖς εὐέλπιδες, bold men, are men of Hope; for boldneſſe ſuffers not a man to be wanting to himſelfe: and there are two Principles which encourage ſuch men upon adventures; the one, *audentes fortuna juvat*; That reſolution is uſually favoured with ſucceſſe; or if it miſſe of that * *Magnis tamen excidit ausis*; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more than the diſcredit of miſcarriage in it.

Difficiliora debent eſſe quæ exercent, quò ſit levius ipſum illud in quod exercent. Quintil. l. 11. cap. 2. Ariſt. Ethic. l. 3. c. 7. Æncad. 10.

**Ovid. Met. l. 2 Tutius certe per plana, ſed humilius & depreſſius itur, frequentior currentibus, quam reptantibus lapſus. ſed his non labentibus nulla laves, illis nonnulla læves etiam ſi labantur. Plin. l. 9. ep. 26.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Effects of Hope, Stability of Mind, Wearinesse, arising not out of Weaknesse, Impatience, Suspicion, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good Desires, Waiting upon Ayd expected.

THE Effects of *Hope* follow, which I will but name: The first is to free the Mind from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and Fearfulnesse thereof: For as the Philosopher telleth us, Fearfull men are ἀνέλπιστοι, hard of *Hope*: and in this property, *Hope* is well compared unto an Anchor; because it keeps the Minde in a firme and constant temper, without tottering and instability: for though there be but one Hope joyned with Certainty, as depending upon an immutable promise, all other having ground of feare in them; yet this should be only a feare of *Caution*, not of *Jealousie* and *Distrust*; because where there is Distrust in the meanes, there is for the most part Weaknesse in the use of them; and he who suspects the Ayde which he relyes on, gives it just reason

Philosophi quidam erant, qui à spe dicti sunt, Elpicisti qui nihil esse pronunciarunt quod vitam magis cõtineret atque spes. Vid. Plut. Sympos. l. 4. q. 4.

reaſon to faile and to neglect him. And therefore *Ariſtotle* hath ſet Hope and Confidence together, as was before noted, Ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι διὰ πιθανὸν εἶναι, a Good Hope is grounded on a Beliefe, and alwayes worketh ſome meaſure of Affiance in the meanes unto it.

A ſecond Effect of *Hope*, is to work ſome kind of Diſtaſte and *Wearineſſe* in our preſent condition, which according as it is good or evill, doth qualifie the Hope from whence it ariſeth: for there is a diſtaſte that ariſeth out of *Weaknes*; like that of *Iob*, *My ſoule is weary of my life*; *I am a burthen unto my ſelfe*; Another that ariſeth out of *Want*. That which ariſeth upon *Weaknes* is a fickle and unconſtant mutability of the Mind, whereby it deſireth a continuall change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of *Impatiency* of oppoſition; whence the mind upon the firſt difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and diſcouraged; or out of a *Sharpnes of apprehenſion*, diſcovering Inſufficiency in that wherein it deſired content; or out of an *Errour* and too high Eſtimation fore-conceived, which in the triall diſappointing our *Hopes*, and not anſwering that Opinion, begins to be neglected as weake and deceitful; or laſtly out of *Curioſity* & Search, when we ſuppoſe that thoſe things wch cannot in their nature, may at leaſt in their varieties, or number, yeeld ſome content: and as Sands, which are the ſmalleſt things aſunder, yet being united, grow great & heavy: ſo theſe pleaſures, which are alone light and worthleſſe, may by their multi-

Iob 10.1.&7.20

Spes inanes quæ in medio ſpatio franguntur & corruunt & ante in ipſo curſu obruuntur quam portum conſpicere poſſunt. Cic. de Orat. l. 3.

tude bring weight and satisfaction with them. Although herein the Minde is likely most of all to finde *Solomons* Vanity; the union of things subordinate, and which have no Cognation each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction than Tranquility in the Mind; this *Wearinesse* then which springeth from the Unstaidnesse and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the effect of a proper *Hope* (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of minde, a vertue established, and not overthrowne by Hope) the *Wearinesse* then, which is wrought by the fore-cast and providence of a minde possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptinesse and wants, which therefore we long to have removed, like that of *David*, *Woe is me that I am constrained to dwell in Mesech*; whereupon followeth,

Psa. 120. 5.

Ἔλπις παρὰ τὸ ἕλκω ἢ ἕλκυσα ἡμᾶς.
Etymolog.
Studium cum spe senescit.
*Patercu'.l.*1.
Acuit industriam cum spes injecta est, &c.
*Cic. ad. Her. l.*4
Εἰδὲ ἀφίλοις τῶν ἐλπίδα τῶν μέλλοντος ἀγαθῶν ἀφαιρήσῃ καὶ ἀπίστων καὶ παρόντων κακῶν
Max. Tyr. dissert. 33.

The third Effect of *Hope*, which is an earnest contention of the minde, in the pursute of that Good which should perfect our Natures, and supply our wants. And this desire Saint *Paul* calleth *Gemitus Creaturæ*, the groaning of the Creature: which is set downe as a Consequence of the *Earnest Expectation of the Creature*: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much imploy, and so little violate Reason, as this of *Hope* doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the minde so earnestly breathes after; and the want whereof doth work such weaknes in it. The

The last Effect of *Hope*, is a *Contented Repose and Patience* of the Mind, resting it selfe in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this *Patience* is three-fold; a *Patience* under the *Want*; a *Patience* under the *Distance*; and a *Patience* under the difficulties of our desired Good; which holds especially in these Hopes (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will & disposition of another, whose pleasure it behooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, than by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint our selves. Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vaine and empty in their successe. He that believes, and must by Faith depend upon Externall help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectations regulated, not by his owne greedinesse, but by anothers will.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Affection of Boldnesse. What it is. The Causes of it, Strong Desires, strong Hopes, Aydes, Supplyes, Reall, or in Opinion. Despaire and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudence, Shame, Immunity from danger, Dexterity of Wit, strength of Love, Pride, or greatnesse of Mind and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things advised, Temerity, &c.

SO little in love have I ever bin with this affection of *Boldnes* (as I finde it managed by many, who make no other use of it, than children doe of straw, with which they stuffe empty clothes, that they may looke like men) as that when first I writ this Tractate, I passed it over rather as a Vice, than an Affection of the Soule, and said nothing of it. And being no more friends with it now than I was then, I should be contented to have left it out still; But that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member, whereof there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience sheweth us there is of this. For as *Plutarch* notes

Plut. in Necia. Πολλα μεν εσθλα πολλα δ' ελυγρα. *Homer.*

notes of Egypt, that it bringeth forth *multa venena, & multa ſalubria*, many good things, and many bad; like thoſe Creatures, ſome parts whereof are poyſon, and others reſtorative: ſo may we ſay of the men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are uſually inſtruments either of much Good, or of much Evill to the places that nouriſh them: as once *Themiſtocles* his Tutor ſaid of him. The beſt mixture that I can call to mind of this Paſſion, was in *Hannibal*, of whom the Hiſtorian tels us, that he was marvellous *Bold* to put upon Dangers; and yet marvellous *Wiſe* in managing of them: His courage not working Temerity, nor precipitating his reſolutions. And his counſell not working ſlowneſſe, nor retarding his courage.

Plut. in Themiſtoc. In Hannibale plurimum audaciæ ad capeſſenda pericula, plurimum Conſilii inter ipſa pericula erat. Liv. l. 21.

Boldneſſe then or Confidence, is (as the Philoſopher deſcribes it) a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion, that thoſe things which are ſafe for us, are neare at hand; and thoſe which are hurtfull, either are not at all, or are a far off, and cannot ſuddenly reach us: Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect danger for the procuring of ſome difficult and good thing, which wee earneſtly deſire and hope for, in confidence to overcome and breake through that danger: For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldly to proſecute the Danger which oppoſeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto the formality of this paſſion; 1. *Vehemency of Hope*, whatſoever ſtrengtheneth that, cauſeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, nearneſſe of Ayds, and

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Vid. Aqui. 1, 2æ quæſt. 45. art. 3.

and the like. 2. *Excluſion of Feare*, whatſoever removeth that, increaſeth this: As Diſtance from Danger, Freeneſſe from Enemies, Clearnes from Injuries, &c.

The *Object* of this Paſſion is two fold. The Primary and Principall Object is ſome difficult worke under the Relation of a needfull Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Deſired and hoped for. The *ſecondarie* Object, is ſome Evill and Danger, which ſtanding between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the vehemency of our Hope, as it were removed, and deſpiſed in our Eyes. *Good* earneſtly *deſired*, and *Evill* confidently *deſpiſed*, are the things about which this Affection is converſant.

The Cauſes of this Affection are ſo many the more, becauſe it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reaſons.

The *fundamentall* and *principall* Cauſe of it, is *ſtrength of Deſire*, working vehemency of Hope, and impatiency of Reſiſtance, or Reſtraint from the thing deſired: For Luſt when it hath once conceived, will at laſt bring forth and finiſh, and ruſh forward to that after which it longeth, which the Philoſopher calleth ὁρμὴν, and Saint *Peter*, ἐκχυσιν, a powring out of Paſſion, and the Prophet a *Breaking forth* and violent Eruption, a raſh and Head-ſtrong præcipitancy, which like a Torrent ventures upon any thing that withſtands it. The Philoſopher inſtanceth for this particular in adulterers, οἱ διὰ τὸν ἐν θυμῷ πλησμονὴν πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνοντες who adventure on many bold Attempts for the ſatisfaction of their Luſt. But

Lam. 1. 14, 15.

Ariſt. Eth. l. 7. *c.* 8.
1 *Pet.* 4. 4.
See my Treatiſe on the ſinfulneſſe of ſin. *p.* 167.
Hoſ. 4. 2.
Ier. 6. 7. 8. 6.
Eth. l. 3. *c.* 11.

But becauſe where there are ſtrong Deſires, there may be weake Hopes, and great Feares, the one Diſcouraging, the other Deterring from the Proſecution of them, therefore to the emboldening of thoſe Deſires, other particular cauſes doe uſually concurre. Some whereof I ſhall enquire after.

1. Then, *ſtrong Hopes*, and Ready, Preſent *Ayds*, and ſupplies proper to the End which we would advance are Excellent meanes to generate Boldneſſe. Great Aydes as the Catts *Vnum magnum*, or *many* Aydes, that if one faile, another may hold. As greatneſſe of wealth, friends, power, ſtrength. And theſe in a Readineſſe, and *neare* at hand, τὰ παρασκευὰ ἐγγύς, as the Philoſopher expreſſeth it, as the Trojans being beſieged when *Æneas* with his Army drew near, gathered courage above their feares.

Auxilia. { *magna.* *multa.* *vicina.*

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

——— *Clamorem ad ſydera tollunt*
Dardanidæ è muris, ſpes addita ſuſcitat Iras,
Tela manu jaciunt.

Ænead. 10.

(joyes,
They all climb'd up the wals, thence fill'd with
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noyſe
Should wake the Stars; hopes added, ſtirr'd up Ires
And their Darts flew as ſwift as any fire.

And in Scriptures we are often quickened unto courage againſt the Difficulties of our Chriſtian Warfare by the *Greatneſſe*, and the *nearneſſe* of the *Aydes*, and the *Reward* which we Hope

1 Iob. 4. 4. Heb. 10. 36, 37. Iam. 5. 8. Rev. 22. 12.

Θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ δυσπόμφοι ἐνύπνιοι γὰρ. *Ethic. l. 3. c 11. Prov. 23. 34.*

for. Yea, so strong a power hath Hope over the Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dreame and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth, marvellous ventrous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to feare. *Solomon* tels us of a Drunkard lying on the top of a Mast, and I have my selfe seen a Drunken man climbe to the top of a Steeple. Which boldnesse proceedeth in such men from weakenesse and wilfulnesse of self-conceit, and Opinion; for commonly that strength which a Drunken man loseth in his *Reason*, he gathers in his *Fancy*: and as his judgement weakens, his Opinion encreaseth. And we shall never finde men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirme.

Ἰσχυρογνώμονες ὀξὺ ἰδιογνώμονες ἢ ἀκριβεῖς. *Ethic. l. 7. c. 10.*

Now upon this Ground, that *Hope* is the great Quickner unto *Courage*, it was, that *Alexander* used it as an Argument to his souldiers against the Persians, when he saw them come into the field cloathed so richly, that their Armes were much rather a *Prey* to the Greeks, than a *Defence* unto themselves, in which respect *Homer* thus derides *Amphimachus*.

Præda magis utrius quam hostem incruentus devicit. Liv. lib. 9. Iliad. β 873. Plut. lib. de Homero. Quam minimum sit in corpore tuo spoliorum plures computant quam gerunt. Senec. Epist. 12.

Οἵ ῥ' ἐν χρυσείῃσι πολὺμιτι δ' ἦν ἰόντε κούρῃ
Νήπιος· οὐδὲ τί οἱ πύξ' ὑπέρμορα λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον.

In glistering Gold, like a faire Damsell, clad
He came to fight: Vaine man why art so mad

To

To thinke that Iron is kept backe by gold?
Thou bring'ſt the price, for which thy ſelf art ſold.

And yet upon a contrary Reaſon, I finde one of the greateſt and wiſeſt Commanders of the world, *Iulius Caſar*, requiring of his Souldiers to carry gold about them, that the feare of loſing that, might make them the more conſtant to their Reſolutions. *Sueton. in Julio 97.*

Contrary unto this we ſhall often obſerve, that *Deſpaire* and *Extremities* doe put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more deſperately than Cowards when they cannot flie, as the Hiſtorian noteth [a] of *Cn. Piſo* a Confederate of *Cataline*, that by poverty he became deſperate, and thereby emboldened unto that attempt, wherein he might either riſe by the ruine of others (having neither merit nor Hope to riſe by their favours) or at leaſt not be ruined without company. [b] As that which ſhakes a Tree, doth often ſerve to ſettle and faſten it: So many times dangers and [c] extremities doe excite ſtrength, as in the height of a Feaver or Frenzie, men ſhew more ſtrength and agility of body, than in their perfecteſt Health. And as they ſay of [d] Beaſts, they bite with more venome and indignation when they are wounded, and readie to die. And therefore *Homer* expreſſeth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; ſo utmoſt extremities of miſeries make men put out the more boldneſſe either in Revenge or new Attempts, becauſe they may be better, but they cannot

a *Summæ Audaciæ egens, factioſus quem ad perturbandam remp. Inopia, ac mali mores ſtimulabant. Saluſt.*
b *Plu. in Numa.*
c *Sæpè contemptus hoſtis cruentum certamen edidit. Liv. l. 21. Spes deſperatione quæſita, Paterc. l. 1. Ignaviam neceſſitas acuit, & ſpei ſæpe deſperatio cauſa eſt. Q. Cur. l. 5. Dant animum ad loquendum libere ultimæ miſeriæ. Liv, lib. 29.*
d *Maxime mortiferi eſſe ſolent morſus morientium Animantium. Florus, Jul. Capitol. in Maximino.*

cannot be worſe. a And it is a kind of Impunity to be ſo low as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.

a *Impunitatis genus eſt non habere pœnæ locum. Senec.*

b *Lucan. Ænead. 1.*

b *Morienſque recepit, Quas nollet victurus aquas.*

In a famine a man will eat and drink that which in plenty he could not have the courage to looke on. And this cauſe of Boldneſſe is thus expreſſed by the Poet when he ſheweth how the Youth of Troy, ſeeing their City burnt and ſacked, grew unto a Deſperate Reſolution.

Sic animis Iuvenum furor additus: Inde Lupi ceu
Raptores atra in Nebula quos improba ventris
Exegit Cæcos rabies, catulique relicti
Faucibus expectant ſiccis, per Tela per hoſtes
Vadimus haud dubiam in mortem ——

c —— *fortuna miſerrima tuta eſt; nam timor eventus deteriores abeſt. Ovid. de Pont. lib. 2. Eleg. 2.*

Thus youth did rage, deſpairing of their lives,
Like Wolves of Prey, whom extreme hunger drives
From their yong thirſty whelps, throgh darkeſt ſtorms;
Through darts and foes we runſh on our owne harms,
And being ſure to die, dare that which feare
With Hope of Life would force us to forbeare.

Vid. Veget. de re militar. l. 3. c. 21.

Διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πόλλας νενικηκέναι κατὰ ταὐτόν, *Ethic. l. 3. c. 11.*

Another cauſe of Boldneſſe is *Experience*, when a man hath often done a thing with ſucceſſe, often ſeen Dangers and eſcaped them, as Mariners at Sea, found other men, upon as ſmall hopes as he himſelfe hath, to goe through the like matters without doubt or heſitation. For *Examples* dee

put

put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are encouraged sometimes rather to [a] erre in good company, than to goe right alone, and this Argument *Æneas* used in the Poet.

Vos & Scillæam rabiem, penitusque sonantes
Accestis scopulos, Vos & Cyclopea saxa
Experti: revocate Animos, mæstumque timorem
Mittite ——

You by Charibdis, and by Scylla sayl'd, (vail'd
Where waves through Rocks did sound, nor hath pre-
'Gainst you that worser Rocke the Cyclops denne.
Then cast off feares, and shew your selves brave men.

And as *Experience*, so on the contrary side *Ignorance* is as usuall a cause of Confidence, as we see Children will put their fingers in the fire, and play with Serpents, as not acquainted with any hurt they can doe them. Wee may too often meet with men like waters or vessels, which the shallower and emptier they be, doe make the lowder noise, and make use of other mens Ignorance to gaine Boldnesse and Credit to their own. To which purpose it is a grave expression of the Poet:

—— Οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς
Φαῦλοι, παρ' ὄχλῳ μυσικώτεροι λίγυν.

Those whom wise men know for dull,
With vulgar eares are wondrous Musicall.

[a] *Vel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus. Quint. l. 1. c. 6.*

Ἡμῖν δὲ ἰδιώτας ἐν ἀδόξοις μόν. *Laert. in Arist. Et. l. 30. 8. & 10. Plin. l. 4. Ep. 7. Quo moriture ruis majoraque viribus audes? fallit te incautum pietas tua. Æn. 10. De Audacia puerili vid. Val. Max. l. 3. c 1. Eurip. Hyppol.*

Iliad. P 638.

And as Flies are esteemed very Bold Creatures, because they often returne to the same place: so the boldnesse of these kinde of Speakers is usually discovered in vaine and emptie Tautologies, which is the reason why (as the Orator noteth) they are usually more copious then far Learnedner men, *Quia doctis est electio & modus*, because able speakers use choice and Judgement in what they produce

Quintil.

Another cause of Boldnesse in attempts may be *Religion*, and a Confidence of Divine Direction unto what we doe. *Iehu* his pretence unto zeale, was that which caused him to walke furiously. And in this case as the Historian speakes, *Melius vatibus quam Ducibus parent.* Men are apter to be led by their *Prophets* then by their *Captaines*. And we finde when God would encourage his People in their warres, he gave them signes and assurances for their faith to relie upon above their feares, that where *Reason* saw cause of Doubting, *Faith* might see all Defects supplied in God; so to *Gideon*, to *Ahaz*, to *Hezekiah*, and others: and the Church complaines of the want of them in their times of Calamity. *We see not our signes, neither is there amongst us any Prophet or any one that knoweth how long.* When *Iosuah did* fight, *Moses* did pray, and *Israel* was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, then by the valour of the other. And the Philistines were never more affrighted, then when *Israel* brought forth the Arke of God against them; for as *Aiax* said in the Poet.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Q. Curt. lib. 4. De impetu Animorum divinitus excitato, vid. Plut. in Cor.
Iudg. 6 36.
Isa. 7. 11, 12.
2 Reg. 19. 29.
2 Sam. 5. 24.
Psal. 74. 9.
Exod. 17. 11.
1 Sam. 4. 7, 8.

——— εἰ τις θεὸς
Βλάπτει, φύγοι' ἂν ὁ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα.

Sophocl. Ajax vid. Ezek. 21.

——*If God will fight,*
He can make weak men put the ſtrong to flight.

And therefore *Tolumnius* the Soothſayer having received happy *Auguria*, doth thereupon grow to Reſolutions of courage:

Hoc erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod ſapè petivi,
Accipio, agnoſcoq; Deos; me, me duce ferrum
Corripite ô Rutili.

Ænead. 12.
— Priſcum de more Latinis Auſpicium; tum bella parãt mentesque deorum Explorant ſuper Eventu, &c.
Sil. Ital. lib. 5.

This, this is that which in my chiefeſt thought
I ſtill deſir'd, and now find what I ſought:
The Divine Tokens I embrace and ſee; (me.
Come Souldiers, Take your ſwords and follow

Unto this Head of Religion belongeth *Innocency*, as a moſt excellent cauſe of *Boldneſſe*; for the *Righteous is bold as a Lyon*, which careth not though a multitude of ſhepheards come out againſt him. And the Philoſopher tels us that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of ſucceſſe in their attempts, beleeving that they ſhall finde no Enemies, becauſe they have provoked none. A notable Example whereof we have in *M. Publius Furius* the Roman Conſul, who was ſo confident of his owne Integrity in publike Adminiſtration, that being deputed by lot to governe the Province of Spaine, he choſe the two biteereſt Enemies that

Prov. 21. 21.
Iſa. 31. 4.
Vid. Iliad. γ. 23.
Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Val. Max. l. 3. c. 7. vid. haud diſſimile Exemplum Catonis.
Plut. de util. ex Hoſtib. capiend.

that he had in the City to be Coadjutors with him in that Dispensation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which *Drusus* gave to him who would have contrived his house for secrecie, when he told him that he would wish his house were pervious and transparent that privatest Actions might be seen in publick.

Κυνώπης apud Homerum. Ier. 3.3. Isa. 48.4. Ezek. 16.30. Os ferreum. Cic. in Pisonem. Iul. Pollux. l 3. c. 28 Plut. in Alcib. vid. Theophrast. περὶ ἀπονίας. Arist. Ethic. l. 3. c. 9.

And as Religion and Innocency, so on the other side *Deboishnesse* and *Desperateneesse* of living doth implant a marvellous Boldnesse in the Minds and Faces of men, when they have no Modesty or shame to restraine them. As we see in Gypsies, Parasites, Jugglers, θαυματοποιοὶ, *neurospastæ*, and such like. And therefore such kind of men both in Scripture and in other writings, are said to have faces of Brasse, and necks of Iron, whoorish and impudent foreheads that cannot blush nor be ashamed; and these words, ἀπόνοια, ἀναισχυντία, ἰταμία, we shall find for synonymies and of equall signification, whereof the former signifie Despaire, Impudence, and the other Boldnesse.

Θαυμάζω μὲν πῶς οὐκ ἠσχύνθη ἀπαγγείλας.

Againe, as Impudence, so *Shame* and feare of Disgrace is a great Cause of *Boldnesse*, in vertuous and honourable Attempts; for there is no Man of generous principles, but will much rather chuse an honourable danger than a sordid safety, and adventure his *Person* before he will shipwracke his honesty or *good name*, chooseing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a *morall* than a *naturall* feare, to give an account of himselfe rather to those that love his *vertues*, than to those who love his *fortunes*. In one word standing

ding more in awe of mens *Hearts* then of their *Hands*, and ſhunning more a *Iuſt Repreheuſion* then an *Unjuſt Injury*. And to this purpoſe it is gravely obſerved by the Hiſtorian, that the diſhonour which the Romans ſuffred *ad furcas Candinas*, was that which procured their adverſaries a bloudy overthrow afterward, *quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat nec Inimicos tollit*. Their ſaving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being eſteemed not a benefit but a ſcorne: a very like example we have hereunto in the ſervaants of *David*, abuſed and put to ſhame by *Hanun* the ſonne of *Ammon*. And thus the Poet expreſſeth the courage of *Dares* revived by the fall which he had from *Entellus*:

2 Sam. 10. *Mixtus dolor & pudor armat in Hoſtes.* Ænead. 10. *Tu ne cede malis, ſed contra audentior ito.* Ænead. l. 5. Ariſt Eth. li. 3. ca. 11.

At non tradatus caſu, nec territus heros,
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim ſuſcitat ira,
Tum pudor incendit vires & conſcia Virtus.

Dares no whit diſmay'd, renewes the ſight
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite
The ſtouter courage, Shame with Valour met,
Inflam'd his mind, and did his weapon whet.

Another cauſe of Boldneſſe, is *Immunity* from Danger, or at leaſt a *Verſatilouſneſſe* and *Dexterity* of wit to evade it, or ſhift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not alwayes ſecond their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand goe in Equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are ſo far in love

Qui ad fraudem callidi ſunt, non tantum audent quantum excogitant. Cic. pro Cluentio.

with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as *Darius* was wont to say of himself, that in a pinch and extremitie of perill he was ever wisest: and *Sylla* gave the same judgment of himselt, that he came off best in those businesses, which he was most suddenly put upon; which also I finde observed in the Character of our *Henry* the seventh (who hath had the felicity above all his predecessors, to have his lineaments drawn by the ablest pen that hath imployed it self in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater *Dexterity* to *evade*, then *providence* to *prevent* them.

Plut. Apoph.

Plut. in Sylla. Consilium in arena. Seneca. Φεύγει βελτίως αὐ τὴν ὅτι ξυρῶ τυχῆς. Soph. Antig.

Another cause of Boldnesse (as I have formerly noted on that Passion) is *strength of Love*, as we see weak Creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong: and the Tribune in *A. Gellius*, out of love either of his Countrey, or of glory, did not only advice, but himself undertake the executing of a service wherein he was before hand certain to perish. And the same Author telleth us of *Euclide*, a Disciple of *Socrates*, who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his life, to enjoy the Discourses and counsels of his Master.

Audacem faciebat Amor. Ovid Met. 4.

A. Gell. l. 3. c. 7.

A. Gell. l. 6. c. 8. Vile est corpus iis qui magnam gloriam quærunt. Ep. l. 2.

Lastly Pride, *greatnesse of Minde* or Parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentednesse and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new

attempts:

attempts: For it is a very hard thing when great *Abilities* and vaſt *Hopes* meet together, to govern them with moderation: Private ends being in that caſe very apt to engage a mans parts, and to take them off from publick ſervice unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it there is no temper of Minde that will with an evenneſſe and uniformity of proceeding; or felicity of ſucceſſe, promote publick and honourable Ends, as *Height of Abilities*, with *moderation of Deſires*; becauſe in that caſe a man can never ſtand in his own light, nor have any miſt or obſtacle between his Eye and his End.

Now from this ground I beleeve did ariſe that *Maxime* of ſome of the States of Greece noted by *Tully*, and at large debated by the Philoſophers, *Nemo de nobis unus excellat*, that they would not have one man to be notoriouſly eminent in abilities above the reſt, and thereupon inſtituted *Oſtracimſe*, or an honourable Baniſhment, as a reſtraint either to abate the exceſſive worth of eminent men: or to ſatisfie and aſſwage the Envy which others might conceive againſt them, who are apt to hate the vertues which they can onely admire: or laſtly, to prevent the dangers which greatneſſe of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applauſe, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Epheſians expelled *Hermodorus*; and the Athenians *Ariſtides*, becauſe he was too juſt for the reſt of the people. As one Voice in a Conſort, which is loud above the proportion of the reſt, doth not adorn,

Cic. Tuſc. q. l. 5. Ariſt. Polit. l. 3 c. 13. Plut. in Alcib. & Ariſtid. ex Nepia. Eandem virtutem & oderant & mirabantur. Liv. l. 5.

but disturbe the Harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under *Enuy* or *Iealousie*. Mens minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto Evill, which *Tacitus* noted to have been the quality of *Domitian*, & *Ammianus Marcellinus* of *Constantius* towards men of the greatest worth.

Tacit vit. Agr. Ammian l. 15.

Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different Effects.

1 There is a *Happy* and *Discreet* boldnesse, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde, and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisedome, before it proceed unto Action or Execution: like the Boldnesse of the Lyon, which is *slow*, but at last *prospers* in what it undertakes. For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions; Boldnesse is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, *quo minus timoris, minus ferme periculi*, as the Historian speaks. The lesse fears are, the lesse also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their successe:

Οὐρῇ μὲν πλευρὰς τε καὶ ἰσχία ἀμφοτέρωθεν μαστίε καὶ οἱ σ' αὐτὸν ἐποτρύνει μαχέσασθαι. Iliad v 170.

Φιλεῖ γὰρ ὀκνηρὸν θράσος ἀνὴρ θεσσόων μέγα. Sepo. Epist. Liv. l. 22. *Semper in prælio iis maximum est periculum qui maxime timent. Audacia pro muro est.* Salust. cat Cat. Theoc. Idyl. 15 a *Malo te sapiens hostis metuat quã stulti cives laudent omnia audentem contemnet Hannibal.* Liv. l. 22. Arist. Eth l. 3. c 7. *Novi ego istos in pace leones, in prælio Cervos. Tertul. de Coron.*

——Ἐς Τ ροίαν πρόμοι ἦλθον Ἀχαιοί.

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy
Their ten yeers wish, and gained Troy.

2. There is a [a] *hasty and rash Boldnesse*, which beginning too speedily without *Counsell* doth usually *end* too *Cowardly*, without *Courage*; for rash men

men whom the Philosopher cals θρασυδείλους, men made up of confidence and feare, are bold and boasting before a Danger; but in it very timorous, or at least inconstant. *Lyons* in peace, but *Harts* in *war*, as *Tertullians* proverb hath it. a Like those of whom *Livy* and *Florus* tell us, That they were more then men in the onset, and lesse then women in the issue, melting away from their Resolutions like Snow.

And another ill property of the Rashnesse of this Passion, is, That it will expose a man to more danger than the successe which it aimes at can compensate: as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hooke: or as *Vlysses* who went backe to the Cyclops his denne to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men *Overvalue themselves*, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like b *Menelaus* in the Poet, who would venture to fight with *Hector*; or *Aristoxenus* in *Tully*, who being a Musitian, would needs determine in questions of Philosophy.

Lastly it hath a property as we say, to *breake the Ice*, and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perillous consequence, not only to the Author, but many times to the publick peace too, c forward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.

a Liv. l. 10. & l. 38. Flor. l. 2. c. 4. *Temeritas ubi primum impetum effudit, velut quædam animalia amisso aculeo torpet.* Q. Curt. l. 4. *Cum ultimi discriminis tempus advenerit in solicitudinem versa fiducia est.* ib. c. 3.

b Plut. in Cat.

c Iliad. n. 97. 112. Tusc. q. l. 1

c *Properè sequi quæ piget inchoare.* Tacit. *Magis eis Author ad seditionem quam Animus deerat.* Liv. l. 26.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Passion of Feare: the Causes of it; Impotency, Obnoxiousnesse, Suddennesse, Neernesse, Newnesse, Conscience, Ignorance of an Evill.

Vide Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.

THe opposite Passion to this of Hope is *Feare*; which being an Equivocall Passion, and admitting of many different kindes, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explaine it. There is a Vertuous Feare, a Feare of Sinne and Shame: an Intellectuall Feare of *Admiration*, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye, a Feare of *Reverence*, an *Astonishing* Feare, by reason of the *Newnesse*: and an *Oppressing* Feare, by reason of the *Neernesse* and Inavoydableness of the Evill feared. It is a Griefe, Trouble, Flight, Aversation of some approaching Evill apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength: For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope (save in the Evill of it) I shall therefore forbeare to touch it, and shall onely in briefe consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.

Fear is an humbling & debasing Pasion, which alwayes

alwayes importeth ſome manner of ſervitude and ſubjection in whom it reſideth: So then as in the former Paſſion of *Hope* I noted the fundamentall cauſe thereof to be *Weakneſſe* and *Want*: ſo likewiſe in this of *Fear*, the Root and firſt Principle is *Weakneſſe* and *Subjection*; whereof the one implyes a diſability in us to reſt; the other a neceſſity to undergo an evill.

Hence it is that we fear the diſpleaſure of great men; or the Power of Unjuſt men; or the competition of popular and plauſible men; or the cunning of cloſe and malitious men; or the Revenge of provoked men; or the guilt of injurious men that have wronged us alreadie: becauſe in all theſe caſes there is ſome notice of Weakneſſe and ſubjection in us: ſo that Fear is of all other a naked Paſſion: For as Nakedneſſe hath three evill properties; to diſable for defence; to expoſe to Injury; and from both to work ſhame in the conſciouſneſſe of our dejected condition: So likewiſe *Fear* hath three properties; to make us *Impotent* and *Obnoxious*; and from both theſe to beget *Shame*. For though his ſpeech was true, *Rubor eſt virtutis color*, that Shame and Vertue have the ſame colour (which makes it ſeeme a companion rather of Perfection then of Weakneſſe,) yet indeed it is rather a ſigne of a minde vertuouſly diſpoſed in teſtifying the quick apprehenſiveneſſe of its own defects, then any Adjunct of Vertue it ſelfe.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Diogenes apud Laert. l. 6. Πῶς ἐρυθιᾷν γὰ χρηστὸς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. *Menander.*

So then the Roots of this Paſſion are *Weakneſſe* and *Subjection* both together; ſo that where either condition

condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of *Feare*, and therefore wee see sundry times strength takes off the yoake of Obedience, not onely in the civill government of men, but in the naturall government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they are all made subject; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their originall Subjection, and instead of Fearing to terrifie man their lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our *Dominion*, whereby we awe them, as our *Reason*, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholden more therein to the working of our Wit, then to the prerogative of our Nature; and usually every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its owne abilities, the more it hath of *Strength*, the lesse it hath of *Feare*; that which *Solomon* makes the strongest, the Apostle the fittest to expell Feare, to wit, Love.

So likewise on the other side, *Immunity from Subjection* in the midst of Weakenesse removes *Feare*. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their Weaknesse, yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary, or mercy of their Iudge they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the Offence, their former Feares do presently turne into Ioy and Gratulations: and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldnesse, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death; because though they be not quite delivered from the

the Corruption, yet they are from the Curſe and Condemnation of Sinne; though by reaſon of their weakneſſe they are not delivered from the mouth, yet they are from the teeth and ſtings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from Sinne, yet from the Strength and Malediction of Sinne: the Law our Adverſary muſt be ſtrong, as well as our ſelves weak, if he look for Feare.

The corruption then of this paſſion, as it dependeth upon theſe Cauſes, is when it ariſeth out of too baſe a conceit of our owne, or too high of anothers ſtrength; the one proceeding from an error of Humility, in undervaluing our ſelves; the other from an errour of Judgement or ſuſpition, in miſtaking of others. There are ſome men who as the Orator ſpeaks of deſpairing Wits, *De viribus ſuis peßimè merentur*, who are too unthankfull unto Nature in a ſlight eſteeme of the abilities ſhee hath given them, and deſerve that Weakneſſe which they unjuſtly complaine of: the ſight of whoſe Judgment is not unlike that of Perſpective Glaſſes, the two ends whereof have a double repreſentation; the one fuller and nearer the truth, the other ſmaller and at a farre greater diſtance: So it is with men of this temper, they look on themſelves & others with a double prejudice; on themſelves with a Diſtruſting and Deſpairing Judgement, which preſents every thing remote and ſmall; on Others with an over-valuing and Admiring Judgement, which contrariwiſe preſents all perfections too perfect. And by this

meanes between a selfe-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever fals to the ground, and for revenge of her selfe, leaves the party thus distempered, alwayes timorous. For as Errour hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because Errour it selfe is a kinde of *Formido intellectus*, a Fear of the Understanding: and it is no great wonder for one Feare to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the Feare of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: Feare not those that can kill the Body onely, and can doe no more. Where the over-flowing of their Feares seems to have been grounded on the over-judging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Essentiall cause of Feare: these which follow are more casuall and upon occasion.

Whereof the first may be the *Suddennesse of an Evill*, when it ceiseth upon (as it were) in the dark: for all darkenesse is comfortlesse: and therefore the last terrible Judgement is described unto us by the Blackenesse and Unexpectednesse of it, by the Darknesse of Night, and the suddennesse of Lightning. All Unacquaintance then and Ignorance of an approaching Evill, must needs work Amazement & Terrour: as contrarily a foresight thereof worketh Patience to undergoe, and Boldnesse to encounter it: as *Tacitus* speaks of *Cæcina*, *Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoq; intrepidus*, that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore not

Præ cæteris Hostibus timentur Repentini. Ammian. Marc. l. 28.

Mala præviſa fiunt Leviora. Cic. Tusc. q. l. 3. Annal. l. 1.

not fearefull of them. And there is good reaſon for this, becauſe in a ſudden daunt and on-ſet of an unexpected evill, the ſpirits which were before orderly carryed by their ſeverall due motions unto their naturall works, are upon this ſtrange appearance and inſtant oppreſſion of danger ſo diſordered, mixed, and ſtifled, that there is no power left either in the Soule for counſell, or in the Body for Execution: For as it is in the wars of men, ſo of Paſſions, thoſe are more terrible, which are by way of Invaſion, then of Battell, which ſet upon men unarmed and uncompoſed, then thoſe which finde them prepared for reſiſtance: and ſo the Poet deſcribes a lamentable overthrow by the Suddenneſſe of the one ſide, and the Ignorance of the other:

Invadunt urbem ſomno vinoq; ſepultam.

They do invade a City all at reſt,
Which ryot had with ſleep and Wine oppreſt.

Dum eâ parte quæ murus dirutus erat ſtationes armatas opponunt, Quintius noctu ab eâ parte, quæ minimè ſuſpecta erat impetu facto ſcalis cepit. Liv. l. 32.

And this is one reaſon why men inclinable to this paſſion, are commonly more fearefull in the Night then at other times; becauſe then the Imagination is preſenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the ſpirits which ſhould ſtrengthen, are more retired, and Reaſon leſſe guarded.

And yet there are Evills too, which on the other ſide more affright with their long expectation and train, then if they were more contracted

Sen. Ep. 14.

and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze: others with a traine and pompe like a *Comet* which is ushered in with a streame of fire, and like Thunder, which hurts not onely with its danger, but with its noise: and therefore *Aristotle*, reckoneth σημεῖα φόβερῶν, the signes of an approaching evill amongst the Objects of Feare.

Another cause of Fear may be the *Neerneſſe of an Evill*, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For as it is with Objects of Sence, in a distance of place, so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a distance of Time; *Remotion* in either, the greater it is, the lesse present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression there-from upon the faculty: and this reason *Aristotle* gives why Death, which else-where hee makes the most terrible evill unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, worke such terrour and amazement, nor so stifle Reason and the Spirits, as Objects farre lesse in themselves injurious to Nature, but yet presented with a determined *Neerneſſe*. And the reason is plaine, because no Evill hurts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its *Vnion*: and all *Propinquity* is a degree of *Vnion*. For although *Futurition* be a necessary condition required in the Object, which must inferre *Feare*; yet all Evill, the lesse it hath *de Futuro*, the more it hath *de Terribili*: which is the reason why that Carnall Security,

curity, which is oppoſed to the feare of God, is deſcribed in the Scripture, by putting the Evill Day farre from us, viewing as in a Landskip and at a great diſtance the terrour of that Day. And if here the Atheiſts Argument be objected, Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we ſhall dye; Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an inducement unto Ryot: We muſt anſwer, that an Atheiſt is herein both right and vaine, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be the beſt cloſe of a wicked life; and therefore moſt earneſtly (though moſt vainly) deſireth that it may be the iſſue of his Epicuriſme and Senſuality. And here briefely the corruption of Feare in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of Evill, to ſwell ſo high as to ſink Reaſon, and to grow bigger then the Evill which it is afraid of.

——— *propiusq, periclo*
It Timor, & major Martis jam apparet imago.

Their Feare gets cloſer then the thing it feares,
Warres Image bigger then it ſelfe appeares.

Ænead, 8. In metu & periculo plura & majora videntur metuentibus cum creduntur facilius, tum finguntur impunius. Cic. de Divinat, l. 2.

For as it is a ſigne of diſtemper in the Body, when the unequall diſtribution of nouriſhment and humours cauſeth ſome parts to exceed their due proportion of greatneſſe: ſo is it likewiſe in the Faculties of the Mind, when the Inferiour grow high and ſtrong; if Reaſon raiſe not it ſelfe to ſuch a proportion, as ſtill to maintaine and

manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed onely of the Rising and Strength, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason: For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keepe it selfe up above rebellion; yet is it not necessary that it should stoop and sink according to the lowneſſe or sordidneſſe of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have all parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a sellow-feeling, not a sellow-languishing; yea indeed in both cases, where the inferiour part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher; becauſe in a Superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppresse and keep under that which rebelleth.

Another cause of Feare may be * *Newneſſe of Evill*: When it is such, wherewith neither the Minde it selfe hath had any preceeding encounter, whereby to judge of its owne Strength; nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirme its hopes in the like succeſſe: For as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is in stead of Armour, and is a kinde of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to beare troubles: for there are some things which he elegantly calleth them, τὰ κενὰ φοβερὰ, *Emptie Dangers*: *Epictetus* calleth them, προσωπεῖα καὶ προσωπία, Scar-crowes, and Vizors, which children feare onely out of Ignorance: as soon as they are known, they ceaſe to be terrible. As the log of timber which was

cast

* *Ne fama aut rem in majus extolleret aut militum animos rerum novitate terreret. Iuſtin. l. 14.*
* Ἔκπληξις φύβος ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀνωφύλου ἢ ἀπ' ἀπροσδοκήτου φαντασία. *Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. Eth. l. 3. c. 7. Arrian. Epict. l. 2. c. 1.*
Nam velut pueri trepidant, atq; omnia Cæcis in tenebris mètuunt: ita nos in luce timemus. Lucr.

caſt into the pond, did with the firſt noiſe exceedingly affright the Frogs, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they ſecurely ſwam about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cauſe that a man can ſet no bounds to his Fear. I *grieve* for ſo much Evill as *hath* befallen me; but I *feare* ſo much as may befall me; and the more ſtrong and working my *Fancy*, the greater my *Feare*; becauſe what I cannot meaſure by *Knowledg*, I meaſure by *Imagination*; the figments of Fancy doe uſually exceed Truth.

Plin.l.8. ep.18. Vereor omnia, imaginor omnia quæq; natura metuentium eſt, ea maximè metui quæ maximè abominor, fingo. Plin.l.6. ep.4. Vid.Sen.ep.13. Prob.Sect.14. q.15.

And from this *Ignorance* likewiſe it is, that Timorous men are uſually *Inquiſitive*, as the Philoſopher notes; and ſo the Prophet expreſſeth the feare of the Idumeans in Warre, *Watchman! What of the night? Watchman! What of the Night?* Feare uſually doubleth the ſame queſtions, as Griefe doth the ſame complaints. Therefore men in a fright and amazement, looke one another in the face; one mans countenance, as it were asking counſell of anorher: and once more from hence grow the *Irreſolutions* of Timorous men, becauſe they know not what to doe, nor which way to flye the things they feare: in which reſpect they are ſaid to flye from an Enemy *ſeven wayes*, as ever ſuſpecting they are in the worſt. *Pavidi ſemper Conſilia in incerto*, they never can have fixed and compoſed Counſels: and it is the uſuall voice of Men in their Feares, I know not what to doe, I know not which way to turne my ſelfe; *Trembling of Heart*, and *Failing of Eyes*, Blindneſſe and Aſtoniſhment, *Ignorance* and

Iſa.13.8.21.11 Ier.51.31. Gen.42.1. Μαλλον οκνουσι λεον ἀτυ ἡ υβλα φεγοντες πλανωμενοι υπ' ἀπορίας Schol.in Soph. Deut.28.25. In magnis difficultatibus ſemper præſentia fugimus tanquam maximè periculoſa. Plut.in Mario. Deut.28.28.95

Fear

Feare, doe thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoicks make ἄνοια and ὄκνους, a sluggish Affection of Minde, whereby a man shrinketh back, and declineth businesse, because of difficulty of danger which he observeth in it, and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Minde, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kindes of this Passion of feare. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgines, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Feare:

Laert in Zenon. l. 7.

Vt fugiunt aquilas timidissima turba Columbæ,
Vtq; fugit visos agna novella lupos:
Sic illæ timuere viros sine lege ruentes,
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color.
Nam Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris,
Pars laniat Crines, pars sine mente sedet.
Altera mæstæ silet, frustra vocat altera matrem,
Hæc queritur, stupet hæc, hæc fugit, illa manet.

Ovid. de Arte Amandi. li. 1.

As weak and fearfull Doves the Eagle flye,
And tender Lambs when they the Woolfe espie:
So the affrighted Sabine Virgines runne
Pale and descolour'd, Roman youth to shunne.
Their Feare was One, but Fear had not One look,
Part here sit reav'd of sence, part there doth pluck:
And teare their hairs; One silent mourns, another
With a succesleless Outcry calls her mother.
One moans, the fright another doth amaze:
One flies for Fear, for Fear another stayes.

Now

Now the reasons why *newnesse* of evil doth thus work *fear*, may be many. For first, all *Admiration* is a kinde of *fear*; it being the property of man, not onely to fear that which is *against*, but that also which is *above* our Nature, either in regard of *natural and civil dignity*, which worketh a *fear of Reverence*, as to parents, governours, masters; or in regard of *Moral Excellency* and *Excesses* above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a *Fear of Admiration*. Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it, to work, more or lesse, some manner of *admiration*, which (as the Honour of this ages Learning calls it) is a *broken knowledge*, and commonly the first step which we make in earth particular *Science*: & therefore *children* are most given to *wonder*, because every thing appeareth *new* unto them. Now then when any evil shall at once fright our *nature*, and pose our *understanding*, the more our *Ignorance* doth *weaken* our *Reason*, the more doth it *strengthen* our *Passion*.

Advancement of Learning.

Σοφιστὴν δὲν θαυμάζειν οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο παραδόξων. *Laert. in Zenon. l. 7*

Plut. de Aud. Ὁ δὲ θαυμάζων ἀγνοεῖ. *Metap. l. 1. c. 2.*

Again, though such evils may haply be in themselves but sleight, yet the very *strangenesse* of them will worke an opinion of their *greatnesse*: for as that of *Seneca* is true, *Magnitudinem rerum consuetudo subducit*, that use makes small esteem of great things: so it will follow on the contrary side, that Novelty makes evill appear greater; as the way which a man is least acquainted with, seems the longest.* And therefore the *Romans* did use themselves unto their gladiatory fights and bloodie spectacles, that acquaintance with *wounds* & *blood* might make them the lesse fear it in the Wars.

Nat. Quæst. l. 7. c. 1.

* *Iul. Capitol. in Maximo & Balbino. Vide Lipsii Saturn.*

And lastly, such is the inbred cautelousnesse of Nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the Minde, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any, and thereby it is made naturally fearfull even of harmlesse and inoffensive things, (*Omnia tuta timens*) much more then of those which bring with them the noise and face of evill.

Now the corruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soon upon the object, and snatcheth it from the Understanding before that it hath duely weighed the nature of it; when as *Aristotle* speaks of *Anger*, that it runs away from reason with an *half message*; so the Object shall be pluckt away from the Understanding with an *halfe judgement*. For when a man hath but an halfe and broken sight, like him in the Gospell, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as trees, and to passe a false sentence upon any thing which he feares.

Another cause of *Feare*, may be *Conscience* of evill, and guiltinesse of minde, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foule and thicken: *For wickednesse, when it is condemned of its own witnesse, is exceeding timorous; and being pressed with Conscience, always forecasteth terrible things*: and as the Historian speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, *Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus & ictus*; their minds with lust, cruelty, and unclean resolution, being no lesse torn and made raw, then the body flea'd

wisd. 17. 11.

Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.

flea'd with ſcourges. Every vicious man hath a double flight from God, a flight from the Holineſſe, and a flight from the Juſtice of his Will. *Adam* firſt *eates*, and next he *hides*: as ſoon as he hath tranſgreſſed the Covenant, he expects the Curſe: and therefore we ſhall ſtill obſerve that men are afraid of thoſe whom they have injured. **Alcibiades* having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to truſt them, ſaying, It is a fooliſh thing for a man when he may flee, to betray himſelfe into their hands from whom he cannot flee. And therefore they who would have us fear them, deſire nothing more then to be privie to our guilts, and to know ſuch crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamie or loſſe upon us.

* *Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l.* 13. *c.* 38.

Scire volunt ſecreta domus, atque inde Timeri.
Into our ſecret crimes they pry, that ſo
We may feare them, when they our vices know.

Juven. Satyr. Charus erit Verri qui Verrem tempore quo vult Accuſare poteſt, *&c.*

And therefore Innocency is the beſt Armour that any man can put on againſt other mens malice, or his own feares: for the righteous are bold as a Lion.

Pro. 28. 1.

Other cauſes of Feare might here be obſerved, which I ſhall but intimate. As we feare active and buſie men, becauſe if they be provoked, they will ſtirre and looke about to revenge themſelves.

Minus timebant Epaminondam. Διὰ φιλοσοφίαν οὐς ἀφοβίγμενε. *Plutarch.*

We fear likewiſe Dilators, becauſe they are inquiſitive and pry into the ſecrets of others. *Plutarch* compares them unto Cupping-glaſſes,

which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates thorow which none passed but condemned and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flyes, which resort onely to the raw and corrupt parts of the body; or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrefaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make others appear worse then they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appear so.

We fear also abusive and Satyrical wits, which make use of others mens names, as of Whetstons to sharpen themselves upon.

Horat. l. 1. Sat. 4.

Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas,
Fœnum habet in cornu, longe fuge; dummodo risum
Excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico.
Et, quodcunque semel Charitas illeverit, omnes
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacuque,
Et pueros, & anus——

These all hate Poets, fear to suffer scorn
From those curst wits, which cary hay in horn.
Shun them; they will not spare their deareſt *frend*
To make *themselvs* sport: then what *they* have pend
Th'are big with, till old wives and boys that go
From ovens & from washpools, know it too.

Οἱ φοβοῦνται ἢ ἐφ' ὑβρει ἢ καταφρονήσει ὀργίζονται τοῖς. Arist. Rhet. l. 2.

Lastly, we fear, close, cunning, and suppressed malice, which like a skinn'd wound doth wrankle inwardly: Crafty insinuative, plausible men, that

that can ſhrowd and palliate their revengefull purpoſes under prefexts of love. I formerly noted of *Tiberius*, and (a) *Ælius Spartianus* obſerveth it of *Antoninus Geta*, that men were more afraid of his kindeneſſe then of his anger, becauſe his uſe was to ſhew much courteſie there where he intended miſchiefe.

And (b) *Cæſar* was wont to ſay, that he was not afraid of *Antony* and *Dolabella*, bold adverſaries, but of *Brutus* and *Caſſius*, his pale and lean enemies, who were able to ſmother their paſſion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they ſay) have a Proverb wherein they promiſe to take heed themſelves of their enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this, as it is of all other the moſt dangerous and the moſt unchriſtian, ſo it is the moſt unworthy and ſordid diſpoſition of minde, (I cannot finde words bad enough to character it (c) by) which at the ſame time can both flatter and hate, and with the ſame breath praiſe a man, and undo him. And therefore the (d) Philoſopher telleth us that a magnanimous man is φανερὸς καὶ φανερόφιλος, ſuch an one as doth boldly profeſſe as well his diſpleaſure as his love, eſteeming it timorouſneſſe to trifle and conceal his affections.

Of all Chriſts enemies, *Iudas* when he kiſſed him, the *Herodians* when they praiſed him, and the devill when he confeſſed him, were the worſt and ill-favouredſt. A Leproſie was ever uncleaneſt when it was whiteſt, and Satan is never more wicked

a *Fuit ejus Immanitatis Antoninus ut iis præcipue blandiretur quos ad necem deſtinabat, ut ejus magis blandimentum timeretur quam Iracundia. Spart. in Geta.*

b *Plutarch. in Cæſare.*

Ira quæ tegitur nocet. Sen. Med.

Pſal. 62. 4. 55. 21. 10. 8, 9, 10.

c *Peſſimum inimicorum genus Laudantes. Tac.*

Turpe eſt odiſſe quem Laudes. Sen. de Ira, lib. 3. cap. 29.

d *Ariſt. Ethic. lib. 4. c. 8.*

Τοῦτο λανθάνειν φιλοῦσιν.

wicked or more ugly then when he puts on *Samuels* Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the most mishapen monster. Like those poysons which kill men with laughing, or like the Philistines Trespasse-offering, Mice and Emeralds made of gold.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the Effects of Fear, Suspicion, Circumspection; Superstition, Betraying the succours of Reason, Fear generative, Reflecting, Inward weakning the faculties of the Mind, Base Suspicion, Wise Caution.

I Proceed to consider some of the *Effects* of this Passion, whereof the first may be *Suspicion* and Credulity, which either other mens rumours, or our own working Imagination frameth unto it self. Which effect of Fear the Historian hath wisely observed, *Retineri comeatus dum Timet, Credit*; what he feared that he believed. And in another place speaking of the strange relations which had been made of monsters, his Judgement upon the report is, *Visa sive ex metu credita*, It was uncertain whether they had been really

Tacit. lib. 4.

Annal. lib. 2.

really seen or beleeved out of Feare. For as timorous men are by their owne suspicion ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to feare where no feare is, which the Poet hath observed,

Quæ finxêre Timent.

'Ημεῖς ἢ χωρὶς ἢ ἀναγκαίων κακῶν. Αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν ἕτερα φαντασιζόμεθα. *Menand.*

——they are afraid
Of fancies which themselves have made;

So are they ready likewise to beleeve the apparition of their owne braine for reall terrors: For *Tacitus* his speech is here likewise true: *Fingunt Creduntque*, first they feigne, and then they beleeve.

Now the Reason hereof may be First, the generall Impression of Nature, which being subject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdome of providence, and circumspection, to foresee those evils, which cannot by dexterity be so easily shifted off, as they may at a distance be prevented; so that wee finde even in the most cleare and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing (though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our Nature) untill it be better understood, a secret drawing back and feare lest it should prove hurtfull unto us; how much more then when it is once prepossessed with passion? For as cloth once dyed from it's naturall white, will take no other but a darker colour: so mindes once steeped in the bitter (a) humours of this melancholique passion, will seldome

Quorum in alterius manu vita posita est, sæpius illud cogitant quid possit is cujus in ditione sunt quam quid debeat facere. Cic. pro Quinto.

a *De timore isto melancholico, Vide quædam apud Cæl. Rhod. l. 9. c. 26.*

dom admit of any, but more black and feareſull conceits.(e) And from this ſuſpicion of fear it is, that timorous men are uſually cruell, when they gain any advantage: Their jealouſie teaching them to doe that unto others which they fear from them.

A ſecond Reaſon may be, becauſe in feare the minde of man is drawn to a neerer ſenſe of its weakneſſe, and to a more prejudicate apprehenſion of the adverſe power: and therefore it is a true obſervation, (b) *Prona ad Religionem perculſæ ſemel mentes, &c.* Minds once poſſeſſed with fearfull conceits, are moſt forward in ſacrifices, and Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils which they expect. So that as *Tacitus* on another occaſions ſpeaks, *Inclinatis ad credendum*; ſo I may ſay, *Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, etiã Fortuna.* When the minde is once drooping, things which before paſſed away as matters of courſe and caſualty, are now drawn within the compaſſe of Preſages and Emphaticall evills.

But here by the way we are to remember that this *credulity of fear* is to be underſtood with reſpect of its owne ſupicion, otherwiſe in regard of thoſe ſtrengthening helpes which are given againſt it, it is ever *incredulous: O thou of little faith! why doſt thou fear?*

Now this effect of Fear is generally in it ſelfe a corruption of it: For though I would have a mans dangers make him provident and ſolicitous in the forecaſting future evils out of a ſound and ſober conjecture, ackording as are the

a *Quod de conſtantio obſervavit Ammian. Marcell. l. 16. de Artaxarche. Plutarchus de Medea. Euripid. in Medea. De Domitiano Tacitus, quidam nunquam magis quam cum erubuerunt Timendi ſunt. Senec. Ep. 11.*

b *Tacit. An. l. 1 Vide Plutarch. de ſuperſtitione; Et lib. contra Epicur. Max. Tyrius diſſertat.*

4 *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 7. p. 512. Hiſt. lib. 2.*

the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himself in a careleſſe ſecurity, nor divert his Minde from ſuch unwelcome and penſive thoughts, like *Vitellius* in *Tacitus*, who in the near approach of his fatall ruine, was *Trepidus, dein Temulentus*, one hour Fearfull, and the next Drunken, ſmothering in himſelf every thought of enſuing danger, and enduring nothing but *Iucundum & Laſurum*; that which was pleaſing, though harmefull to him; yet I would not have the minde tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and preoccupate Evils to be no further effected than in our braine, becauſe hereby it is made ſoft and irreſolute, tumultuary and confuſed, and both wayes much indiſpoſed and diſabled for Action.

Another ill Effect of Feare, is a *Diſlike* of whatever meanes Reaſon preſents for the freeing of us, whence inſue Inconſtancy and continuall Change of Reſolutions, hating all Counſels when they are preſent, and recalling them when they are to farre paſt: which Effects is elegantly deſcribed by the Author of the Booke of *Wiſdome*, who ſaith, that *Feare is a betraying of the Succours which reaſon offereth*; a ſubmitting of them to the falſe interpretations of a crooked and prejudicate ſuſpicion, which overcurioufly diſcovering Weakeneſſe in all meanes, and making uſe of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger.* They ſay of a certaine Fiſh, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect Embleme of Feare, which though you put into Armor, yet you cannot give it Courage. And

* *Themiſtocles apud Plut. Apophth.*

* therefore as he said, an army of Lyons led by a Hart, would do lesse service then an army of Harts led by a Lyon, because in that case Feare would betray her own succours. And this I finde a frequent observation, that *Pavidis consilia in incerto.* Feare ever dazeleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and *Timor etiam auxilia reformidat.* It is afraid of the very succors that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of *Vlysses* over his feares, that he could think and wisely advise what to do.

——— Nec talia passus Vlysses,
Oblitusq; sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.

Although with feares oppresst; yet he had not
The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may be first, because *Feare* is a Multiplying and *Generative* Passion, ever producing motions of its own Nature. He which fears danger from anothers power, will easily feare Errors or Impotency in his own ayds: and it is * common with men to thinke themselves *Vnwise*, when they feel themselves *Vnhappy*, and this very thought that they are so doth I know not by what Fascination, make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flyes from the Dogges, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him, so when our feares drive us from one mischief, they often hamper and intangle us in another.

Againe

* *Chabrias ib. & Orat. 2. de fortit. Alex. Arist.* Οὐδὲν ἴσως ἐστὶ πύργος ἐπιταῦρος ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν, &c. *Sop. Oedip. Tyr. Tac. An. l. 3. Q. Cur. Omnia tuta timent. Non minus præsidium suum quã hostes metuerunt discrimine tanto Liv. 1.*

Ænead. l 3.

Περὶ τῶν τὸ χαυνωτικὸν φρίτας καταπλαγῶν. *Iniquum sed usu receptum, quod honesta consilia vel turpia, prout malè aut prosperè cedunt, ita vel probantur, vel reprehenduntur. Plin. l. 5. Ep. 21. Arrian. Epist. l. 2. c. 1.*

Againe it is the property of *Feare*, to make us ever reflect upon our own Weaknes, & (as I said) not only to present it but to worke it: as the Sun when it discloseth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly it selfe hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it shineth on the Earth, it hides the Starres: so it is in those two Offices of Reason; the Transient and Reflexive act, that whereby we looke Outward on others, or Inward on our selves, specially where there is Passion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker: which is true most of all in this Passion of Feare, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the less we see of inward strength for resistance. Insomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered, as the Poet intimates, when *Ajx* came forth to battell:

Τεῦκρος δ' πρόμος ἦλθε ὑπολυδὸς γαῖ' ἔχουσαν. *Iliad.* 8. 262.
Ἔκλυεν δὲ ἄρα μιν θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πεπτᾶνται.

Feare had the other Trojans all oppresst;
Yea Hectors *heart panted within his breast.*

A third Effect may be a Weakness of the Faculties of the Minde, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Counsell, the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as *Plutarch* noteth) it imports in the Greek, a Binding or shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the Soul for Action. *Plut. de Sup.*

And such Actions, as Feare forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weak and unnaturall, that it is a Maxime in the Law, *Per metum gesta pro non ratis habentur* : Those things which we doe in Feare, are voide and invalide to binde, when the Feare which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the Civill State, so it is in the Morall Common-wealth of the Soule, there are three principall wayes to inferr Weakneſſe, Forreigne Incurſions, inteſtine Tumults, and an Emptying of the parts, all which are to be ſeen in the Extremity of Feare. Where firſt two things are to be granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the minde. The firſt is, that the Spirits being of the moſt ſtrong, ſubtile, and quick motion, are the principall Inſtruments of Entercourſe, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reaſon: the other, that the Minde being of a Spirituall and Elevating Nature, retaines then the perfecteſt power of Operation, when it leaſt of all ſuffers the Incurſion of groſſer Paſſions, which yet I underſtand not of all manner of Miniſtry and Admixtion of Appetite with Reaſon (as if the Regular motions of inferior powers did not ſerve to ſharpen the Counſels of the higher) but only of Invaſion and Tyranny.

Which granted, we may obſerve all the three former cauſes of Weakneſſe in an Extremity of *Feare*. For firſt there is a Confuſed and Unſerviceable mixture of *Paſſion* and *Reaſon*: The *Paſſion* with too much outrage and aſſault breaking in, and diſtracting the advices of *Reaſon*, which is

Forreigne

Forreigne Incurſion : For, though theſe two are not parts of a different *Regiment*; yet they are of a different Nation (if I may ſo ſpeak) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower part or Region of the ſoule. Secondly, there is *Tumult* and Diſorder amongſt the Spirits, which is *Civill Diſſention*. Thirdly there is a Retyring of them to the principall Caſtle or Fort, the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and Ungarriſon'd; which though it be a ſtrengthning of the Better, yet it is a Weakning of the Major part, and this anſwereth unto Emptying or Vacuity. By all which, both Reaſon is made unfit to Counſell (all the Conceipts thereof being choaked and ſtifled with a diſorderly throng of Spirits and Paſſions) and the Body likewiſe is ſo benummed, that though our diſcourſe were entire, yet it could not be there ſeconded with any ſucceſſefull ſervice. And hence are thoſe many ill Effects of Fear upon the Body, whiteneſſe of Haire, Trembling, Silence, Thirſt, Paleneſſe, Horrour, Gnaſhing of Teeth, Emiſſion of Excrements. The Outward parts being overcooled, and the Inward melted by the ſtrength of the Spirit retyring thither. Which *Homer* hath thus deſcribed, ſpeaking of a Coward.

Cœl. Rhodig. l. 7. c. 47. Plut. de Hom. Ariſt. Prob. Sect. 27. Q. 1. 2. 3.

His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he ſet
Long in one place; he croucheth to his feet;
His Heart pants ſtrong, and intercepts his breath,
His Teeth do gnaſh with, but the thoughts of Death.

Iliad. N. 280. Colorem mutat Polypus, quia Timidum anim. Plut. l. q. n. q. 19.

Brave men are ſtill the ſame, not much agaſt,
When the firſt brunt of their Attempts is paſt.

Where by the way we may obſerve what *Seneca* alſo tels us, that *Feare* doth uſually attend * the *beginnings* of great enterprizes, even in the worthieſt men. Which mindeth me of one more, (and that a uſefull and profitable) Effect of this Paſſion, I meane * *Care*, *Wiſdome*, and *Caution*, which ever proceeds from a Moderate Feare, which is a Dictate of Nature; And therefore the weakeſt Fiſhes ſwim together in ſhoales, and the weakeſt Birds build in the ſmalleſt and outermoſt boughes, which are hardeſt to come unto. And we may obſerve that Nature hath made the weakeſt Creatures ſwifteſt: as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and they * ſay that the Hare is very quick at hearing, and ſleepeth with his Eyes open, every way fitted to diſcover danger before it ſupriſe him. For as in Religion, a Feare that is governed by the Word of God; ſo proportionably in Morality, a Feare grounded by the Word of Reaſon, is the Principle of Wiſedome. As Security and Supineneſſe is the Root of Folly, which *Tiberius* replyed to the petition of *Hortulus*, wherein he requeſted of the Senate a Contribution from the publicke Treaſury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was ſunke and began to wither. Induſtry, ſaith hee, will languiſh, Idleneſſe will increaſe, if no man have Feare, or Hope in himſelfe: but all will ſecurely expect a ſupply from others; in themſelves lazy and burthenſome

* *Ariſt. Prob.* 27.9.3. *Vid. Sen. de Ira. l.2.c.3. Plut. in Arato.* *Βελθυτικὸς πολιτῆ *Ariſt. Rhet. l.2. Vid. Pol. l.5.c.8* * Φοβεῖσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀμωὶς ἀλλ' εὐλαβήσεσθαι δὲ. *Laert. in Zenon. Ælian. de Anim. l.8.c.18. l.4.c.8.* **Plut. Sympoſ. l.4.q.5. Homerus viros fortiſſimos ſemper in pugna deſcribit armatos. Et Hanibal in tot pugnis nunquam vulneratus. Plut. in Pelopida, & in Marcello. Langueſcit induſtria, intenditur Socordia, ſinullus ex ſe meus aut ſpes: Securi omnes alienа ſubſidia expectabunt, ſibi ignavi, nobis graves. Annal. l.2.*

thenſome unto us: and it is the judgement of *Tacitus* upon one of the wiſeſt Policies, which ever that Emperour practiſed, I meane his writing to the Legions abroad, *Tanquam adepto principatu*, as if he were already Emperor, when at home in the Senate he uſed only Modeſty and Refuſals, That he did it out of *Fear*, ſo wiſe a Counſellor was his Paſſion unto him. And we finde that ſome * great Commanders have cauſed their Scout-watches to be unarmed, that Feare might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Paſſion is the Inſtrument of Diſcipline, ſeaſoning the Minde, as ground-Colours do a Table, to receive thoſe beauties and perfections, which are to be ſuper-induced.

Paulus Æmil. apud Plut. Apoth. l. 44.

Vid Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 1. c. 9. Plin. l. 6. ep. 17.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of that particular Affection of Feare, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus feare. The grownd of it, Evil of Turpitude, Injustice, Intemperance, Sordidnesse, Softnesse, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vaine-glory, Misfortune, Ignorance, Pragmaticalnesse, Deformity, Greatnesse of Minde, Unworthy Correspondencies, &c. Shame, Vicious and Vertuous.

Φόβος ἀδοξίας *Arist. Eth. l. 1. c. 15.*
Αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ λύπη περὶ τὰ τῆς ἀδοξίας, &c. *Arist. Rhet. l. 2. c. 6.*
Φόβος ἐπιφανοδοξίας χρόνε. *Damascen. de Orthod. fid. l. 2. c. 15.*
A Gell. l. 9. c. 6.
Ὁ γὰρ δῖος ὄρα πρόσθεν καὶ ὀπίσσω. *Iliad. Σ 214.*

BEsides this Generall Consideration of the Passion of *Feare*, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation; namely *Shame*, which is a *Feare of just Disgrace*, and Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion we do or ought to value, as he said in the Poet,

Πολυδάμας μὲν ἀριστὸς ἐὼν ἐνόησε νοῆσαι.

Now those whom we thus feare, are *wise men*, (for so *Polydamas* is said to look behinde and before him.) *Aged* men, and all whose presence we reverence, as Parents, Rulers, Counsellers, Friends: Any whom we our selves *Admire*, or who Admire us. We feare digrace with those whom we Admire, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kinde of Touch-stone, which if we

we cannot ſuffer the triall off, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Metall. And we feare it with thoſe who admire us, becauſe as every man is willing to ſee his face when it is cleane, in that Glaſſe which repreſents it faireſt : ſo when it is foule, of all other he ſhunneth that moſt. In the former caſe, we are in danger to miſſe what we deſired ; in the other, we are in danger to ſhipwracke what we before enjoyed.

We are apt to be aſhamed with our *Friends*, becauſe their opinion wee value, and with our *Enemies*, becauſe theirs we feare; with our Friends, becauſe they are grieved ; with our Enemies, becauſe they are delighted with that which ſhames us.

Againe we feare in this Regard, Rigid, and *Severe Men*, who are not ready to forgive, nor to put candid and charitable Conſtructions upon what we doe. Therefore when *Cato* was preſent, (who was *vir rigidæ Innocentiæ*, a ſterne and ſevere Cenſor of the manners of Men) none durſt call for the obſcœne ſpectacles of their *Floralia*, being more awed by the Authority of the man, then allured by the pleaſure of the playes.

Liv. l. 39. Val. Max. l. 2. c. 10. Vid. etiam l. 4. c. 5.

Likewiſe buſie and *Garrulous* men, becauſe they enquire into our Crimes, and having diſcloſed, do divulge them. For which cauſe we feare in this caſe the *Multitude*, becauſe an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appeares the more deformed. As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves : a little Water drawn into a thin ſteeme and vapor, ſeems

Ἀνδιμᾶ non Pompeium modo ſed πᾶσας ἢ πᾶσάδας. l. Ep. Art. l. 7. c. 1

wider then it was at first: so even lesser crimes being multiplyed through the mouthes of many, doe grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a mans name. For he is presumed to be void either of wisedome or modesty, that doth not feare many Eyes. We feare *Innocent* and Vertuous men, their presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, because *Examples* have a proportionable Authority over the heart of man, as *Lawes* have, which wee doe not trespasse without feare. And therefore the Philosopher adviseth to live alwayes so, as if some grave, and serious and severe person were ever before us, to behave our selves *sub Custode, & Pædagogo*, as under the eye of a Keeper, because such a mans conversation will either regulate ours, or disgrace it. Vicious men doe the lesse feare one another, by how much they stand in need of mutuall pardon, as we find *Stertorius* (if I forget not) giving those souldiers of the Enemies Army their lives, who had but one eye, he being himselfe *Monophthalmos*.

Sen. Ep. 11. & 25. Cydias orator Athenienſis apud Aristotelem. Rhet. l. 2. c. 6. Et Persæ aduncо naſo præditos in pretio habent quod Cyrus talis eſſet. Plut. Apoph. Aristid. orat. de Parahthegmate.

Againe we feare *Envious* and malevolent persons, because such looke upon our Actions with prejudice; and as *Momus*, when he could not find fau't with the face in the Picture of *Venus*, picked a quarrell at her Slipper: so these men will ever have something either in Substance or Circumstances of our Actions, to misreport and expose to scandall.

Lastly we feare those in this respect, whose *Company* we shall most be used unto; because that leaves

leaves us not time wherein to forget our Errours, or to fortifie our ſelves againſt them. It makes a man live ever under the ſenſe of his Guilt. In which reſpect *Cato major* was wont to ſay, That a man ſhould moſt of all reverence himſelf, becauſe he is ever in his owne ſight and company. *Plut. Apoph Κάτωνος.*

The Fundamentall ground of this Affection, is any evill that hath either *Guilt*, or any kind of *Turpitude* in it, or any ſignes or ſuſpicions thereof, reflecting either on our ſelves, or any of ours, whoſe reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apoſtle telleth us, that all *Sin* is the matter of *Shame*, when it is revived with a right judgement. *What fruit had you then in thoſe things whereof you are now aſhamed.* That which hath *Emptineſſe* in the Beginning, and *Death* in the End, muſt needs have *Shame* in the middle. But though all ſin with reſpect to Gods Eye and Judgement doth cauſe Shame, yet in the Eye of men, thoſe cauſe it moſt which have any notable and more odious *Turpitude* adhering unto them. As either obſcene or ſubdolous, and diſhoneſt actio is when they are detected, forging of Deeds, defacing Records, counterfeiting of Names or Seales, ſuborning of Witneſſes, making uſe of ingenious Profeſſions, as Cloaks to palliate, and Inſtruments to provoke Abuſive and Illiberall practiſes.

Such are all kinde of *Sordid Actions* or Behaviours, as gain raiſed out of deſpicable commodities, (as (a) *Veſpatian* ſet a Vectigall or exciſe upon Piſſe) and the Philoſopher tels us of ſome that made a (b) gaine of the dead. Such are alſo the

a *Sueton. in Veſp. c. 23. vid. Quædam apud Caſaub. in Theo. περὶ μισθ. Vid. Orat. Bunduicæ apud Dion. l. 62.*

b *Ἀποκομιδὴ ἀπὸ νεκρῶν. Vid. de ea. Theophraſt.*

Livings which by sordid Ministers, Panders, Bawdes, Curtezans, (a) Parasites, Juglers (b) Delators, Cheaters, Sharks, and shifting Companions make unto themselves, such the Poets miser.

——— c *Populus me sibilat at mihi plaudo*
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arcâ.

The people hisse me all abroad,
But I at home my selfe applaud,
When in my Coffers I behold,
That which none hisse at, heaps of Gold.

Many particular Causes there are which are apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall briefly naine; as,

First *Sloth*, and shrinking from such labour, which those that are better, older, weaker, more delicate then our selves doe willingly undergoe. Thus *Menelaus* in the Poet seeing the Grecians as fearfull to undertake a single combat with *Hector*, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid their Cowardize.

μαλακία ἀνανδρία

Ὦμοι ἀπειλητῆρε, Ἀχαιΐδες οὐκέτ' Ἀχαιοί, &c.

What Grecian soldiers turn'd to Grecian dames?
That can digest so great, so many shames?
What not a man of Greece (O foule disgrace)
Dare meet or look proud Hector *in the face?*
Well, sit you downe Inglorious, heartlesse men,
Turn'd to your first water and earth: yet then

Ile

a *Vid. Desid. Herald. digres. l. 1. c. 21.*
b *Vid. Plin. Paneg. Tacit. Annal. 4.*
c *Horat. l. 1. Sat. 1. Vid. Plaut. Aulul. Act. 2. Theophrast.* περὶ Μικρολογίας.

Iliad. κ. 97. O vere Phrygiæ neq; enim Phryges. Ænead. 9.

Ile take up Armes; for victories last end,
Doth not on Our, But Divine will depend.

In like manner *Hector* rebuketh the baseneſſe of *Paris* in flying from *Menelaus*.

Ὦ ἄνοι χείπμι κίδαιρις, τὸν δᾶρ Ἀφροδίτης, &c.

Iliad. γ. ς. λαὸν ὀχτῶ, α *Vocat lapides quibus Adulter ex Antiquo more obrui debuiſſet.* Μὴ πυξὰ. *Quam iniquè comparatum eſt iis qui minus habent, ut ſemper aliquid addant ditioribus. Terent. Phorm.*

Trim Warriour, tell me what thy Lute can do,
What Venus *Graces, comely haire, ſweet hew,*
When thou ſhalt wallow in the duſt? Th' art far
Fitter to weare Stone-coat *then Coat of War.*

Againe, any thing which argueth *puſillanimity* or littleneſſe of mind is a juſt ground of ſhame, as to recount curteſies & upbraid them, & therefore he ſaid in *Seneca*; *Non tanti eſt vixiſſe.* That his life was leſſe worth, then to be ſo valued to him, in dayly Exprobations, and that his bloud with leſſe trouble to him might have been let out at his veines then to be every day diſordered, and called up into his face; To receive continuall gifts, and be ever craving from our Inferiours, burthenſome to thoſe who can leſſe beare it.

Hereunto referre all *Light* ludicrous and *ridiculous* behaviour, wherein if a grave or ſerious man be deprehended, it rendereth him ſuſpected of a mind that can flag and leſſen, and therefore *Ageſilaus* being ſo taken playing with his childe made his Apologie for it, and deſired his friend not to think light of him, till he had children of his owne, for love will teach greatneſſe of minde to diſcend.

Plutarch. Apoph. Lacon. παιδιὰ *Vid. Plutarch. & Theophraſt: Terent. Eunuchum Act. 2. Scen. 2. Act. 1. Scen. 7. & Plauti Artotrogum in milit. Glor.*

Alſo all ſordid Arts of *Flatterie*, which prai-

ſeth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complyeth, transformeth it ſelfe to all ſhapes to get a living, and like Crowes pulleth out mens eyes with praiſes, that it may after more ſecurely make a prey of them, *Fœdum crimen ſervitutis*, as the Hiſtorian well calls it, A ſervile and filthy Crime.

Any thing which argueth *vanity*, and windineſſe of mind, as (*a*) Arrogance, and vain-glorious Oſtentation, aſcribing to our ſelves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning, lands, activements of other men, as he who called all the ſhips in the harbour at Athens his owne. *Labore alieno magnam partam gloriam verbis ſæpè in ſe tranſmovet.* Whereunto belong Abſurd and unuſuall Affectations in words or faſhions, mimicall and fantaſticall geſticulations, frothy and ſuperficiall Complements, Strange and exoticke Habits, which are uſually the ſcum of Light, and unſetled minds, and ever expoſe them to contempt. Inſomuch that *Alexander* himſelf eſcaped not the Imputation of Levity, when he followed the faſhions of thoſe Countreys which he had ſubdued.

Misfortune and decay in the outward Ornaments of Life, for it is not in mens fortunes as in their monuments, wherein (*b*) Ruine doth many times conciliate Reverence.

Nil habet infelix Paupertas durius in ſe
Quam quod ridiculos homines facit ——

a *vid. Theoph. περὶ ἀλαζονείας; Plauti Mili. Glor. Ariſt. Ethic. l. 4. c. 13. Mal. Vax. l. 9. c. 15. Plutarch l. de Alex. fortuna. ἀτυχία.*

b *Curios jam dimidios naſumq; minorem Corvini & Galbam auriculis, naſoq; carentem. Iuvenal.*

Un-

Unhappy Poverty hath nothing worſe,
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of ſunke and broken eſtates are aſhamed to live there, where they have been formerly in Credit and Eſtimation, as *Hecuba* complaining in the Tragedy.

Ὅτῳ γὰρ ἄφαλὼς δύλυχρόσ' αἰδὼς ἐμὶ ἔχει
Ἐν τῷδι πότμῳ πυγχάνω· ἴν εἰμι γυῶ, &c.

In this my broken and dejected caſe,
Pardon me, if I ſhame to ſhew my face
To Polemneſtor, *whoſe Eyes once have ſeen*
Me, a now ſpoyled Captive, then a Queen.

Eurip. in Hæc. Magnum dolorem habet unde cum honore deceſſeris eodem cum ignominia reverti. Cic. pro l. Muræna.

Ἀχνύσαιμι χρόνος δ' ὑφέλοι τὸ μέγιον καὶ ὀνείδεα πείσθαι. *Iliad. β.*

Artium peccata artificibus pudori ſunt, &c. ---- *Sen. Ep. 97.*

Againe, *Ignorance* and Ineptitude in our owne proper functions, and miſcarriage in our owne Arts and profeſſions, is an Exprobration, either of indiligence, or weakneſſe. As want of proficiency in a Student, of Elocution in an Orator, of Military wiſedome in a Souldier, &c. And therefore a Phyſitian will ſeldome ſtay to ſee his Patient buried, he uſually departs before the ſicke man, becauſe Funerals are *Convicia Medicorum.* Yet all Ignorance is not matter of diſgrace, for ſome things there are below the inquiry, or Studies of ſome men. And therefore though *Tully* tels us that when *Themiſtocles* declined the Lute, he was eſteemed more ignorant then became a perſon of quality, yet it was a brave Apology which hee made for himſelfe, That

Cic. Tuſc. qu. l. 1.

That though he knew not to handle a Lute, yet he knew to conquer a City. And *Gelo* when others after a Feaſt ſang to an inſtrument, called for his great Horſe, and did excellently mannage that. And as it was a cautelous Anſwer which *Favorinus* gave touching *Adrian* the Emperour, who had cenſured him in his own profeſſion of Grammar; That he durſt not be learneder then he who commanded thirty legions; ſo it was a truer anſwer which another Artificer gave in the like caſe unto a Prince: God forbid Sir, that you ſhould know things of ſo meane a quality, better then I who owe my ſubſiſtence unto them.

Plut. na. Alitèr Iphicrates apud Plutarch.

Spartian in Adrian.

Plutarch.

πλειοφραγμοσύνη.

And as Ignorance in our owne, ſo *Intruſion* and Uſurpation of other mens offices, is a ground of ſhame, eſpecially if they be ſuch as wherein we deſcend below the dignity of our places or profeſſions, as when men of liberall condition apply themſelves unto the buſineſſe of ſordid perſons. For every man is intruſted with the Dignity of his place, he is to be not only the poſſeſſor, but the Protector of it, which when he betrayes, it doth juſtly revenge it ſelfe upon him with contempt and diſgrace.

Dignitas in indigno, ornamentum in Luto. Salv. de Gub. lib. 4.

Againe, any notorious externall *Deformities*, and *Dehoneſtamenta corporis*, eſpecially if there be any thing of our owne, either guilt or ſervility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill ſhape and worſe conditions of *Therſites*, are ſaid to looke on him with deriſion and laughter, then when they had other occaſions of ſadneſſe. And when *Vlyſſes* his companions were by *Circe* tranſ-

Sidon. Apoll. 3. Ep. 13. Iliad. β. Vid. Voſſ. Rhet. par. 1. p. 78, 79. Odyſſ. α. Senec. de Ira. l. 3. c. 17. 29.

transformed into ſhape of Swine, they wept and were aſhamed of their owne deformities. And the Poet deſcribeth *Deiphobus* whom *Menelaus* had diſmembred.

——*Pavitatem & dira tegentem*
Supplicia. Æneid. 6.

Afraid of being known, carefull to hide
His mangled wounds, that they might not be (ſpide.

And we finde how carefull men were to cover any of theſe notes and prints of infamy, or ſervility, which perſons either extremely vicious, or in bondage, were marked withall, for infamous or ſervile perſons were wont ſo to be branded. *Vid. Athenæum lib. 6. Val. Max. l. 6. c. 8. Sect. 7. Sueton. Calig. c 27. Lipſ. l. 2. Elect. c. 15.*

Many times *Greatneſſe of Minde* is a cauſe of Shame, either for ſomething which ſuch a man ſuffereth in himſelfe, or in thoſe that are neare unto him, ſuch was that of the Romanes, *Ad furcas Caudinas*, of which the Hiſtorian gives this obſervation.

Their obſtinate ſilence, Eyes faſtned to the Earth, Eares refuſing all comfort, Faces aſhamed to behold the light, were certaine Evidences of a minde deeply reſolved upon Revenge. And of *Maximinus*, of whom the Hiſtorian telleth us, that out of a Deſire to conceal his Ignoble birth, he ſlew all, even the beſt of his friends, which were Conſcious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often ſuffer conflicts with this

Silentium obſtinatum, fixi in terram oculi, ſurda ad omnia ſolatia aures & pudor intuendæ lucis, ingentem molē irarum ex alto animo cientis indicia erant. Liv. l. 9. Capit. 10. Max.

Passion of shame, when penury denies that which Luxury and Pride demands.

Iuvenal. —*Quid enim majore Cachinno*
Excipitur vulgi quam pauper Apicius?

Who without much irrision can endure,
To see a Begger a proud Epicure?

Pet. Victor. in Artit. Rhet. l. 2. Againe, Acquaintance and *Intimacy* with *Infamous* persons is noted by the Philosopher amongst the Grounds of shame, and therefore it was upbraided unto *Plato*, that *Calippus* the Murtherer of his hoste had been bread in his Schoole; and to *Socrates*, that he was resorted unto by *Alcibiades*, a factious and turbulent Citizen; and to *Themistocles* that he held correspondence, and intelligence with *Pausanius* a Traitour; and wee finde how fatall the favour of *Seianus* after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man not onely out of Indignation, but out of feare too cryed out.

Plutarch. l. de capiend. ex. Hostib utilitate. Tacit. Annal. l. 5. c. 6.

Iuvenal. Sat. 10. —*Nunquam si quid mihi credis amavi*
Hunc hominem.

Such being the impotent and immoderate Passions of many men to trample on the same persons in their calamity, whom in their greatnesse they almost adored, as he said,

Ἀρὶς πεσόντας πᾶς ἀνὴρ ξυλάσσεται.

When

When the Oake is fallen that ſtood,
Then every man will gather wood.

Laſtly, not onely things ſhamefull in themſelves, but ſuch as are ſignes, and Intimations of them doe uſually beget this affection. As *Æſchinus* in the Comædian, bluſhed when he ſaw his Father knock at the doore of an infamous woman, becauſe it was a token of a vicious intention. And therefore *Cæſar* was wont to ſay, That hee would have thoſe that belonged unto him free, as well from *Suſpition*, as from *Crime*; for we ſhall never finde that a man who is tender of his *Conſcience* will be prodigall of his *Credit*; and he who is truly fearefull of incurring cenſure from himſelfe by the Guilt of a Crime, will in ſome propotion be fearfull of incurring cenſure from others by the ſhew and ſuſpition of it: for as a Good Conſcience is a Feaſt to give a man a cheerfull heart; ſo a good name is an Oyntment to give him a cheerfull Countenance

Teren. Adelph.

Sueton. in Cæſar.

There is a Twofold ſhame, The one *Vertuous*, as *Diogenes* was wont to ſay, That Bluſhing was the colour of Vertue, The other *Vicious*, and that either out of *Cruelty*, as *Tacitus* and *Seneca* obſerve of *Domitian*, that he was never more to be feared then when he bluſhed, Or elſe out of *Cowardize*, when a man hath not ſtrength enough of Countenance, to out-face and withſtand a Vicious ſolicitation, as it was ſaid of the men of Aſia, that they had out of tenderneſſe of face, expoſed themſelves

Τοιοῦτον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι τὸ χρῶμα τῆς ἀρετῆς. *Laert. in Diogene.*

Sævus ille vultus & rubor quo ſe contra pudorem muniebat. Tacit. in Agric.

selves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one Syllable, *No*. It was a better Resolution, that of *Zenophanes*, who being provoked unto some vicious practice, confessed himselfe a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to doe dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherewith *Plutarch* beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same Argument. That as Thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signes of an Excellent Ground wherein they grow: so shamefastnesse though many times a weakenesse, and betrayer of the Minde, is yet generally an Argument of a soule ingenuously and vertuously disposed.

Quidam nunquam magis quam cum erubuerint Timendi sunt, quasi omnem verecundiam effuderint. Sylla tunc erat violentissimus cum faciem ejus sanguis invaserat. Sen. Epist. 11. Plut de vil. Pudore.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Of the affection of Anger. The Distinctions of it. The Fundamentall Cause thereof, Contempt. Three kindes of Contempt, Dis-estimation, Disappointment, Calumnie.

I Now proceed to the last of the Passions, *Anger*, whereof, in it selfe a subject of large Discourse, yet being every where obvious, I shall not speak much. I intend not therefore distinctly to handle the severall kindes of this Passion, which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* hath given us, (*a*) which are a sharp Anger, and an hard or Knotty Anger. And Saint *Paul* who likewise give us Three kinds of it: Whereof the first I may call a (*b*) close and buried anger, which he names bitternesse, the other a violent (*c*) burning Anger, which he calls *Wrath*, and the last a Desiring and pursuing Anger, which seemeth to have it's (*d*) derivation from a word which signifies to desire, & therfore is defined by *Aristotle* to (*a*) be ὄρεξις, & by the (*b*) Stoicks ἐπιθυμία, words of prosecution and pursute. For these differ not Essentially or formally amongst themselves, but onely in diversitie of Degrees, and in order to the diverse constitutions of the

a *Eth. l.* 4. *c.* b' Ὀργὴ θύμος μῆνις κότος. *Vid. Damas. de Orthod fid. l.* 2. *c.* 16. *Cæl. Rhod. l.* 12. *c.* 7. *Est autem* μῆνις *memor. Ira* κότος *Ira inveterata, plumbea, alta mente reposita, vindicta occasionem tacitè expectans* μηλόπωδης, ἰχὼ κοτὴ ὅππα πύτον τιλέσσαι Illiad. a. c *Non vultu alienatus, non verbis commotior, adeo illum contiderat. Tacit. de Tibe. Annal. l.* 2. d *Severus, commotione animi Stomachi Choleram evomere solebat. Ælius Lampid. in Severo.*

Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habites wherewith they are joyned.

In which reſpects wee might obſerve ſeverall other ſhapes of this Affection. For there is the (*a*) Anger of a Waſpe, which is an Haſty, Pettiſh, and Fretfull Anger, proceeding from a Nature (*b*) Leavend and habituated with Choler, which is preſently ſtirred and provoked. And there is the Anger of a (*c*) Lion, which is ſlow, but ſtrong and ſevere, thus Elegantly deſcribed by (*d*) *Homer*.

——— Ὁ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἀτίζων
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ὅτε κεν τις ἀρηιδοκὸν, αἰχμῇσιν
σῆμα βαλὼν ἴαλλε τε χερσὶν, ὅθεί δ' ἀφέῃς ὀδύνας
γίγνεται, &c.

He firſt walkes by with ſkorne, but when ſwift youth,
Vrge him with Darts, then with devouring mouth
He turnes againe, and at his lips is ſeene
A boyling foame, while his ſtout heart within
Rouſeth it ſelfe with (a) *groanes: and raund about*
His Tayle, beating, his ſides and loynes, cals out
And wakeneth proud Revenge: Thus ſtirr'd he flies
Right on with red and fiery ſparkling eyes
To kill or to be kill'd ———

There is further a Cowardly verball and ridiculous Anger, like that of Whelps, which barke aloud, but run away from the thing which Angers them. Which ſpendeth it ſelfe onely in ſtormes of empty expreſſions, rather pleaſing then puniſhing thoſe whom they light on, and rendring the perſon that uſeth it a very μυρμολυκίων,

or

a *Iliad.* π. 259. *unde Crabrones irritare apud Plaut. Amphit.*

b *Nunc in Fermento tota eſt, ita turget mihi. Plaut. Caſin.*

c *Pectora qui fremitu plerumq; gementes nec capere Irarum fluctus in pectore poſſunt. Lucr. l. 3.*

d *Iliad.* υ. 167.

a *Dolor Excitat Iras. Æneid. 2. Immaniq; oculos infecerat Irâ. Claud. Multa in irâ terribilia & Ridicula Plut.*

or Skarre Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like *Geta* in the Comædian.

Ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, prosternerem. Terent. Adelph. Act. 3. Scen. 2.

There is a grave and serious Anger, like that of *Agamemnon*. An insolent and boasting Anger, like that of *Achilles*. A sullen and stubborne Anger, like that of the (a) Roman Army disgracefully used by the Samnitians. A cruell and raging Anger, like that of *Scylla*, who in an excesse of fury, vomited up blood and dyed. And thus *Saul* is said to (b) have breathed out threatnings, and bin exceeding mad against the Church. A Revengefull and impatient Anger, as that of (c) *Cambises*, who being reproved by *Prexaspes* for his Drunkennesse, confuted the reproofe with this act of Cruelty, he shot the sonne of his Reproover thorow the heart, to proove the steadinesse of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who seeing *Cn. Flavius*, a man of meane Condition, advanced to the Prætorship, threw away their golden Rings, (the signes of their honour) to testifie their just Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expresseth the like against *Menas*, made of a Slave a Freeman by *Pompey*.

Videsne Sacram metientem te viam
Cum bis ter ulnarum toga?
Vt ora vertat huc & huc euntium
Liberrima Indignatio? *Sectus*

Iliad. ε.

a Liv. lib. 9. Val. Max. l. 9. cap. 3.
b Act 9. 1. 26. 11. Ira spirat. sanguinem. Senec. Thyest. Δεμὼ δ' ἅτα ῥινας μίνυς. Homer. ἢ ἐι ἀεί δεμεῖα χολὰ πολὶ ῥινι κρα ϑηται. Theocrit. Idyl. 1. Irat Cadat naso rugosaq; Sanna. Pers. Satyr. 5.
c Herodot. Thalia. Val. Max. l. 9. c. 3. Sect. 3. Plin. lib. 33. cap. 1. Horat. Epod. Od. 4.

Sectus flagellis hic triumviralibus
Præconis ad fastidium,
Arat Falerni mille fundi jugera
Et Appiam Manis terit.

When thou paceſt up and downe
In thy long Gowne,
Seeſt thou how the people fret
To ſee thee let?
How with Indignation bold,
They cannot hold
To ſee a man, ſo lately plow'd
With ſcourges low'd,
Untill at length the weary Cryer
Began to tyre,
Dreſſing a thouſand Acres now
With Horſe and Plow?

Laſtly, an Anger of Emulation, or a diſpleaſure againſt our ſelves for comming ſhort by our negligence of the perfections of other men whom haply by induſtry we might have equalled. As *Themiſtocles* profeſſed that the Trophie of *Miltiades* would not ſuffer him to ſleep. And *Cæſar* wept when he read the atchievements of *Alexander*, as having not at his age done any memorable thing. And *Thucydides* hearing *Herodotus* recite a Hiſtory which he had written, brake forth into a ſtrange paſſion of weeping, which the Hiſtorian eſpying thus comforted his Father, you are a happy man to be the Father of ſuch a Son, Ὅς ἀγαθῶν ἴχνη τὴν ψυχὴν φέρει τὰ μαθήματα, who is carried with ſuch a vehement affection unto Learning.

Plut. Apotheg.

Plut. in Cæſare.

Suidas in Thucidide.

But

But to passe over these particulars, I shall in the generall content my selfe with a briefe Consideration of the Causes and Effects of this Passion.

The Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of our selves. Whether it be disestimation and undervaluing of a mans person, or disappointment of his purposes, or slandring his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him, or any of these particulars being impaired (if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) doe work not only Anxiety and Griefe (which is a motion of flight) but hope also and desire to ease it selfe, if not in the recovery of its own losse, yet in the comfort of another mans: For Calamity (as the Historian speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant, *Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit alieno.* When it feels it self wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by justice or revenge to please it selfe in retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himselfe: so it is his particular desire also, being *Animal Sociale & Politicum*, to be loved by others; because hereby that love of himselfe, which proceedeth from Judgment and Reason, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly beleeve that, whereunto he hath farther authority to perswade him. And therefore though Love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a Mans owne, or a Friends actions and behavtour; yet that Love, which is not blind and furi-

Despectus tibi sum, nec quæ sim quæris Alexi.
At Ego quæ Divûm incedo Regina, Iovisq;
Et Soror & Conjux, unâ cum gente tot annos
Bella gero, & quisquam numen Iunonis adoret
Præterea. Ænead. 1.
Q. Curt.
Καὶ μὴ δοκῶμεν ἀλεξῆσαι ἀνιώμεθα ἐκ ἀντίσιον αὖδας ἔν λυπώμεθα.
Sophoc. Ajax.
Εἰδὼ κακὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἐκλύειν ἀνὴρ μεῖζον ἀχθος.
Hesiod. ἔργ. l. 2.
Si mihi pergit, quæ vult dicere, ea quæ non vult audiet. Terent. Andr.

ous, will be ever ready to submit it self unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to it selfe, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.

Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friends person or parts, shall find either of them by others sleighted and despised; from whose joynt-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therehence ariseth not only a * *Griefe* to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalued; but withall a * *Desire* to make known unto the persons, who thus contemne him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, *Revenge* (for all these may be the instruments of our *Anger*) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits it selfe to the government of Reason, is then alwayes alowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemne us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and ambition in our selves, which makes us greedy of more honour fromo thers, than their judgements or our owne worth suffers them to afford us,

To this branch of Contempt may be referred *Forgetfulnesse* of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection: For

Omnia

* *Ignoscunt Iræ duris dolor ossibus ardet. Ænead 9. Affectus nunquam sine tormento sui violentus, quia dolorem cum inferre vult, patitur, &c. Val. Max. l. 9. c. 3. Dolor addidit Iram: Ovid. Met. 12.*

* *Spes addita suscitat Iras. Ænead. 10.*

Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt, saith *Tully*: and *Aristotle* to the same purpose. Those things which wee doe respect, doe not lye hid and out of our sight.

Next, hither may be referred al *Vngratefull* persons, who sleight those favours which they have received from other mens bounties, and out of a swelling and height of stomack, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations, but desire to receive benefits, as Corrupt men take Bribes in the darke, and behinde their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their owne eyes might be witnesses unto it: For as *Tacitus* speaks, *Gratia oneri habetur*, such is the pride of some men, that they disdaine not to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindenesse. And therefore *Vbi multum beneficia antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur*, saith the same Author, When they find themselves overloaden with Love, the best requitall which their high minds can afford, is hatred: which cannot but worke a double *Anger*; an Anger against our selves and our owne weakenesse in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which so basely entertained them.

Ejectum, littore egentem Excepi, & regni demens in parte locavi; Amissam classem, Socios à morte reduxi: Heu furiis incensa feror, &c. Ænead. 4.

Hither also we may referre those Locked and Close men, who even to their friends, are so reserved, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose Judgement or Trust they might commit themselves

Hitherto likewise are referred Acceptation of persons in equallity of merit with unequall respect,

spect, negligence of outward ceremony and behaviour, and generally what ever else may worke an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first Fundamentall Cause was an *Hindering* of the projects and purposes of another, which is not onely a *Privative* (as the former) but a *Positive* and reall Injury, which includes that other, and addes unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; not an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to incense nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I think I may well compare to a Banke, and to a Bridge, or some other stops to a river in his course: Whereof the former doth *Confine* the river, and not *Oppose* it, as not hindring it in its direct and naturall motion (which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion Laterall and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Later resisting the naturall course of the streame in its owne Chanell, and standing directly crosse, where the Water should passe, makes it not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the meane time works in it great tumult and noise.

Spumans, & fervens, & ab Obice Savior ibit.

It

It foames and boyles, and with a raging force,
Fights with all Obstacles that stop its course.

So of these two Degrees of *Contempt* in *Anger*; the former as being only a *Confining* and Limiting Contempt, which shuts up a mans worth within too narrow and strait a judgement, workes indeed a secret swelling of the Heart with Indignation at the conceipt of such disesteeme; but this breaks not out into that clamour (as S. *Paul* cals it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which ariseth out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.

Unto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceedings, which tends to the prejudice and disappointing of any mans end; whether it be by closenes and undermining, as cheats and couzenages in the preventing of lawfull, or by other politick wisedome in hindering unlawfull ends; or whether by open and professed Opposition, as in matters of Emulation, Competition, Commodity, and the like; or lastly, whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desire to be undiscerned. And therefore *Tacitus* reckoning the ambiguous and close speeches of the Emperour *Tiberius*, sayes that it was *Vnicus Patrum metus si intelligere viderentur*, the Senate feared nothing more then to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after: *Eò acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret*, nothing did more exasperate him than to

Quem ego credo manibus, pedibusq; obnixè omnia facturum magis id adeo nisi ut incommodet quã, &c. Terent. And. Act. 1. Sc. 1.

Annal. l. 1.

see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppresse and dissemble. Both which were true in *Scaurus*, one of the Senatours, who adventuring to Collect *Tiberius* his willingnesse of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his Tribunitiall Authority the relation thereof by the Consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But of all Contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that I meane, which immediately violates our *Reputation* and Good name; because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a Man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and Eares of the World; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Desire; the one of *Perfecting*, the other of *Perpetuating* himselfe: which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first Father; the honour of *Integrity* in Goodnes, and the honour of *Immunity* from Corruption: so there may be from the violation of these sundry degrees of Anger, or any other burthensome Passion wrought in us. But when in injury we finde them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued; but our name and memory (which belong to our preservation) tainted likewise, we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates, either to weakenesse or perfection: But of this Fundamentall cause of Anger enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other Cauſes of Anger: firſt in regard of him that ſuffers wrong; Excellency, Weakneſſe, ſtrong Deſires, Suſpicion. Next in regard of him who doth it; Baſeneſſe, Impudence, Neerneſſe, Freedome of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effect of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulſion of Reaſon, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Paſſion.

THoſe which follow are more Accidentall: whereof ſome may be conſidered *ex parte Patient*, on the part of him that ſuffers; and ſome *ex parte Inferentis Injuriam*, on the part of him that doth the Injury. Touching the patient or ſubject of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to *Anger*, upon ſuppoſition of the Fundamentall Cauſe, *Contempt*: and the firſt of theſe is *Excellency*, whether Inward from *Nature*, or Accidentall from *Fortune*: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuſe, as well perceiving that all Injury implies ſome degree both of *Impotency* in the

Ἀγανακτῶσι δὲ τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι. *Ariſt.*

Θυμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔπεται δυσὶ πρώτοις δαλεῖται. *Iliad. α.*

the *Patient*, and of *Excellency* (at least conceited) in the Agent. As *Aristotle* speaks, ὁ πρίχου οἰονται ὑβριζοντες, that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their owne *Excellency*, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that minde which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the Poet intimates in those words:

Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.

Ænead. 1.

——— Manet altâ mente repostum
Iudicium Paridis, Spretæq; injuria formæ.

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred
To see their Beauties undervalued
By a weak wanton Judgement.

It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of *Power* and *Wisedome* to see a weake and wanton Judgment give Beauty the precedence in their emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possesse a man with Griefe and Fury, the one example of *Achitophel* alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsell, when he was too low to revenge himself on *Absalon*, executed his Anger on his own neck.

The second Qualification of the subject is *Weakneſſe* and Defect, when the mind finds it selfe assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which *Aristotle* hath observed, when he tels us, that * *Sicke* men, Poore men and Lovers are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a paine, and a greater contempt to rub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new-

* *Arist. Rh. l. 2. Plin. nat. hist. 1. l. 22. c. 24.* Ἔστι γὰρ πικρὸν καὶ οἷς ἀεὶ ἕλκεα νοτὶ ῥινὶ καθίλλει. *De pane fess. Theocr. Idyl. 1.*

new. That injury which proceeds against men of high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep as that which is exercised upon open and naked weakneſſe: becauſe the former proceeds only from ſtrife and emulation; but the other from inſultation and pride: the one is only a diſeſteeme; but the other a contumely and exprobation: the one is a conflict of judgements, but the other a conflict of paſſions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unleſſe, as ſometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from Baſeneſſe and Ignorance) is an injury from Worth alſo: but a Neglect, and deſpiſing men already downe, is an injury from ſtomacke and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour ſo much to cleere it ſelfe from the Imputation, as to revenge it ſelfe for it.

Another reaſon why *Weakneſſe* the better diſpoſeth a man to Anger, may be, becauſe ſuch men are moſt *Tender* to feele an injury, moſt *Suſpitious* to feare it, and moſt *Interpreting* to over-judge it. All which being circumſtances of aggravation to increaſe a wrong, are likewiſe good means to adde degrees and heat unto our Paſſion.

Laſtly, to give a reaſon of both theſe two former cauſes together, it may be a Diſappointment and Fruſtrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weake and defective, expect Compaſſion to cover, and not Pride to mocke, and ſo double their wounds: and both theſe are in ſome ſort debts of Nature,

Omnes quibus res ſunt minus fecundæ, magis ſũt, neſcio quomodo ſuſpitioſi, ad contumeliam omnia accipiũt, magis propter ſuam impotentiam ſe ſemper credunt negligi. Ter. Adolph. Act. 4. Sc. 3.

Pueri inter ſe quam pro levibus noxiis ita gerunt? quapropter? quia enim qui eos gubernat animus infirmum gerunt. Ide. Hecyr. Act. 3. Sc. 1.

——*Minuti ſemper, & infirmi eſt animi exiguiq; voluptas ultio.* Juven. Sat. 13.

Iracundiores ſunt incolumibus languidi, fœminæ maribus, &c. Amm. Mar. l. 27. Vid. Cauſin. de Eloq. l. 8. c. 29. Plutarch. Περὶ ἀοργησίας. Sophoc. Ajax. Sen. de Ira. l. 2. c. 21.

it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover Nakedness: and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in our selves; so neither to rejoyce or think evill of another: and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it selfe lawfull.

Unto this particular of *Weakness* we may also reduce that which the Grammarian hath observed on *Virgill*, *Plus Irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui irascimur*, Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therfore the chaining up of Woolves and Mastives enrageth them, because it restraineth them, which the Poet hath excellently described:

Ænead. 9.

At veluti pleno Lupus insidiatus ovili,
Cum fremit ad caulos, ventos perpessus & imbres
Nocte super media: tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent. Ille asper & improbus irâ
Sævit in absentes, collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longo rabies, & sicca sanguine fauces.
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castra tuenti
Ignescunt Iræ, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.

(whet,
As a fierce Woolf with winds, storms, midnight,
When in close folds the secure lambs do bleat,
Barks at his absent prey with the more Ire,
When rag'd and deceiv'd Hunger doth him tyre.
So *Rutilus* seeing his foes all safe,
Doth vex and boile with the more burning chafe

For

For it is a great torment to an Enemy, when he can finde no in-let nor advantage against him whom he hates.

Vid. Plut. de capiend. ex host. utilitat.

Another cause of Anger may be *strong Desires*: For alwaies the vaster and exacter our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therfore as the Philosopher notes, Luxurious men are usually transported with Anger, because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures: and hence as *Plutarch* observes, men are usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant: as the Country-man with his Bayliffe; or an Epicure with his Cooke; or a Lover with his Corrivall; because all these crosse men in that which they most Love. Now strength when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excesse; as we see in Winds or Rivers when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.

Οἱ ὀξύχολοι ὡς ἱππάριοι. *Lucian.*

Rhet. l. 10.

De Ira. lib.

The last Qualification of the Subject, wherby he is made more inclinable to this Passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out injury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its Anger may be imployed) to frame occasions unto it selfe. And therefore tis wise advise of *Seneca*, *Non vis esse Iracundus? ne sis Curiosus.* He which is too wise in his judgement on other mens Errours, will be easily too fooliish in the nourishing of his owne Passion: and its commonly seen in matters of censure & suspicion, the more sight and reason goes out, the lesse useth to abide within. Now it is hard for a man,

Sen. de Ira. l. 3. c. 11.

if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find out, either in defects of Nature, or rudenes of custome, habit, education, temper, humour, or the like, some probaple ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, wil prove rather strangenes than injury.

And this is generally a Corruption of Anger: First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastning it selfe there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that Suspition proceeds from Guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it: as it is observed of some reproachfull speeches, which a Senatour was accused to have uttered against the honor of *Tiberius*: *Quia vera erant, dicta credebantur*, His suspitious mind was perswaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custome under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgement; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisdome. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a halse judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualifie the *Agent*, or him that worketh the injury; and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these generall ones.

First

First *Baseneſe*, which workes a double cauſe of Anger: One for an injury of Omiſſion, in neglecting thoſe reſpects which are required in men of meane and inferiour ranke towards their ſuperiours: Another for a poſitive enquiry in the evill exerciſed againſt them. And many times the former alone is a cauſe of Anger, without the latter: For this diſtance of perſons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, inſomuch that thoſe demeanors, which are commendable and plauſible toward our equals, as rude and irreverend toward thoſe that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to be ſet out ſo terrible unto us; becauſe of the infinite diſtance between the Unmeaſurable Glory of the Maker of the World, and the baſeneſſe of ſinners. And therefore the compariſon which uſeth to be made for the defence of Veniall ſins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitly more merciſull than men, ſhould yet be offended at that which a mans neighbour would pardon him for, as a fooliſh angry word, or the ſtealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reaſon: becauſe between man and man there is a Communityb oth in nature and weakneſſe; and therefore,

Hanc veniam petimusq; damusq; viciſſim.

Becauſe we Both our Errours have,
We pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an Argument of infinite Inſolence

in a vile Creature for feeding it own Corruption and selfe-love in a matter of no value, to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.

The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raise the Passion, is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons hereof may be:

First, because as *Aristotle* observes, all Impudence is joyned with some Contempt, which is the Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger.

Secondly, because all Impudence is bold, stiffe and contentious, which are all incitements to this Passion. For as shame being a degree of Feare works an acknowledgement of our owne weakenesse; and therefore a submission to the power we have provoked, which (as *Aristotle* observes) procureth from beasts themselves lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary Effect.

Rhet. l. 2, c. 3. Corpora magnanimo satis est prostrare Leoni. Pugna suum finem, cum jacet hostis habet. Ovid. Trist. lib. 3, Eleg. 5.

Thirdly, those things which we Impudently do, we do willingly likewise. And therefore we shal observe in the Scripture, how reigning sins, that is, those which are done with greedinesse of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of Stubbornnesse, Rebellion, whorish Fore-head, Brasse, and Yron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reasons are,

First, because a mans *Power* is in his *Will*: but

Passions

Passions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the easier borne withall.

Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (such as I take most of Impudence to be) there are required *Antecedenter*, Deliberation, Approbation, & Assent, & *Consequenter*, Resolution, Perseverance, & Constancy. All which, as they take away the two principal conditions required unto Lenity, Confession and Repentance; so likewise doe they adde much to the weight of an injury: because an action which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole Man, and imploys, as a perfect consent thereunto; so a perfect and compleat enmity toward the person offended thereby: Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are those of the will, led by an ignorant; or those of Passion, led by a traduced Understanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an Unjoynted and Paralyticke part, which follows not the motion of a stayed reason; and therefore as they proceed from more disorder in our selves, so doe they work lesse in the party offended.

Another thing which may raise and nourish this Passion, is any degree of *neer Relation* between the parties; whether it be Naturall by Consanguinity; or Morall, by Society, Liberality, or any other friendship. For as it is prodigious in the Body Naturall to see one member wrong & provoke another: so in Vnions Civill or Morall, it is strangely offensive to make a devulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us by

Sen. de Ira. l. 2. c. 31.

by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or * strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

* Job 19.19. Zach. 13.6. Psal. 41.9. 55.12.

And the reason why this difference between men neerly referring each other should worke a greater Anger between them, is: First, because herein we may find that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of expectation: For in this case, we expect Sympathy and not Division. Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of dis-joyning or Divulsion of things before joyned: there therefore, where is the greatest Union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation: as in the Body, the Divulsion of Soule is more horrible than of an Arme, or some other member; because the one is an Essentiall, the other only an Integrall Union; and so it is with those who are by bloud or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.

Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great freedome and indiscreet use of speech; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke: For as *Solomons* speech is true, *Mollis responsio frangit Iram*, a soft answer pacifies wrath: so on the contrary it is true likewise, *Dura Correptio unit Iram*; that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourish'd than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh; because Speech is to Anger, like Tears

to

to Griefe, a ſpending and venting of it, yet alwayes in another, unto whom we miniſter further matter of offence. To which purpoſe, is that ſpeech of *Syracides*; *Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.*

Another Cauſe which I ſhall obſerve, is Contention and Difference, whether it be in Opinions or in Inclinations: becauſe this muſt needs be ever joyned with ſome undervaluing of another mans choice and judgement; which if it be not ſeaſoned with much ſobriety, will eaſily induce a man to beleeve, that it proceeds not from Zeale to Truth, but from a humour of Oppoſition, Wherewith many men are ſo farre poſſeſſed, that one muſt hardly dare to ſpeake the truth in their company for feare of endangering it and them. Like *Chryſippus* in *Laertius*, who uſed to boaſt that he often wanted Opinions, but thoſe once gotten he never wanted Arguments and Sophiſmes to defend them.

The laſt cauſe which I ſhall note of this Paſſion is in him, who offends us, his very Abilities, when we ſee them neglected: for this provokes to more diſpleaſure, then naked impotency. Weakneſſe, when it miſcarries, is the object of Pitty: but ſtrength, when it miſcarries, is the object of Anger.

——— ὥς ἄρ᾽ ἔφην·

ἀνδρὶ μαχησόμεθ᾽ ἔμμεν ἐπὶ πολέμοιο μιδήσαι

λυγρὸς ἐὼν, ὑμῖν δὲ τιμησόμεθα περὶ κῆρι. *Illiad.* 11.

I ſhould not blame unworthy and baſe ſpirits
To ſlug and ſhrink from Battell: but for merits
So to forget themſelves, for you to be
Vnlike the men you are, What man can ſee
Such weakneſſe, and not wonder, chide, debate;
Till you your ſelves doe your owne Errours hate!

Unto all theſe wee might adde ſome others which the Philoſopher toucheth, as neglect of our Calamities, or rejoycing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleaſure. Or laſtly, repreſenting the Signes which may bring into minde the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite ſent the parts of his abuſed Concubine up and downe unto the Tribes of Iſrael to move them unto Indignation. So *Antony* in the funerall Oration upon *Iulius Cæſar* produced his Robe ſtained with the bloud which *Brutus* and *Caſſius* had ſhed, to work a deteſtation of that fault in the people.

σήργει οἴ ἔδυς ἄγγλον κακῶν ἴσον. *Vid. quæ de hac re habet Nuncius apud Sophoc. Antig.*

Dion. lib. 44.

Now concerning all theſe cauſes together (becauſe it would be too tedious to gather particular circumſtances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it ariſeth from any of them, is then only Regular and Juſt, when it keeps theſe conditions.

1. Firſt, that it ſtill obſerve proportion and conformity to the rules of Love: otherwiſe it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in fratrem*, not againſt the Crime but the perſon of my Brother: for we know

know the nature of this passion is to be Transient, to goe out from us on our brother and reforme him, not Immanent to worke upon our selves and deforme us: I meane by soyling the habite of Charity, which ought alwayes to remaine inviolate.

2. Secondly, that it keep likewise due proportion unto judgement, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not only to be angry with our brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement then must be true first, that is, cleare, setled, and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the act of Direction or Government, which reacheth unto the Passion.

3. And next it must be a whole judgement: and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives its degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joyned thereunto.

Secondly, it must judge fully of the act of Passion, not only in informing, *quod sit*, that reparation of our selves is lawfull; but *quomodo* too, in the manner and forme how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in it selfe, wants the tongue of judgement to informe it what to doe: So, being blinde, it wants the hand of Judgement to leade it in the doing of it: and this

Ira de Causa est iracundia de vitio.
Μέγεθος ἐστιν ὀργῆς φάρμακον λόγος.

this I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher unto *Augustus*, to repeate over the Alphabet between the Passion and the Revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the minde from the occasion to some other trifle, which is onely to cozen and not to conquer our distemper: and therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of Empericks, which give present ease; but search not into the roote, nor leave such an habit within, as shall in after occasions limit the unrulinesse of such distempers, like those odours which use to raise men out of a fit of the falling sickenesse, but doe not at all cure them of the disease.

Dandum Iræ spatium. Liv. Ita Romani pueros a jurandi levitate cohibentes, prius domo exire. Iubebant ut esset deliberandi spatium. Vid. Plut. qu. Rom. qu. 28. Vid. Plutarch. περὶ ἀοργησ.

Now to speake a word or two of the Effects of this Passion: they are such as are wrought, either in our selves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodyes, or inward which Reflect upon Reason.

Those on the Body are clamour (as Saint *Paul* cals it) in the Tongue, Tumor and Inflammation in the Heart, Fire in the Eyes, and Fiercenesse and Paleneſse in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which, depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be Governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of those alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely the testification of our just displeasures

sures at an offence received, and the inlivning or sharpening of us (if occasion require) to the prosecution of further lawfull redresse; for though I would not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turne his face into a torment punishing himselfe as much with Deformity, as his adversary with feare, yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politique and stomack Anger, which cunningly shrouds it selfe under a calme and serene countenance; which being unnaturall to this passion (whose property it is; *Non insidiari sed palàm agere*, not to worke by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.

Vid. Senec. de Ira, lib. 2. c. 35. Vos quoq; si mediâ speculum spectetis in irâ, cognoscat faciem vix satis ulla suam; Ovid. de Arte Amandi, lib. 3. Vid. Plutarch. Plumbeas iras gerunt. Plaut. Ethic. lib. 7.

The inward effect of this Passion, is an excitation of Reason, to judge of the wrong and meanes of redresse, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministerially and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason; which is to make it a party rather then a Judge.

Ὁι ἰφίκτε πολυλύφρα γὸ χαλεπῆνες.

Which makes sometimes a Wise man breake
Into Distempers wild and weake.

In which ill Office there is not any Passion more busie and fruitfull then this of Anger by reason of it's suddennesse, and of it's violence: both which are strong meanes to smother or

divert Reason, as we see in *Tiberius* himselfe, who though a man of close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions (insomuch as he lived in them and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by *Agrippina*, to a more violent Anger than usuall, his Passion wee see for the time altered his nature. *Et veram occulti pectoris vocem elicuit, Num ideo laederetur, quia non regnaret.* He brake forth into words, strange and unusuall from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not Reigne? which is *Tacitus* his observation upon the Anger of that man.

The last Effect is Expedition and Dexterity in executing those meanes which Reason judgeth needfull for satisfying our selves against the person that hath offended us; wherein it's assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in mans actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one maine corruption is to be avoided, Precipitancy and impatience of Delay, or Attendance on the determinntion of right Reason: which makes it commonly run away with an halfe or a broken judgement. In which respect *Aristotle* in his Ethicks very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away poasting with halfe his errand, and to Dogs, which, as soon as ever they heare a noise, barke presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the doore, or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justnesse of seeking redresse, and then suddenly

Vires injicit ad pericula subeunda. Ethic. lib. 3. c. 11. Θυμὸς σύμφυτον ὅπλον. Vid. *Coel. Rhod. l. 12. c. 53. lib. 7.*

ſuddenly haſtens away without any further liſtening to the rules of *Decorum* and *Iuſtice*, which it ſhould alwayes obſerve in the proſecution therof: Leſt while it is too intent on his own right, it fall into that extreme which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any Paſſion which ſtandeth more in need of *Moderation* than this doth, both becauſe it is one of the frequenteſt which we are troubled with, and the moſt unruly, as that which can over-beare the reſt, and, of all other, hath the leaſt recourſe to [a] Reaſon, being haſty, Impetuous, full of Deſires, Griefe, Self-love, Impatience which ſpareth no [b] perſons, Friends or foes, no things, animate or [c] inanimate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore [d] Grammarians tell us that it hath its name *Ira* from *Ire*, becauſe a man in his *Anger* uſually goeth away from his *Reaſon*, and as his *Anger* ſlackens, he is ſaid, *ad ſe redire*, to returne againe unto himſelfe. And therfore thoſe men in whom Reaſon is moſt predominant, are leaſt tranſported by this affection, and moſt often diſpleaſed with themſelves for it. It was a ſtrange Commendation given to [a] *Theodoſius* Junior, that never any man ſaw him Angry; And ſuch a power had [b] *Lycurgus* over himſelfe, that when an inſolent young man had done him no leſſe injury than the ſtriking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and manſuetude he convinced and gained him. [c] And *Pericles* that great Stateſman and Oratour of Greece, being all the day reviled by an Impure companion, com-

a Οἱ λογισμῶν ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι, θυμῷ πλεῖστα εἰς ἅπαντα κεκτημένοι. *Thucyd. lib. 2.*

b *Plutarch.* περὶ ἀοργησ. *Sen. de Ira lib. 3. cap. 28. & Epiſt. 18.*

c *Ipſum compedibus qui vinxerat Ennio pigæum. Juven. Sat. 10. Plut. de Ira.*

d *Donat & Cœl. Rhod. l. 12. c. 53.*

a *Socrat. lib. 7. cap. 22.*

b *Plutarch. in Lyc.*

c *Plut. in Pericle.*

commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house*; nothing more obvious than Examples of this kind.

That we may therefore so manage this passion as to be *angry but not sinne*, it will be requisite,

1. To let it have an Eye *upward*, as *Moses* did, who never expressed any other anger that we read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.

2. To convert it *inward* into a self-displicency and severity towards our owne Errours, for the more acquainted any man is with himselfe, the lesse matter hee will find of Anger with other men, as having so much both *to doe*, and *to blame* at home. Anger ever ariseth from the Value which we set upon our selves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3. Follow it not too *Close*, joyne not too soone, nor too hastily with it; though it may be *used* sometimes, it must never be *encouraged*, being over-bold and forward of it selfe. And therefore as many drugges must be prepared before wee may dare to use them; so we must take heed of dispatching this affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled before it be imployed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soone as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.

4. Keep

* *Senec. de Ira, lib. 2. c. 12. & 38 Plut. de serâ num: vindicta.*

Sicut aquilæ & leones inter ambulandum ungues intro avertunt. Vid. Plut. decurios. Sen. de Ira, lib. 2. c. 28. Indignatio animio sui suspectu. Sen. de Ira, l. 3. c. 5. Senec. l. 3. c. 12.

Plutarch. de Aud. poetis.

4 Keep it not *long*, it is the ſpawne of Malice and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a corroding thing which will fret and ſtaine the Veſſell in which it is kept. Let not the Sunne go downe upon it, 'tis ill being in the darke with ſo bad a Leader. It may paſſe through the heart of a wiſe man, but it *Reſteth onely in the boſome of Fools.*

5 Remove the *Occaſions* of it, withdraw Fuell from ſo catching a Flame. They ſay of Turpentine, and ſome other like things, That they will draw and ſucke Fire unto them. Certainely of all Fire there is none ſo ductile, ſo ſequacious and obſequious, as this of Wrath. It was not ill done therefore of *Cotys* and *Auguſtus*, To cauſe thoſe curious Veſſels to be broken of purpoſe, which having beene accidentally broken might have made a breach likewiſe upon the diſcretion of their owners. Plut. Apoph. Sen de Ira lib. 3. c 40. Cœl. Rhod. l. 12. c. 52.

6 Give not an eaſie Eare to *Reports*, nor an eaſie entertainement to *ſuſpicions*, bee not greedie to know who or wherein another hath wronged thee. That which wee are deſirous to know, or apt to beleeve, we ſhall bee the more readie to revenge. *Curioſitie* and *Credulitie*, are the Handmaides unto Paſſion. *Alexander* would not ſee the woman after whom he might have Luſted: Nor *Cæſar* ſearch *Pompeyes* Cabinet, leſt he ſhould find new matters of Revenge. He choſe rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. In Sen. de Ira l. 2. c. 22, 23, 24. Plut. in Alex. & l. curioſit. Dion. Caſſ. l. 41.

juries unknowne doe many times the lesse hurt; when I have found them, I then begin to feele them, and suffer more from mine owne discoverie, then from mine enemies attempt.

7 Bee *Candid* in Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glasse through which I looke, makes that seeme formidable, and the wave, that crooked, which in it selfe was beautifull and straight. Haply thou art Angrie with that which could not intend to hurt thee, Thy Book, thy Penne, the stone at which thou stumblest, the winde or raine that beates upon thee: bee Angrie againe, but with thy selfe, who art either so *bold* as to be Angrie with *GOD*, or so *foolish*, as to be Angrie with *nothing*. Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage, Call it not Injurie but *Imprudence*, and then pittie it. Thou art Angrie with Counsell, Reproofe, Discipline; why doest thou not as well breake the Glasse in which thy Physitian ministreth a potion unto thee. Bee Angrie with thy sinne, and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is he that adviseth thee thy Superiour? Thine Anger is undutifull; is hee thy friend, thine Anger is ungratefull.

Sen. de Ira. lib. 8. c. 26.

8 Give Injuries a *New Name*, and that will worke a new Affection. In blinde Agents call it Chance; in weake Persons, Infirmitie; in simple, Ignorance; in wise, Counsell; in Superiours,

Disci

Diſciplſine; in equals, familiaritie; in inferiors, confidence; where there is no other conſtruction to be made, do as *Joſeph* and *David* did, call it *Providence*, and ſee what God ſayes to thee by it. Get a minde converſant with high and noble things, the more heavenly, the leſſe Tempeſtuous.

Minimas rerum diſcordia turbat pacem ſumma tenent. Lucan. Vid. Sen. l 4. c 33. Sen. de Ira. l. 2. c. 25. 26.

9 Bee not *Idle*, *Sluggiſh*, *Luxurious*, wee are never more apt to be Angrie, then when we are ſleepie or greedie. Weake reſolutions and ſtrong Deſires are ſenſible of the leaſt exaſperation, as an emptie ſhip of the ſmalleſt Tempeſt.

Againe, be not *over-buſie* neither. That man can hardly bee maſter of his Paſſion, that is not maſter of his imployments. A minde ever burdened, like a Bowe alwayes bent muſt needs grow impotent, and weary, the fitteſt preparations to this diſtemper. When a mans buſineſſe doth not poiſe, but preſſe him, there will ever be ſomething either undone or illdone, and ſo ſtill matter of Vexation. And therefore our Mindes as our Veſſels muſt bee unloaded, if they would not have a Tempeſt hurt them.

Plutarch περὶ ἀοργ. Senec. l. 3. c 6. Sen de Ira l. 3. cap. 16. —χίμαιρ' ἥρως ὅστις ἄγρωιν ἐστείνει, κλῶνας ὡς ἐκσωθήσεται τὸ δ' ἀνθεῖν σὺν αὐτῷ σφᾶιν ἀπώλυτο. Soph. Antig. Plut. Sympoſ. l. 4 qu 2.

Laſtly, wraſtle not with that which pincheth thee. If it be ſtrong it will hurt, if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. He that ſtrives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempeſt breaks not the ſtalks of Corne, which rends aſunder the armes of an Oake, the one yeelds, the other

ther withstands it. An humble weakneſſe is safer from injurie, then a ſtubborn ſtrength.

I have now done with the Paſſions of the Minde. And briefly proceed to thoſe Honours and Dignities of the Soul of Man which belong unto it in a more abſtracted Conſideration.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of the Originall of the Reasonable Soule, whether it be immedately Created and Infused, or derived by Seminall Traduction from the Parents. Of the Derivation of Originall sinne.

THe dignity of *Man* in respect of his *Soule* alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the *whole*, or of the parts therof. Concerning the whole we shall consider two things; Its *Originall*, and its *Nature*. Concerning the *Originall* of the *Soule*, divers men have diversly thought; for, to let passe the Opinion of (*a*) *Seleucus*, who affirmed that it was educed out of the Earth, and that (*b*) of *Origen* and the *Platonists* who say that the Soules of men were long ago created, and after detruded into the Body as into a Prison: There are three Opinions touching this question. The first of those who affirme the *Traduction* of the *Soule* by *generation*, some of which so affirm, because they judged it a *Corporeall* substance, as did (*c*) *Tertullian*. Others because they beleeved that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as *d Apollinarius*, *Nemesius*, and divers in the Westerne Churches, as *St. Hierome* witnesseth. The second, of those who deny the naturall Traduction, and say that the

a *Philastr. de Hæres. Seleuci, &c.*
b *Justinian. Tract. ad Menam contra Orig. Hieron. Epist. ad Marcell. & Anapsychiam Theophyl. Alex. Ep. Pasc. 2. Anastat. Sinuita Anagog. contemp. lib. 11.*
c *Aug. de Hæres. 86. ep. 157. de Gen. ad lit. l. 10. c. 25. Tertul. de Anima, c. 5, 6, 7, 22, 25, 27.*
d *Hieron. Epist. ad Marcellinum. Nemesius de natura hominis, l. 2 Lucifer. apud Aug. Hæres. 81.*

Soule is by *Creation* infused into Bodies, organiz'd and prædispoſed to receive them; of which Opinion amongſt the Ancients were [e] S. *Hierom*, [f] *Hilarie*, [g] *Ambroſe*, [h] *Lactantius*, [i] *Theodoret*, [k] *Æneas Gazeus*, and of the moderne VVriters the *Major* part. The third is of thoſe who doe *hæſitare*, ſtick betweene both, and dare affirme nothing certaine on either ſide, which is the moderation of [l] S. *Auguſtine* and *Gregory* [m] the Great, who affirme that this is a queſtion incomprehenſible, and unſolvable in this life. Now the onely reaſon which cauſed S. *Auſtin* herein to hæſitate, ſeemeth to have beene the difficulty of traducing *Originall ſinne* from the Parents to the Children. For ſaith he (writing unto S. *Hierome* touching the Creation of the Soule) If this Opinion doe not oppugne that moſt fundamentall faith of *Originall ſinne*, let it then be mine; but if it doe oppugne it, let it not be thine.

Now ſince that Opinion which denieth the *Traduction*, ſeemeth moſt agreeable to the ſpirituall ſubſtance of the Soule, I ſhall here produce ſome few reaſons for the *Creation*, and ſolve an argument or two alledg'd for the *Traduction* of the Soule, reſerving notwithſtanding unto my ſelfe, and others, the liberty and modeſty of S. *Auſtins* hæſitation, which alſo I finde allowed by the Holy Ghoſt himſelf.

Two things there are of certainty in this point. 1. That the ſoule is not any corporeall Maſſe or ſubſtance meaſurable by quantity, or capable of ſubſtantiall augmentation. 2. That the

e *Hieron.* ep. ad Pam. contra Ioan. Hieroſ.
f *Hil.* de Trin. l. 10.
g *Ambroſ.* de Noah & Arca. c. 4.
h *Lactant.* de op. Hom. c. 9.
i *Theod.* de curand. ægr. affect. ſer. 4.
k *Æneas Gaz.* in ſuo Theophraſto.
l *Aug.* ep. 7. 28. 157. & Retract. l. 1. c. 1. de Gen. ad lit. 10. & de anima.
m *Greg.* l. 7. ep. 53.

Eccleſ. 11. 5.

the *Traduction* of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things, That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle, & that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but *Ratione seminali, & per modum decisionis*, by a seminall way, and the decision, separation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, The Arguments against *Traduction* are these.

First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the *Father of Spirits*, as our naturall Parent the *Father of our bodies*, *Iob* 33.4. *Eccles.* 12. 7. *Esa.* 57.16. *Num.* 16.22.27.16. *Heb.* 12.9. *Zac.* 12.1: which though they doe not according to the judgement of St. *Aug.* conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet doe they much favour the probability of this Opinion.

2. To have Being by *Traduction*, is, when the soule of the Childe is derived from the soule of the Parent, by the meanes of seed: but the seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soule, both becauſe the one is a Corporeall, the other a spirituall substance, uncapable of Augmentation, or Detriment. Now that which is *spirituall*, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeall: neither can any seed be discinded or issue out from the soule, being *substantia simplex, & impartibilis*, a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is *separable* from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its being or making upon it; for if by the Gene-

ration of the Body the soule be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted, for every thing that is generable, is corruptible; But the Soule can subsist and work without the Body, therefore it doth not from corporeall generation derive its Being.

4. If the Soule be seminally traduced, it must be either from the Body, or from the soule of the Parents; not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its own sphere, and more noble then it selfe; not from the soule, because that being a spirituall and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substantiall seed unto the constitution of another soule.

5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the Soule is formed, then it is not traduced by naturall generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soule is formed, for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seed of the Soule would perish, and by consequence the soule it selfe would be corruptible, as having its Originall from corruptible seed. These and divers other the like arguments are used to confirme the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable Soule. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the forecited Fathers. S. *Hierome* telleth us that the Originall of the soule in mankinde is not as in other

Hier. ad Pammach. & in l. 32. Eccles. 12. contr. Ruffinum, l. 2. c. 1. 2. & dialog. de Orig. Anim. inter opera ejus. Tom. 8.

living

living creatures; Since as our Saviour ſpeaketh, *The Father worketh hitherto.* And the Prophet *Eſay* telleth us, That *he formeth the Spirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men*; as it is in the Pſalmes. And ſo *Lactantius* (whom I doe wonder to finde numbred amongſt the Authors that affirme the Traduction of the ſoule, by *Ruffinus*, and the Author of the Dialogue amongſt the workes of *Hierome*) It may be queſtioned (ſaith he) whether the ſoule be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, Becauſe the ſeed of the Soule is not put into the Body by either, or both of theſe. A body may be borne out of their Bodies, becauſe ſomething may be out of both contributed; but a ſoule cannot be borne out of their ſoules, in as much as from ſo ſpirituall and incomprehenſible a ſubſtance nothing can iſſue forth or be ſevered for that uſe. So alſo St. *Hilary*. The ſoule of man is the worke of God; the generation of the fleſh is alwayes of the fleſh. And againe, it is inbred and an impreſs'd Beliefe in all, that our ſoules have a divine Originall: And in like manner *Theodoret*, God (ſaith he) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of the Bodies ſubſiſting before, but the ſoule, not of all creatures, but of Men onely hee worketh ἐκ μὴ ὄντων out of nothing that had been before.

Hilar. de Trin. lib. 10. & in p. 62.

Againſt this Doctrine of the ſoules Originall, The principall argument is drawn from the conſideration of *Originall ſinne*, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled

Athenag. de Reſur. Gernad. de Eccleſ. dog. c. 13.

Aug. ep. 28.

and staggerd S. *Augustine* in this point. For if the Soule be not naturally traduced, how should Originall sinne be derived from *Adam* unto it? And if it were not in the loynes of *Adam*, then neither did it sinne in his loynes; whereas the Apostle expresly telleth us, that by one Man sinne came into the world, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by naturall Propagation, deriving an inhærent habituall pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soule of every man that entreth into the world, and is the fruit of *Adams* loynes.

Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the Soule by the immediate contract of the flesh, and the Parents attinging the ultimate disposition of the Body, upon which naturally followeth the Union of the soule, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence, which he in the vertue of a *first and supreme cause* is to contribute unto them,) I shall set down what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.

Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 13. c. 14.

Macar. Ho. 12.

First then, it is most certaine that God did not implant *Originall sinne*, nor take away *Originall righteousnesse* from Man, but man by his Prævarication and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a *defiled nature* to his posterity. For as *Macarius* excellently speaketh, *Adam* having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his Nature Secondly,

Secondly, Originall injuſtice as it is a ſinne, by the default and contraction of Man, ſo it is alſo a puniſhment by the ordination, and diſpoſition of Divine Juſtice. It was mans ſinne to caſt away the Image of God; but it is Gods juſt judgement (as he hath that free diſpenſation of his owne Gifts) not to reſtore it againe in ſuch manner as at firſt he gave it unto that nature which had ſo rejected and trambled on it. *Aug. contr. Jul. l. 5. c. 3.*

Thirdly, In this *Originall ſinne*, there are two things conſiderable, The *Privation* of that Righteouſneſſe, which ought to be in us; and the *luſt* or *Habituall concupiſcence*, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The *Privation* and want of Originall juſtice is meritoriouſly from *Adam*, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that Originall rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his moſt righteous and free diſpoſition is pleaſed not to reſtore unto his Nature in his poſterity againe. In the *habituall luſt* are conſiderable theſe two things ἁμαρτία the ſinfull *diſorder* of it, and ἀντιμισθία the puniſhment of ſinne by it. Conſider it is as a puniſhment of *Adams* firſt Prævarication; and ſo, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Juſtice, who did moſt righteouſly forſake *Adam*, after his wilfull fall, and leave him in the hand of his owne Counſell; to tranſmit unto us that Seminary of ſinne which himſelfe had contracted.

But if we conſider it *as a ſinne*, we then ſay that the *immediate* & *proper* cauſe of it, is *lapſed nature whole*

whole and entire by Generation and Seminall Traduction derived upon us. But the *Remoter cause* is that, from which wee receive and derive this Nature. *Nature* I say first *fallen*; for unto Nature Innocent belonged Originall Righteousnesse, and not Originall sinne.

2. *Nature derived* by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loynes, and of the womb. For though Christ had our Nature, yet hee had not our sinne.

3. *Nature whole and entire.* For neither part (as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sinne. For it is improbable that any staine should be transfused from the Body to the Soul, as from the foule vessell to the cleane water put into it. The Body it selfe being not Soly and alone in it selfe corrupt and sinfull; else, all Abortians and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sinne.

Originall sinne therefore most probably seemeth to rise by *Emanation*, partiall in the parts, totall in the whole; from Mans *Nature* as *guilty*, *forsaken*, and *accursed* by God for the sinne of *Adam*. And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by vertue of their concurrence and *Union*, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the Soule be a partiall subject or seat of Originall sinne; yet wee have not our sinne and our soule from one Author; because sinne followes not the

the *part*, but the *Nature* whole and entire. And though we have not from our Parents *Totum Naturæ*, yet we have *totam Naturam*, wee have our whole Nature, though not every part of our Nature. Even as *whole Christ* was the Son of *Mary*, who therefore by vertue of the Communication of Properties in Christ, is justly called Θεότοκος, the *Mother of God*, against the Nestorians in the Councell of *Chalcedon*; though in regard of his divine Nature, he was without beginning; and the reason is, because the integrity of Nature ariseth from the *Vnion* of the two parts together, which is perfected by *Generation*; so then we say that *Adam* is the Originall, and *meritorious* cause; Our next *Parents*, the instrumentall and *immediate* cause of this sinne in us, not by way of Physicall Emission or Transmigration of sinne from them to us, but by secret contagion, as Saint *Augustine* speaks. For having in the manner aforesaid from *Adam* by our Parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the Guilt and Cause of the first prævarication, from this *Nature* thus *derived*, as *guilty* and *accursed*, doth immediately and intimately flow Habituall pollution. So then Habituall concupiscence is from *Adam* alone *meritoriously* by reason of his first prævarication. From *Adam* by the mediation of our *Parents seminally* by naturall *generation*. And from *Nature generated* not as Nature, but *as* in *Adam guilty*, *forsaken* and accursed, by secret and ineffable *Resultancy* and *Emanation*. This is that which I conceive of this great difficulty, not

Contra Julian. l.5.c.14.

unmindfull in the meane time of that ſpeech of S. *Auguſtine*, That there is nothing more *certaine* to be knowne, and yet nothing more *ſecret* to be underſtood than *Originall ſinne*. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soule, they are not of ſuch moment; And therefore I paſſe them by, and proceed to the conſideration of the Soule in its Nature.

Nihil peccato originali ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum ſecretius, Aug. de morb. Eccleſ. cap. 22.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Image of God in the Reaſonable Soule, in regard of its ſimplicity and ſpirituality.

CONcerning the dignity of the Soul in its nature & eſſence, Reaſon hath adventured thus farre, to confeſſe that the ſoule of man is in ſome ſort a ſpark and beame of divine brightnes. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath warranted that it was *breathed* into him by God himſelfe, and was made after his *Image and likeneſſe*, not ſubſtantially, as if there * were a Reall Emanation and Traduction of the Soule out of God; which were blaſphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Reſemblance, and imitation of Gods Properties in mans Originall created Nature, which is more notable in him, than in the other parts of the world; there is indeed

Macrob. de ſomnio, Scip. p. 1. c. 14. divinæ particula auræ. ἀποσπασμα θεῖ. Philo.

** Vid. contra hanc impietatē decretum concil. Bracar. cap. 5. μιλοχῆ τῆς θείας ἀπαμψαι. Damaſ. de orth. fid. lib. 2. ca. 12.*

Igneus eſt ollis vigor & cœleſtis Origo.

deed in all Gods works ſome kind of Image, and lineaments, and footſteps of his glory.

Deum namq; ire per omnes
Terraſq; Tractuſq, maris Cælumq; profundum, &c.

For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky,
Are filled with divine immenſity.

The whole world is a great * book, wherein we read the praiſe, glory, power, and infiniteneſſe of him that made it, but man is after a more peculiar manner called εἰκὼν, and δόξα, *the image and glory of God*; the greater world is only Gods workmanſhip, wherein is repreſented the wiſedome and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the workman; but man (in the originall purity of nature) is beſides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impreſſed by that divine ſpirit (whoſe worke it is to ſeale) a ſpirituall reſemblance of his owne goodneſſe and ſanctity. Again, the greater world was never other then an *Orator* to ſet forth the power and praiſes of God; but he made the ſoule of man, in the beginning, as it were his *Oracle*, wherein he faſtened a perfect knowledg of his Law and Will, from the very glimpſes and corrupted reliques of which Knowledge of his Law, ſome have been bold to call men συγγενεῖς θεοῦ, *the kindred of God.* And *Seneca*, *Liber Animus & Dijs cognatus*; which is the ſame with that of *Aratus* cited by Saint *Paul*, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, *for wee are his off-ſpring*, yea *Euripides* (as *Tully* in his

* Βίβλος θεοῦ. *Orig. apud Euſeb. de præpar. Evan. l. 6. c. 11.*
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum, Ov. Met. 1.
In aliis creaturis eſt ſimilitudo dei tantùm vermodum Veſtigii; in Sola Rationali Creatura per modum imaginis. Vid. Aquin. par. 1. qu. 93. art. 6.
Σημειοῦται ἡ τυποθεὶς σφραγὶς θεοῦ. *Philo apud Euſeb. de præpar. Evan. l. 7. c. 18.*
Ποίημα θεοῦ λογικὸν, καθ' εἰκόνα γενόμενον τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν. *Greg. Nyſſen. Ser. 1. in verba illa Faciamus hominem, &c.*
θεῖον ὁ νοῦς. *Ariſt. Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.*
Deorum cognatione tenetur. Cic. de Divi. l. 1. & l. de Amicit. Porphyr. apud Euſeb. de præp. Eva. l. 11. c. 28.

* Lib. 1. Clem. Alex. in fine l. 4. Stromat. Ipse etiam Cic. in somnio Scipio. Senec. ep. 31. & 41.

Tusculans observes,) was bold to call the soule of man, by the name of God; and *Seneca* will venture so farre too. *Quid aliud vocas animum quàm deum in humano corpore hospitantem.* But to forbeare such boldnesse, as (it may be) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry: Certaine it is, that there are (as *Tully* many times divinely observes) sundry similitudes between God and the mind of man. There are indeed some Attributes of God, not only incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in mans soule, as immensity, infiniteneſſe, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility, and the like; but whatsoever spirituall, and rationall perfections the power and bounty of God conferr'd upon the soule in its first Creation, are all of them so many shadowes and representations of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.

Vid. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12. Ambr. Hexam. lib. 6. cap. 8. Tertul. lib. 2. contra Marcio. cap. 5. 9. 16. Clem. Alex. in Protrep. p. 30. Basil. Hexam. Homil. 10. * Vid. Theodoret. Serm. 5. de Natura Hom. & Nemes. c. 2. Sen. Nyssen. lib. de Anim. Plutarch. de placitis Philosoph. l. 4. c. 2. Tertul. de Anim. Senec. Nat. qu. l. 7. c. 24.

The Properties then and Attributes of God, wherein this Image chiefly consists, are first these three: *Spirituality* with the two immediate consequents therof, *Simplicity* and *Immortality*, in which the soule hath partaked without any after-corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vast, and needlesse, to confute those * sundry opinions of ancient Philosophers, concerning the substance of the soule; many whereof *Tully* in the first of his *Tusculans* hath reported; And *Aristotle* confuted in his first *de Anima*. Some conceived it to be bloud, others the braine, some fire, others ayre; some that it consists in Harmony and number; and the Philosopher *Dicearcus*, that it was nothing

thing at all but the body disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these passe as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.

There are sundry naturall reasons to prove the * *Spirituality* of the Soule, as first, the manner of its *working*, which is *immateriall*, by conceiving objects, as *universall*, or otherwise purified from all grossenesse of matter, by the Abstraction of the *Active Vnderstanding*, whereby they are made in some sort proportionall to the nature of the Intellect passive, into which the species are impressed.

Secondly, its *independance* on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soule require the concurrence of the *Common sense* and *Imagination*, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the *object*, not by way of assistance to the elicite and immediate *act*. They only present the *species*, they doe not qualifie the *perception*. *Phantasmata* are only *obiecta operationis*; the objects they are, not *instrumenta operandi*, the instruments of the soules working. The *Act of Vnderstanding* is immediatly from the soule, without any the least concurrences of the body thereunto, although the things whereon that Act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily Organs to represent them unto the soule; as light doth not at all concurre to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the visive faculty, but only serves as an extrinsecall assistance for qualification of the *Medium* and ob-

* *Vid. Nemes. de Anim. cap. 2. Claudian. Mamercum de statu Animæ, l. 2. Plotin. apud Eusb. de præparat. Evang. l. 15. c. 21. Damasc. de Orthod. fide l. 2. c. 12. Plutarch l. de placitis Philosoph. l. 4. c. 23. Aug. lib. de quantitate Animæ.*

ject that must be seen. And this reason *Aristotle* hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soule, is not mixt with any body, but hath a nature altogether diverse there-from, because it hath no bodily Organ, as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the *Soule immateriall*, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within it selfe, as is more manifest in the *Reflexion* of the soule upon its owne nature, being an operation (as he expressly speaketh) *seperable there-from*, the soule being not only *actus informans*, a forme informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but *actus subsistens* too, a forme subsisting; And that *per se*, without any necessary dependance upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Lib. 3. de Anima, cap. 5.

Ibid. cap. 6.

Another reason of *Aristotle* in the same place, is the difference between *Materiall* and *Immateriall power*. For (saith he) all bodily cognoscitive Faculties doe suffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightnesse of the Sun, the eare from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like. But the *understanding* on the contrary side is perfected by the worthiest contemplations, and the better inabled for lower enquiries. And there-

fore

fore *Ariſtotle* in his *Ethicks*, placeth the moſt compleat happineſſe of man in thoſe heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are faſtned on the divineſt and moſt remote objects; which in Religion is nothing elſe, but a fruition of that beatificall viſion (which, as farre as Nature goes, is call'd the *contemplation of the firſt cauſe*) and an eternall ſatiating the ſoule with beholding the Nature, Eſſence, and glory of God.

Another reaſon may be drawne from the condition of the *Vnderſtandings Objects*, which have ſo much the greater conformity to the ſoule, by how much the more they are divine and abſtracted. *Hoc habet animus argumentum ſuæ divinitatis*, (ſaith *Seneca*) *quòd illum divina delectant*. This argument of its divineneſſe hath the mind of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the ſoule were corporeall, it could not poſſibly reach to the knowledge of any, but materiall ſubſtances, and thoſe that were of its owne Nature; otherwiſe we might as well ſee Angels with our eyes, as underſtand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reaſon is, that axiome in Philoſophy, that all reception is *ad modum recipientis*, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are ſpirituall and divine, have greateſt proportion to the ſoule of man, is evident in his Underſtanding and his Will; both which are in regard of truth or good unſatisfiable, by any materiall or worldly objects, the one never reſting in enquiry, till it attaine the perfect knowledge,

ledge, the other never repleniſhed in deſire till it be admitted unto the perfect poſſeſſion of the moſt divine and ſpirituall good; to wit, of him who is the firſt of Cauſes, and the laſt of Ends.

From this attribute of *Spirituality* flowes immediatly the next of *Simplicity*, *Vnity*, or *Actuality*; for matter is the root of all perfect compoſition, every Compound conſiſting of two Eſſentiall parts, *matter* and *forme*. I exclude not from the Soule all manner of compoſition, for it is proper to *God* only to be abſolutely and perfectly ſimple: But I exclude all *Eſſentiall compoſition*, in reſpect whereof the Soule is *meerely Actuall*; And ſo I underſtand that of *Tully*, *Nihil eſt Animus admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex.*

Ariſtot. de Anima, l. 3. c. 6.

Tuſcul. q. l. 1. & lib. de Senectut.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Souls Immortality proved by its ſimplicity, independence, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God and duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of underſtanding things immortall, unſatiableneſſe by objects Mortall, freeneſſe from all cauſes of corruption.

AND from this *Simplicity* followes by a neceſſary and unavoydable conſequence, the third property ſpoken of, * *Immortality*, it being abſolutely impoſſible (as *Tully* excellently obſerves, and it is the argument of *Iul. Scaliger* on this very occaſion) for any ſimple and uncompounded Nature to be ſubject to death and corruption; For (ſaith *Tully*) *Interitus eſt diſceſſus & ſecretio ac direptus earum partium quæ conjunctione aliqua tenebantur.* It is a ſeparation (and as it were) a divulſion of parts, before united each to other, ſo that where there is * no Union, there can be no ſeparation, and by conſequence no death nor mortality.

Another reaſon may be the ſame which was alleged for the *ſpirituality* of the Soule, namely, *independence in operation*, and therefore conſe-

* Vid. Plut. lib. de placit. Philoſoph. 4. c. 7. quæ ex Seneca in unum collegit Diony. Gothofrid. in locis ex ipſo Theologicis. Titul. de Animo Cic. Tuſc. qu. lib. 1. Cato maior, ſivè de ſenect. & de Amicit. Iſtam materiam fuſe tractarunt Aug. tom. 1. Euſe. de præpar. Evang. li. 11. ex Platone Porphyr. &c. Nemeſ. Eneas Gazæus in Bed. Era Contarenus, Alii.

* Nihil poteſt perdere eſſe quod non perdit actum per quem eſt: Iſtæ autem formæ [viz. Simplices] non poſſunt perdere actum per quem ſunt, quia ſibi ipſis ſunt Actus Nihil autem poteſt ſeipſum perdere. Contarenus lib. 1. de Immort. Animæ.

quently in *Being* upon the body. And that Independance is manifest. First, because the acts of the soul are educ'd immediately in it self, without the intercedence of any organ wherby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soul can perceive and have the knowledge of truth of *universals*, of *it self*, of *Angels*, of *God*, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any wayes be produced by the Intrinsecall concurrence of any materiall faculty. Thirdly, because in *Raptures* and *Extasies*, the soul is (as it were) drawn up above and from the body, though not from *informing* it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soule is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortall as the body

Another reason may be taken from the Universall agreement of all nations in the Earth in * *Religion* and the worship of some Deity, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. *Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta ut non aliquos deos credat*, saith *Seneca*; whence those fictions of the Poets touching *Elizium* and fields of happinesse for men of honest and well-ordered lives; and places of Torment for those that doe any way neglect the bonds of their Religion.

* *Cum de Animorum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominũ aut timendum inferos aut colentium. Senec. ep.117.*

Ergo

Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumq; malorum
Supplicia expendunt.

Therefore they exerciſed are with paine,
And puniſhments of former crimes ſuſtaine.

For in this life it is many times in all places ſeene, that thoſe which have given themſelves moſt liberty in contempt of Gods Lawes, and have ſuffered themſelves to be carried by the ſwinge of their owne rebellious Paſſions, unto all injurious, ambitious, unrully Practices, have commonly raiſed themſelves and their fortunes more then others, who out of tenderneſſe and feare have followed no courſes but thoſe which are allowed them. And yet theſe men who ſuffer ſo many indignities out of regard to Religion, doe ſtill obſerve their duties, and in the midſt of all contempt and reproach, fly into the boſome of their God: And as *Lucretius* himſelfe that Arch Atheiſt confeſſeth of them.

Multo in rebus acerbis
Acriùs advertunt animos ad religionem.

Their hearts in greateſt bitterneſſe of mind,
Unto Religion are the more enclinde.

Their very terrors & troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging ſome Deity and in the worſhip of it. *Hic Pietatis honos?* would not this eaſily have melted their Religion into nothing, and quite diverted their miudes from ſo fruitleſſe a ſeverity, had they not had a ſtrong and indelible perſwaſion faſtned in their ſoules, that a ſtate would come, wherein both their Patience ſhould be rewarded, and the inſolencie of

their adversaries repayed with the just Vengeance they had deserved?

As for that Atheisticall conceit, that Religion is only grounded on Policie, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and Setledness of their States, making it to be only *Impericum Vinculum*, a Bond of Government, that the Common-weale might not suffer from the fury of minds secure from all Religion, it is a fancie no lesse absurd, then it is impious. For that which hath not onely beene observed and honour'd by those who have scarce had any form of a civill Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practice of the whole world, is not a Law of Policie and civill Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane impositions. Nor else is it possible for Legall institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves inclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby onely to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for feare of a such a God, to whose Infiniteness, Power, and Majesty they Assent by none but a civill Tradition. It must be a visible character of a deitie acknowledged in the Soule, an irresistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witnesse of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (observed among all Nations) wherein even

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in place of Idolatry, were ſome ſo irkſome and repugnant to Nature, and others ſo voyd of Reaſon, as that nothing but a firme and deepe Aſſurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their owne Immortality, could ever have impos'd them upon their conſciences. And beſides this conſent of men unto Religion in generall, we finde it alſo unto this one part hereof touching the Soules immortality. All the wiſeſt and beſt reputed Philoſophers for Learning and ſtayednesſe of life, and, beſides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and ſavage people have diſcerned it. *Adeo neſcio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quaſi ſeculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*, ſaith *Tully*. The Soule hath a kind of preſage of a future world; And therefore he ſaith, that it is in mans Body a Tenant, *tanquam in domo aliena*, as in anothers houſe: And is only in Heaven as a Lord, *tanquam in domo ſua*, as in its owne. *Tuſc.qu.l.1.*

Though in the former of theſe, the ignorance of the *reſurrection* made him erre touching the future condition of the Body; wherein indeed conſiſts a maine dignity of Man above other creatures, And this Opinion it is which he ſaith was the ground of all that care men had for poſterity, to ſow and plant Common wealths, to ordaine Lawes, to eſtabliſh forms of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their Blood for the good of their Countrey; all which could not have beene done with ſuch freedome of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unleſſe there were withall a conceit that the good

thereof would some way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themselves after this life: for it was a speech savouring of infinite Atheisme.

Ἐμοῦ θανόντος, γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί.

When I am, and in mine Vrne,
What care I though the World burne?

Tul. Tus. qu. l. 1. Sen. ep. 117.

Now although against this present Reason drawne from the *consent of men* (which yet Heathens themselves have used) It may be alleged, that there hath been a consent likewise of some, That the Soule is nothing else but the Eucrasie or good Temperature of the Body, and that it is therefore subject to those Maladies, Distempers, Age, Sickneſſe, and at last Death, which the Body is; as among the rest *Lucretius* takes much paines to prove: yet the Truth is, that is *Votum magis quàm judicium*, never any firme opinion grounded on Judgement and Reason, but rather a desire of the heart, and a perswasion of the Will inticing the Understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd Epicures and sensuall minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of Immortality, which often times pursues them, and obtrudes it selfe upon them against their wils, shining like lightning through the chinks and crevises (as I may so speake) of their soules, which are of set purpose closed against all such light, sets the Reason on worke to invent arguments for the contrary side, that so their staggering and fearfull impiety may be something emboldened, and the Eye of their

conſcience blinded, and the Mouth muffled from breathing forth thoſe ſecret clamors and ſhrikes of feare. The Deniall then of the Immortality of the Soule is rather a *Wiſh* than an *Opinion*, a corruption of the Heart and Will, than any Naturall Aſſertion of the Underſtanding, which cannot but out of the footſteps and reliques of thoſe firſt ſacred Impreſſions, acknowledge a ſpirituall reſemblance in the Soule of Man unto ſome ſupreme Deity, whom the conſcience in all its Enormities doth diſpleaſe: And therefore it is obſerved that the Mind of an Atheiſt is continually wavering and unſatisfied, never able ſo to ſmother the inbred conſciouſnes of its immortality, as not to have continuall ſuggeſtions of feare and ſcruple. Whereſoever there is an impious Heart, there is alwayes a ſhivering judgement.

Bacon Eſſay of Atheiſme.

Another Reaſon of the Soules Immortality may be drawne from the dignity and prehemineence of Man above other Creatures: for he is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be ſerviceable to him, and Miniſters for his contentments: which dignity cannot poſſibly ſtand with the Mortality of the Soule. For ſhould not many other Creatures farre exceed Man in the Durance of their Being? And even in their time of living together, how ſubject to weakneſſes, ſickneſſe, languiſhing, cares, fears, Jealouſies, diſcontents, and all other miſeries of Mind and Body, is the whole Nature of Man, of all which, other creatures feele the leaſt diſturbance? Are

Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι ϖῶ ἐστιν οἰζυροώτερον ἀνδρὸς *Iliad. p.* 446.

Diogenes vocare solebat πτισανοφθήνους οἵτινες τῶν πτισανοφάγων. Laert. lib. 6. Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐστι συμφορὰ. Solon ad Crœsum, vid. Theod. ser. 5. de natura Hom. & Clem. Alex. Stro. l. 3. p. 316, 317. Edit. Hiens.

Are not men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and receptacles of misery? Is not our heart made the Naturall center of feares and sorrowes? and our Mindes, as it were, Hives to entertaine numberlesse swarmes of stinging and thorny Cares? Are wee not Vassals and Slaves to mauy distempered passions? Have not our very Contents their terror, and our Peace disturbance? Are not all our comforts, wherewith wee strive to glut and stuffe our selves here, the glorious Vanities, and golden delusions and cosenages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happinesse is unhappy? And for Reason, what comfort could wee finde in it, when it would alwayes be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternall losse of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation? Mortality and Corruption makes Unreasonableness a Privilege; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy then Man, by how much the lesse they know their owne wretchednesse. An Atheist would be in this life farre happier then he is, if he could bring himselse to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.

Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of Mans reasonable Faculties. To every power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it Objects of equall extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its naturall desires, whereby it

it fasteneth on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Objects, we easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Essence; for from the Essence flowes naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally educed the Operation, which requires naturally Objects proportionall, convenient, satisfactory, and of equall extent. Where therefore no mortall Object beares full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty, there it and the Essence, from which it flowes, are both immortall. Now we see sensitive Powers finde in this life full satisfaction, as the Sight from all the variety of Colours, the Eare of Sounds, and the like: only the Reasonable Parts, the Understanding, and the Will can never be repleniſhed in this estate of Mortality. Have they as great and wide contentments, as the whole Frame of Nature can here affoord them; still their pursuites are restlesse, still they find an absence and want of something which they cannot finde. *Orbis Alexandro angusta*; In this case every man is like *Alexander*. This world wherein wee now converse, is too straight and empty to fill the vastnesse, and limit the desires of the Soule of Man. Only the sight and possession of God, the most infinite good, can satisfie our Understandings and our Wils. For both these Faculties (as all others in *sue Genere*) ayme at *summum*. The Understanding is carried *ad summam Causam*, to the *first of Truths*; the Will *ad summum Bonum*, to the *last of Ends*; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last,

Fecisti nos ad te, & irrequietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Aug. Confes. l. 1. c. 1. vid. Ib. l. 4. c. 10, 12. de Trinit. l. 13. c. 8. Omnis mihi Copia quæ Deus meus non est, Egestas est. Confe. l. 13. c. 8. Vide etiam de Civ. Dei. l. 8. c. 8. l. 11 c. 13. l. 12. c. 1.

can satisfie these two searching and unquiet Faculties.

Hi motus Animorum atq; hæc certamina.

These are the Motions, this the strife
Of Souls, aspiring unto life.

All the Knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a Mirrour wherein to view our Ignorance, and we have only light enough to discover that we are in the darke. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be throughly proportioned to the Heart of man, The labour of getting the Knowledge we have, and the vexation for the want of what we have not, and the griefe of parting so soon with it, would render the vexation of it far greater than the content.

Hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?

Is this the fruit, for which we fast?
And by pale studies sooner waste?

Doe we toyle and sweat, and even melt our selves away for that which we sooner forsake than find? Doe we deny our selves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeall condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? Is it naturall for gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we lose both

both it and our ſelves ? and to labour for ſuch a purchaſe, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed ſooner loſt than gotten ? Certainly were man not conſcious of his owne Immortalitie, there could be no ſtronger inducement to ſottiſhneſſe, luxury, ryot, ſenſuality, and all other unbridled practiſes. It is regiſtred for the impiety of Atheiſts ; *Let us eat and drinke, for too morrow we ſhall dye.*

Another Reaſon may be framed after the ſame manner, as was that to prove the *Spirituality* of the Soule from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on thoſe two ordinary Axiomes in Philoſophy, That *every thing is received according to the quality of the receiver*, and that *every thing hath the ſame manner of Eſſence, as it hath of operation.* Now the Soule of Man can eaſily receive impreſſions and conceits of Immortality, and diſcourſe thereupon: therefore alſo it is in its owne Eſſence and Nature immortall. We ſee even between things meerly corporeall, as the *Object* and the ſenſitive *Organ*, how ſmall a diſproportion works incapacity. Much more muſt it be found in ſo great a difference as would be between immortality of Objects and corruption of the Soule that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angell or Spirit, nor make any immateriall ſtamp in a piece of wax, ſince a *corporeall* ſubſtance is capable of none but corporeall impreſſions. And therefore we ſee that even amongſt Bodies, the more pure and ſubtile they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickeſt and moſt ſpirituall

sense, the sight. Now the Mind of man in Understanding, is but as Wax to the Seale, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it represents: which is the ground of that Paradox in *Aristotle*, that in Understanding the Soul is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax, after it is stamped, is in some sort the very Seale it selfe that stamp'd it, namely *Representative*, by way of Image and resemblance; so the Soule, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the Picture and Image of the thing it selfe. Now the Understanding, being able to apprehend Immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall substance, as if it were immortall, I meane by purging it from all grosse materiall and corruptible qualities) must therefore needs of it selfe be of an immortall Nature. And from the latter of those two Principles, which I speake of, namely, that the quality of the *Being* may be gathered from the Nature of the *Operation*, *Aristotle* inferres the *separability* and *independance* of the Understanding on the Body, in the third *de Animâ* aforenamed: For the Soule being able to worke without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act it selfe (as was before shewed) must needs also be able to subsist by its owne nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustaine it. And therefore he saith in the same place, that *the understanding* is *separable*, *uncompounded*, *impassible*; all arguments of *immortality*. Other reasons are produced for the proofe hereof, taken from the causes of corruption,

which

which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence of the Sunne; or thirdly by corruption of the subject whereon it depends. None whereof can be verefied in the Soule. For first, how can any thing be contrary to the Soule, which receiveth perfection from all things? for *Intellectus omnia intelligit*, saith *Aristotle*, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put off their Opposition. For (as a great man excellently speaketh) those things, which destroy one another in the *World*, maintaine and perfect one another in the *Mind*; one being a meanes for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the Soule (being else in it selfe simple and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation) doth never faile, and hath himself promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the Soule depends not, as doe other Formes, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only *Actus informans*, but *subsistens* too, by its owne absolute vertue.

Mornay of Christian Religion. Chap. 14.

Chap. XXXV.

Of the Honour of humane Bodies by Creation, by Resurrection; of the Endowments of glorified Bodies.

Vid. Cœl. Rhodig. l. 2. c. 9, 10, 11. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12. &c. Platonicâ sententiâ Carcer, Apostolica Templum. Tert. de Anim. Tert. de Carne Christi. Vid. Aug. l. 7. de Trin. c. 6.

AND now, that this particular of *Immortality* may further redound both to the honour and comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching Mans *Body*; wherein I intend not to meddle with the Question, How mans Body may be said to be made after the *Image of God*, which sure is not any otherwise, then as it is a sanctified and shall be a blessed Vessell, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation *Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus*: As if Christ had been the patterne of our Honour, and not we of his Infirmity, since the Scripture saith, He was made like unto us in all things, and that he assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him; not, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of *Immortality*, both in the first *structure*, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle cals it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be *Secundum Imaginem*, after

after his Image, who was *Primitiæ* the first fruits of them that rise. That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, so in our Exaltation our Mortality shall be swallowed up of his Glory. And for the first estate of Mans Body, we conclude in a word; that it was partly Mortall, and partly Immortall: *Mortall* in regard of possibility of Dying, because it was affected with the mutuall Action and Passion of corruptible Elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery of it selfe by food, as being still *Corpus Animale*, and not *Spirituale*, as S. *Paul* distinguisheth, a Naturall, but not a Spirituall Body. But it was *Immortall*, that is, Exempted from the Law of death and Dissolution of the Elements, in vertue of Gods Covenant with man, upon condition of his Obedience. It was Mortall *Conditione Corporis*, by the condition of a Body; but Immortall *Beneficio Conditoris*, by the Benefit of its Creation; else God had planted in the Soule such naturall desires of a Body wherein to worke as could not be naturally attained; For the Soule did naturally desire to remaine still in the Body. In the naturall Body of *Adam* there was no sinne, and therefore no death, which is the wages of sinne.

Aug. de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 25. de Civ. Dei. li. 13. c. 19. Vide quæ fuse & erudite disserit. Geor. Zeeman. tract. de Imag. Dei. c. 8. sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5---.

I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in *Pignore & in Primitiis*, in our Head, and in some few of his Members, *Enoch*, *Elias*, and (as is probable) in those dead Bodies which arose to testifie the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished

Ephes. 4. 30. Luke 21. 28. plished at that *day of Redemption*, as the same Apostle cals the Last day: that day of a full and finall Redemption, *when death, the last enemy, shall be overcome.* And well may it be called a *day of Redemption*, not only in regard of the *Creature*, which yet groaneth under the Malediction and Tyranny of sinfull Man: nor yet only in respect of *Mans Soule*, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the Glorifying Vision, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fulnesse thereof, as being the day of the Manifestation and plenary discovery both of the Punishing Glory of God in the Wicked, and of his Mercifull and admirable Glory in the Saints: but also, and (as I think) most especially in respect of the Body. For there is, by vertue of that Omnipotent Sacrifice, a double kind of Redemption wrought for us: The one *Vindicative*, giving us *Immunity* from all spirituall dangers, delivering us from the Tyranny of our Enemies, from the Severity, Justice, and Curse of the Law; which is commonly in the New Testament called simply Λύτρωσις and Ἀπολύτρωσις, a Deliverance from evill; The other *Purchasing*, or Munificent, by not only freeing us from our owne wretchednesse, but farther conferring upon us a Positive and a Glorious Honour, which Saint *John* cals ἐξουσία, a Power, Privilege, Prerogative, and Title unto all the Glorious Promises of Immortality: which likewise Saint *Paul* cals ἀπολύτρωσιν τῆς περιποιήσεως, the *Redemption of a purchased Possession*, and

Luke 1. 68. Heb. 9. 12. Luke 21. 28. Rom. 8. 23. Ephes. 1. 7.

Iohn 1. 12.

Ephes. 1. 14.

and a *Redemption unto the Adoption of Sons.* Now then the Laſt day is not Totally and Perfectly a *day of Redemption* unto our ſouls in either of theſe ſenſes, ſince they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the Wrath of the Judge, from the Tyrannie of the Enemy, from the Reigne of ſinne, and by Death freed not onely from the dominion, but from the Poſſeſſion, or Aſſault of the Enemy; not only from the Kingdome, but from the Body of Sinne; and is withall in good part poſſeſſed of that Bliſſe, which it ſhall more fully enjoy at laſt. But our *Bodies*, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here ſanctified veſſells, freed from the Authority and Power of the Devill, World, Fleſh, and from the Curſe of Death too, wherein they part not onely with life, but with ſinne; yet after all this doe they want ſome part of either Redemption: as namely to be raiſed and delivered from that diſhonour and corruption, which the laſt Enemy hath brought upon them: and to be Admitted into thoſe Manſions, and inveſted with that Glory, whereby they ſhall be Totally poſſeſſed of their Redemption. In a word, the Soule is in its ſeparation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the firſt; and in a great meaſure enjoyeth the Viſion of God, which is the ſecond part or degree of Mans Redemption. But the Body is not till its Reſurrection either quite freed from its Enemy, or at all poſſeſſed of its Glory. I meane in its ſelfe, though it be in its

Head, who is *Primitiæ & Pignus Resurrectionis*, the first fruits and earnest of our Conquest over Death.

Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, than Curiosity in the enquirie after it; yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be Raised, a *whole entire and perfect Body*, with all the parts best fitted to be Receptacles of Glory; freed from all either the Ushers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmity, Sickness, Corruption, Ignominie, and Dishonour: And shall raise a true, whole, strong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body shall not have those peculiar uses, which here they have, since they *neither eat, nor drink, marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God*: yet shall not any part be lost: *Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis retinentur*; Though they are freed from their Temporall service, for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgment, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Dishonour.

Tertull.

The second Dignity is that Change and Alteration of our Body from a *Naturall* to a *Spirituall Body*, whereby is not meant any Transubstantiation from a Corporall to a Spirituall substance: For our Bodies shall, after the Resurrection, be conformable unto Christs Body, which, though glorious, *was not yet a Spirit, but had flesh and bone, as we have*. Nor is it to be understood of a thin

Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 13. ca. 20. & 23. & Epist. 146.

a thin, Aereall, Inviſible Body (as ſome have collected) ſince Chriſt ſaith of his Body, after he was riſen, *Videte, Palpate.* Whereſoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all ſenſible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a ſtrong Argument, that it is not there, where it is not ſenſible; And therefore the Doctrines of *Vbiquity*, and Tranſubſtantiation, as they give Chriſt more than he is pleaſed to owne, an Immenſity of Body, ſo do they ſpoyle him of that, which hee hath been pleaſed for our ſakes to aſſume; Extenſion, Compacture, Maſſineſſe, Viſibility, and other the like ſenſible properties, which cannot ſtand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Chriſts Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in ſubſtance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmity, Ignominy, Animality) to be truly inveſted with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Chriſt hath an efficacie and operation in all parts of the world; it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by *Interceſsion*; amongſt the bleſſed Angels by *Confirmation*; in Earth, and that in all ages, and in all places amongſt Men, by Juſtification, and Comfort; in Hell amongſt the Devils aud Damned, by the Tremblings and Fears of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requireth only a preſence of Vertue, not of Subſtance. For doth not the Sunne work wonderfull effects in the bowels of the Earth, it ſelf notwithſtanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven? And why ſhould not the

Sunne of Righteousnesse worke as much at the like distance, as the Sunne of Nature? Why should he not be as Powerfull Absent, as he was Hoped? Or why should the Not presence of his Body make that uneffectuall now, which the Not existing could not before his Incarnation? Why should we mistrust the Eyes of *Stephen*, that saw him in Heaven, at such a Distance of place, when *Abraham* could see him in his own bowels through so great a Distance of Time?

That Speech then, that the Body shall be a Spirituall Body, is not to be understood in either of those former senses: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate Union and full *Inhabitation* of the vertue and vigour of Gods Spirit in our Bodies, quickning and for ever sustaining them without any Assistance of Naturall or Animall qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompence of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the naturall opposition of the Elements, is dayly diminished. Secondly, it shall be so called in regard of its *Obedience* and Totall Subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those *Spirituall qualities*, those *Prerogatives of the Flesh*, with which it shall be adorned; which are,

First, a *Shining* and Glorious *Light*, wherewithall it shall be clothed as with a Garment: for *the Just shall shine as the Sunne in the Firmament*. Now, this shall be wrought first by vertue of that *Communion*, which wee have with Christ our Head,

Head, whose Body, even in its Morallity, *did shine like the Sunne, & had his cloaths white as light.* And secondly, by *diffusion* and *Redundancie* from our Soule upon our Body, which by the Beatificall Vision, filled with a Spirituall and unconceiveable brightnesse, shall work upon the Body, as one a Subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.

De mirâ vi Animæ in Corpus vide Cæl. Rhodig. li. 11. ca. 15, 16.

The second Spirituall Property shall bee *Impassibility*, not in respect of *Perfective*, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or *destructive Passion*. These shall not be any Warre in the members, any fighting and mutuall languishing of the Elements; but they shall be sustained in their full strength by vertue of Christs Communion, of the Inhabitation of the spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified Soule. There shall be no need of rest, or sleepe, or meat, all which are here requisite for the supply of our Infirmities and dayly defects, and are onely the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the Blessednesse of Possession. For although Christ after his Resurrection did eat before his Disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, then that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was onely for our sakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without these visible and inferour Witnesses, by which he was pleased to make his very Glorified flesh a proportioned Object to our fraile sense and faith, that so wee might thence learne confidently to rely for our selves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or

it was done (as *St. Augustine* speaks) *Non ex Necessitate, sed ex Potestate*: as the Sun is said to draw and suck up standing waters: *Non Pabuli Egestate, sed Virtutis Magnitudine*, Not to Nourish, but to Manifest its vertue.

De Civit. Dei. lib. 15.

Thirdly, the Body shall be a *strong and beautifull* Body, throughly able to minister unto the Soul any service, wherein it shall imploy it, and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clogge, and luggage thereof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity (which ever ariseth out of the distemper and discord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced unto a full, comely and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their Death comtemptible, Infants, lame, dismembered, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption; *Naturæ, non injuriæ reddimur*, we shall be restored to our *Nature*, but not to our *shame*; the Dust shall still retaine and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.

Ita nihil perituru de Corpore ut nihil deforme maneat in Corpore. Vid Aug. Enchirid. c. 91. & de Civ. Dei. l. 22. cap. 19. 20. Tertul. de resurvitia detrahentur, Natura servabitur. Aug. de Civ. Dei l. 22. c. 27.

The last quality of our Bodies which I shall observe, is a perfect *subtilty* and *agility*, best befitting their service for the Soule in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, then here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and spacious Countrey. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the Souls glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, add the sweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquisite Operation of the

senses,

ſenſes, the Bodily communion and fellowſhip of the Saints, and, above all, the Eternall Corporeall viſion of that moſt ſacred Body, whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whoſe preſence were truly and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell it ſelfe a Place of Glory: how much more that Countrey, and thoſe Manſions, where the Soule likewiſe ſhall be ſwallowed up with the immediate viſion and fruition of Divine Glory. Our Souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our Bodies ſhall be there.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of that part of Gods Image in the Soul, which anſwereth to his Power, Wiſdom, Knowledge, Holines. Of Mans dominion over other Creatures. Of his love to Knowledge. What remainders we retain of Originall Iuſtice.

THe other Properties or Attributes of God, of which Mans Soul beareth an *Image* and dark reſemblance, are thoſe, which according to our Apprehenſion ſeem not ſo Intrinſecall and Eſſentiall as the former. And they are ſuch as may be either generally collected from the manifeſtation of his *Works*, or more particularly from his *Word*. Theſe, which referre unto *his Works*, are his *Power*, in Making and Ruling them; his *Wiſdome* in Ordering and

and Preserving them; his knowledge in the Contemplation of them: and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon mans Soule.

Concerning the Attribute of *Power*, most certaine it is that those great parts of Gods workmanship, *Creation*, and *Redemption*, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his owne Prerogative Royall. Insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto our selves the least resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceedings of Gods workes there is some Analogie and Resemblance in the Workes of Men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of *Nature*, but the Ordinary workes of God? All formes and intrinsecall Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments; *for by him we live, and move, and have our being*. And of all other workes, mans only imitate *Nature*: as *Aristotle* observes of the Workes of *Art*, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that naturall instinct, which is Intrinsecally belonging to their condition, without any manner of Art or variety) The Resemblances of Nature in the Workes of Art are chiefly seene in these two Proportions: first, as Nature doth nothing in Vaine, but in all her Works aymes at some End, the *Perfection*, or the *Ornament*, or the *Conversation* of the Universe (for those are the three ends of Nature subordinate to the Maine, which is the Glory of the Maker) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the understanding to some

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one of those ends; either to the prefection of Men, such are all those, which enforme the Understanding, and governe the life; or to his Conservation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decays, or sheltering the weaknesses of Nature; or lastly to his Ornament; such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Inventions, which, though not necessary to his being, yet are speciall instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or Intellectuall.

The second Resemblance, is betweene the Manner and Progresse of their Workes: for as the Method of nature is to proceed *ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora*, and *per determinata Media ad suum Finem*, So Artlikewise (as is plaine in those which are Manuall) by certain fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the helpe of Instruments appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits Mans dignity, as well as commends it, I forbeare to speake of. Though even herein also we doe seeme to imitate God, who in his great worke of Creation did proceed both by succession of Time, and degrees of Perfection; only it is *Necessity* in us which was in him his *Will*.

To come therefore nearer, it is observable, that in the first Act of Gods power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was Nothing here below created properly, immediately, and totally, but the Chaos and Masse, or the

Earth without forme, and voide, out of the Obedience whereof, his power did further educe and extract those Wonderfull, Various, and Beautifull Formes, which doe evidently set forth unto the Soule of Man, the Glory and Majestie of him that made them. By a small Resemblance of this manner of Working, man also in those Workes of Art, peculiar to him from other Creatures, doth *ex potentia Obedientiali* (as the Schooles call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection of any proposed Masse produce, *Non per Naturam, sed per imperium*, Not out of the Nature of the Subject, but by the command of Reason sundry formes of Art full of Decency and Beauty.

And for *Government*, I meane Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdued unto Man; and, next unto the Glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit *; And therefore, when ever wee finde any of them hurtfull and Rebellious, wee cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our owne disloyalty; they doe but revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a Faithfull care and jealousie to Preserve his Honour, renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitour * And indeed how can we looke to have our Dominion intire over Beasts and inferiour Creatures, when by continuall Enormities we make our selves as one of them?

This

* *Vid. Tertul. de Resurrect c. 26. Ambros. Hexam. l. 6. c 6 Nyssen. Orat 1. in faciamus hominem, &c. Aug. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 3. c 20. Damas. de Orthod. fid. lib. 2. cap. 30. Sanctius his animal mentisquè capacius altæ decrat adhuc, & quod Dominarii in cætera. posset Natus. Homo est Ovid Mat. l. 1. Quia per peccatum Homo deservit eum sub quo esse debuit subditus est eis supra quæ esse debuit. Aug Tract. 8, in Iohan.*

This *Dominion* of Man over the Creatures, sheweth it selfe in severall things. In the Admirable *skill* that man hath to *use* the Creatures, unto Rationall and Artificiall Ends, which no other Creature can doe. As the Fire is an Instrument to the Smith, the Founder, the Chymist, to every Artificer. The winde and water ordered to grinde Corne, to carry up and downe Vessels: Stones and Timber to make goodly Frames of building. There is not the meanest of Creatures whereof the Reason of man hath not found out some needfull use tending either unto life, or health, or pleasure, or ease, or facility of operation, or some one or other end for the service of man.

In the *feare* that even now God hath placed in many great and strong Creatures towards Man, so that one Childe is able to drive a whole Herd of them before him. In the skill which Man hath to *tame* and subdue fierce Creatures, which otherwise might annoy him; and to make use even of Vipers, and poysonous Creatures unto wholesome ends. In the power which he hath to *instruct* docile Creatures, as the Elephant, the Dogge, the Horse, the Bird, to obey the Dictates, and to imitate the expressions of humane reason. In the strange Instinct that God hath put into some hurtfull Creatures to feare man, as the Serpent; into others to come abroad at such times only when man stayeth in, and *when the Sun ariseth for man to goe forth unto his work, then they lye downe in their dennes.*

Vid Plin. lib. 8. cap. 8 9. &c. Iam. 3. 7.

Plin. lib. 8 c. 7.

Ps. 104. 20, 23.

Gen. 1.28.9.2. The grounds of this *Dominion* are, 1. The Originall grant and deed of Gift made by God unto man, both in the Creation of the world, unto *Adam*, and in the Reparation of it, unto *Noah*. Unto both whom God brought the Creatures, and delivered them unto their custody and disposition. 2. The Order of Nature, which dictateth this Law unto the Creatures, that the more imperfect and ignorant should be regulated by those which are most wise and perfect; else power let loose from wisedome, would presently fill the face of Nature with confusion and disorder. 3. The Providence of God, implanting a notable instinct of awfulnesse, obedience, docility, serviceablenesse in the Creatures towards man; and of wisedome and sagacity in man for the use of them. 4. The generall end of Gods glory: For the other Creatures cannot actively and intentionally direct their Faculties or Vertues unto God, as having no Knowledge of him; But man having Gods glory for his own end, is able in the Use of all the Creatures (which God made for himselfe) to contemplate the various wisedome, power, goodnesse, providence of God, and to direct them all to the setting forth of his Glory.

This *Dominion* standeth first in a *solemne Delivery*, and Seisin, and possession given by God unto Man, when the Creatures were either by the Ministery of Angels, or some other act of Manuduction brought unto *Adam*, and put into his hands, and *received names* from him in

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* token of his ſpeciall authority over them, to command them by their names. As the Subjects of a Prince doe in a more ſolemne manner preſent their homage and fealties before him at his Inauguration.

Secondly, in a *plenary power* over them, and that Two-fold; a *power to Awe*, and ſubdue them to his government: *Let the feare of you and the dread of you be upon all living Creatures on the earth, &c.* And a *power to uſe* them. Their *Natures* for Contemplation, and Delight. Their *Abilities*, Sagacities, Strength, Swiftneſſe, Sympathies, Antipathies, unto ſuch ends whereunto they ſhould be ſerviceable. Their *Lives* and *Subſtance* to Aliment, Indument, Ornament, or any other uſe, when Mans Neceſſity ſhould require it.

And this Power of Man over the Creatures, was moſt *Generall*, reaching to thoſe with whom hee had leaſt ſociety; the Fiſhes of the Sea, and the Fowles of Heaven. Moſt *Eaſie* both by reaſon of the *Inſtinct* which God put into the Creatures to feare and ſerve Man, and of the *Wiſedome* which hee put into Man to diſcerne the natures and fitneſſe of ſeverall Creatures for ſeverall ſervices, and accordingly to apply them. Moſt *Equall* and Juſt, without ſinne, tyranny, oppreſſion, violence, under which the Creature now groaneth, and is made *ſubject unto Vanity*, as the Apoſtle ſpeaketh.

This part of Gods Image in Man, is by his Fall much weakned, as wee may obſerve

* *Dominantis enim eſt nomina imponere. vid. A. Gell. l. 17. c. ult. Cic. ad. Att. l. 4. Ep. 14 lib. 7. ep 8. Sueton. in Octav. c. 101 Vid. Caſaub. in Baron. exercit. 13. ſect. 13. Briſſon de Form. lib. 7.*

serve by the Rebellion and Insurrection of the Creatures against him: So that though by wisdome hee tame many Creatures, yet hee cannot with his brow and countenance awe them as he could at first. Wee finde the Starres fighting against one, the Sunne and Moone against another; the Earth against *Corah*, the Sea against *Pharoah*, the Fire against *Ahazia*, the Lions against *Samaria*, the Quailes against *Israel*, the Asse refusing the service, and rebuking the madnesse of *Balaam*. The losse and diminution of this Power is notably seene in this, that mans Authority is perished, or much abated over the *greatest* and over the *smallest* of Creatures. The one with power and strength affright him, the other with nimblenesse, or with number escape him. The one an exprobration of his weakenesse, the other of his vilenesse. And therefore when God plagued Egypt, hee did it not by Lions and Tygers, but by Locusts, and Frogges, and Lice, the weakest and basest Creatures: So hee resisted the pride of *Pharaoh*, so hee consumed the pride of *Herod*, making base things to vindicate his Glory, and weake things to execute his Justice upon the pride of those who thought themselves Great enough to rob him of his Glory, and to outface his Justice.

Observatum Pereria ex Hugone in Gen. 1 26.

But though this Dominion be by sinne *diminished*, yet it is not *extinguished*, but in part Continued, and in part Renewed unto us,

Continued

Continued by the Generall *Providence of God*, whereby hee is pleaſed to preſerve things in that courſe of Subordination wherein firſt he made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the uſe of his Creatures, even then when hee is a priſoner unto his Juſtice. *Renewed*, by the *Promiſe* and Grant made againe unto *Noah*. And there is a Double Promiſe under which wee may enjoy the Creatures, the one a *Morall Promiſe* made unto *Induſtry*; as, *The Diligent hand maketh Rich*; and *hee that Plowеth his Land, ſhall have plenty of Corne: the* other an *Evangelicall Promiſe* made unto *Piety*, and Faith in Chriſt, whereby is given unto Chriſtian men both a *freer uſe* of the Creatures than the *Iewes* had, and a *purer uſe* than the *wicked* have. For, *unto the Cleane all things are Cleane.*

And this Grant of God doth ſometimes ſhew it ſelfe *extraordinarily*, as in the Obedience of the Crowes to *Eliah*, the Viper to *Paul*, the Lions to *Daniel*, the Whale to *Ionah*, the Fire to the three Children, and the trembling and feare of wilde Beaſts towards many of the Martyrs: alwayes *Ordinarily*, in ordering and diſpenſing the courſe of Nature ſo, as that Humane Society may bee preſerved, both by power in ſubduing the Creatures which hee muſt uſe, and by wiſedome in eſcaping the Creatures which hee doth feare.

Euſeb. lib. 8. c. 7. Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit. Euſeb. l. 4. c. 14.

Now for the ſecond Attribute, * *Wiſedome*, there

* *Gen. 1. v. ult. Eccleſ. 7. 30.*

Col.3.10. Gen.2.19,23.

*Iob.1.5. Eph.4.17,18. Rom.3.13. Col.1.21. Prov.22.15.

there is also a remainder of the Image thereof in Man: for albeit, the fall and corruption * of Nature hath darkned his eyes, so that hee is inclined to worke Confusedly, or to walke as in a Maze, without Method or Order (as in a Storme the Guider of a Vessell is oftentimes to seeke of his Art, and forced to yeeld to the windes and waves) yet certaine it is that in the minde of Man there still remaines a Pilot, or Light of Nature, many Principles of Practicall prudence, whereby (though for their faintings a man do's often miscarry and walke awry) the course of our Actions may be directed with successe and issue unto Civill and Honest ends. And this is evident, not onely by the continuall practise of Grave and Wise men, in all States, Times, and Nations; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Polititians, and Philosophers have by their naturall Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a mans just ends, and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.

Lastly, for the Attribute of Knowledge, It was doubtlesse after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man, when hee was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their severall Properties and Nature; and in them to shew himselfe, as well a Philosopher, as a Lord. *Hee filled them*, saith *Siracides*, *with*

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the Knowledge of Vnderstanding. And herein, if we will beleeve *Aristotle*, the Soule is most neerely like unto *God*, whose infinite Delight is the Eternall Knowledge and Contemplation of himselfe, and his Works. Hereby, saith he, the Soule of Man is made most Beloved of God, and his Mind, which is allied unto God, is it selfe Divine, and, of all other parts of man, most Divine. And this made the Serpent use that Insinuation only, as most likely to prevaile, for compassing that cursed and miserable project of Mans ruine. By meanes of which Fall, though Man blinded his Understanding, and robb'd himselfe of this, as of all other blessed habits, I meane of those excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet still the Desire remaines vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often præjudiciall to the estate both of the Body and Mind. So that it is as true now, as ever, that man is by Nature a curious and inquiring Creature, of an Active and restlesse Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding it selfe into all the paths of Nature; and continually traversing the World of Knowledge. There are two maine Desires naturally stamped in each Creature; a Desire of *Perfecting*, and a Desire of *Perpetuating* himselfe. Of these *Aristotle* attributeth in the highest degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he saith, that of all the works of living Creatures, the most naturall is to Generate the like: and his Reason is ἵνα τῶ ἀεὶ καὶ τῷ θείῳ μετέχειν ἐφίεται. Because hereby

Ethic. l. 10.

Lib. 2. de Anim. cap. 4.

thereby that Immortality (the principall End (as he there supposeth) of all naturall Agents) which in their own Individuals they cannot obtaine, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued off-spring and succession. But (though in regard of life it held true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himselfe that other desire of *Perfection*, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principall advancements of the Soule) should not only in a Positive sence, as *Aristotle* hath determined in the Entrance to his Metaphysicks, but in a Superlative degree be verified, that He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the Principall thing (to use *Aristotle* his owne reason) whereby Man doth τὸ θεῖον μετέχειν, Partake of *Divinity*, as I observe before out of *Aristotle* himselfe. And the reason of the difference between Man and other Creatures in this particular is: First, Because Man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his owne Immortality, which takes away the Necessity of Propagation to sustaine his Nature. And secondly, because Knowledge, the Perfection of the Soule, is to Man (as I may so speake) a kind of *Generation*, being of sufficiencie to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injury of Time, and making him to survive and out-live his owne Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendred unto each Region of the World those Elements and Prin-

ciples whereof it was compoſed, and hath not ſo much as Duſt and Cinders left to teſtifie that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowledg, beyond the reach of Fate and Corruption.

The Attributes of God, which are manifeſted more eſpecially in his Word, though ſundry, yet (as farre forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprized in this more generall one of *Holineſſe*. Whereby I underſtand that Abſolute and Infinite Goodneſſe of his Nature, which is in him moſt Perfect, Pure, and Eternall. Of which, though Man according to that meaſure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly robb'd and ſpoyl'd, as not being able in any thing to reſemble it, or to retaine any the leaſt Prints of thoſe pure and Divine Impreſſions of Originall Righteouſneſſe; yet ſtill there remaines, even in depraved and polluted Nature ſome ſhadowes thereof: There is ſtill the *Opus operatum* in many actions of Mortality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true End, whither it ſhould be directed, take away the Goodneſſe and the Sanctity thereof. The top and higheſt pitch of Nature toucheth the hemme and loweſt of Grace. We have in us the Teſtimonies, though not the Goodneſſe of our firſt Eſtate: the Ruines of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be inhabited. It is true indeed thoſe great endowments of the moſt ſevere and illightned Heathen, were indeed but glorious

miseries and withered Vertues, in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aymed at sinister and false ends: yet withall both the corruption of them proves their præcedent losse (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times:) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weake, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an Original aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universall Purity. Now in this Rectitude and perfect Regularity of the Soule in this divine Habit of Originall Justice did Man most eminently beare the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still Immortall, Spirituall, Reasonable; yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary pollution. And he alwayes recovereth most part thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruines, and vindicateth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime Originall Purity, wherein he was created.

These are the Dignities of the Soul considered wholly in it selfe. In all which it farre surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withall. And yet such is the prepostorous and unnaturall baseneſſe of many men, that they are content to make their soules vassals to their owne servant. How doe they force their Understandings, which in their owne worthiest objects, those deep and divine Contemplations,

plations, are as drowzie as *Endymion*, to ſpend and waſt themſelves in proud, luxurious vaniſhing Inventions? How doe they enthrall that Supreme and Architectonicall Power in Mans little world, his Will, to the Tyranny of ſlaviſh appetite, and ſenſuall deſires? as if they ſerved here but as Cooks to dreſſe their own bodies for the wormes? Strange is it that Man, conſcious to himſelfe of Immortality, and of an Heroicall and Heavenly Complexion, that hath received ſuch immediate Impreſſions of God, and is the very Modell of all Natures Perfections, ſhould ſo much degrade himſelfe, as to doat only on that part, which is the vaſſall and ſlave of Death. If there were no other miſchiefe which ſinne did the Soule but to debaſe it, even that were argument ſufficient for noble ſpirits to have it in deteſtation. For man being in honour, and which underſtandeth not, is like the beaſts that periſh.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the Faculty of Vnderstanding. Its operations outward upon the Object. Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Judgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Severall kinds of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto Man in his Creation The benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Natural, Voluntary, Penall. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatilousnesse of Conceits. The benefit of Modest Hesitancie.

NOw it followes to speake of the parts or principall powers of the Soule, which are the *Vnderstanding*, and the *Will*. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the *Latitude* and excellent Variety of its *Objects*, being the whole world of things (for *Ens & Intelligibile* are reciprocall, & *omnia*

omnia intelligit, saith *Aristotle* of the Understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the *Operations* of it both *ad extra* in respect of the *Objects*, and *ad intra* in respect of the *Will*. The one is a *Contemplative*, the other a more *Practique* Office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Active Operations. *Passive* I call those first perceptions and apprehensions of the Soule, whereby it receiveth the *simple* species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministery of the Soule; as when I understand one Object to be a Man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.

Aristot. de Anim. l 3.

Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are *mixed Operations* of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which we call *Discourse*. Of all which to speake according to their Logicall Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellency chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve, which is *Knowledge*; of the which, I shall therefore here speake a few things.

Knowledge is the Assimilation of the Understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe irradiate it, and put the power of it into Act. For as the beames of the Sunne shining on a glasse

Aquin. par. 1. q. 14. a. 2.

glasse, doe there worke the Image of the Sunne: so the species and resemblances of things being conveighed on the Understanding, doe there work their owne Image. In which respect the Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becommeth All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, we call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the Eye.

Arist. de Anim. l.3.c.4.& 5.

There is not any Desire more Noble, nor more Naturall unto a Man (who hath not like *Saul* hid himselfe amongst the stuffe, and lost himselfe in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) then is this *Desire of Knowledge*. Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specificall then upon its Genericall perfection. And hence it is that though *Man* be the perfectest of all Creatures, yet many doe excell him in Sensitive Perfection. Some in exquisiteness of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Tast, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnesse and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when wee have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpasse us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our owne specificall and rationall Perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfet on their Objects.

Vid. Plin. lib. 7. in Procem. Et Lactant. de Opifi. Dei. c. 2, 3. Et Cœl. Rhodigi lib. 2. cap. 9.

But

But *Knowledge* as knowledge, doth never either burthen or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the * *Rest of the Vnderstanding*, wherein it taketh delight as a Thing in its naturall place.

And so great is this Delioht, that Men have ventured on much trouble to procure it. * As *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as *Salomon* sent to *Ophir* for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to beare them. A true Lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distresse, if it doe not violate, and restrain their particular appetite. If hee may enjoy the Delights of Learning, hee will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. *Archimedes* was not sensible of the losse of *Syracuse*, being holy intent upon a Mathematicall Demonstration. And *Demetrius Phalerius* deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetnesse of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the quick, but when he is punished in his most delightfull affections, of all which the most predominant in Rationall men is this of Knowledge.

And therefore as the first Creature God formed was *Light* (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might

* Τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τῶν διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα. *Aristot. Physic. l.7.c.2. Text 20* ἕξις ἐπιστητικὴ. *Clem Alex. Strom. lib.2.* Τὸ πέρας τῆς γνώσεως ἐν ἅπασι. *Cl. Alex. præd. l.1. c.6.*

* *Vid. Valer. Max. l.8.c.7. Theodor. Ser. de fide Clem. Alex. Strom. lib.1 p 222,223.*

Cicero de finibus, lib.5.

ſet forth and manifeſt his Glory) ſo the firſt motion of *Adam* after his Creation was towards *Knowledge*. By his Exerciſe of Knowledge hee ſhewed Gods Image in him, and by the Ambition after more hee loſt it: As no man ſinnes eaſier than in the Thing which hee beſt loves. And for this cauſe we may obſerves that Chriſts frequenteſt Miracles were ſhewed in opening the eyes of the blind, and the eares of the deafe and dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themſelves on thoſe Faculties which are the chiefe Inſtruments of *Knowledge* in Men which they moſt love.

Malunt homines mente lamentari quam lætari in Amentia. Aug. Civ. Dei, l 11, *cap* 27.

And this love of *Knowledge* is ſeen evidently in this, that men had rather have ſober Calamities, than mad pleaſures, and more freely chooſe cleare Intellectuals with miſerie, than diſturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themſelves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their ſtudies, than to purchaſe a better Health at ſo great a Price as the loſſe of Learning.

But the Principall Excellency of *Knowledge* is this, That it guideth the Soule to *God*: and ſo doth all kinde of Right Knowledge in divers reſpects. For firſt, there is ſcarce any Science properly ſo called, which hath not its *Arcana* to poſe and amaze the Underſtanding, as well as its more eaſie Concluſions to ſatisfie it. Such as are in Philoſophy, thoſe

thoſe *Occult Sympathies and Antipathies*, of which naturall Reaſon can render no Account at all: which overcomming the utmoſt Vigour of humane Diſquiſition, muſt needs enforce us to beleeve that there is an admirable Wiſedome that diſpoſeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth thoſe ſecrets which we are not able to fathome.

Againe, ſince the *Knowledge* of Things is either of their *beings*, or of their *properties* and *operations*: And Nature abhorreth the Motion of proceeding (*a*) *in Infinitum*; in either of theſe, neceſſary it is, that the Mind of man (*b*) tracing the fooſteps of naturall things, muſt by the Act of *Logicall Reſolution* at laſt ariſe to him who is the fountaine of all *being*, the firſt of all *Cauſes*, the Supreame over all *Movers*, in whom all the reſt have their Beings and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us. (*c*) *I will heare the Heavens, and the Heavens ſhall hear the earth, and the earth the corne, and wine, and they Iezreel.* *Iezreel* cannot ſubſiſt without *Corn* and *Wine*, ſhe cries to them to help it; theſe cannot help without the *Earth* to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitfull. The *Earth* can bring forth nothing of it ſelfe without influence, benignity, and comfortable ſhowers from the *Heavens*, it cries to them for aide. (*d*) The *Heavens* cannot give Raine nor Warmth of them-

a Ἠρώτης φύσεως τὶ ἄπειρον, *Ariſt. de Generat. Animal. lib 1. cap 1.* Οὐδὲν εἰς ἄπειρον προιόντι, ἀλλὰ ϛήσεται πᾶν ἐφ ἑϛατῷ τὶ ὁ πρώτως αἴτιον ἐϛιν τῷ κινεῖσθαι *Ariſt. Phyſic. lib. 7. cap. 1. Text. 3.*

b *Vid. Juſtin. Martyr qu. ad Græc. qu. 3. Tertull. Apol. cap. 17, 18. De Reſurrect. carnis, cap. 12. Contra Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 17, 18. Baſil. Hexam. Homil. 1. Aug. Confeſſ. lib. 10. cap. 6.*

Irenæus, lib. 2. cap. 9. Theophyl. ad Antel. lib. 1. c Hoſ. 2. 21, 22. d Jerem. 14. 22. Job 38. 24, 37.

selves, without him who is the Father of rain, and the Fountain of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The *Connexion* and concatenation of all second Causes to one another: The *Co-operation* of them together for the good of the Church: and the *Subordination* of them all to *God*, unto whom at length the more accurate inquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this Subordination standeth in foure things: 1. All things are subordinate unto God in (*a*) *Being*. He only hath Being *per Essentiam*, By Absolute and Originall Essence; all other things *per participationem*, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. (*b*) In *Conversation*. For God doth not make his creatures as a Carpenter doth his house, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very *Being* from him, that *Being* cannot *be* or *continue* without his supportance, as light in the house dependeth both in *being* and in *continuance* upon the Sunne. 3. In regard (*c*) of *Gubernation* and providence; for all things are by his Wisdome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which flie out of the order of his Precepts, doe fall into the order of his Providence. Lastly, in regard of (*d*) *Operation*. For in him we live and move, hee worketh our workes for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any causality till he be pleased to concurr with them.

Again, since we finde that all other Creatures

a *Vid Plutarch. lib. de* Ei. Exod. 3. 14. Isai. 40. 17. Act. 17. 28. Rom. 11. 36. 1 Cor. 8 6. Col. 1. 16, 17. Heb. 1. 2.

b Neh. 9 6. Job. 12. 10. Psal. 104. 29. Isai. 40. 24.

c Mat. 10. 29. Prov. 16. 4. Gen. 48. 28. Act. 4. 27, 28.

d Act. 17. 28. Isa. 26. 12. Job. 10. 8. Ps. 139. 15, 16. 1 Cor. 12. 6. Isa. 10. 5.

tures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which nature hath Grasted in them, proportionable Objects of equall latitude in goodnesse to the Faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest doe enjoy. Since then the supreme Appetite of the Reasonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfie this Desire: But that still there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquiry after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanyed with Unquietnesse, and labour (as the Beast first stirres the mudde in the water with his feet, before hee drinkes it with his mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the Soule be carried at the last to *God*, The Adequate and * Ultimate End and Object of all our Desires, as *Noahs* Dove was carried back to the Ark, when she found no place for the soal of her foot to rest on.

Againe, when wee see things which have no knowledge, worke so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to goe, wee must needs conclude they are guided by a mighty Wisdome and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skilfull Archer that directed it.

* *Vid. Aug. Confess. l.* 1. *cap.* 1. *& lib.* 4. *cap.* 10. 12. *& lib.* 13. *cap.* 8. *de Trin. lib.* 8. *cap.* 3. *Dr. Field* of the Church. *lib.* 1. *cap.* 1 *Hooker* Ecclesiasticall Pol. *l.* 1. *sect.* 11.

Unto the Perfection of *Knowledge*, after due and proper Representation of *Objects* in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the Minde; There are in the *Subject* three things requisite.

Representatio rerum. Judicium de Rebus Representatis. Aquin. 22. æ. qu. 173. Art. 21.

First, Clearnesse of *Apprehension*, to receive the right and distinct Notion of the things represented, as the clearnesse of a Glasse serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that lookes upon it, whereas if it be soil'd or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect shape.

Secondly, Solidity of *Iudgement* to try and weigh the particulars, which wee apprehend. That out of them we may sever for our use the precious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent enquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire, and fanne, to give it us purified from drosse and levity. And this in speculation answereth unto the generall vertue of *practicall prudence* in Morality, whereby we weigh the severall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.

Musæ itaque dictæ Iovis & Mnemosynes filiæ. Cæl. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.

Thirdly, Fidelity of *Retention*: for he is not likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a * *bag with holes*. For as Nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporeall strength, and nutriment,

* *Hag. 2. 6.*

triment, a *Retentive power* to claſp and hold faſt that which preſerveth it, untill a through concoction be wrought; ſo proportionably is the Faculty of *Memory* given to Reaſon, as a means to conſolidate and enrich it. And *fluxes*, as in the Body, ſo in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weakneſſe. Whence it comes to paſſe that in matter of learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit perſons to breed up unto Learning, wee ſhould take a like courſe as wiſe Architects doe in choice of fit Timber for Building. They chooſe firſt the ſtraiteſt and that which hath feweſt knots and flaws in it; which in the minde anſwereth unto clearneſſe and evenneſſe of Apprehenſion. For a cleare minde, like ſtreight and ſmooth Timber, will worke eaſieſt. Next, they take the heart and ſtrongeſt ſubſtance, and cut out the ſap; becauſe that is beſt able to beare the weight that ſhall be laid upon it: And this anſwers unto maturity and firmneſſe of judgement. Laſtly, they doe not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and ſuch other meterialls as are quickly apt to putrifie and wear away, but ſuch Timber as is laſting and Retentive of its Nature; as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superſtruction of the nature of the Foundation, ſtrong and laſting: and this anſwereth to that excellent Faculty of the Minde, a *Rationall memory*:

memory: from which one particular (I thinke more than any other) doe arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the mindes of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappinesse of *Calvisius Sabinus* in *Seneca*, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retaine fast the names of *Achilles*, or *Vlysses*: But, as his Parasite was wont diridingly to advise him, wanted a Grammaticall Attendant to gather up the fragments which his memory let fall. And *Curio* the Orator in *Tully*, was wont when he had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to adde a fourth; yea *Messala Corvinus* forgat his owne name, as *Pliny* telleth us. And as wonderfull on the other side hath been the felicity of some others. (*a*) *Seneca* the Father could repeat two thousand words together in their order. (*b*) *Cyrus* and *Themistocles* could call all their Souldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of courtesie (*c*) *Otho* aspired unto the empire) (*d*) *Adrian* could read a booke which he never saw before, and after recite it by memory; and of the Emperor (*e*) *Iulian* it is said, that he had drunke *Totum memoriæ dolium*, the whole vessell of memory. To say nothing of (*f*) *Simonides*, and *Apollonius Tyaneus*, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 yeers old, were very famous for the exquisiteneſse of their memories; nor of *Cyneas*, *Charmidas*, *Portius Latro*, and divers others, who have been admired

Senec. Ep. 27. Vid etiam Cœl. Rhod. l. 11. c. 10.

Vt Grammaticos haberet Analectas.

Cicero in Bruto, & in Oratore.

Plin. l. 7. c. 24.
a *M. Senec. Controvers. lib. 1 in Prolog.*
b *Plin. l. 7. c. 24. Quint. lib. 11. cap. 2. Val. Max. lib 8. cap. 7. sect. 15.*
c *Alex. ab Alex. lib. 6. cap. 18.*
d *Æli. Spartian. in Adriano.*
e *Ammian. Marcell. lib. 16.*
f *Plin. Supra. Suidas in Apoll. Voss. Instit. Orat. l. 6. c. 6. sect. 2.*
g *De quibus mentio apud Plinium & M. Senecam & Quintil. ut supra.*

mired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodicall and orderly Disposition of Minde, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for *Cyrus* to remember men in an *Army* than in a *Throng*. And hence hath proceeded the *Art of Memory*, invented as *Pliny* tels us by *Simonides*, and perfected by *Metrodorus Sceptius*, consisting in the committing of severall Heads of matter unto distinct places, whereof *Quintillian* discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.

Of Knowledge there are severall sorts, according to severall Considerations with respect to the *Ends* of it. Some is *Speculative* for the improving of the Minde, as Physicall, Metaphysicall, and Mathematicall Knowledge. Others *Practicall* for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of men, as Ethicall, Politicall, Historicall, Militarie Knowledge. Some *mixt* of both, as *Theologicall* Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine *Verities*, and in the direction of Divine *Duties*. Some *Instrumentall*, being only subservient unto others, as Grammaticall, Rhetoricall, Dialecticall learning. In regard of *Order*, some *Superiour*, others *Subalternate*, as Musick to Arithmetick, Opticks to Geometry. In regard of their *Originall*, some *Ingrafted*, as the Supreme *Principles* of Veritie, and implanted Notions of Moralitie, which is called the *Law of Nature*, and *written in the Heart of all men*, Romans 2. 14, 15. Other *Ac-*

quired, and by Search and Industry laboured out of those *Principles*, and the others which are taught us. Other *Revealed* and Divinely manifested to the Faith of men, whereof the supreme *Principles* are these two. 1. That *God* in his Authority is *infalliable*, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleeved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainly set downe *in termi-nis*, is an unquestionable Principle; and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theologicall and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the *manner* of Acquiring, some is *Experimentall*, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some *Habituall*, a generall Knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by *Invention* from a Mans Industry, or by *Auscultation* and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of *Objects*, some *Supreme*, as the Knowledge of *Principles* and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Termes. Others *derived* and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of *Conclusions*. In regard of *Perfection*, *Intuitive* Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know

know things by the View, and *Diſcurſive*, as that of Men, whereby we know things by Ratiocination. In regard of *Order* and Method, *Syntheticall*, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Compoſition from the Cauſes to the Effects; and *Analyticall*, when wee riſe up from Effects unto their Cauſes, in a way of Reſolution.

With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its firſt Creation: ſo farre forth as the Neceſſity of a Happy and Honourable Life, of the Worſhip and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himſelfe, and of the Inſtruction of his Poſterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not thinke that God, who made Man in a perfect ſtature of Body, did give him but an Infant ſtature of Mind. God made all things *exceeding Good*, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soule of Man, was doubtleſſe given unto it, in its firſt Creation. Hee made man *right* and ſtraight; and the Rectitude of the Mind is in *Knowledge* and Light; and therefore the Apoſtle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is *after the Image of him that Created us*, Coloſſians 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fit Names, and ſuitable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpoſe were

De iſtâ Materiâ fuſiùs diſputant Scholaſtici ad l. 2. diſt. 23. & ad part. 1. Tho. Aquin. 94. & Perer. in Gen. 2. 19, 20. l. 5. diſput. 1. de Amplitud. & Excellent. Scient. Adami.

brought unto him. He could not have awed and governed ſo various, and ſo ſtrong Creatures, to preſerve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongſt them. Hee could not have given ſuch an Account of the Subſtance and Originall of *Eve*. Of the End of her Creation, to be the Mother of all living men, as hee did. *Experimentall Knowledge* he had not but by the Exerciſe of his Originall Light upon Particular Objects, as they ſhould occurre. Knowledge of *future Events* hee had not, it being not Naturall, nor Inveſtigable by imbred Light, but Propheticall, and therefore not ſeene till Revealed. *Secret Knowledge* of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counſels of God, he could not have, becauſe *ſecret things belong unto the Lord*. But ſo much light of *Divine Knowledge* as ſhould fit him to have Communion with *God*, and to ſerve him, and obtaine a bleſſed Life; ſo much of *Morall Knowledge* as ſhould fit him to converſe in Love as a Neighbour, in Wiſedome as a Father, with other men; ſo much of *Naturall Knowledge* as ſhould diſpoſe him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which hee had received Dominion; ſo much wee may not without notable Injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanſhip, and to the Beauty and Rectitude of our firſt Parent, deny to have been conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits

nefits of which ſingular Ornament of Knowledge are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover a *largeneſſe of Heart*, for which *Solomon* is commended, 1 *Kings* 4.29. Able to diſpatch many buſineſſes, to digeſt and order Multitudes of Motions, to have Mindes ſeaſoned with generous and noble Reſolutions; for that diſpoſition is by the Philoſopher called μεγαλοψυχία, Greatneſſe of Minde. Hereby wee are brought to a Juſt *Contempt of ſordid* and wormie Affections. It is Darkneſſe which makes men grope, and pore, and looke onely on the things before them, as the Apoſtle intimates, 2 *Peter* 1. 9. Illightned Mindes ſee a greater luſtre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, *Proverbs* 3. 14, 15. The Excellencie of Evangelicall Knowledge made Saint *Paul* eſteeme every thing in the World beſides *as Dung*, *Philippians* 3. 8. As the Light of the Sunne ſwallowes up all the petty Light of the Starres: ſo the more Noble and ſpacious the Knowledge of Mens Mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of thoſe various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It diſpoſeth Men for *mutuall Communion*, and helpfull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is *feræ Naturæ*, like Birds of prey, that flye alwayes alone. Neither is it poſſible for a man to bee ſociable, or a member of any publicke Body, any further than he hath a proportion

Quod Plinio, & aliis obſervatum de Cæſare; & Ælio Spartian. de Adriano.

Vid. Aqu. 2a 2æ. qu. 188. Art. 6. in C.

tion and measure of Knowledge : Since Humane Society standeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumbe, and Blinde, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought *nearer unto God*, to admire him for his Wisdome, and Power ; to adore him for his Greatnesse, and Majesty ; to desire him, and worke towards the fruition of him, for his Light and Glory ; because in the Vision of him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.

This *Knowledge* is corrupted foure manner of wayes. First, By the Contempt of it in *Ignorance*. Secondly, By the Luxuriousnesse and Wantonnesse of it in *Curiosity*. Thirdly, By the Defect and Uncertainty of it in *Opinion*. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Opposition unto it in *Errour*.

There is a three-fold Ignorance wherewith the Minde of men may be blinded and defaced. The one is a *Naturall Ignorance*, which of Divine Things, so farre forth as those things are *Spirituall*, is in all men by Nature ; for the *Naturall Man* neither Receiveth with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration *discerneth* the things of the

Deum scire nemo potest nisi Deo docente. Vid. Iren. l. 4. c. 14. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1. & 5. In tantum videbimus in quantum similes erimus. Aug. Ep. 6. Ubi ad profunditatem sacramentorum perventum est, omnis Platonicorum caligavit subtilitas. Cypr. Sp. Sanct. Aug. de Prædest. c. 8. & de Doctr. Christiana, lib. 2. cap. 6.

Spirit

Spirit of God; And the Reaſon the Apoſtle gives, becauſe they are *ſpiritually diſcerned*. For as the Eye is fitted to diſcerne light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of ſounds: ſo the Minde cannot otherwiſe receive ſpirituall Objects, than as it hath a ſimilitude to thoſe Objects in a ſpirituall diſpoſition it ſelfe; whence that Expreſſion of Saint *Iohn*, *We ſhall be like unto him, for we ſhall ſee him as he is*. Spirituall Things doe exceed the weakneſſe of Reaſon, becauſe they are *above it*, and ſo cannot be *diſcerned*; And they doe oppoſe the corruption of Reaſon, becauſe they are *againſt it*, and ſo cannot be *Received*.

There is likewiſe in many Men much Naturall Ignorance, even in Morall and Naturall things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituals were loſt, ſo were our Naturals weakned too, as we find in the great Dulneſſe of many men in matters of Learning, inſomuch that ſome have not been able to learne the Names of the firſt Letters or Elements.

Vid. Hieron. adverſ. Jovin. l. 2.

Cœl. Rhod. l 11. cap. 10.

Againe, there is a *Voluntary* Ignorance (of which wee have before ſpoken) whereby Men doe wilfully cloſe their Eyes againſt Knowledge, and refuſe it; and of this there may be a double ground, The one *Guile*, in Knowledge that

that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chuseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobations of contemning it. The other out of *Sluggishnesse* and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the obtaining of Knowledge; When of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.

Thirdly, there is a * *Panall* Ignorance of which I shall not speake, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spirituall things, save only in the relation that it hath to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their Blindnesse, that the thing which with respect to their owne choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto Gods Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectuall Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.

* Mat. 13.13. Act. 28.26,27. Rom. 1.28. 2 Thes. 2.10, 11. *Ne intelligerent meritum fuit delictorum. Tertul. Apol. cap. 21. contr. Marc. l. 3. c. 6. Cyprian. lib. 1. Ep. 3. Percussi sunt Cæcitate ut nec intelligant. Delicta nec plangant Indignanda. Dei major hæc ira. Cypr. de lapsis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. ex Matth. & fusè contra Julian. lib. 5.*

In others it is abused by *Curiosity*, which may well be called the *Pride*, and the *Wantonnesse* of Knowledge, because it looketh after *high things* that are above us, and after *hidden things* that

Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 1. statim ab initio. Irenæus lib. 5. cap. 28. Vid. quædam contra hunc scientiæ pruritum apud Tertul. de Anima. cap. 1. contra Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 1. Aug. Ep. 29. & 56. & 78. & 157. Confess. lib. 11. cap. 12. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 2. cap. 9. & lib. 10. cap. 23. Hieron.

are

are denied us. And I may well put these two together, *Pride* and *Luxurie* of Learning. For I beleeve wee shall seldome finde the Pride of Knowledge more prædominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectorall enquiries of Wit, and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when he telleth us of some, who *intruded themselves into things which they had not seene, and were Vainely puff'd up by a fleshly Minde.* And hee himselfe complaineth of Others, who were *Proud*, and languished about needlesse Questions; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholsome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which wee cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quales, you may be sure the Stomack is cloyed, and wants Physick to purge it. I will not here adde more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter occasion.

In my Sermon of the peace of the Church, pag. 24.--26.

A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of Assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were *in Equilibrio*, that it cannot tell which way to encline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to *Science*, is called *Opinion*: For *Science* is ever *cum certitudine*, with Evidence and Unquestionable

Consequence of Conclusions from necessarie Principles: but *Opinio* is, *cum Formidine Oppositi*, with a feare least the contrarie of what wee assent unto should be true: And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.

Aquin. 2 æ. qu. 1, Art 4, C.

The Causes of *Opinion*, I conceive to be principally two: The fruit is a *Disproportion* betweene the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazles the power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding *Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem*, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than informe, and things too Materiall and Immerst, are like a mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath truth in it, bee the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Bodie, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those *Vespertiliones*, to which *Aristotle* hath compared the Understanding in this estate of subsistence

ſiſtence with the Body) there is required a mixture of contraries in the Ayre; it muſt not bee too light, leſt it weaken and too much diſgregate or ſpread the ſence; nor yet too dark, leſt it contract and lock it up: But there muſt bee a kinde of Middle Temper cleereneſſe of the Medium for conveyance, and yet ſome degree of Darkneſſe for qualification of the Object. Even ſo alſo the Objects of mans Underſtanding muſt participate of the two contraries, *Abſtraction and Materiality*. Abſtraction firſt, in proportion to the Nature of the Underſtanding, which is Spirituall. And Materialitie too, in reſpect of the Senſe, on which the Underſtanding depends in this eſtate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is Difficultie and Uncertaintie of Operation in the Underſtanding, there is a double defect and diſproportion: firſt in the Power, whoſe Operations are reſtrained and limited for the moſt, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a ſufficient mixture of thoſe two qualities, which ſhould proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar ſimilitude; an Aged man is not able to read a ſmall Print, without the Aſſiſtance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction ſeeme greater. Where firſt wee may deſcry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare

and well-dispos'd as a young mans, hee would be able by his Naturall Power, whithout Art, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiencie in the Letters; for if they had the same Magnitude and fitnesse in themselves, which they seeme to have by Refraction through the Glasse, the weakenesse of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them whithout those Helpes. So that alwaies the Uncertainty of *Opinion* is grounded on the Insufficiencie of the Understanding to receive an Object, and on the *Disproportion* of the Object to the Nature of the Understanding.

The next Cause of *Opinion* and Uncertainty in Assents, may be Acutenesse and Subtilty of wit, when Men out of Ability, like * *Carneades*, to discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements betweene an equall weight of Arguments, are forc'd to suspend their assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choise of some thing to averre (and that is properly *Opinion*) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion, as being accompanied with feare, floating, and Inconstancie.

* *Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit quam non probarit, nullum oppugnavit quam non everterit.* Cic. de Orat. li. 2. *Non minoribus viribus contra Justitiam dicitur disseruisse, quam pridem pro Justitia dixerat.* Quintil. de Carnead. lib. 12. cap. 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap. 30.

And

And this indeed, although it be in it selfe a defect of Learning; yet considering the state of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Vnderstanding by continuall Inquiry (man being bound in this also to recover that measure of his first fulnesse which is attaineable in this Corrupted Estate by sweat of Braine, by labour and degrees *Paulatim extundere artes*) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Judgement (so it be not *Vniversall* in all conclusions; for that argues more weakenesse, than choise of conceit; not *Particular* in things of *Faith* and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Usefull. Commendable, because it prevents all temper of heresie (whose nature is to * be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softenes of Judgement, which will not suffer it selfe to be captivated, either to its owne conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to descry weakenesse. And this is that which *Pliny* commends in his friend *Titus Ariston*, whose hesitancy and slowneſse of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptines or unfurniture; but *ex diversitate Rationũ quas acri magnoq; Iudicio ab origine Causisq; primis repetit, discernit, expendit*, out of a learned cautelousneſse of judgement, which made him so long suspend his Assent, till he had weiged the severall repugnances of reasons, & by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same *Pliny* elsewhere out of *Thucydides* observes) It is rawnes & deficiency of learning that

Via quæ adversus Sceptices disputat Aristocles apud Euseb. de præpar. Evang. l. 14. c. 18.

* *Ad quamcunque sunc disciplinam, quasi tempestate delapsi ad eam: Tanquam ad Saxum adhæresunt, &c. Acad. q. l. 4. Plin. l. 1. ep. 22.*

Lib. 4. Ep. 7.

make bold and peremptory : λογισμὸς ἢ ὄκνιν φέρει. Demurs and fearfulnes of Reſolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the uſe of Doubtings: Firſt, they leſſen the number of hereſies which are (as I ſaid) alwayes obſtinate. And next it gives occaſion of furthy enquiry after the Truth, to thoſe who ſhall find themſelves beſt qualified for that ſervice, But Hereſie coming under the ſhape of Science, with ſhewes of Certainty, Evidence, and Reſolution (eſpecially if the inducements be quicke and ſubtle) doth rather ſettle the Underſtanding, and poſſeſſe it with falſe Aſſents than yeeld occaſion of deeper ſearch, unleſſe it meet with a more piercing Judgement, which can through confidence deſcry weakneſſe. For queſtionleſſe the Errours of Great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldnes of Aſſertions, do either by poſſeſſing the judgement with prejudice of the Author, make it alſo ſubſcribe to the Error; or if a more impartiall eye ſee inſufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deterres from the oppoſing of his conceipt. Whereas when mens aſſents are propoſed with a modeſt confeſſion of diſtruſt and uncertainty: the Underſtanding is incited both to enquire after the reaſons of Diffidence; as alſo to find out means for a more ſetled Confirmation and cleering of the Truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Errours : the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Falsifying them, or Transferring the Truth of them out of their owne bounds. Affectations of Singularity, and Novell courses. Credulity and Thraldome of Judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects corrupteth Judgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.

THe other maine Corruption of Knowledge was *Error*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habituall assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falshood under the shew of truth. It is *Aristotles* assertion in his Ethicks, that one man may conceive himselfe as certaine of his Errour, as another man of his Knowledge; and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seemes most neerly to resemble it.

If we enquire after the prime Fundamentall Cause, the Gate by which Errour came first into the World, *Syracides* will tell us in a word, that *Errour* and *Darknesse* had their beginning together with *Sinners*: and the reason is, because sinne being

being a partition-wall, and a ſeparation of man from God, who is *Pater Luminum*, the Father and fountain of all knowledge; and whoſe perfections man did at firſt one principall way by Knowledge reſemble, cannot chuſe but bring with it darkneſſe and confuſion into the Soul. But I ſhall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Cauſes; ſome whereof, amongſt ſundry others, I take to be theſe:

1. A firſt and moſt ſpeciall one is the Abuſe of Principles: For the Vnderſtanding muſt have ever ſomething to reſt it ſelfe upon: and from the conformity of other things thereunto, to gather the certainty and evidence of its Aſſents. For it is the nature of mans minde, ſince it had at firſt it ſelfe a beginning to abhorre all manner of Infinity, *à Parte-Ante* (I meane in Aſcending and Reſolution) as well of Sciences and Concluſions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Vnderſtanding is not quieted in Philoſophicall inquiries about created things, till it have according to their ſeverall differences ranged them ſeverally within the compaſſe of ſome Finite Line, and ſubordinated the inferiors of every kinde, *Sub uno Summo Genere*, under one chiefe, and reſts not in the Reſolution of Effects into their Cauſes, till it come to *Aliquid primum*, in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Cauſality, and Eſſentiall Dependance: ſo likewiſe it is in *Knowledge* & Truth, notwithſtanding a *Parte Poſt*, downward, our purſutes of them ſeeme Infinite and Vnlimited, by reaſon of our owne infinities, and

Ariſt. phyſ. l. 9.

and Æviternity that way: yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originalls, the Understanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in *Infinitum*, and never rests till it finds a *Non ultra*, an utmost linke in the chaine of any Science, and such a *Prime*, Universall, Vnquestionable, Vnprovable *Truth*, from whence all Inferiour Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of *Principles*: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceipt, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streames have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by *Falsifying* and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their owne limits; as when Philosophicall Errours are falsly grounded upon Philosophicall Axioms, which is *Error Consequentiæ*, or *Illationis*, an Errour in the Consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their owne bonds, into the Territories (as I may so speake) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject; which is *Error Dependentiæ*, or *Subordinationis*, an Error in the Dependance of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwayes either the Subtilty or modesty of errour to shrowd it self under truth, & that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undenyable grounds, & by a

strange kind of Chimistry, to extract darkness out of light. * *Fraus sibi ex parvis*, (said *Fabius Maximus* in *Livy* upon another occasion.) I will alter it thus, *Error sibi ex principiis fidem præstruit ut cum magnâ mercede fallet.* * Unreasonable and groundlesse fancies alwayes shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. * As *Praxilites* the Painter drew the Picture of *Venus* by the face of his Minion *Cratina*, that so by an honorable pretext he might procure adoration to a Harlot. * Thus as *Plato* is said, when he enveighed chiefly against Orators, most of all to have played the Orator (making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it selfe) so they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custome of that *Scipio*, honoured afterward by the name of his Punicke Conquest, alwaies before he set upon any business, (as *Livy* reports of him) to enter the Capitoll alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justnesse, issue, and successe of his intended designes; and then, *Apud multitudinem, plerumq; velut mente divinitus monitâ agebat*: he bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploites hee perswaded them to attempt, had all the approbation and Unerring Judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whether an Ambitious hope of fastning an Opinion of his owne Divineness in the midst of the people, or an hapy and politicke imposture, the beter to presse those people (alwayes more inclinable to the perswasions

* *Liv. l.* 28.

* *Ex his eam impugnas ex quibus constat. Tertul. de. Baptis. c.* 2 *Vid. de. præscr. c.* 36. 39. *Sententias per primas communibus Argumentis minuunt. de Animal. c.* 2. *Inde sumentes præsidia, quò pugnant. c.* 50. *Omnia adversus Veritatem, de ipsa Veritate constructa sunt. Apolog. c.* 47.

* *Clem. Alex. in Protrepric.*

* *Cic. Orat. l.* 1. *In Ictidendis Oratoribus Orator Summus. Liv. l.* 26. *Nec aliter Numa simulans sibi cum dea Ægeriâ nocturnos congressus esse, apud eundem. l.* 1. *Vide Val. Max. l.* 1. *c.* 2. *Plut. in Numa.*

ſwaſions of Superſtitions than Reaſon) to a free Execution of his deſignes, it is not here neceſſary to enquire. Sure I am, even in matters of greateſt conſequence, there have never been wanting the like Impoſtours, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppoſe it: as *Iacob* in *Eſau's* Cloathes, robbed *Eſau* of the bleſſing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and conſume it. And this is a very prepoſterous and perverſe method, firſt to entertaine Corrupt Conceits, and then to * wreſt and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errours of the mind, as in the diſtempers of the palate, uſuall with men to finde their owne reliſh in every thing they read.

Concerning the other Abuſe, it is an often obſervation of *Ariſtotle*, that Principles and Concluſions muſt be within the Sphære of the ſame Science; and that a man of Learning ought alwaies to be faithfull unto his owne Subject, and make no Excurſions from it into another Science. And therefore he ſaith that it is an equall abſurdity for a Mathematician (whoſe concluſions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) onely to ground them on Rhetoricall probabilities, as it were for a Rhetorician, whoſe Arguments ſhould be more plauſible and Inſinuative, to leave all unſaid that might reaſonably be ſpoken, except it may be proved by demonſtrative principles. This leaping *à Genere ad Genus*, and confounding the dependencies

* *Scripturarum eſſe volumus quæ noſtra ſunt. Aug. vid. quæ. adverſus hanc Curioſitatis Laſciniam paſſim occurrunt apud Tertull. Apol. c. 46. 47. contr. Hermog. c. 1. de. præſcr. c. 17. 38, 39. 40. De reſurrect. c. 40. De fug. in perſec. c. 6. De Pudic. c 26. Simplicitatem ſermonis Eccleſiaſtici, id volunt ſignificare, quod ipſi ſentiunt. Epiph. ad Joan. Hieroſol. Juſtin Martyr. ad Zenam. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 7. p. 5. 45. D. Aug contr. Pelag. & Cæleſt. l. 1. c. 42. De Gratia Chriſti*

Πάσης πλάνης ἡ ψευδοδοξίας αἰτία τὸ μὴ οἰκείως διακρίνειν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἔθνη κατανοεῖ καὶ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ εἰδὲ μή κεῖται, τὰ δόγματα μὴ τὸν λόγον ἐφοδεύειν. σπάνις συνοχῆς τὰ πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια. *Clem. Alex. Strom. 6.*

cies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudiciall to Knowledge; and Errour hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop and bow to Reason; & when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with * Nature, and no farther. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denyed those two maine Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (* although in some of them the very sight of nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those maine Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that *ex nihilo nihil fit*; nothing can be made of nothing. And a *privatione ad habitum non datur regressus*; That there is no regresse from a Totall privation to the Habit lost. And this reason was evidently implyed in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the root of all Errour, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: *Erratis nescientes Scripturas atque Potentiam Dei.* Where are intimated two maine Principles of that Mystery of the Resurrection; the *Word*, and the *Power of God*. This later commanding our Assent that it may be: that other, our Assurance that it will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance

* *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & dialecticum Christianissimũ protulerunt. Tertul. de præscript. cap. 7.*
* *Cic. lib. de Vniverso. Plat. in Timæo. Eus. de præpar. Evan. l. 11. c. 29. Theod. ser. 4. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 5. Quin & Resurrectionem Philosophis notam (sed ex Hebræorum doctrinâ) affirmat. Eus. l. 11. c. 33, 36. Tert. de Resurrect. car. c. 1. Nescio an huc etiam pertineant illa. Senat. qu. lib. 3. ca. 30.*

Ignorance of these two, and we goe about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing, then an Obeying reason: the immediate consequent of such peremptory and preposterous course, is Error and Depravation of the Understanding. *Pythagoras* and his Scholars, out of a strong conceit that they had of the Efficacy of Musick, or Numbers, examining all the passages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous Errour, that Number was the first and most Essentiall Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured Glasse, have all Objects, how different soever, represented in the same colour: so they examining all Conclusions by Principles forestalled for that purpose, thinking every thing of what nature so ever to be dyed in the colour of their owne conceits, and to carry some proportion unto those Principles, Like *Antipheron*, *Orites* and others in *Aristotle*, who did confidently affirme every thing for Reall, which their imagination fancied to it selfe. But *Tully* hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that Satyricall reprehension which he gives to *Aristoxenus* the Musician, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceit the Soule of man to consist of Harmony, *Hæc magistro concedat Aristoteli, canere ipse doceat*: Let him leave these things to *Aristotle*, and content himselfe with teaching men how to sing; intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its own bounds.

Plut. de placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 3. Laert. in Pyth. Quintil. Instit. l. 10. c. 10.

Τὰ φαινόμενα λέγοντες ἀς γαλήνην ἢ ἀς μελίσσας ἄνοντες. *Lib. de Memor. & Reminis. c. 1.*

2. Another cause of Errour may be Affecta-

tion of Singularity, and a Disdaine of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions, or of Tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walke in wayes of their owne making, then in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented Errours, then content with a derived and imputed Learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers of Heresie, then the Heires of truth, *Quasi nihil fuisset rectum, quod primum est, melius existimant quicquid est aliud*, as *Quintilian* spake elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteeme every thing therefore better, because new.

Non tam Authoritas in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt, &c. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

3. Another cause may be the other Extreme (for a man may lose his way, as well by enclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. *Et credere, quàm scire, videtur reverentius*, we rather beleeve, then know what we assent unto. 'Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of learned men to read them always with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing: But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans hand. Beliefe, without evidence of Reason, must be onely there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestionable, and where it is impossible to erre, there onely it

it is Impious to Diſtruſt. As for mens Aſſertions, *Quibus poſſibile eſt ſubeſſe falſum*, what he ſaid of Friendſhip, *Sic ama tanquam oſurus*, Love with that Wiſedome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantagious in Knowledge: *Sic crede tanquam diſſenſurus*, ſo to beleeve, as to be ready, when cauſe requires, to diſſent. It is a too much ſtreightning of a mans owne Underſtanding, to inthrall it unto any: or to eſteeme the diſſent from ſome particular Authorities, Preſumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Diſtempers in the Body of Learning, then Factions and Sidings. When as *Seneca* ſaid of *Cato*, that he would rather eſteeme Drunkenneſſe a Vertue, then *Cato* Vicious: So Peripateticks and Platoniſts, Scotiſts & Thomiſts, and the reſt (if I may adventure ſo to call them, of thoſe learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) ſhall rather count Errour Truth, then their great Maſters Erroneus. But yet I would not be ſo underſtood, as if I leſt every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a preſumptuous dependance only on his owne judgement, with contempt or neglect of others. But I conſider a double Eſtate of the Learned; Inchoation and Progreſſe. And though in this latter there be requiſite a Diſcerning Judgment, and Liberty of Diſſent; yet for the other, *Ariſtotle's* ſpeech is true, *Oportet diſcentem credere*, Beginners muſt beleeve. For as in the Generation of man, he receiveth his firſt life & nouriſhment from

Vid. Aug. ep. 6. Lib. de Unitat. Eccleſiæ. c. 19. contra Creſcon. Grammat. l. 2. c. 32. & ep. 111. Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cæcilium.

Vid. Theodor. ſerm. 1. de fide. & Platon. apud Euſeb. l. 12. c. 1.

from one Wombe, and after takes onely those things, which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is grown unto strength and yeares, he then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onely, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choise or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Joynts and Members of it into one body is best affected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, *Cato* being a childe, was wont to require a reason) but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the liberty of its owne Judgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speake not this therefore to the dishonour of *Aristotle*, or any other; from whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountains, hath been derived: Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration; And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given *Aristotle* by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, then the whole Series of Ages since hath in any particular member thereof: And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning doe well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between Reverence and Superstition; we may assent unto them as Antients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easie and inclinable, they may not have them

Plut. lib. de Audiend. Poetis. Vid. Sen. ep. 64.

Hooker l. 1. Sect. 6.

Ἅπαντας μὲν τῶν λόγων ἔχειν πιθανὰς ἀφορμὰς μέν· πίστιν δ' οὐκ ἔχειν. *Arist. Orat. 1. de Rhet.*

them captivated and fettered to their opinions: As I will not diſtruſt all, which without manifeſt proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Errour, ſo likewiſe will I ſuſpend my beliefe upon probability of their miſtakes: and where I finde expreſſe Reaſon of Diſſenting, I will rather ſpeak Truth with my Miſtreſſe Nature, then maintaine an Error with my Maſter *Ariſtotle*. As there may be friendſhip, ſo there may the Honour with diverſity of Opinions: nor are wee bound therfore to deifie men, becauſe we reverence them. *Plura ſæpe peccantur dum demiremur, quam dum offendimus*; We wrong our Anceſtors more by admiring then oppoſing them in their Errors; and our opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we thinke they had rather have us followers of them, then of Truth. And we may in this caſe juſtly anſwer them as the young man in *Plutarch* did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjuſt thing; I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me. For good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. *Ariſtotle* his Commendation of his middle Aged men, ſhould be a rule of our Aſſent to him, and all the reſt of thoſe firſt Planters of Knowledge: We ought neither to over-prize all their Writings by an abſolute credulity, becauſe they being *Men*, and ſubject to Errour, may make us thereby liable to *Deluſion*; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, becauſe being *great men*, and ſo well deſerving of all Poſterity, they may challenge from us an Eaſines

Ἀμφοῖν ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον πρῶτον τὴν ἀλήθειαν. *Ariſt. Ethic. l. 1. c. 4.*

Tacit. Veritas nec mea eſt, nec illius, aut illius. Aug. Confeſſ. l. 12. c. 25.

Rhet. l. 2.

of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it bee only without and not against Reason) as *Tully* professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soule, as Immortality: *Vt rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Authoritate me frangerat*: Though *Plato* had given no reason for it, yet his Authority should have swayed assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose alwayes to be swayed by Truth, more then by the thousand years of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

Ai ἀποδοξε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.
Arist. Met. 1.
Immoderata est omnis susceptarum voluntatũ pertinacia, &c.
Vid. Hil. init. l. 16. de Trinit.

4. Another Cause of Errour may be a Fastning too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: as if Truth were the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion-like could alter it selfe to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be Unquestionable and Authenticall, when we have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of mans Nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long agoe observed by *Varro*) which could not but be out of every particular Philosophers conceit, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happinesse, not where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Judgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errours, according as the Minds

Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 19. c. 1.

of

of men were any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a prepostterous and unnaturall course, like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity: For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Understanding concerning Happines should precede the pursuit of the Will, they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceiveth it would goe farre better with him in the end, then otherwise it is like to doe) and then this Desire allures the Understanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may perswade to the Belieſe thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: *Quod nimis volumus facile credimus*, we easily beleeve what we will willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by Nature he love Sinne) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereof, either from others, or himselfe; and therefore be his Errours never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his Minde never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily perswade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Judgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vicious Suggestions, *Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus*. When once

once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to be perverted, and the discourse of the Understanding will quickly bee drawne to the maintaining of either: So easie it is for men to dispute when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vitall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the Weakneſſe spreads, and overrunnes all the other, though remotest from it: so likewise the violent motion of partiall and unruly Appetites, which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of man soule, out of the naturall Harmony and consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially doe they labour to winne over the Judgement unto their side, and there-hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Understanding is regular, the cheife Dominion therof is over-Affection. And therefore we see alwayes that men of the most stayed and even judgements, have the most unresisted power in the government of Passions: so on the other side, when the Affections are strongly enclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality, or object in Nature; the first faculty whereon they strive to transferre their prejudice is the Reason, since without the Assent and Appro-

Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with ſuch freedome from diſtractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophiſtry and Diſputes of that Power. Thus as it is uſuall with men of deceitfull palats (as before I touched) to receive in every thing they taſte the ſame diſagreeing relliſh, wherewith their mouth is at that time diſtempered: So it is with mens Mindes prepoſſeſſed with any particular Fancy: *Intus Exiſtens prohibet alienum.* They cannot ſee it in its own proper colours, but according as their Conceipts are any way diſtempered and tranſported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in naturall Philoſophy ſprang that Opinion of *Ariſtoxenus* the Muſitian (which I ſpake of before) that the Soule of *Man* conſiſted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, *Velut in Cantu & Fidibus*, between the parts; and *Tully* intimates the Reaſon I ſpake of very prettily: *Hic ab artificio ſuo non receſſit*: this man knew not how to leave his own Art; & more expreſly of the ſame in another place: *Ita delectatur ſuis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur.* Hee was ſo affected with *Muſicke*, that hee transferred it upon the Soule.

5. Another Reaſon, which I conceive of Corruption of the Underſtanding by Errour, is Curioſity and Puſhing it forward to the Search of things claſped up and reſerved from its inquiry. Tis the naturall diſeaſe of mankinde to deſire the knowledge of nothing more than what is leaſt attainable. *Ita naturâ comparatum eſt* (ſaith *Pliny*) *ut*

proximorum incurioſi Longuinqua ſectemur; adeo animum rerum Cupido Langueſcit, cum facili eccaſio eſt. It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowledg, as in other things, to eſteeme that which is far fetched (as we ſay) and deare bought moſt precious; as if Danger and Rarity were the only Argument of worth. The inquiry after the Eſtates of Spirits and ſeperated Soules, the Hierarchies of Angels; and (which is more) the ſecret Counſels of God, with other the like hidden Miſteries, do ſo wholly poſſeſſe the minds of ſom men, that they diſappoint themſelves of more profitable Inquiries, and ſo become not onely hurtfull, in regard of their owne vanity and fruitleſneſſe; but alſo in that they hinder more wholſom and uſefull Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of ſo oppoſite a nature unto mans Soule, that though it be Holy, it pleaſeth not; if there be but Evil (the worſt of all Objects) unknowne. The Devill perſwades *Adam* rather to make it by ſinning, than not to know it.

But wee are to remember that in many things our ſearchings & bold ſpeculations muſt be content with theſe Silencing, more than Satisfying Reaſons; *Sic Natura jubet, ſic opus eſt mundo:* Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe unto Natures workes, as well our wonder as our inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more to magnifie than to ſearch. There are as in the countries of the World, ſo in the Travels of mens wits; as well *Præcipitia*, as *Viæ*; as well Gulfes and Quickſands, as common Seas. He that will be climbing

climbing too high, or saying to farre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but onely what it is to have a shipwrack, and to suffer ruine. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly *Morall* and Earthly; and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawle on the ground, to raise the Soule unto no higher Contemplations than Base and Worldly, is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurne and disdaine these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soare after Inscrutable Secrets; to unlock and breake open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deepe and impenetrable Counsels of Heaven, which we should with a holy, fearfull, and astonished Ignorance onely adore, is too bold and arrogant sacriledge, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell: For *Ero similis Altissimo*, I will be like the most high, was (as is beleeved) the Devils first sinne: *Eritis tanquam Dii*, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obeyer with Darknesse; in the one, with the Darknes of Tophet; in the other, with the Darknesse of Errour.

Aug. de gen. ad lit. l. 11. c. 14. Et lib. de vera Relig. c. 13. De. Civ. Dei. l. 12. c. 6. Hier. Ep. 44. ad Anton. de Modestia, & in c. 14. Isaiæ. Greg. Moral. l. 14. c. 17. Damas. de. Orthod. fid. l. 2. c. 4.

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Judgement: of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity: of Tradition, by Speech, Writing: of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech.

HItherto of the more Passive Operation of the Vnderstanding, which I called Reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active, which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in it's Apprehension: And they are the Actions of *Invention*, of *Wit*, and of *judgement*. The former of these hath two principall parts; the *Discovering* of Truth; and the *Communicating* of it. The former only is properly *Invention*; the other a consequent thereof, *Tradition*: but both much making to the Honour of the Facultie. For the former, I shall forbeare any large Discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises, Dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, Government of Life; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts; so great Beauty and Ornament

Ornament amongſt men, which out of one world of things have raiſed another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

Firſt, a Deſpaire and Diſtruſt of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe-Opinion is a maine Cauſe of Errour: ſo Diffidence and Feare is on the other ſide a wrong to Nature, in abuſing thoſe Faculties which ſhe gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulnes. *Multis rebus ineſt Magnitudo* (ſays *Seneca*) *non ex naturâ ſuâ, ſed ex debilitate noſtrâ*: & ſo likewiſe, *Multis rebus ineſt difficultas, non ex natura ſua ſed ex opinione noſtrâ*. Many things ſeem hard & involved, not becauſe they are ſo; but becauſe our ſuſpition ſo miſconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill diſpoſed Body every light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent diſtemper, where the Conſtitution is ſtronger: So with fearfull and deſpairing wits, every Inquiry is eſtimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Diſopinion & ſlender conceit wch they have of their own Abilities. *Non calcant ſpinas ſed habent*. It were but ridiculous for a Blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the Aire, but in the Eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I obſerved before on another Occaſion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of thoſe who have gone before us: For when men ſhall ſo magnifie the Gifts of others, that they ſlight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Conceipt that the Ancients have ſufficiently perfected the

Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exercise their wits (capable of greater imployments) in degenerate and unusefull Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindred from attaining that Maturity, to which by their own Inventions it might be raised. Thus as it fals out among men of thirstlesse mindes in their Fortunes: *Divitiarum abundantia inter Causas paupertatis est*; Their profuseneſſe out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, draws them quickly beyond their Fortunes: or as it was in the like case amongst the Romans in those times of Publike Luxury, and Effeminateneſſe, the valour of their Ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the meanes of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weakneſſe was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predeceſſors: So it is in the matter of Learning, when we spend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our owne Inventions, the large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, wherein their Labours offer greater assistance, than discouragement. There was not I perswade my selfe among the Ancients themselves, a greater means of discloſing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of many

many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitfull and goodly issues; all which might haply have been un discovered, had men laboured onely in Traditions, and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errors being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleeved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other, Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Errour in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to finde his Imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a meanes to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours when discovered in the Inquiry after Truth; that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as he is sooner likely to finde out a place who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knowes not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Unfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued frame brancheth it selfe into sundry members: So that there is not onely in the Object of the *Will*, which is the *Good* of things; but

but in the Object of the *Understanding* also which is their truth, a certain mutuall Concatenation, wherby every part hath some reference unto the other; insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as doe necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of *Tully* is generally true, *Tusc. q. l. 2.* *Difficile est pauca esse ei nota, Cui non sint, aut pleraq; aut omnia.* All that addresse themselves either to the invention of Arts not knowne, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.

For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech: Wherin I consider a double ministerial reference, the one to the eye; the other to the ear, that is *Vox scripta*, a Visible Voice; this *Vox viva*, an Audible Voice. To which purpose *Scaliger* acutely: *Est quidem recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus.* The Dignities which this particular confers on man, & wherein it gives him a preheminence above other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every serviceable or Ministeriall Instrument is to be gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

Arist. Polit. l. 1. c. 2. The end whereunto Living and Organicall *Speech* was principally ordained, is to maintaine mutuall

mutuall Society amongſt men incorporated into one Body. And therfore *Tully* well cals it, *Humanæ Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinnew, whereby the Body of Humane Converſation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to ſpeake of the Honour which God hath beſtowed upon our Nature in this Noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue ἄγγελον λόγων as the Poet calleth it, The Meſſenger of Reaſon, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our conceits with characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I ſhall not engage my ſelfe on ſo great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of ſo many learned men, who have written ſome Rhetoricall, others Morall Inſtitutions and Precepts touching Speech. I ſhall therefore content my ſelfe with but naming ſome few particulars, by Conſideration whereof we may accknowledg the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by ſo noble a ſervant. *Eurip.*

1 For the Dignity hereof it appeares in this, That whereas in other leſſe Conſiderable Perfections, other Creatures have an Exquiſiteneſſe above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reaſon clothed in ſenſible Characters unto others of his owne kinde. For though ſome melancholy men have beleeved that Elephants and Birds, and other creatures have a Language whereby they diſcourſe with one another, yet we know that thoſe narrow and poore *Vid. Aug. lib. Quæſt. ex Vet. Teſtam. q. 3.*

Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed only from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called λόγος, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth onely upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his *Body* excell them too. First, in the Uprightnesse of his Stature, whereby he is made to looke up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth the Impression of that Light which dwelleth within him. For the Face is the window of the Soul.

Ὁρθὸς γὰρ ἐστι μόνον τῶν ζώων διὰ τὸ φρόνιμον εἶναι θεῖον. *Arist. de part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10. Vid Laurent. Anacom. l. 1. c. 2, 4. Perer. in Gen. 2. 7. disp. de præstantiâ Hum. Corp. q. 1.*

Pronáq; cum spectent Animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, Cælumq; tueri
Iussit, & erectos ad Sydera tollere Vultus.

Whil'st other creatures downward fix their sight,
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:
To man he gave a lofty Face, might look
Up to the Heavens; and in that spacious Book,
So full of shining Characters, descry
Why he was made, and whether he should fly,

Quint. Instit. l. 2. c. 16. Cæl. Rhodig. l. 2. c. 30. l. 16. c. 13.

Next in the Faculty of *Speech*, which is the Gate of the Soule, through which she passeth, and the Interpreter of the Conceits and Cogitations of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks; The uses whereof are to convey and communicate the

Συμβολα τῆς παιδευσίτου. *Arist. de Interpret. c. 1. Greg. Nyss. de Hom. opificio, cap. 9.*

Conceptions

Conceptions of the minde (and by that means to preſerve humane ſociety) to derive knowledge to maintain mutuall love and ſupplies; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our ſorrowes; but above all, to Honour God, and to edifie one another, in which reſpect our *Tongue* is called our *Glory*, *Pſa.* 16.2. *Acts* 2.26.

The force & power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almoſt beyond its power to expreſſe, How ſuddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, tranſport, and carry Captive the Affections of men. *Cæſar* with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. *Menenius Agrippa* with one Apologue, the ſedition of a people. *Flavianus* the Biſhop of Antioch with one Oration, the fury of an Emperour. *Anaximenes* with one Artifice, the indignation of *Alexander*. *Abigail* with one Supplication, the Revenge of *David*. *Pericles* and *Piſiſtratus* even then when they ſpake againſt the peoples liberty, over-ruled them by their Eloquence, to beleeve and imbrace what they ſpake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. *Pericles* and *Nicias* are ſaid to have ſtill purſued the ſame Ends, and yet with cleane different ſucceſſe. The one in advancing the ſame buſines, pleaſed; the other exaſperated the people; and that upon no other Reaſon but this, the one had the Art of perſwaſion which the other wanted.

Πειθὼ τύραννος ἀνθρώποις μόνη. *Euripid. Hec.*

Sueto. in Cæſ. cap. 73.

Luc. lib. 1.

Πολλὰ τοι σμικρὸς λόγος ἔσφηλεν ἤδη κἀνέστησε δυοῖν βροτοῖν. *Sophoc. Elec.*

Chryſoſt. ἀνδρείαν πρὸ κ.

Vide Cauſin. de Eloq. l. 1. c. 4.

Val. Max. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarc. lib. de Præcept. gerend. Reip.

Αγλωσσία μ πολλάκις λιρδίς ἀνὴρ
Δικαία λέξας, ἔσσυτ' ἰυγλώσσου φέρει.
Αὖν σ' ἰρέοισι τύμασι τὸν ἀληθέα τὸν
Κλίπτωσιν ὥστι μὴ δικᾶν ἃ χρὴ δικεῖν.

One spake the Right with a slow Tongue,
Another fluently spake wrong.
He lost, this stole the Cause, and got
To make you thinke, what you thinke not.

And this power of Speech over the Minds of men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his thus elegantly described:

Virg. Ænead. 1.

——Magno in populo cum sæpè coorta est
Seditio, sævitq; Animis Ignobile vulgus
Iamq; faces & Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat.
Tum pietate gravẽ, ac meritis si forte virum quem
Conspexêre, silent, arrectisq; auribus astant:
Ille regit dictis Animos & pectora mulcet.

When in a Multitude Seditions grow,
And Ulcerated Minds doe overflow
With swelling Ire; when stones & firebrands fly,
(As Rage doth every where weapons supply)
Then if some Aged man, in Honour held
For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,
And Moderate this Tumult: straightwayes all
Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall
Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway
Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.

The

The Vertues of Speech (whereby it worketh with ſuch force upon the Mind) are many, which therefore I will but Name, ſome *Grammaticall*, as Property, and Fitneſſe, and Congruity, without Solæciſmes and Barbarouſneſſe; ſome *Rhetoricall*, as Choice, Purity, Brevity, Perſpicuity, Gravity, Pleaſantneſſe, Vigor, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency; ſome *Logicall*, as Method, Order, Diſtribution, Demonſtration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digeſting, of all the Aydes of Speech; as Wit, Learning, Proverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Hiſtories, Lawes, Cauſes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which aſſiſt us in Invention. Some *Morall*, as Gravity, Truth, Seriouſneſſe, Integrity, Authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleeved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they ariſe *è ſulco pectoris*, and have their foundation in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the ſelfe ſame Wine with pleaſure in a pure and cleane Veſſell, which he loaths to put unto his mouth, from one that is foule and ſoiled: ſo the ſelfe ſame Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and diſgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

Vid. Voſſ. Orat. Inſtitut. l. 4. Cauſin. de Eloq. lib. 2. Quint. l. 1. c. 5. & paſſim alibi.

Σαφήνεια συντομία πρέπον κατασκευή. *Laer. in Zen. l. 7.*

Vid. A. Gell. l. 1. c. 15.

——— Λέγε ἐκ ἀδοξίτων λόγων.
Κἂν τῶν δοκούντων αὐτὸς ᾖ τυγχάνειν σθένει.

Eurip. Hecub.

A Speech from Baſe men, and men of Reſpect,
Though't be the ſame, works not the ſame Effect.

Plut. lib. de Audit. A. Gell. l. 18. c. 13.

And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life and Opinion what they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it: That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his Judgement. For wee are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dresse it. And therefore it is a very true Character which *Tully* and *Quintilian* give of a right Oratour; That he must be *vir bonus dicendi Peritus*, as well a Good man as a Good speaker; Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the *fancy* of his hearers, he will have but little power over their *Affections*. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is fewell, but quenched as it is greene.

Quint. l. 12. c. 1.

—— Οὐ φρὶς ἐκ ξὺ σοῦ σφοῖν ἐπωδὰς φρὶς ὑμῖν πνέμαν. Sophoc. Ajax.

Lastly, some are *Civill* in Causes Deliberative or Iuridical, as Wisdome, pertinency and fitnesse to the Nature and Exigence of the end or Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder & measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. *Paul* amongst the Philosophers diputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their *Poets*, & from confessed Maximes of *Reason*, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and leading them to Repentance. But amongst the Jewes hee disputed out of *Scripture*. With *Felix* that looked for money, he disputed of Righteousnesse and Judgement to come; but amongst the

the Phariſees and Sadduces, of the Reſurrection, that a Diſſention amongſt themſelves might procure a party for him. It is not wiſedome for a man in miſery to ſpeake with a high ſtile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The ſame ſpeech may be Excellent in an umbratile Exercitation which would be too pedanticall, and ſmeling of the Lampe in a matter of ſerious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat in one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conſcience. Nature hath guarded and compaſſed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth, like a double Hedge, that wee might be admoniſhed to weigh and ponder our words before wee produce them.

Mudlv μὴ ἐξω ἑρκος ὀδόντων φύγῃ. *Sophocl. Ajax*

Petulantiæ verborum coercendæ vallum eſſe oppoſitum dentium, &c. A Gel. l. 1. c. 15.

Theſe are the principall Vertues. And in Oppoſition unto theſe, wee may eaſily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my ſelf with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammar, are Solæciſmes, Barbariſmes, Obſoleteneſſe, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidneſſe, Tediouſneſſe, Obſcurity, Flatneſſe of Conceit, Arguteneſſe, and *Minutiæ*, Gawdineſſe, Wordineſſe, and Empty Oſtentation. In Morals, the Vices may be compriſed under theſe two Generals, *Multiloquium* and *Turpiloquium*, Garrulous and Rotten Communion. Laſtly, in Civil Reſpects, Levity and Impertinency, like the advices of *Therſites*, Ἀνόμαστα πολλὰ καὶ ἀκόσμητα, Many and to little purpoſe.

Vid. Plut. de Garul. & Theophraſt. Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 7. Stuck. Conviv. l. 4. c. 17. & 19. Cæl. Rhodig. l. 7. cap. 26.

But

De Turpiloquio. Clem. Alex. Pædag. l. 2. c. 9. Ejus species quam plurima extra institutum nostrum, Ut blasphemiæ, perjuria, maledicta, scommata, Dicteriæ, Obscænitates, &c.

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a *Lye*. For as every thing is then most Regular when it retaines the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be expresse and lively, we stil call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) we still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weaknesse and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Conceipts of the mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its originall Office: and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I spake of, without which they are but Hypocrisie, and come within the compasse of the noted Corruption, a Lie: for every Hypocrite is a Lyer,

Lyar. I confesse there are Sins of Speech greater then a Lye, in the intension and degrees of their own guilt: But herein is the difference, the tongue may in it (whether Morally religiously considered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)

First, it may be Unconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurres, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion between Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the Thoughts.

And then secondly, it may be disproportioned to the Conceits of the Mind in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a *Lye*. Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) becausse I conceive in it a greater measure of hainousnesse and Guilt, then in any other Speeches; (becausse all Guilt followes the Inconformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Sedition, may have a greater measure of wickednesse) but becausse in a *Lye* I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceits of the Mind; but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.

The next kind of Active Operations were those of *Wit*. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestings and

Abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Conceipt, whether in Stile or Conference, which like rotten wood in the darke, have more Shine then Substance; whose Use and Ornament are like themselves, Swift and Vanishing; at once both admired and Forgotten: but I understand a setled, constant, and habituall sufficiency of the Understanding, whereby it is inabled in any kind of Learning, Theory, or Practice, both to sharpnesse in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kind seen in Panegyricks, declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministeries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation than Use, and are only the Remission of the Mind and Unbending of the thoughts from more severe Knowledge: as walking for Recreation is rather Exercise than Travell, although by the violence of the Motion, or length of the Way, there may ensue Sweat and Wearinesse.

Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be diverse; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone. For Wit, though it be Swift, yet is often Blinde. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men, who have been eminent in this Faculty, if they

swayed it by Moderation and Prudence: So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of Truth, then men best furnished with Acuteneſſe, when they turned the uſe of it to the ſtrengthning of their owne Fancies, and not ſubmitted it to Judgement and Examination. As the fatteſt Soiles in Greece cauſed the greateſt troubles; and the beauty of *Helena*, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy againſt the poyſon of the Mind; but being it ſelfe poyſoned, it doth kill the ſooner. There ought to be for the right diſpoſing of our Inventions, a mutuall reference and ſervice between Wit and Judgement. It is a vexation of Mind, to diſcerne what is right and profitable, and have no inablement to attaine it: and that is Judgement without Wit. And to have a felicity of compaſſing an End, and a working and reſtleſſe fancy without direction to faſten it on a fit Object, is the only courſe to multiply Errour, and to be ſtill in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gaine of Way; and this is Wit without Judgement. They ought therefore, I ſay, to be mutuall Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to ſtirre up and quicken the Underſtanding: and Judgement is the Bridle to ſway and moderate Wit: Wit is the Hand and Foot for Execution and Motion; but Judgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Laſtly, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progreſſe in any Inquiry; but Judgement is the Ballace to

Poise, and the Steere to guide the course to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Judgments Operation in directing either our Practice or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it reduceth them to certaine Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which *Quintilian* observes, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent then men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any examination; but *apud Sapientes est Electio & Modus*, They first weigh things before they utter them.

The maine Corruption of Judgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Judgement is to discerne between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore tis true in this, as in the course of publick Judgements; That respect of persons, or things, blind the eyes, and maketh the Understanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth: Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Judgement; so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a Mistake, but a Lye; Of which kind flattery is the principall, when the Affections of Hope and Fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL.

Of the Actions of the Vnderſtanding upon the Will, with reſpect to the End and Means. The Power of the Vnderſtanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Objects of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks only at Good preſent. Two Acts of the Vnderſtanding, Knowledge and Conſideration. It muſt alſo be poſſible, and with reſpect to happineſs Immortall. Ignorance and Weakneſſe in the Vnderſtanding, in propoſing the right means to the laſt End.

HItherto of the Actions of the *Vnderſtanding*, *ad extra*, in regard of an *Object*. Thoſe *ad intra*, in regard of the *Will*, wherein the Underſtanding is a Miniſter or Counſellor to it, are either to furniſh it with an End, whereon to faſten its deſires; or to direct it in the means conducible to that End: For the *Will* alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot ſee the right Good it ought to affect without the Aſſiſtance of an *Informing* Power; So neither can it ſee the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the di-

rection of a *Conducting* power. As it hath not Judgment to discover an *End*: so neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right *Meanes*, whereby that may be attained: So that all the Acts of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding Acts in the Understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Understanding is usually by the Schoole-men called *Imperium*, or *Mandatum*, a Mandate or Command; because it is a *Precept*, to which the Will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well, are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will, though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, is only a Regulating and Directing, it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will alwayes is *Domina suorum actuum*, The Mistresse of her own Operation: For *Intellectus non imperat, sed solum modò significat voluntatem imperantis*. It doth only intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God, some seeds whereof remaine in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of *Mandate*; but therfore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Understanding,

ding, but to sin against our Law-giver. As in Civill Policy, the offences of men are not against inferior Officers; but against the soveraigne power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whose authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of Government. Besides, *Ejus est imperare, cujus est punire:* For Law and Punishment being Relatives, and mutually cannotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only can be an imposition of Law from which may be an infliction of punishment.

Now the Condition under which the Understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them, *Goodnesse, Possibility*; and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) *immortality* too. Every true Object of any power, is that which beares such a perfect Relation of convenience and fitnesse thereunto, that it is able to accompliish all its desires. Now since *Malum* is *Destructivum*, all Evill is Destructive; It is impossible that by it selfe, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, it should ever have any attractive power over the Desires of the Will. And on the other side, since *Omne bonum*, is *Perfectivum*; since Good is perfective, and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the Will, were it not that our Understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions, and the Will it selfe corrupted in its owne Inclinations.

But

But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought to will any Divine and Perfect Good; yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable and destructive to his Nature; since all Naturall Agents ayme still at their own Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience; or Evill pursued, without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Understanding doth alwayes propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their owne Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Understanding it selfe, knowne to be evill; And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its owne Knowledge, as Evill; We may distinguish two opposite conditions in *Good* and *Evill*: For first, all evill of Sin, though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is *Destructive*; yet on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and *corrupt*. As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropticke Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drinke for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death, but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite: So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, only that he may thereby

thereby come to Destruction(though he is not ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise *Goodness*, though it have the most absolute *Convenience* to man, as it is *Perfective* and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet it hath as great a *disconvenience* toward mans corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to square them by, and in respect of its *Rectitude*. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes; yet to distempered Eyes it works more trouble then delight, because as in Philosophy, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modũ recipientis*: so, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modũ appetentis*. So that if the Appetite it self be by inherent pollution depraved and evill, it cannot but desire every thing that bears proportion & conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the maine reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, often times fasten Delight on those objects which they know to be Evill, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.

Ὁ πόνος πᾶσ' ἐκαστος ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ μὴ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ. *Arist. Ethic. l. 3. c. 7.*

To which I may adde another, namely, the Resolution of a Corrupt Will to yeeld unto it selfe all *Present Satisfaction*, and not to suffer it selfe to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a *Future Estate*: Insomuch that the small content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actuall fruition of some instant-conceited Good, prevailes more to draw on Appetite, then the fearfull Expectation of ensuing Misery, can to deterre from it. And the present irksomnesse of pious Duties, have

more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them, then the Fore-conceit of Eternall blisse can have to allure the minde unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appears, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith Reason is to propose any End or Meanes to the Will, that it may be desired; namely, *Sub Ratione Boni*, under the Condition of Good, not alwayes true and Moral, but sometimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved Uunderstanding, *Sub conceptu Convenientiæ*, as it bears Conformity to the present crooked Estate of mans Will: a *Depraved* Understanding I say, and not alwayes properly and precisely a *Darkned* Understanding; *Depraved* by Neglect and *Inconsiderablenesse*; not darkned by Ignorance and *Blindenesse*. For there may bee an Irregular Will with a Judgement rightly informed by Truth: Otherwise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider, that there is in a well-frayed *Reason*, a double Act in the directing of the *Will*; The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the *Object*; the other more peculiarly the Circumstance of *Time*; the one is properly *Knowledge*; the other *Circumspection*, arising out of Meditation, and more close pressing of the Object, which is knowne as Good to the Will, against Insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aime onely at the Fruition of pleasure *present*. First, the Understanding proposeth to the Will *Felicity*, as an Absolute and eternall *Good*, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth *means* for the attaining

of it; namely, the practise of these Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The *Will* being, besides its own Corruption, transported by the Sensitive Appetite, findes great Irksomnesse in those *means*. A restraint of all those present joyes, delights, satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to bee expected, many prejudices and difficulties to be grapled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraint to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the Minde, fewer inablements for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment; which withdraw the Will, & make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of Understanding, *Efficacy* and weight of *Consideration*, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the small time they shall continue; with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue there-from, and also with the unsufferable torments that follow the vileness of present pleasures. Whence the Will is made more inclinable (by the assistance of greater power then its owne) to go along rather through Thorns with Vertue, then with adulterate and painted pleasures to daunce towards ruine.

Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a *Blinded* Understanding; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Insufficiency

and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumſtances, and preſſing the endleſſe Conſequence of Good or Evil, workes properly a *Depraved* Underſtanding, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in ſome deep Contemplation by a Ditch; though his Eyes be open to ſee a preſent danger before him, yet may haply fall into it, not out of *Blindneſſe*, but out of *Inconſideratneſſe*, as not fixing his conceit thereon; but being wholly poſſeſſed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Underſtanding being taken up by the Impoſture of the Affections, with the conceit of *preſent Good*, or *preſent Ill* in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a ſerious Inquiry after the true Rectitude and Obliquity thereof, ſuffers the Will fearfully to plunge it ſelfe in danger and miſery.

Another Condition, under which an *End* or *Meanes* are to be propoſed by the Wil, is *Sub ratione Poſſibilis*, as a good *Poſſible*. For if once the Underſtanding diſcover Impoſſibility in any Object, the Will cannot faſten any deſire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can repleniſh and ſatiate the power. Now all Satisfaction is by Fruition; all Fruition neceſſarily preſuppoſeth a poſſibility of acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopeleſſe, and therefore Deſireleſſe; and therfore we ſee that the nearer any thing comes to Impoſſibility, the more averſe is the Will of moſt men from it: as is plaine in thoſe things that are perplexed and difficult to attaine. And if

here

here the wiſh of him in the Poet be objected:

O mihi præteritos referat ſi Iupiter annos.

O that *Iove* would me reſtore,
The yeares that I have liv'd before.

It may be anſwered that this was a Wiſh only, and not a Will. Since that which a man willeth, he doth really endeavour to obtaine.

The laſt Condition (which is reſtrained onely to the utmoſt end of mans deſire) is that it be propoſed, *Sub ratione Immortalis*, as an *Immortall Good*. The endleſneſſe of Happineſſe is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the mind of man naturally is carryed to an *Immortality* of *Being*; and therefore alſo conſequently to an *Immortality* of *Happineſſe*; it being a neceſſary Deſire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a perfection proportionate to the meaſure of their Continuance. So then mans End muſt not be only *Good*, but *for ever good*, *Totally* and *Eternally*: not only a Fulneſſe of *Ioy* in the *nature* of it; but a Fulneſſe of *Perpetuity* in the Continuance. Moſt *perfect* in proportion in the *Spirituality*; moſt *infinite* in proportion to the *Immortality* of mans Soule. The Frailty and Languiſhing of any Good, and a Fore-ſight of the loſſe thereof, with the ableſt Minds doth much weaken the Deſire of it. And the reaſon is, becauſe Providence and Forecaſt is a certaine companion of the humane Nature; and he which is moſt a man, is moſt carefull to con-

trive the advancement of his *Future* Estate. It is beastiall to fasten only upon *Present Good*; this being a maine difference between the Understanding and the Sensuall Appetite, that this respecteth only the present Joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its owne immortality, fastens it selfe upon the remotest times; yea out-runs all time, and suffers it selfe to bee ever swallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an endlesse Happinesse. And therefore the reason that *Aristotle* brings against his Master's *Ideas*, argues an Understanding lesse Divine in this particular then *Plato's* was, when he saith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, then Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any Essentiall part of *Goodnesse* in it self; yet it is a necessarie and principall condition to make Goodnesse *Happinesse*; that is an Adequat Object to mans desires; there is not then the same proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether Extrinsicall and Irrelative in respect of White; but the Happinesse of man hath an Intrinsicall Connection with Immortality; becaus mans Utmost and Adequate Good must be proportioned to the Nature of his Mind: (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way repleniſh and leave nothing behinde it that may be desired) So that man himselfe being Endlesse, can have none End able to limit his desires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which he may

Ethic. l. 1.

may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an Atheist in the world who hath in his life be beasted himself by setting his desires only on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his death-bead count it the best bargaine he ever made, to change soules with one of those whose diligence in providing for a future happinesse, he hath often in his beastly Sensuality impiously derided.

Now of these two directions of the Understanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the *Meanes*, then in the Discovery of the *End*, and far oftner failes the Will herein then in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same Supreme and Immortall Happinesse, the Beatificall Vision; Every *Balaam* fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any agreement in an end, where is such notable Discord in the wayes to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is the severall proportion, which the true End and the true Meanes thereunto beare unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there [illegible]ut one generall Hinderance or Errour about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect

fulfilling

fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion betweene man and the right meanes of a true End is far Greater. For there is not only Errour in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practick Faculties, proceeding from their generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Understanding, I observe therein a double Hinderance concerning these *Meanes*: *Ignorance* and *Weaknesse*; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the *Wil*. For the former of these, there seemes to bee an equall difficulty betweene the End and the Meanes, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is far more preventable (considering the Helpes we have to know it) then of the Meanes. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the *Meanes*, as of the *End*; but because they are in their *Number* many, and in their *Nature* repugnant to mans corrupt Minds. There is therefore more Wearinesse, & by consequence, more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, then after the *End*, because that is in it self but *One*; and besides, beares with it (under the generall Notion of *Happinesse*) such an absolute Conformity to mans Nature, as admits of no refusall or Opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.

Ignorantia & Difficultas. Aug.

Now

Now beſides this *Ignorance*, when the knowledge of the *meanes* is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exerciſe of them. For (as *Ariſtotle* obſerves) amongſt all the Conditions required to Morall Practice, *Knowledge* hath the leaſt ſway. It hath the loweſt place in Vertue, though the higheſt in Learning.

There is ſecondly in the Underſtanding *Weakneſſe*, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular Motion of the Will, and withdraws it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye, with an Impartiall and Bribeleſſe Judgement, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the ſeverall Paſſages of all our Actions, with all the preſent and conſequent Inconveniences of crooked courſes. It were a vaſt labour to runne over all the Oppoſitions, which vertuous meanes, leading to an Happy End, doe alwayes find in the ſeverall Faculties of man: how the Will it ſelfe is ſtubborne and froward; the Paſſions Rebellious, and Impatient of Suppreſſion; the Sences and Senſitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping alwayes like thoſe under-Cœleſtiall Orbs into another Motion, quite contrary to that which the *Primum Mobile*, Illightened Reaſon, ſhould conferre upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Diſproportion between the means of Happines, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodneſſe is neceſſarily adjoyned with Rectitude and Straightneſſe (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a *Good* man is

called an *Vpright* man; one that is every where Eeven and Strait. To which *Aristotle* perhaps had one Eye, when he called his Happy man, a *Foure-square* man, which is every where smooth, stable, and like himselfe. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a distorted and crooked Nature; and therefore altogether unconformable to the Goodnesse which should as a Canon, direct it to the true and principall End it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are Impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling movers necessarily require more liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in naturall Bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow bounds, as that which is Strait.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the Conſcience; its Offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, Watchfulneſſe, Memory, Impartiality. Of Conſciences Ignorant, Superſtitious, Licentious, Sleeping, Frightfull, Tempeſtuous.

THere remaines yet one higher and diviner Act of the Practicall Underſtanding, of moſt abſolute power in man, and that is *Conſcience*. Which is not any diſtinct Faculty of the Soule, but only a compounded Act of Reaſon, conſiſting in Argumentation; or a *practique Syllogiſme*, inferring alwayes ſome Applicative and Perſonall Concluſion, Accuſing or Excuſing.

The Dignities whereof are to be gathered from the Offices of it, and from the Properties of it.

The maine Offices are three; *Direction, Conviction, Conſolation*, whereof the two laſt alwayes preſuppoſe the firſt with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Obſervance.

The *Direction* of Conſcience conſiſts in a Simple Diſcourſe: or (as I may ſo ſpeake) in a *Direct Ray* of Underſtanding, gathering morall or divine Concluſions from a preſuppoſed habit

of Principles, either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally impreſt, or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts ſpiritually inſpired into the Practique Judgement or hearts of men. The obſervance of which Concluſions it impoſeth upon all thoſe Executive powers, which each particular Concluſion doth moſt immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our owne inward peace, with that ſweet repoſe and ſecurity of Mind which followes it; and alſo (as the Heathens themſelves have obſerved) upon feare of incurring the diſpleaſure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his penetrating and ſearching Eye is able to read our moſt retired Thoughts: ſo his impartiall and unpreventable Juſtice hath thunder and fire in ſtore for the Rebellions againſt this Faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and Herauld in all mens hearts.

The two latter of thoſe Offices conſiſt in a *Reflexion* of that former diſcourſe upon mens Actions, and according as is diſcovered in them, either an obſervance or neglect of thoſe impoſed Duties: the heate of that Reflection is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of theſe two, that of Conviction is nothing elſe but a performance of that Equivocall killing promiſe made by the Serpent to our ſeduced Parents; I meane an opening of their Eyes, to know with deſperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregone; and with feare, ſhame and horrour, the Evill

Evill which they plunged themſelves and their whole poſterity into. This one Act it is which hath ſo often confuted that Opinion of *Ariſtotle* touching Death, that it is of all things moſt terrible; in that it hath purſued many ſo farre, as that it hath forced them to leap out of themſelves, and to preferre the terrour of Death and Darkneſſe of the Grave, before the griſly Face of a convicting Conſcience.

The chiefe Dignity hereof conſiſteth in *Conſolation*, whereby it diffuſeth into the whole man, from a ſecret aſſurance of divine favour (for nothing can throughly calme the Conſcience, but that) a ſweet Tranquillity, ſilent Peace, ſetled Stayedneſſe, and which is higheſt of all, a Raviſhing Contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-fruition of Bliſſe and Immortality.

The properties of the Conſcience (whereby I underſtand the Miniſteries, which it never failes to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; *Watchfulneſſe*, *Memory*, *Impartiallity*. It keeps all always Sentinell in a mans Soul; and like a Regiſter, records all our good and ill actions. Though the Darkneſſe of the Night may hide us from others, and the Darkneſſe of the Mind ſeem to hide us from our ſelves; yet ſtill hath Conſcience an Eye to looke in ſecret on whatſoever we doe, whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardneſſe. Though in many men it ſleep in regard of Motion; yet it never ſleeps in regard of Obſervation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which ſeemes

Invisible and Illegible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of Gods judgement, will be most cleare. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastened in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indeleable Characters, never to be blotted out. All or most of our Knowledge forsakes us in our Deaths; Wit, Acuteneſſe, variety of Language, habits of Sciences; our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: only those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliturate and raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest; whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour. The Testimonies of Comfort (if true) are fastened in the Heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so hard, and they so deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or melting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.

Then thirdly, it is a most Bribeleſſe Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wayes. It is (if I may so speake) Gods Historian, that writes not Annals, but Journals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Houres and Moments: never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares

speake

ſpeake truth as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. *Nero* the Emperour ſhall feele as great a fire burning in his breaſt, as he dare wrap the poor Chriſtians in to light him to his Luſt. There is ſcarſe one part in man, but may be ſeduced, ſave his Conſcience. Senſe oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can tranſport the Will, and themſelves both may be drawn by perſwaſion contrary to their owne propenſions; this only deales faithfully with him, whoſe witneſſe it is, though it be to the confuſion of it ſelfe and him, in whom it lodgeth. It may I know erre ſometimes and miſtake; but it can never by any Inſinuation be bribed to contradict its owne Judgement, and regiſter White for Blacke.

The Corruption of Conſcience ariſes principally from two Extremes; the one occaſioned by *Ignorance*; the other by *Sinne* (for I oppoſe theſe two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conſcience after a different manner.) The one is when the want of due Knowledge drawes the Conſcience, to ſiniſter determinations, either in Practice or forbearance. The other when evill Habits and Actions defile the Conſcience. Now both theſe containe under them ſundry Degrees of Corruption.

From Ignorance, firſt comes a Fettered and Reſtrained Conſcience, fearfully binding it ſelfe to ſome particular Acts, without ſufficient grounds. Next a Licencious and Indulging Conſcience, giving Freedome to its ſelfe in ſuch courſes,

course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it selfe from either.

Then from the other Root there comes: First, a *Dead*, Secure and Sleeping Conscience by Common and Customary Sins. A *Pale*, Sweating, and Affrighted Conscience by Atheisticall and Unnaturall Sins.

—— Tum frigida mens est
Criminibus; tacitâ sudant præcordia culpa.

The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs,
Cold-sweating Horrour on their bosome brings.

A *Desperate*, Tempestuous and Ravening Conscience from blasphemous and open Sins. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne; but that the Quality of some sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered Conscience; but because all these, as also this whole discourse pertaines to a higher Science, I shall here forbeare to speake more of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Electing of Meanes to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perswasive. Of Fate, Astrologie, Satanicall Suggestions. Of the manner of the Wils Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Conclusion.

I Proceed to the last Faculty of mans Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate, and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar Perfections; *Appetite*, *Liberty*, *Domination*. The former respecteth an *End*; the two latter, the *Means* thereunto conducing. The *Desires* are fixed on some *Good* throughly proportionate to the wideneſse of the Heart: then the *Liberty* of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Judgement, makes choise of such Means, as are most proper for attaining of that Good: and lastly, the *Dominion* imployes all inferiour Faculties for the speedy Execution of those Means.

Arist. Ethic. l. 1. c. 1. Lib. 8. c. 5.

Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditionall occasions: but the true *Vltimate*, utmost, and *Absolute* Good is *God*. All other Ends are *Ministring* and *Subordinate*; hee only is κυριώτατον & ἀρχιτεκτονικὸν, as *Aristotle* cals his Felicity, the *Supreme* and over-ruling End; the Fountaine of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that scantling of satisfaction and proportion, which they bear unto mans will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him *Bonum & Bonum Supereſſentiale*, the only Self-sustaining, and Self-depending Good, that is only able throughly to satiate and repleniſh the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

Ethic. l. 1. c. 2.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two extremes of Exceſſe and Defect. The extremes of Exceſſe are *Superstition* and *Idolatry*; a worshipping of false gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceeds from the confused mixture of Originall Blindneſſe, with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter gives us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypotheſis, who that God is, with the circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of Darkneſſe and unavoydable Doubting and Uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the *Neceſſity* of a Duty; but not to cleere the *Meanes* of Execution. Light enough to enjoy a walking; but the way being a narrow way.

way, is on every ſide hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Defect, is either *Atheiſme*, in not acknowledging, or *Ignorance* in not ſeeing, that God whom we ought to ſerve and deſire. Both which (if *Affected* and Voluntary, as uſually they are) proceed either from Guilt, or a *Conſciouſneſſe* of fearefull Crimes, which make men ſtudy to flatter their diſtracted ſpirits in the perſwaſion that no Judge ſees them; or elſe from a Senſuality and a *Deſire* and purpoſe to give *Indulgence* to themſelves in their civill courſes; thinking like that fooliſh Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no ſnare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but ſeiled up, and their heads thruſt into the hedge of their own darkneſſe: Though herein both the Atheiſts diſcovers Divinity, and the Ignorant perſon Knowledge enough to convince their owne Conſciences, and condemne themſelves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of *Liberty*, conſiſteth in the Freedome which it hath to chuſe or reject Means ordained for the Compaſſing ſome propoſed End, according as the Underſtanding ſhall find them more or leſſe conducible for the attainment of it. It is, I ſay, a chuſing of the Meanes: For Election (as *Ariſtotle* determines) is never of the End. We doe not *chuſe*, but *neceſſarily Deſire* to be happy. The matter of our Happineſſe being propoſed without appearance of preſent inconveniencie: becauſe every thing is naturally prone to its owne Perfection, where there are no intervenient diſcommodities

Ἐλευθέρα ἐξουσία αὐτοκρατίας. *Zeno apud Laers. l. 6. Unde Stoici Sapientes, Reges appellabant.* *Ibid. Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.*

to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sinne: So wee may conclude of the Will, it shall in the state of Glory, (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect Liberty: Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and unnaturalnesse. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite depraved, being now in Corruption; without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, throughly disinabled from seeking means, which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and inthralled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolated, only in Naturall, Morall, and in Civill Actions; Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeleble Foot-prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its owne and others Temporall Good.

The *Dominion* and Supreme Command of the Will is only over those Powers, to the production of whose Operations, it doth by its immediate Authority concurre as an *Absolute Efficient*, or at least, as a *Moving Agent*. It teacheth not therefore so farre as to the command of the *Vegetative* Power: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the vege-

vegetative faculties, wch were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither teacheth it to an universall Command of the *Senses*; but only by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Soveraigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing not immediately, but by the *Locomotive Power*, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the *Sensitive Appetite*, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy, irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will, and the Law of the Members carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Soveraigne over those Apprehensions of the *Understanding*, which depends on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it not to discourse about such Objects, and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive; The one is Absolute, working on meere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditionall, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an *Oeconomicall* Government in respect of the body, and the Moving Organs thereof, as over *Servants*: and it hath a *Politique* or Civill Government towards

Arist. Polit. l. 1. c. 5.

towards the *Understanding*, *Affection*, and *Sensitive Appetite*, as *subjects*, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditious and rebellious subjects. So that the corruption of this Power in the Will, is either *Tyranny* in it selfe, or *Usurpation* in another; An abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The *Abuse*, when the Will absolutely gainsayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Understanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Inticing, and Insinuation of the *Sensitive Appetite*, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of these courses, which are most delightfull to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soul become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny over-beares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot doe the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to flie, yet falleth downe againe.

Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion: there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only, *ab Extrinseco*, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme

swaying

swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion and flux of causes, which they call *Fate*. Astrologers understanding by Fate nothing but the Uniforme and Unchangable working of those beautiful Bodies, the heavenly Orbs and their Influencies upon inferiours, annexed unto them a binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practises of men. Enquire the reason why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses?

Laert. in Zen. Plut. de placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 27, 28. Sen. Ep. 96. A. Gel. l. 6. c. 2.

Anne aliud, quàm ——————
Sydus, & occulti miranda potentia Fati?

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,
And wondrous power of secret Destiny.

It is not to be denyed, but that the Heavens having strong and powerfull Operations on all sublunary Corporall Substances may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kind of Influence (if it may be so called) upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. Wee doe not only impiously take away the *Guilt* of Sinne; in that we make all mens Lapses

Vid. Euseb. Cæsarien. de præparat. Evang. lib. 6. & Max. Tyrium disser. 3. Plut. adver. Stoicas. Tertul. Apol. c. 1. & ibi notas Herald. Aug. de Civ. Dei, l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8

Lapses to be wrought without free Principle in himselfe (and so derogate from the Justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were by other of his Creatures unavoydably determined) not only rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those vertuous dispositions of the Mind (which are his immediate Breathings into man) unto the happy Aspect of the Heavens, but withall we deny to the Soule both Naturall Motion and Spirituality. *Naturall Motion* first; since that alwayes flowes from an *Inward Principle*, that is Essentiall to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression made by some Extrinsicall Worker. And then *Spirituality* likewise; since the Heavens, being Corporall Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther then over Bodily Substances.

Ἐξ ἡμέων ἄρχεσθ' καὶ' ἡμεῖναι ὐς σὺ ἐξ αὐτοὶ σφῶν ἀπεδαλίσειν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἀλγὶ ἔχωσιν. *Homer. Odyss. a.*

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seeke to fasten all the Corruptions of their Wils on something above the Heavens, even the Eternall Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the Sunne will rise; or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause-working Necessity of the next Day, or the last Judgement. It is true indeed, *Gods prescience* implyes a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknows: but this is *Necessitas* only *Infallibilitatis*, in regard of his undeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to passe by the free

free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not *Neceſſitas Coactionis*, or *Determinationis*, whereby the VVill of man is without any other diſpoſition or propenſion in it ſelf, inforced or unſpontaneouſly determined to the producing of ſuch Effects. The Actions of our VVill are not therefore neceſſarily executed, becauſe they were foreknown; but therefore they were foreknowne, becauſe our will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedome and Election. And for Providence, notwithſtanding there be *Providentia Permiſſiva*, whereby God hath determined to ſuffer and permit men to ſinne; and moreover a *Diſpoſing Providence* in Ordering all things in the VVorld unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not preſume to think that God doth determine, or actuate, impell, and overrule the wils of men to Evill. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all reſpects doth will ſhall not be done with the ſecret VVill of his good pleaſure (for who can withſtand his VVill) and that his purpoſes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet he doth not ſo worke his VVill out of mens, as thereby to conſtraine and take away theirs (for indeed the conſtraint of a liberall and Free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof) This were an Argument of VVeakneſſe, as if hee were not able to bring his owne Ends about, but by chaining and fettering his oppugners from exerciſing the Freedome which he firſt gave them; nor doe his owne VVill, but by taking away his owne Gifts. But herein

Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 11. c. 17. 18. l. 14. c. 26. Lib. de contin. c. 6. de Corrept. & Grat. c. 10. Epiſt. 120. Cap. 2. de Gen. Contr. Manich. l. 2. c. 28. De Gen. ad lit. l. 11. c. 4. De Trin. l. 3. c. 4. Octoginta triumque. q. 21.

Vid. Euſeb. de Præparat. Evang l. 6. c. 6.

herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, and the great Wisdome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his owne heart, and that even Rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his owne Glory (the End whether we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods *Revealed Will* is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keepe it: so alwayes his *Secret Will* is performed, Even by the free and Selfe-mooving Operations of those who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any Supreme Destiny Extrinsecally moving, or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particular Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casuall Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the Intrinsecall Operation of all Inferiour Agents (which we call Nature) produce one maine and Supreme End, without strayning or violating the proper Motions of any.

Cyrill. Alex. contra Jul. l. 4.

Hinc etiam quod faciunt contra voluntatem Dei, non impletur, nisi voluntas Dei. Aug. de præd. Sanct. l. 1. c. 16.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their sinnes upon the motions of Satan, as if hee brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and as Saint *Paul* said in Faith, *Not I, but sinne in me*: So they in Hypocrisie, *Not I, but evill motions cast into me*; and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill cometh not

Rom. 7. 17.

Matth. 4. 3.

not from any Willingneſſe in themſelves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a ſtrong Operation on the Wils of Corrupt men,

1 Firſt, becauſe of the *Subtilty* of his *Subſtance*, whereby he can wind himſelfe and his ſuggeſtions moſt inwardly on the Affections and Vnderſtanding.

2 Secondly, becauſe of the *Height* of his Naturall *Vnderſtanding* and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himſelfe into an *Angel of light*, and ſo to method and contrive his devices, that they ſhall not m iſſe of the beſt advantage to make them ſpeed.

3 Thirdly, becauſe of the vaſtneſſe of his *Experience*, whereby he is the better enabled to uſe ſuch plots as have formerly had the beſt ſucceſſe.

4 Fourthly, becauſe of his manner of Working, grounded on all theſe, which is *Violent* and Furious for the ſtrength, and therefore he is called a *Strong Man*, a *Roaring Lyon*, a *Red Dragon*; & *Deep* for the ſubtilty of it, and therefore his working is called a *Myſtery of Iniquity*, and *Deceivableneſſe of Iniquity*. Which is ſeen, Firſt in his *Accommodating* himſelfe to our particular Humours and *Natures*, and ſo following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Tempations according to our *Vocations* and Perſonall Imploiments, by changing, or mixing, or ſuſpending, or preſſing, or any other the like qualifying of his Suggeſtions, according as he ſhall find agreeable to all other Circumſtances. But yet wee doe not

Luke 11.21.
1 *Pet.* 5.8.
Rev. 12.3.
2 *Theſ.* 2.7.
Heb. 3.13.
Rom. 7.11.

find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the arts that are used to the inveagling of it. The working then of Evill *Angels*, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a *Prince* over his Subjects, or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may well stand with the Freedome of mans Will. And therefore his temptations are in some places called the *methods*, in others, the *Devices*; in others the *Snares* of Satan: All words of Circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own VVils: Though then Satan have in a notable manner the name of Tempter belonging unto him; yet we are told in another place, that* *Every man is tempted, when he is drawne away of his own Concupiscence, and inticed.* So that the Devill hath never an effectuall Temptation (such an one as carryes and overcomes the VVill) but it is alwayes joyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the deceitfulnesse of our owne lusts. So that in this case every man may say to himself, as *Apollodorus* in *Plutarch* dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I will but name. As first for the *manner* of its Operations. In some cases it worketh *Naturally* and *Necessarily*, as in its Inclination unto *Good* in the whole latitude, and generall

Eph 6.11. *Eph*.7.2. 2 *Tim*.2.26. *Eph*.6,11. 2 *Cor*.2.11. 2 *Tim*.2.26.

* *James* 1,14. *Vitii Author Diaboli decipientis Calliditas & Hominis Consentientis voluntas. Aug*.*de peccat. Orig*.*l*.2 *c*.37.

Lib.*de Sacrâ numinis vindict.*

rall apprehenſion thereof. For it cannot will any thing under the generall and formall notion of Evill. In others *Voluntarily* from it ſelf, and with a diſtinct view and *knowledge* of an End wherunto it worketh. In others *freely*, with a *Liberty* to one thing or another, with a power to elicite, or to ſuſpend and ſuppreſſe its owne Operation. In all *Spontaneouſly*, without violence or compulſion: For though in ſome repects the Will be not free from *Neceſſity*, yet it is in all free from *Coaction*, And therefore though *Ignorance* & *Fear* may take away the complete *Voluntarineſſe* of an Action proceeding from the Will (becauſe without ſuch Feare or Ignorance it would not have been done; As when a man caſteth his goods into the Sea to eſcape a ſhipwrack; And when *Oedipus* ſlew *Laius* his Father, not knowing him ſo to be) yet they can never force the Will to doe that out of violence, which is not repreſented under ſome notion of *Good* thereunto.

Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.

Secondly for the *Motives* of the *Will*; They are firſt Naturall and *Internall*. Amongſt which, the *Vnderſtanding* is the principall, which doth paſſe Judgement upon the *Goodneſſe* & Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater or leſſer excellency thereof, repreſent it to the Will, with either a *Mandatory*, or a *Monitory*, or a *permiſſive* Sentence. The *Will* likewiſe doth move it ſelf. For by an *Antecedent* willing of the *End*, ſhe ſetteth her ſelf on work to will the *Means* requiſite unto the obtaining of that End.

And the *Senſitive Appetite* doth *Indirectly* move

it too, By suppressing or betwiching and inticing the Judgment to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse: so such as a mans owne Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next *Supernaturally God* moveth the *Wills* of men, Not onely regard of the *Matter* of the Motion: For *in him we live, & move, & have our being*; but in regard of the *Rectitude* and Goodnesse of it in Actions Supernaturall, both by the *Manifestation* of Heavenly Light, *They shall be all taught of God*; and by the *Infusion* and Impression of Spirituall *Grace*, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to Will and to Do of his owne pleasure.

Lastly, for the *Acts* of the *Will*, They are such as respect either the *End* or the *Meanes* for attaining of it. The Acts respecting the End are these three. 1. A *Loving* and Desiring of it in regard of its beauty and goodnesse. 2. A serious *Intention* and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its *distance* from us. 3. A *Fruition* or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two things. In *Assecution* or possession, whereby we are actually joyned unto it: and in *Delectation* or Rest, whereby we take speciall pleasure in it.

The Acts of the Will respecting the *Meanes*, are these. 1. an act of *Using* or Imploying the Practicall Iudgement, an application and Exercising of it to consult & debate the proper meanes conducible unto the End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practicall Iudgement, a Repre-

Repreſentation being made of the Means diſcovered, there next followeth an embracing of thoſe meanes, and inclining towards them with a double Act; The one an act of *Conſent*, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as *proper* and *poſſible*: the other an Act of *Election*, whereby, according to the different weight of Reaſons, we adhere unto one *Medium* more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more fecible. Thirdly, becauſe the means do not bring us unto the End by being *Choſen*, but by being *Executed*. Hereupon followeth another Act of *Mandate* to all the Faculties interreſted in the Execution of thoſe means, to apply and put forth their Forces with vigor and conſtancy, till the End be at the laſt by the due Execution of thoſe meanes attained and enjoyed.

Now whereas the Philoſopher doth often diſtribute the things belonging unto the *Soule*, into *Affections*, *Faculties* and *Habits*; For the *Faculties* are moved bv the *Paſſions*, & the *Paſſions* are regulated and managed by the *Habits*; The *Habits* procured for Facility and conſtancy of *Action*, and the *Actions* directed to the obtaining of an *End*: This Method of the Philoſopher would now lead us to ſpeake further,

Ethic. l. 2. c. 6.
Idem l. 2. c. 2.

Firſt of the *Habits* of the Reaſonable Soule, and they are either *Rationall* only, and in the *Mind*, as the Habits of Wiſedome, of Principles, of Concluſions, of art and Prudence; or beſides that *Vertuous* and Vicious, converſant about Good or Evill *Morall*. Which are firſt the *Habits* of *Practicall Principles*, called *Syntereſis*, and next the *Habits*

bits of *particular Vertues*, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Unto the fælicity of all which are required these four conditions,

1 *Justice* and *Rectitude*, disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right we owe unto them.

2 *Prudence*, discovering that which is in this manner *Right*, Iudging of it, and directing unto it.

3 *Fortitude*, enabling the Will firmely to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of Practical prudence, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delaies it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 *Temperance*, suppressing and subduing those Sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant Resolutions.

Next, because all *Habits*, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of *Actions*, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of *Humane Actions*, *Fortuitous*, *Violent*, *Natural*, *Voluntary*, *Involuntary*, *Mixed*; As also, to the grounds of the *Goodnes* or *Ilnes* of *Actions*, taken first from the *Rule* of them unto which they are to conforme. Secondly, from the *Principles* of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, *Knowledge* and Faith to see, *Will* to purpose, *Love* to do,

Subjection

ſubjection, to obey ſtrength, to finiſh and fulfill what Vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and meaſure of their perfection. And laſtly, from the ends unto which they ſhould be directed. By which conſideration, we ſhould be led to take a view of the right end, and *ultimate felicity*, unto which all theſe actions ſhould leade and carrie us; not as the cauſes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But theſe pertaining to a nobler Science, and being without the limits of the *Subject* which I propoſed to ſpeak of, I ſhall follow *Pliny*'s counſell, and look back to the Title of my Book; which having (as well as my weakneſſe was able) endeavoured to go thorow, it now cals upon me to go no further.

FINIS.